If one wishes to begin to form some sort of image in their mind of what the nature of nature might be, one must begin to think of the substrate as a continuity of wave forms as opposed to particles separated by .... what? — Rich

The problem, as I said already, is that I think of a wave as a bunch of particles interacting in a certain way which produces the form of a wave, like a sound wave, or a wave in water. So there is no such thing as thinking of "wave forms as opposed to particles" because a wave form is a form that a group of particles has.

There are no points and there are no boundaries. — Rich

How could there be a wave form without points and boundaries?

I have to say this, but such a description is anachronistic Newtonian. While I don't agree with Whitehead's analysis, on the basis of quantum mechanics and his own studies of Bergson, he did endeavor to eliminate the notions of particles and space and such and replace it with processes (activities). One way to think of electrons are as wave perturbations (large amplitudes). Such electrons do not occupy a definite space or time but are in constant in and out flux. This marries well with current understanding of particle theory. — Rich

You may utilize wave analogies to describe things like electrons, as "wave-like", but that doesn't change what a wave is. A "wave" still abides by the same description, despite that description being anachronistic Newtonian. But it is wrong to refer wave-like things as an example of what a wave is, because these things aren't waves, they simply have some wave-like characteristics..

There is a difference between continuity of substantiality and boundary. A wave is continuous with no point of demarcation. — Rich

But "wave" refers to an activity of a substance, and that substance must consist of particles, and space between the particles in order that the wave can move. So the concept of a wave requires a duality of substance and space and a necessary boundary between these two. The wave itself may be described as continuous (assuming that it has no point of origin or completion), but the medium in which the wave exists cannot be continuous.

I've been thinking a lot about your pointilism problem, and it seems like an easy fix. First, here's what I think the problem is. Between each interval there are an infinite amount of intervals. So 0.9 can become 0.99 can become 0.999 but never reach one. In a nut shell is that it? That an infinite amount of time would be required to transverse the infinite number of intervals? — MikeL

That's not exactly the problem, but it's an acceptable analogy. In theory, if two points are separate then there is an infinite number of points between them. In practise it is impossible to measure an infinite number of points. So as you point out there is a discrepancy between the way things are in theory and the way thing are in practise. That, I believe is your rendition.

If so, the easy fix would be to make time a quanta. Give it a fixed value, then you can summate it.
Yes? No? — MikeL

I don't think that this solves the problem because you would then say that a quantum of time passes, and value this quantum according to some physical change. But unless such a valuation could be supported by some real evidence, of real quanta of change, it would be purely arbitrary. So within each quantum of change, there would still be continuous change occurring which would have to be accounted for by some other means, and the states referred to at each point, constituting the quanta, would be completely arbitrary and artificial.

So for instance, suppose the motion or change which we are quantifying is my breathing. We could arbitrarily assume that each time I completely inhale, this constitute one quantum of change. So we have a series of states, at each point my lungs are full, and this repetition of similar states validates the assumption of the arbitrarily determined one quantum. However, we still have all the intermediary activity, and all the possible definable states in between these arbitrary designated points.

So any time we give time a fixed value like that, say X amount of time is equivalent to Y oscillation, it is an arbitrary quantum of time which is artificially designated. within that quantum there is still change occurring, and therefore time passing. Unless you can empirically determine that there is state, then no physical change for a certain period of time, followed by a different state, with no activity between, you have no empirical support for the assumption of a quantum of time. In other words, the assumption of a quantum of time is completely arbitrary and useless unless it is supported by physical evidence of such. But so far, it appears like physical evidence points to a continuous time like Rich argues for.

The logic indicates a need for quantized time, but until the evidence is provided for real physical quanta of time, any such designation is purely arbitrary and useful only according to the purposes for which it assigned (my breathing for example), and not representative of any real quanta.

There is no boundary here. There is a gradual and not so gradual fall off in substantiality or compactness if energy. Food moves from substantial to unsubstantial via the digestive process which begins with the bite. What is left behind is still embedded in the energetic universe that surrounds us. It is a continues flow like a cloud forming rain (insubstantial to substantial) and the rain then melting into the ground. Never a hard boundary in this process of conversion. — Rich

A gradual boundary is still a boundary, and I think you are speaking nonsense calling this a "compactness" of energy. The energy cannot be compacted unless something compacts it, and this would be the boundary.

I think the root issue of the OP is not about discrete vs continuous motion per se, rather it is motion itself - and I think MikeL has sort of acknowledged that. It's something that "bothers" me from time to time - the way I phrase it is "what the heck is the difference between two objects that move differently besides the motion itself?" Psychologically speaking, it seems that there should be some way of knowing the velocity of an object (moving in an inertial reference frame, for the sake of simplifying) by isolating the object and getting "intrinsic" information from it. This "information" would represent a "cause" of the motion. The object moving in space would be the "effect". — Jake Tarragon

I agree that the inertial information concerning an object is the information which is intrinsic to that object, but ironically this is the information which relates the object to its environment. So by describing in completion, the surroundings of the object, we actual provide a complete description of the object itself, and this is its spatial-temporal reality. We can conclude that this information exists within the object, as the object itself, or that the object actually is the information which describes its surroundings.

But that leaves us with the question of "in what form does this information really exist?". If we say that it exists as the object, we are just going around in circles. So we must plunge further into the object itself, until we have reduced it as near as possible to a non-dimensional point (apokrisis will deride this as reductionism) and then determine what is at this point. What is at this point is the same thing as "a description of its surroundings" but what is that?

Symbolism is not required to observe. What is required is memory of the observation. — Rich

Since the memory, is not the occurrence itself, then the memory is a symbol of the occurrence and memory is symbolism.

However, I think the issue of thinking about the mysteries of inertial motion could perhaps be fruitful to science - it's a "boundary" issue between science and philosophy, I would say. — Jake Tarragon

I agree, and believe there are many such boundary issues. Resolution of these issues requires speculation and hypotheses (philosophy), as well as empirical trials (science). The nature of time, and the issue of continuous versus discrete motion, which MikeL appears interested in, is one such key issue.

The future is an image in memory (the past) of some possible actions (Bergson's virtual actions). — Rich

How can the future be in the memory? That doesn't make sense.

The boundary is a cloud. — Rich

But a boundary doesn't have to exist as a non-dimensional line, X on one side, Y on the other. Such a boundary would be unreal, artificial, because it would consist of nothing but an ideal. A real boundary between X and Y would consist of something which is neither X nor Y, but prevents the two from mixing. The piece of fruit, does not mix with the surrounding air to become a homogenous thing because the chemistry of these two keeps them separate. So "the chemistry" whatever that refers to, is neither the fruit nor the air, but is something else, the boundary which prevents the two from mixing.

For the time being though: Motion is relative, which is a good thing, because on both arrows I placed a tracker that is recording all the atomic information of the arrow. To the tracker the arrows are not in motion. The tracker is beaming information to a teleporter which through the trackers activates the teleportation of both arrows. When they materialise at the new destination I suspect the arrow in motion will continue to fly while the other won't. Is this a feasible work around for the pointilism vs continuous problem of time? If so, how can we account for the movement of the arrow in flight, or do you think they will both drop lifelessly to the ground? — MikeL

Let me see if I understand what you're asking. You have assumed a teleporter which positions the arrows at a particular place at each moment of time. One arrow would be positioned at each moment so as to appear as a continuous flight through the air, and the other arrow would be positioned so as to be dropping to the ground without any forward momentum. So you have described discrete, non-continuous motion. The arrows appear like still-frames at each moment of time, which give the illusion of continuous motion.

The still-frame of the arrow in its position constitutes a moment in time when the physical world exists in such and such a state. Between each moment in time, the teleporter is active preparing the next physical position of the arrow. So time is passing because the teleporter is active but no physical activity is occurring. The teleporter behind the scenes is active so time must be passing, yet no physical change is occurring. This activity of the teleporter constitutes continuous time, but the arrow only has physical existence at one moment and the next.

If I understand then, your question is how does the arrow get from one point to the next.

That was Newton's very great genius. He knew what to leave out when everyone else - like Aristotle or Descartes - was saying you couldn't possibly. — apokrisis

The op is a question concerning what is left out. Sure you can say that as long as you can predict what will happen, it doesn't matter how it happened, but prediction does not provide an understanding of what is happening, and philosophers want to understand. Ancient people using mathematics could predict where on the horizon the sun would rise and set each day, as well as many things concerning the motions of the moon and planets, but they did not understand these motions. Modern physicists using mathematics can predict many things concerning the motions of electrons and photons, but they do not understand these motions.

It is this very attitude which you refer to, the attitude of leaving things out, because predictions can be made without resolving these little paradoxes, which moves us forward into a realm of misunderstanding and self-deception. It is self-deception because some believe that because predictions can be made, the phenomenon is understood, and others such as yourself seem to believe that understanding the phenomenon is unimportant so long as predictions can be made. But the philosophical spirit does not stop with the pragmatic of making predictions, it is the desire to understand. So things which appear as unimportant to the pragmatist, which one might be inclined to "leave out", are very important to the philosopher, because unraveling these little problems, these little paradoxes, is like working on a little puzzle which hides the mysteries of the universe.

Sharing it ideas is helpful in providing direction and clue, but ultimately one must rely on direct observation and intuition. This is how the Daoists accumulated their vast knowledge. Without direct experience too much is lost including that which cannot be communicated in any fashion and certainly b not via words or math. — Rich

But observation is dependent on words. To observe is to "notice", or take note of what is happening. This implies a description of what occurs. We can remember what has happened with mental images, but this is not very useful toward knowledge. So the capacity to accumulate vast knowledge relies on the power of description, which is a use of words.

And, I would go even further, to say "that which cannot be communicated in any fashion" cannot be understood. It is a necessary requirement of understanding, to be able to put what is understood into words. If you cannot put it into words, you do not understand it. And this points to the issue which apokrisis brings up with mathematics. Apokrisis seems to think that to model a phenomenon with mathematics such that predictions can be made, is all that is required in order to understand that phenomenon. I disagree because the things which the mathematical model leaves out are critical to understanding.

I agree that the subjective element, the direct observation and intuition which you refer to, is the most fundamental, because it is always an individual being who knows and understands. But referring back to the individual is inconsistent with your fundamental principle that there is no boundaries and therefore no individuals. The individual person's ability to understand the complexities of physical processes is capacitated by what is derived from others, communicated. We always build upon existing principles.

No such division exists. It is a continuum. The division is artificial since duration continues without interruption. Call it b what you wish, it is all arbitrary with no hard boundary. It is for this reason that any symbolic approach will utterly fail and the search for truth and facts will equally fail. All is in continuous flux and cannot be frozen. You can try but then the infinities and infinitesimals will start popping up all over. — Rich

Are you claiming that the present, as the division between future and past, is an artificial division? How do you account for the fact that what has happened has happened, and cannot be changed, yet things which have not yet happened can be prevented from happening, or induced to happen? According to your direct observation and intuition, which seems to be of the utmost importance to you, do you not notice that there is a very real, and non-artificial division between past and future? I think your claim that "duration continues without interruption", and that time is a continuum, is what is artificial. because our direct observation and intuition tells us that time is a divide between past and future. How could such a division be a continuum?

Try finding the boundary between the fruit, you, and the universe. Impossible. But keep trying. — Rich

I have no problem finding a boundary between the fruit and the rest of the universe. This boundary is what allows me to pick up the fruit and move it this way and that way, in relation to other things. It exists as a separate and distinct entity and therefore must have a boundary or else I could not move it in this way as a separate entity. What is impossible, and untenable, is your claim that this boundary does not exist. Such a boundary must exist or else I could not move the fruit in that way, as an individual entity. What do you think you see when you see an object? Are you not seeing a boundary?

Ontology describes what is and how one derives knowledge varies. — Rich

We derive knowledge from others, so our principles of communication dictate how we derive knowledge.

Science at times may require divisibility for practical problem solutions, but such efforts have nothing to do with the ontological underpinnings. — Rich

This is not true, because "what is", which is what you describe as the ontological underpinnings, is itself a division. It is a division between what has been (past) and what may be (future). So this point in time, which we call the present, which is also a necessary assumption to support the idea of "what is", and the basis for ontology, has "division" inherent within as the divider. Since division is inherent within the ontological underpinnings, then what is implied by this is that divisibility is an essential aspect of reality. In order that reality is actually divided, as it is between past and future, it is necessary that it is divisible.

The universe is indivisible, but humans, for various practical reasons have developed symbolic representations that can be manipulated as if it was divisible. There are no boundaries between this and that. It is a complete continuum. There is no such thing as the beginning and end of something. — Rich

This is an assertion which is totally unfounded. As I explained, reality is fundamentally divided between past and future. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that there are boundaries between things, and this is what allows me to pick up some food and eat it without eating the entire universe. Your claim of "no boundaries" is completely untenable.

You are confusing a problem of maths with a problem of reality. Calculations break down when they arrive at a singularity - a point of circular self-reference. But that's just calculations for you. Don't conflate the map with the territory. — apokrisis

If mathematics is what we apply to reality in an attempt to understand it, and there is a problem with the mathematics which renders the reality incomprehensible, then there is a problem with the conceptual scheme. That's what I was saying, there is a problem with the way that we conceptualize these things. I wasn't saying that this is a problem of reality, whatever that might mean.

I do not believe it is possible possible to develop an ontologically sound metaphysics that is premised on divisibility of duration and motion. It's a brick wall and you are inviting in all kinds of problems, infinities, infinitesimals, and paradoxes, etc. But as an exercise, go for it. Learning is by doing. — Rich

The problem is, that to have an ontology which has the capacity to act as the basis of an epistemology, it is required that the ontology is premised on the divisibility of duration and motion, contrary to what you state here.

This is what you say in the prior post:

The mind divides motion for practical purposes which is why the mind invented symbolic representations. It is a way of freezing so multiple minds can share. — Rich

The multiple minds sharing which you refer to, is justification, which is essential to knowledge. So the problem you have here is that the cut and dried divisions, and static states of descriptions, which are required by the fundamental laws of logic, in order that we can have such a thing as knowledge, are exactly what you claim are a "brick wall" to an ontologically sound metaphysics.

Now you need to face the fact that either there is something fundamentally wrong with the laws of logic, by which we describe things, or there is something fundamentally wrong with your assertion that the divisibility of duration and motion is ontologically unsound.

Nothing about the driving force of evolution, i.e. genetic variation and natural selection, requires a designer. — Arkady

If genetic variation is in any way random, as they say, then it - like any other random event - requires a designer.

Remember that the maths was developed to deal with idealised point objects. So the Zeno-style paradox of jumping to the first next point to get moving is an artefact of that maths. — apokrisis

The problem applies to the movement of any object. If the object is at rest, then accelerates, there must be infinite acceleration in this time period. What this indicates is that this interaction cannot be properly accounted for with this conceptual scheme. Even if we theoretically break the object down into fundamental particles, the problem persists because it is inherent within the concept of energy.

Energy is conceptualized as the property of an object related to its existence in space and time. That energy transfers from one object to another is evident. How energy transfers from one object to another is an unresolvable problem. This indicates that the concept of energy is deficient, inadequate for a complete understanding of an object's existence in space and time, because it leaves us with an unresolvable problem.

If we took the arrow in flight analogy. I do want to freeze frame it, just like the paradox. But I want to swap it out for an arrow that is not in flight:One that I pull out of my quiver. When I release time again, the swapped out arrow will drop lifelessly to the ground while the in flight arrow will continue its flight. — MikeL

This is a good representation of the problem. If you "freeze frame" the moving object, you assume a point in time where the object is at X location. But this assumption automatically denies that time is continuous. The two are incompatible premises. If there are points in time then time is not continuous.

Energy is a property which is based in the premise of a continuous time. So if you assume a point in time when you might switch out the arrows, you also deny the applicability of the concept of energy. This allows you to claim, in your example, that you have robbed the arrow of its energy, invisibly switching it for one with no energy. By saying that you could "freeze frame" time, you've rendered the concept of energy inapplicable.

As both arrows are identical in appearance, it is my contention that the difference between the two arrows must have to do with a difference in the energy fields of the atoms within the arrow. Could it be that an asymmetry in the energy field of an atom (pulling all the energy fields in a singular direction like a magnet) is creating the motion. — MikeL

The difference between the two arrows can be very simply understood now. The flying arrow is conceptualized as existing in a continuous time, and the evidence for this is the claim that it has energy. The arrow which you replace it with is conceptualized as existing in a time which consists of points, i.e. it is not continuous. The freeze framing of time is the premise which allows you to bring in that arrow. So the difference is that one is conceptualized as existing in a continuous time while the other is conceptualized as existing in a non-continuous time.

If we can accept this assumption then we can elaborate on it further to say, an initial change in the direction of the energy field creates acceleration. The restoration of the energy field thereafter maintains a velocity at the point of release, a further tug will cause further acceleration.

That being said, I can envisage a futuristic programmer typing a value and direction of the energy field into an object and causing it to spontaneously leap into a state of acceleration. — MikeL

The problem cannot be resolved in this way because you now utilize two distinct, and contradictorily incompatible concepts of time, one which conceives of time as continuous and the other which allows for points in time.

If we adhere to the idea that time is continuous, allowing for the concept of energy, then we must dismiss the idea that the energy passes from one object to another at a point in time because there are no points in this continuous time. So this must occur over a period of time. But this will reduce our capacity to conceive of energy as the property of objects. That is because if energy is transferred from object A to object B in such a transaction, we must now assume a time period when the energy is neither the property of object A, nor the property of object B.

It appears like the difficulty may be due to our conceptualization of "objects", so we reduce the problem by assuming parts of the object, and allow that in the period of time when energy is transferring from A to B it is the property of the parts of the object. But this does not resolve the problem because each part is itself an object which is subject to the same unresolvable problem. So the problem is really intrinsic to how we conceive of time and energy.

I guess I am wondering if there is a way to internally change the atomic energy configuration of a stationary object so that it suddenly acquires velocity or acceleration. I mean, the falling baseball is in an energy field created by gravity, but what has that energy field done to the ball to cause it to move? Has it dragged the own energy fields of the atoms in the ball assymetrically, thus giving directionality to the atoms and creating movement? — MikeL

If I understand correctly, the falling ball has kinetic energy. In relation to the atoms in the glass, the energy is expressed as potential energy in the form of field mathematics. So the energy in the ball is not understood to transfer directly from the atoms of the ball to the atoms of the glass, because the fields are intermediary. So the energy of one object cannot be comprehended as transferring directly to another object.

The reason for this, I believe, has to do with the problem of conceiving of an object going from zero velocity to having some velocity in an extremely short period of time. You can see that if the object is considered to have zero velocity, then have a specific velocity, there would have to be a period of time, as the object leaves zero, when acceleration is infinite. I believe the very same problem is expressed from a different perspective in the uncertainty principle of the Fourier transform. In wave theory, the shorter the time period, the more uncertain is the frequency, so there is a time/energy uncertainty relation. In an extremely short period of time, the energy uncertainty approaches infinity.

would contend that your definition of God through this archaic reference written by men thousands of years ago may need some modification. — MikeL

OK, so with reference to your op then, I would assume that "explaining God to scientists" means reciting a definition of "God" which is consistent with the principles utilized by the scientists. Care to state that definition?

Okay Metaphysician Undercover, I have your statement. I have glossed over it a bit too easily, so I'll take another look at it even though we are talking religion here and not God. — MikeL

How are you distinguishing "religion" from "God"? I've provided a definition of God, one derived from religion of course, and we are discussing this. But you say we are discussing religion, not God.

To say that "I am" commonly refers to being at the present, by your own admission does not predicate it in every instance, and while I am sure you are correct in this translation, it seems a bit of a stretch to me. You say that many people interpret Einstein's relativity as stipulating no such thing as the present, again if I do concede this to you, "many people" is not all people. So we have one highly ambiguous statement stacked upon another ambiguous statement, drawing from a document written by Israelites thousands of years ago in Babylon and juxtaposed against a theory of the universe written in the 1920s in order to draw out a contradiction on the nature of God. — MikeL

Yes that is exactly the point I made. One can claim to believe in special relativity and to believe in God (as I am that I am), both at the same time, but this is "a bit of a stretch". It is a stretch, because it requires either interpreting "I am" in an unusual way, or interpreting special relativity in an unusual way. To interpret these two both in the normal way makes them incompatible.

You're not Mike? Sorry, somehow I must have overlapped who I was talking too. My spatial analogy of time gives the sense that past present and future are relative concepts. Just as a meter ruler can have a very definite length when viewed one way, that definition changes with perspective. I'm not giving any real definition of time here, just trying to illustrate an example. — MikeL

OK, now compare this with what is said about God in the OT, "I am that I am". How can it be true that the present is relative, unless God is relative. If God is relative, then relative to what?

Are you calling me Mike? If so, that's OK, I like the name. How is your spatial analogy related to how we conceptualize time, unless you are already presupposing that time is just a dimension of space?

Mike, in terms of Einsteins present, obviously there is one, we are in it right now and now and now, but I think the point he was making was that time can be viewed linearly, as it is, but rather than travelling from one end of this linear string to the other, the entire string may be moving in one motion sideways instead so that the past present and future of the string occur at once. — MikeL

The problem remains though. The way that most people interpret special relativity is directly incompatible with the definition of God "I am that I am", provided in the Old Testament. To believe in both SR and God, is to hold contradictory beliefs. So either one has to shift their interpretation of SR, or shift their notion of God.

Think of it as akin to waking up. Thus, as moving from one state of consciousness to another. While in a dream, it's still you, but just in a lower state of awareness. The main point is that there is continuity of the self. If there is no continuity of memory or experience, then it wouldn't be you, and that I think is what is wrong with the doctrine of reincarnation - it loses this continuity. What I have learned by studying NDEs is that the continuity is maintained. — Sam26

I agree that continuity is the critical factor here. If we stipulate that consciousness, and all different states of consciousness are properties of an individual, a self, and separate "self" from "soul", then we can assign continuity to the soul, and allow that the soul continues while the "self", being associated with the thing, the body has a beginning and ending. So, in your example of sleeping, the continuity of a particular "state of consciousness" is broken by the person going into another state of consciousness. But all different states of consciousness are properties of that individual self which maintains continuities through those different states. Now, if we allow that the soul maintains continuity, and that the self is a property of the soul like consciousness is a property of the self, we look at the individual living beings, the selves, as analogous to the particular states of consciousness, which are broken and discontinuous, while the soul provides a continuous existence.

The issue appears to be that people want to think of reincarnation as separating an individual's consciousness from that individual's self, allowing the consciousness to pass from one self to another. But consciousness is inherently dependent on the existence of the self. So to allow for reincarnation we have to go beyond the existence of the self, to the soul itself, and establish the continuity of the soul, which is something other than the self.

Here's something to consider. In the Old Testament, when Moses asked God, who are you, God answered "I am that I am". "I am" commonly refers to being at the present. Further, many people interpret Einstein's special theory of relativity as stipulating that there is no such thing as the present. These people, if they hold and believe in the truth of special relativity, deny the possibility of God under this fundamental definition of God.

Reading through the reader reviews of that title, it seems Deutsch gives pretty short shrift to anyone who doubts the actual reality of parallel universes, which he seems to think is necessary for the concept to actually work. — Wayfarer

Isn't apo saying that the concept doesn't actually work?

The self is the system as a whole. And it is a whole in that all four causes evolve via mutual interaction. They arise within the system itself. Top-down constraints shape the bottom-up degrees of freedom. And those bottom-up degrees of freedom in turn construct - or rather reconstruct - those prevailing global states of constraint. — apokrisis

So the question, what creates the system, as a whole? A system cannot create itself, it requires an author.

That human life must be a kind of mistake is sufficiently clear from the fact that man is a compound of needs, which are difficult to satisfy; moreover, if they are satisfied, all he is granted is a state of painlessness, in which he can only give himself up to boredom. — Schopenhauer

The need is never satisfied to the point of perfection so your conclusion of boredom is inappropriate. Whenever we anticipate a point of satisfaction, and that point comes, there are always elements of dissatisfaction remaining, even if related to a different need. Our needs are many and varied so boredom is unnecessary.

Yep, machines need a creator. That is why organisms need explanation in terms of a logic of self organisation. — apokrisis

So how does "self organisation", in which a "self" is implied, differ from "ghost in the machine" or avoid a homuncular regress?

In biology, they are the determining part. What happens during growth or development is then that this finality gets mixed with a lot of particular accidents.

So the acorn is a one-off genetic template - a particular form that can only deliver that one adult tree. Sexual reproduction ensures a shuffling of the genetic cards to create a unique hand. — apokrisis

It is not true that biologists generally conceive of genetics in this way. There are many "accidents" which can occur right within the genetic system, different types of mutations which are responsible for variations, and they are necessary to evolutionary theory. If the genetics of the seed determined the particular plant which would grow, there would be no such thing as evolution. And not all genetic mutations are due to environmental factors. You are just stipulating this in an effort to support your metaphysical position instead of accepting that this position is untenable.

Furthermore, your own system of metaphysics claims local degrees of freedom. So you are producing inconsistency within your own system with this form of determinism, unless the activity explained by genetics is global rather than local. But if you look for an even smaller, microscopic level of activity, you will find final cause active even at this smaller level. No matter how microscopic you go, you will never separate the local degrees of freedom from the final cause.

Your move is to remove final cause from the local freedom, describing it as a global constraint, and this is all just an effort to remove the "ghost in the machine". Why? Do you have some deep seated fear of dualism? When all the evidence, and many rational arguments throughout history point in that direction, why are you insisting on inconsistent principles just to avoid a name, "dualism"? By pulling the ghost out of the machine, you are just left with a machine. But you now have an even bigger problem. Machines are artificial, created with intention. To maintain consistency with this evidence, that machines which act with purpose are created, you need to assume a creator of that machine. So either we follow the evidence, that final cause is immanent within the living being to the most fundamental particles of matter, or we look for an external creator, of which we can't find any evidence.

Again, you have brought the discussion back to a reductionist way of thinking where constraints must be absolutely determining. But organically, constraints only have to regulate contingency to the degree it really matters. Doing more than that is pointless over-kill. — apokrisis

OK, so if the genes, operating under the principle of final cause, within the acorn, cannot produce one specific oak tree, because there are degrees of contingency involved. Then we cannot say that the intent within the acorn is to produce that one particular tree. We have to say that the intent within those genes is vague and general. The genes will not produce this certain tree, they will produce an oak tree in general. So if we speak of final cause as a constraining or determining factor it is so in this general way, it is not a particular constraint, as formal cause is. And this makes an important difference between formal cause and final cause, one is a particular constraint and the other is a general constraint

Perhaps get someone to explain genes to you sometime. — apokrisis

What kind of reply is that? Genes play a part in determining the characteristics of the individual, but that's only a part. This is where we find final cause active, within the local aspect. Final cause acts from within and there is an inherent element of freedom as is evident from genetic mutations and evolution. But there is also the environment, global constraints. You seem to somehow twist these around.

Top-down constraint is formal and final cause bound up. — apokrisis

This is where the temporal problem lies. Formal cause relates to what exists, and final cause relates to a goal for the future. By binding up these two, you negate the division between past and future, also negating the need for dualism. But you no longer have a true "final cause".

Hardly. The acorn packs a genome - the product of millennia of evolved intentionality. You couldn't pick a worse example. The acorn - as a small package of carbohydrate and basic metabolic machinery - has to grow. It must construct an oak by constraining material flows for 100 years. But the fact it will be an oak is already written into its destiny. — apokrisis

I didn't pick the example, it's Aristotle's. If it appears to you like a bad example, it's because you misunderstand final cause. And in your explanation you conflate the particular and the general. If the acorn grows, it will construct an oak tree (in general), but not any particular oak tree, the intent is something general. Furthermore, there is no necessity for it to grow, it may not grow, and this is due to the nature of the material cause. So the acorn consists of material cause, potential, it consists of formal cause. what it is, or how that potential exists, and it consists of final cause which is the intent to become something. But the "something" in the intent is something more general than the specific "something" which is the acorn. And so there is a necessary separation between formal cause and final cause.

That doesn't mean there is no "freedom of choice". It means that we are constrained by our biology and sociology to act intelligently and creatively. — apokrisis

This claim is just as hollow as your claim that the acorn "must grow".

You are locked into cause and effect thinking. A doer and a done-to. That is the mental habit you need to break. Aristotle ought to be a good start for any systems thinker. His four causes approach was the basis for self-organising entelechy. Material potential becomes actualised as it expresses its functionality. — apokrisis

You still haven't explained how you have activity without something which is active. It's easy to say "let's just talk about the activity, and forget about the thing which is active", but it doesn't make a metaphysics because you have an ontology without any being. You think I should break the good mental habit of insisting that if there is activity, there is something which is active, to opt for the bad mental habit of describing the activity with total neglect for the thing which is active.

Your mode of thinking is to just combine formal and final cause, and forget about the material which separates these two. Matter is the potential for change. Formal cause relates to the form which the matter has, and final cause relates to an intended form. If you remove the relationship between form and matter then you no longer have this distinction between what is (necessitated as "the past"), and what may be (in the future).

Final and formal cause are wrapped up in the systems notion of top-down acting constraints. — apokrisis

As I explained, "top-down constraint" is formal cause, but this is inconsistent with "final cause" which gives the thing acting (the agent) freedom to choose a goal.

They are matched in complimentary fashion by bottom-up acting degrees of freedom - a notion wrapping together material and efficient cause. — apokrisis

If you assign "freedom" to bottom-up actions, then to maintain consistency you must assign "final-cause" to bottom-up actions. The acorn becoming a tree, is a bottom-up action. The tree, which will come to be, from the acorn does not constrain the acorn, because it does not even exist when the acorn is acting.

Otherwise the human agent has no freedom to choose one's own goals, and this is inconsistent with observations of human behaviour. We freely choose our goals, they are not enforced through top-down constraint. Goals are freely chosen by the human mind, and goal-directed actions are bottom-up, starting from within the neurological system.

The agent should vanish if the systems account is working. We end up with a system that has the property of agency exhibited hierarchically over all scales of its being. — apokrisis

Agency cannot vanish unless there is nothing which is active. If nothing is active then there is no activity.

But in the systems view, both the global constraints and the local degrees of freedom produce effects. Both the general context and the particular events are causal. — apokrisis

Then what is the thing which is active? Global constraints and local degrees of freedom produce effects on what? Unless you have an agent, you have a system of constraints and freedoms without anything actually being affected by that system, and your claim that these constraints and freedoms produce effects is just smoke and mirrors because there is nothing there which is being affected.

I'm not a fan of dualism or homuncular regress. — apokrisis

Thjs is surprising coming from someone who supports the idea of "final causes". What do you think final cause is, if not a dualist principle?

In any activity, there is always an "agent". This is the thing which is acting, the agent produces an effect. The agent (thing which is acting) may be motivated (moved to act) through efficient causes or final causes. Inanimate agents we observe to be motivated by efficient causes, while we observe human agents to be motivated by final causes.

You claim to support the idea of final causes but then you describe human activities in your neuroscientific way, as if they are all efficient causes. Unless you can describe an interaction between efficient causes and final causes within one model, there is no basis to your claim that you both support the idea of final causes, and deny dualism.

If that's how you support your principles and defend neuroscience, it's a pathetic defense.

The word "synonym" means two words that mean the same thing. So, we have a word for the thing that you say doesn't exist (words that mean the same thing). — Harry Hindu

Of course we have words for things which do not exist, words like "nothing". We also have words like "impossible", and despite something being designated as impossible, some will say it's possible. What does this mean to you?

In broad way that is so. But habit is also final cause/constraint that has got baked in over a long period of learning. So the contrast is in an efficient division of labour in a time-pressured world. Habits represent finality that has been learnt to the point it is baked-in intentionality. Attention is then the finality we have to construct specifically to deal with the current moment in time. — apokrisis

I think that this is a misrepresentation of habits. Habits do not represent finality, or final cause because a habit develops as a means to an end, whereas final cause is the end itself. As the means, the habit may prove to be useful toward many different ends. if looked at in any particular instance of activity, the habit may be used toward an end which is quite unrelated to the end which it was originally developed toward. So a habit, being a formal constraint, is not a final cause, nor is it properly representative of a final cause, it is better referred to as a formal cause.

It would be difficult to identify final cause as constraint, because an agent is free to produce one's own goals. We cannot say that an agent is constrained by one's goals, when an agent is free to choose one's goals. What constrains the agent, thereby restricting one's goals, is existing forms, and so we should associate constraint with formal cause rather than with final cause. Habit, as well as the forms of physical reality which constrain a person are the two types of formal cause. Habit may sometimes be overcome by intention and final cause, when we break a habit.

So both attention and habit are separable systems. And being systems, each requires the same structure - finality and efficient cause in interaction. Or constraints vs degrees of freedom. — apokrisis

You are not properly distinguishing between existing forms, which constitute formal cause, and desired forms , goals, which are constitutive of final cause. Formal causes may be understood as existing constraints on the thinking being, whereas the being is free to determine goals. Therefore final cause which is derived from future possibilities is inherently free, and only constrained when formal cause is brought to bear upon the goal in judgement.

Alternatively time slows. The fact that attentional level processing doesn't have time to make sense of what is going on leaves us with the feeling of the moment being stretched out and lasting an eternity.

And then you say you were in conscious control. Yet sports science will say the best that could be the case was that you were in the usual zone of responding out of trained habit, then afterwards there was a reportable working memory as attention fixed a record of the blur of events.

So it is your belief against the scientific evidence here.

Sure, relabel the same things anyway you like. It makes no difference. I just go with the standard labelling that has emerged in psychology and neuroscience. — apokrisis

There is a large gap, a division opening wider and wider between neuroscience and modern phenomenology. Phenomenology starts with the premise of being, which is existing at the present. From here it proceeds to recognize the present as a division between past and future, and tries to understand living, in terms of this division, which is the most significant thing in our lives. Neuroscience, on the other hand, relies heavily on principles derive from the Special Relativity theory which renders this distinction between past and future as unreal, or extremely vague if it's given a charitable interpretation.

The result is that neuroscience has no real principles for distinguishing between how the thinking mind is differentiating between things of the past and things of the future. The closest thing you have put forward is the concept of "attention", but you have no real way to distinguish between paying attention through your senses to things which have just happened, and paying attention through anticipation to things which are impending. Instead, you offer the blanket term "attention", which loses all such distinction in a vague "present".

The gap between phenomenology and neuroscience continues to widen, due to these failings of neuroscience.

My only quibble is that "anticipation" is useful for signalling another paradigm difference - the switch from "consciousness" as the output of a representation, to seeing it as about predictive modelling. It is anticipation that comes first. And then that acts as a selective filter on awareness which allows us to in fact ignore as much of the world as possible. — apokrisis

It is not a case of switching from consciousness as "the output of a representation", to consciousness as "predictive modelling", it is a matter of understanding consciousness as both. This requires distinguishing the two, and providing the proper dichotomy between these two. Because if the human mind mixes up, and confuses actual things of the past (oh shit I shouldn't have done that, I'm going to try to make it so that I didn't do it) with future possibilities (X is inevitable and there's nothing I can do about it), then that human mind has a real problem. Your concept of "attention" combines these two together, in this confused way.

Again, I already said that "consciousness" involves both the half second before and the half second after. So the fact that attentional level processing is slow means that it is there in advance of the moment, and there afterwards mopping up. First it generates the prediction that allows most things to be ignored. Then it deals with what in turn couldn't be ignored. After that, we have a tidied up impression of the world that can be filed as reportable memory. — apokrisis

This is exactly what I mean. You say "attentional level processing" "involves both the half second before and the half second after", as if there is no fundamental difference between these two. They are both grouped together under "attentional" as if the mind, at the most fundamental level does not differentiate between the before and after. But if the mind, at the most fundamental level really does distinguish between the before and the after (which it must in order to avoid having a real problem), then why group these two together as "attentional"? The only reason would be that you are overlooking this most fundamental distinction asan unimportant distinction.

You are forgetting that my approach is quite different from yours on this. Again, you want to boil things down to the effective causes of behaviour. And that leaves out the complementary role played by the final causes. — apokrisis

I'm not leaving out final causes, I want to bridge the gap between final and efficient cause. Do you agree that conscious goals are final causes, but the cause of an habitual action is an efficient cause?
If this is the case, then how do we show how a conscious goal "acts" as a final cause to produce a chain of efficient causes (habitual action)?

So should "motivation" be entirely a question of "what local thing triggered this action"? Or is motivation a big enough concept that it includes "what global goal gave form to action itself"?

I of course defend the latter. — apokrisis

What you write though, does not defend the role of final causation. When we discussed the activity in sports, you spoke as if the activity was necessarily all habitual, as if that were the only way that the athlete could keep up to speed with the world, through the rapidity of reflex reactions. The athlete's goals cannot enter into the activity as final causes, because there is no time for that. I was arguing the role of rapid decision making.

Then we found a principle which we had a certain degree of agreement on, and this was anticipation. It appears like anticipation might be completely associated with consciousness, because it predicts, or foresees the future, and it appears like this can only be done through conscious imagination. If anticipation is only a property of consciousness, then it could be associated with goals, and final causation, so the bridge between final cause and efficient cause would be found in the relationship between anticipation and habit.

Do you think that it is possible that an anticipatory action can be habitual, or is there a necessary separation between these two such that all anticipatory reactions require conscious decision? For instance, something is suddenly flying rapidly at your head. You duck to the right, or to the left, or straight down, in anticipation. Does this require a conscious decision, a goal (final cause), or is it strictly a reflexive habit, (efficient cause)?

Can I return to your example of the runners waiting for the starting gun, because I don't think you've paid proper respect to anticipation here? You describe the event completely in terms of habitual reaction, when in reality anticipation plays a large role in the speed of one's start. The runners are given warning, "on your mark, get set", and the gun shot is anticipated. If the anticipation runs too high, a runner might jump the gun. So clearly the rapid start of the race, for the runner, is more complex than just a habitual reaction to the sound of the shot. Anticipation of the shot, which produces preparedness, is just as important as habit, if not more so.

There is not enough time to consciously plan the throwing of a pass. There often isn't even the time to do the quicker thing of simply halting a subconsciously unfolding action plan. Free won't is faster than freewill. Yet even then, we find ourselves often thinking oh shit, shouldn't have done that, as the body is already launching into action. — apokrisis

I disagree with this, in sports there is always enough time to plan one's actions. Something would have to come out of nowhere, and whack you on the head in a fraction of a second for you not to have time to think about your actions. I've been in more than one car accident, driving, where the scene unfolds very quickly, but I've always maintained conscious control over how I operated the controls of the vehicle until the end.

It would be a mistake to think "oh shit, shouldn't have done that", because things are moving so rapidly that there is time only to think about what is impending. This is where the habit of attention is of the greatest importance, to keep us focused on what is impending when things are occurring very rapidly, allowing us the greater power of anticipation. If you are one who is distracted by "oh shit shouldn't have done that", in the middle of a rapidly occurring situation, you are one who has not developed a good habit of attention. This leads us to another aspect related to anticipation, which is confidence. The two work together to enable the habit of attention.

As long as you are focused on finding a trail of effective causes, an organ like the brain is going to be a mystery. But ahead of time I can decide - at an attentional level - to form a state of constraint that regulates my little finger. I can say the general goal is to flex in the next few moments. Go as soon as you like and I won't stop you. I have a clear mental expectation of what should happen, and what should not happen - like I don't want the little finger of my other hand to do the flexing. So I have restricted my habits of finger moving in a very specific and attentional fashion. Pretty much the only thing the habit level brain can do is move in the way expected. So for all its varied propensity, the probability approaches 1 that it will emit the response that has been attentionally anticipated. — apokrisis

This is exactly the logical problem which I tried to bring to your attention already. If using will power to prevent the habit of moving your little finger involves telling it "go as soon as you like", then you have no will power, because you are not preventing your finger from moving, it moves whenever. If you are using will power to prevent your finger from moving, then it only moves when you release it from this will power, so the release, which allows the finger to move, like the will which prevents the movement is a conscious effort. If you know of a way to avoid this logical issue, I'd love to hear it.

The problem I see with what you have written here is that you are relying on your habit/attention dichotomy which I do not think properly represent the situation. Since attention is actually a habit, the better dichotomy would habit/anticipation. The problem with using "attention" as your principle is that we can only properly pay attention to what is occurring. And what is occurring, that which we are paying attention to, has already occurred by the time it is present to the conscious mind. So attention really only gives to our minds what has occurred, the past. Now we need a principle, such as anticipation, whereby the fact that something is about to occur, is present to the mind. The runner waits for the starting gun with anticipation. One's attention is focused on the anticipation. So the above paragraph referring to the moving of your little finger would be better written if you referred to your anticipation of your finger moving, and the attention which you give to this anticipation.

The English language has many different words that mean the same thing. — Harry Hindu

No that's not true some words can be used in place of another, so they have one sense which is similar to a sense of another word, but no two words have the same meaning. So I refuse to argue whether two words have the same meaning, as I think that is a pointless exercise.

Attention is a habit acquired in an evolutionary sense. The brain evolved that propensity in that it is baked into the inherited neural architecture of higher animals. — apokrisis

OK, now that we're clear on this, we can approach the issue of motivation with some level of agreement in principle.

Thus if we are talking about the functional architecture of brains as it is actually divided, you are talking out your hat as usual. You are thinking like a reductionist in wanting to reduce two things to one thing. But an organicist can see that a division into two things is how you can arrive at the functional harmony or synthesis of an effective division of labour. Study brain science and you will discover that it is all about this principle of complementary logic. — apokrisis

It's fine to have your "division of labour", if it helps you to understand the workings of the brain, but I don't see that it is of any advantage in this issue. What we are looking for here is the motivation to get something done, and this is prior to any such a division. So whether the motivating factor at one time motivates a habit level activity, or an attentional level activity (which is really just another level of habit anyway) is irrelevant to our inquiry into the motivating factor itself.

What would be relevant, would be to find the motivating factor motivating something which is not a habitual activity whatsoever. Then we could see the motivating factor in action without the distraction of the habit. Furthermore, since the nature of each habit is that of a potential to act, the motivating factor must be prior to all habits in order that every habit has the potential to act. Thus we will get to the motivating factor where there is activity without habit.

So I'll return to the question I posed already. Since the conscious will power gives us the power to refrain from all activity, how could the motivating factor be anything other than the conscious decision? I think you would agree with me that there are many internal activities of the human body which the will does not have the power to suspend. So the motivating factor is to be found within these internal parts, rather than within the conscious mind. But to motivate the will power, is the closest thing we have to motivation without activating habits, because the will power to refrain from action is to deny the action of habits as far as possible. So it is the motivation behind will power, what motivates willpower, which is the motivation to resist activity, that we will find the purest form of the motivating factor.

Very Schopenhauer of you! — schopenhauer1

I like Schopenhauer, one of the few philosophers who actually has an understanding of the will.

This strongly suggests that the probability of our being wrong on something which we do not know and has been constructed based on logical axioms that are ultimately rooted in well documented psychological and evolved states of assumed thinking (such as towards animism and spiritualism) which have benefited us in the past should be held with suspicion on probabilistic grounds. — Sam Keays

Yes, this is one of the points I am trying to make here. When we dispel the idea that the "laws of science" are discovered, (implying that they cannot be wrong), we are faced with the possibility that any of the accepted laws may be wrong. So we must examine all the logic, and all the evidence which relates to the premises, to determine whether or not these laws are actually sound.

The word "Nature" tends to be, intentionally or unintentionally, and obfuscation. For one thing, Its usage is a Materialist's way of trying to frame the discussion in terms of a premise that the physical world is what's natural, and is Reality itself. — Michael Ossipoff

"Nature" was Wayfarer's word. Law was said to refer to regularities in nature, so I was responding to this usage.

What I take for granted? I've been saying all along that the physical world and its contents aren't objectively real or existent,and that the hypotheticals that it consists of aren't objectively factual,but only need and have meaning in terms of their own local inter-referring context..

Purely conceptpual? Of course. That's what I've been saying all along.

My metaphysics, Skepticism, is an Idealism..

Thank you for arguing for Skepticism. — Michael Ossipoff

I have no problem arguing skepticism. I do it all the time, in fact I am very skeptical of your metaphysics, as you should know by now.

So I'll state the problem as clearly as I can, as it appears in the quoted passage. According to my understanding, a concept is something created by a human mind, and existing in a human mind, completely mind dependent. Yet you claim that the physical world is purely conceptual, and that there were concepts before there were human minds, laws of physics and things like that, billions of years ago. How do you support this claim? Are these concepts supposed to exist within the mind of God?

What's that? You say you weren't there a billion years ago, to create and enforce the law of gravity, to keep the Earth in Solar-orbit? That's ok, because the various scientists, and the information that they've reported, are in your experience, part of your life-experience possibility-story, as is are your own physical observations. — Michael Ossipoff

I really haven't been able to grasp this "life-experience possibility-story". Perhaps that's why I don't understand. Can you explain it in plain English? For instance, how is the earth a billion years ago in my own life-experience? The concept of "the earth a billion years ago" is in my own life experience, but the earth a billion years ago is not.

Easy. As I said above, and in my post before this one, a story includes time. By definition, story takes place across time. Your life-experience possibility story is such a story. — Michael Ossipoff

OK, so do you agree that a story requires an author of that story. Who is the author of my life-experience possibility story?

I don’t know what you think kept the Earth in orbit a billion years ago, but the law of gravity discovered by Newton, and the gravitational constant experimentally found by Cavendish amount to a physical law that explains why the Earth is still in orbit. — Michael Ossipoff

It may be gravity which keeps the earth in orbit, but it's definitely not the law of gravity which does this. The law of gravity is one of the different ways that human beings understand gravity. And our understanding of gravity does not keep the earth in orbit.

So you're point is only that it's not 'a law' until it's written down, whereas I am saying that objects will accelerate in accordance with the formula f=ma whether it's been written down or not. That is why Newton's formula is called 'a discovery' i.e. it uncovers something that already existed but hitherto had not been understood. — Wayfarer

My point is that it's not a law until a human being carries out the necessary logical steps required to produce that law. This means that human beings must carry out the required inductive reasoning to make the generalization, and apply the mathematical principles. Prior to this, the potential for that law to come into existence is there, in the world, because different objects accelerate in a consistent manner, but there is no such law. The law is created with the application of logic by human beings.

There is a big difference between finding something in the world, like Ossipoff finds my fingerprints, and creating something in the world. The application of logic is an activity which does not discover laws, it creates them. Principles, rules, and laws, are not the sort of things which we find naturally existing in the world, they are the sort of things which we create, with the use of reason.

That this is true is evident from the fact that we sometimes create laws which are false, wrong. If laws were discovered, it would be impossible to have a false, or wrong law, because you couldn't discover a false law. But I could roll the dice, and roll a seven, and declare that I've discovered a new law, "when I roll the dice, I will roll a seven". Clearly I just created this law, as it is false, I didn't really discover it. But the only difference between it and a correct law, is that it was created by faulty logic rather than good logic. Faulty logic creates an incorrect law, and good logic does the opposite, it creates a correct law. But how can you argue that good logic, instead of doing the opposite thing as bad logic (creating incorrect laws), it does something categorically different from bad logic, it discovers a law, rather than creating a law. In other words, if faulty logic creates laws, and good logic discovers laws, couldn't we avoid all incorrect laws by determining that the law was created rather than discovered? In reality there is no such difference to determine, as they are both create with logic, the one being faulty logic. So the difference to determine is whether the law was created with sound logic or unsound logic.

You seem to have very little understanding of habit. A habit is acquired, but it is not necessarily learnt. If attention is required to learn, this does not exclude the possibility of attention itself being an unlearned habit. That's the way that habits are structured, they build on each other, supporting each other.

Or do you mean to reference some other philosophical position? Give me a link so I can get an idea of what philosophy you have been studying. — apokrisis

The concept of "habit" was first formally defined by Aristotle in his work on logic. The word is derived from the same word as "have", and refers to a property which a living being has. This property is the propensity to behave in a particular way. In his work on biology "De Anima" (On the Soul), it is noted that a habit is a potential which the living being has. The different powers (potencies) of the living are necessarily understood as potentials of the living creature, because they are not at all times active. So we say that the creature has the power of self-nourishment, the power of self-movement, sensation, or intellection, and by referring to these as potential, it is noted that the described activity is not being carried out by the living being at all times, but it has the capacity to carry out this act.

Thomas Aquinas carried out a much more in depth analysis of what a habit itself, is. Since "habit" refers to the propensity for a particular activity, and not the activity itself, he concluded that the habit, as a property of the living being, must be a property of the potential for the act, and not a property of the act itself. In this way, we can say that a potential, which has no particular necessary actualization, has properties which are described as the inclination toward a particular actualization.

If you are familiar with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, you will find in his 1809 book "Zoological Philosophy", a very in depth study of the relationship between the habits of an animal, and it's physical constitution.

So, according to my understanding of what a habit is, from these and other philosophers, I don't see how "attention" as per your reference to William James, above, or any common notion of the activity referred to by "attention", is anything other than the activity of a habit. Care to explain how you see things differently?

How to walk isn't a goal, it is a set of instructions. If you didn't have the set of instructions for walking, talking, or things that we learned before and now do habitually, then how do you explain you knowing how to do it? Walking isn't "automatic". It's just that you don't have to pay much attention to it because you've done it so often that you your conscious mind doesn't need to focus on it. Notice how consciousness is only needed for the things you don't know how to do and are learning how to do it. When you learn well how to do it the task gets relegated to the subconscious. — Harry Hindu

I'd say that walking is a habit. My body has numerous different capacities for movement, and some have an inclination to actualize in a particular way, and this activity is called walking.

What is the difference between a goal and a purpose? What is the difference between intention and goal? What is the difference between motivation and goal? They all seem to be the same thing to me. — Harry Hindu

I don't think that these are all the same thing, and that's why they are different words. For instance, the word "goal" implies something consciously aimed for. Non-conscious things can have a purpose, but they do not have a goal. All the components in my computer each has its own purpose with respect to the functioning of the computer, but I cannot say that these parts each has a goal. There is one goal here, the functioning of the computer, but that goal was in the minds of the people who built the computer. The purpose of each part is within the computer itself, within the relationship between the part and the whole, while the goal is in the minds of the people who built the computer.

The difference between motivation and goal is what we've been discussing in this thread.

If you say you have the goal of going to the store but not the motivation because you are still sitting on the couch, then what you are really saying is that you have conflicting goals. We often have conflicting goals and it is where we reach a state of indecision - of not being able to establish a clear goal over another. It seems to me that, because you are still sitting on the couch, your goal to sit on the couch is winning over the goal of going to the store, or else you wouldn't still be sitting on the couch. — Harry Hindu

Are you saying that having no motivation is the very same thing as having conflicting goals? If so, I disagree. A motivated person will proceed with the mental activity of attempting to solve such conflicts. The activity here is the act of thinking, and the motivated person is engaged in this act of thinking, while having conflicting goals at the same time. So the person is motivated, and engaged in activity, yet has conflicting goals at the same time. Therefore it is impossible that having no motivation is the same thing as having conflicting goals.

'The law' refers to a regularity in nature. — Wayfarer

This is not true at all. What "the law" refers to is what is written down, and that is a description of a regularity in nature. Take your example, the law is the formula "f=ma". This needs to be interpreted, and what this says to me is that if you know the mass of an object, and the acceleration in velocity of the object, you can determine the force which was applied to the object. Conversely, you can figure out the necessary force required to bring an object of a particular mass, to a desired state of acceleration.

Notice that all three, force, mass, and acceleration, are arbitrary forms of measurement created by human beings. Clearly the said law refers to a relationship between these arbitrary forms of measurement, signified by f, m, and a. The relationship is expressed mathematically with "times" and "equals". You might argue that these terms, "force", "mass", and "acceleration", as well as "equals" and "times", refer to regularities in nature, (what Michael Ossipoff seems to take for granted), but that would be a very difficult argument to maintain, with some of these terms such as "force" and "equals", which appear to be purely conceptual, not referring to anything in nature.

So f=ma refers to a purely conceptual relationship (equals) between something conceptual (force), and the measurable regularities of mass and acceleration. Since the stated relationship itself, "equals", is purely conceptual, the stated law refers to the way that we conceive of these regularities of nature (the formula), and not the regularities themselves.

All I see in a law is a bunch of symbols which need to be interpreted. Learn the right technique of interpretation, and you know the law.
That's why

The laws of motion are not culturally dependent. — Wayfarer

is interpreted as gibberish by me.

That's probably a habit I picked up from studying psychology/neuroscience. — apokrisis

Well, study some philosophy and maybe you can break this bad habit.