I’ve repeatedly clarified and emphasized that I’m not saying that a physical law that obtained a billion years ago is a description that was being spoken at that time. — Michael Ossipoff

You haven't yet explained how a physical law which came into existence a few hundred years ago could have "obtained a billion years ago". As I explained, this is contradiction, and until we sort this out, there is no point in starting with the premise that a physical law obtained a billion years ago.

In fact, I haven’t been defining a physical law as a description at all. I’ve been defining it as a relation between quantity-values — Michael Ossipoff

Again, quantities and values are human judgements, measurements, so this does not get you past this problem.

If you want to claim that some other set of physical laws obtained during Egyptian times, instead of the physical laws that are now established, and that that’s confirmed by what is known about those earlier times, then the burden would be on you to show that. — Michael Ossipoff

No, what I am saying is that if there are no human beings to create physical laws, then no physical laws obtain. That's a pretty simple, straight forward position. I think that the onus is on you to explain how you believe that something which comes about from human judgement, "a relation between quantity-values" could exist prior to there being any human beings.

Do you understand what a "value" is? If so, how do you think that a value could exist without someone to determine the value?

So attention forms an intent as a general constraint? — apokrisis

No, attention hasn't really entered the model yet. We've been discussing the role of motivation in relation to intent, and habit. Attention enters as the result of motivation, like any other habit. But you do not seem to recognize attention as a habit. It is a mental habit. That's where I was headed toward in our last discussion, but you were not listening.

No, what makes it a law is that it is accept by the people. F=MA was not accepted by the ancient Egyptians, and therefore was not a law for them. It did not work out for them because they did not do it. It is you who is obfuscating. Like Michael, you are creating the illusion that people accepted a statement which was never stated.

The logic remains. Nerve signals take time. Habits short circuit action decisions and have an integration time of a tenth to a fifth of a second. Attentive level thought takes a third to three-quarters of a second to arrive at an integrated state. — apokrisis

I agree that habits short circuit conscious decisions, that's consistent with the point I was making to Harry Hindu. But what I'm looking for is the bridge between conscious decisions and habitual actions, because this is what I believe "motivation" refers to.

So in sport or any skilled activity, decisions on how to complete an intent - as in thinking "go" with a throw - have to be left to a trained habit level of execution. — apokrisis

This is not the way that such activities are actually carried out though. The skilled hockey player must master a vast variety of habits, and continually choose, and change choice of which habit to rely on at any particular time. So the skill which the star hockey player has, involves the rapid changing from one habit to another. This is the execution of the changing from one habit level skill to another, with out loosing stride. It is not a case of relying on rapid habit execution, what is relied on is the capacity to rapidly change from one habit to another. And any occupation which requires alert attention, relies on this capacity of having a vast skill set of habits which one can choose from, and switch one to the other at a moments notice.

And on anticipation, of course anticipation is absolutely necessary. The brain is a prediction engine. But the same story applies. We learn how to predict at an slow attentive level. Then we get good and familiar with this predicting such that is can be executed as rapid habit. Both levels of processing are anticipatory. But one has to start out and form a general intent ahead of time - prime for the decision by setting up some notion of the constraining goal. Then the other can kick in and supply the particular action commands right up to the last split instant - which is still a good tenth of a second behind the world, and so also is by necessity anticipatory. — apokrisis

Yes, I believe anticipation is the critical thing here. This may be what bridges the gap between conscious intent and habitual performance, forming the basis for motivation. The intent must be left as general, in order that it adapts to the rapidly changing environment, while maintaining the very same goal. The individual is motivated toward a general intent (winning the game), allowing that there is a massive number of possible means to this end. As the situation unfolds, the appropriate means to this end (habits) are constantly being decided upon. These decisions are based on anticipation and the desire to avoid negative results in favor of the positive.

If an ancient Egyptian dropped a brick, it would accelerate according to the formula given in the Laws of Motion; although the Egyptian wouldn't know this was the case. — Wayfarer

I would agree that such is the case, if the "Laws of Motion" are correct. But now we have a different issue to deal with, and that is what makes a law "correct". Ossipoff has not provided for that condition.

Let's see - Nefertiti's Law. Do you think calling it that would mean objects would fall at a different rate? — Wayfarer

That would be a different law, with a different name, just like General Relativity provides us with a different way of looking at gravity from Newton's way. There are some important differences, which do you think is correct?

The quarterback must release with millisecond accuracy and yet it takes at least a tenth of a second for any "go now" command to form as connections in the brain and messages travelling down the arms and body. So forget about even longer attentional, voluntary, deliberative, reportable consciousness being in control. — apokrisis

I don't think that this is a good argument. The precise time, the "millisecond accuracy" can be predicted in advance, so all the extra time require for the voluntary act can be accounted for in the QB's prediction of when to throw. If something suddenly appeared in front of the QB, and he had to respond within a millisecond, I agree that this would be impossible. But nothing is moving that fast, and this is not the case. The QB is simply waiting for the appropriate time to throw. So all the time is factored into the decision, the time the ball is in the air, the time the arm is moving, and the time that the brain messages are travelling. You have no argument here, that the decision to release is not voluntary.

Even habit level execution takes a tenth of a second to make the simplest decision, like hear the pistol shot that starts the race. And to react to something more complex, like a bad bounce of a cricket ball, takes a fifth of a second. — apokrisis

See, here you are talking about reaction time, but reaction time is not what the example is all about. What is the case in the example, is that the QB is holding the ball, with the goal of throwing, but waiting for the precise "right" moment to release it. This is how I am separating having a goal, from the motivation to act on that goal, as two distinct things. We can hold a goal, and decide to act on it at a later time. So having goals and being motivated to act, are two distinct things. .

But you don’t think that the laws could have obtained until there were physicists to create them. So you’re speaking of them as more than descriptions. You’re speaking of them as some kind sorcery, in which physicists have made the laws and made them obtain. To put it differently, you’re implying that the physicist has the power of a script-writer, to make things any way that s/he chooses to. — Michael Ossipoff

No, I am simply pointing out that it is impossible for a description to be used prior to the existence of the description. Take the statement "the sky is blue" for example. There was a time before that statement was ever made. Before that statement was made, it is impossible that people were saying that the sky is blue. There is no such thing as an unstated statement, that is nonsense, and so it is also nonsense to say that the unstated statement obtained.

Do you really believe that the law of gravity, and Newton’s laws of motion didn’t obtain in the days of the early Egyptian civilization? Don’t we have paintings from that time that show a jar resting on a table-top, or people standing on the ground? In fact, without gravity, the Earth wouldn’t have an atmosphere, and so how would there have been a Sumerian civilization, with no oxygen-containing atmosphere? In fact, how would we have any ancestors? — Michael Ossipoff

How does a picture of jar resting on a table-top imply that Newton's laws of motion were applied in early Egyptian civilization? That's utter nonsense. When we know that Newton was the one to develop these laws, why would you think that the ancient Egyptians were using the same laws long before Newton? I suggest that you consider the possibility that some laws other than Newton's obtained at this time.

Goals are not passive things. They are active states of constraint. So they may not be efficient causes, but they are final causes. They shape the intentional space in which consequent decision making unfolds. If we have an image of the final destination, then that is how we can start filling in all the necessary step actions to get us there. — apokrisis

I disagree with this, A goal is a describable object, it is a state, and as such it is static. The mind iswhat is active in forming goals. If a goal were to change, it can no longer be called "the same goal". This is necessary in order to be consistent with the laws of logic. Goals cannot change,one goal is replaced with another. So it is quite true that one's formal intention is active and changing, just like the form of any object, but when a person's formal intention changes the person can no longer be said to have the same goal. This is despite the fact that we may say that a physical object is the same object despite some changes to the form of the object. To assume this would make the goal unintelligible (contrary to the laws of logic), assuming that it could be the same goal after changing, which would contradict the fundamental nature of the goal, as an intelligible object.

When playing fast sport, the decision-making has to be all pretty much habitual or automatic. — apokrisis

This I disagree with as well. In fast sports, every situation is different, and it is the rapid thinking mind, the ability to foresee the rapidly changing future, the ability to adjust quickly with changes, which is on display in these sports. Hockey is a fine example. Yes, good habits are essential and all professional hockey players must develop these, but when we judge their "star" level we are judging their ability to think outside the box, be creative, and basically, their rapid decision making. The very nature of the habit is to constrain, so it is the difficult task of a fine hockey coach, to maintain a delicate balance between habit and creativity within the high-spirited, highly motivated hockey players.

Then the play starts to unfold and all his trained instincts can slot in according to a general intent. He is itching to pull the trigger on the throw. A conjunction of observed motions on the field hit the point where the habits themselves provide the timing information. The "go now" command is issued by the mid-brain basal ganglia in concert with the brainstem's cerebellum. The conscious brain can discover how it worked out a half second later as attentional-level processing catches up to provide a newly integrated state of experience. The quarterback can start thinking oh shit, or hot damn. — apokrisis

What? Come on now, are you saying that the "go now" command is not produced by the conscious mind? The quarterback doesn't consciously decide when to throw? The hockey player doesn't consciously decide when to shoot the puck? I find that counter-intuitive, and hard to believe, but I'm ready to allow this proposition, if only just for the sake of argument. After all, I'm arguing a separation between the goal, and the motivation which gives the "go now". So if the goal is attributed to the conscious mind, and the "go now" is not, this provides the separation I need.

However, I have difficulty with the logic of this claim, and I'll explain to you my difficulty. Perhaps you can give me an explanation which will help me to get beyond this problem. Suppose that the goal is to throw the ball and this is within the conscious mind. The QB must resist going through with the throw, until the moment is right. So the QB uses will power to stay in this zone of being about to throw, but not yet throwing. I believe that this will power involves a conscious effort. When the throw is made, there must be a release of this will power, a release from this conscious effort not to throw. But this "release" can only be a conscious decision, or else the conscious effort not to throw would be totally ineffective. If the non-conscious could overcome the conscious effort of will power at any moment, then the conscious effort to restrain would have no power to actually do that.

That's the problem I invite you to help me resolve. It appears to be impossible that the conscious effort to refrain from acting could have any power of self-restraint, if the motivation to "go now" was derived from the non-conscious. The non-conscious motivation to "go now" could just arise at any time, overpowering the conscious effort of restraint. In reality, the conscious effort actually restrains the "go now" motivation or else there would be no conscious restraint. How could the release be non-conscious without upending the whole thing?

Actually, isn't your primary goal, to have tea, not to get milk? Isn't getting milk and walking to the store SUB-goals of the primary goal? Isn't that what the goal of moving your feet would be too? — Harry Hindu

I agree with this designation of primary goals and sub-goals. But the problem is that moving my feet never becomes a goal at all, it just happens automatically, like my breathing isn't a goal, it just happens automatically. I decide to walk to the store, and I stand up and go. I do not decide to move my feet. There's many different muscles in my legs, ankles, and feet. I do not decide which ones to move, and how to move them, yet they still move properly when I decide to walk to the store. How would you draw a line? Which movements are described by the goal, and which just come about automatically because the person is motivated to achieve the goal?

The whole first half of your post ignores what I said about learning how to walk. — Harry Hindu

I didn't address this because it isn't relevant. I'm not talking about learning how to walk, I'm talking about walking as a habit. When we know well how to walk, we do so without setting goals of where and when to move our feet, this just happens naturally without the goal. When an individual who knows how to walk is motivated to walk, that person does so without setting goals of where and when to move one's feet. Whether or not one had to proceed with such goals when learning how to walk is irrelevant because I was talking about habitual actions, not learning such things.

So the goal and process of moving your legs and arms are still there - it's just that you can focus on other tasks, not tasks you have performed over and over again. — Harry Hindu

No, the goal is not still there, and that's the point. To be "there" it must be in the conscious mind. I have no idea what goals I had in my mind when I was learning to walk, so whatever those goals were, they are definitely not still there. I now walk without having in my mind the goals which assisted me in learning how to walk in the first place. And the walking activity is "automatic". It occurs without those goals.

The brain is capable of multitasking by leaving he goals and means of achieving them to the subconscious while the conscious part focuses it's attention (which seems to be the special thing about consciousness as opposed to the subconscious and unconscious. It has attention) on other things. — Harry Hindu

How do you suppose that the subconscious has goals? I don't see how this is possible. I can understand that a subconscious activity is carried out for a purpose, but this does not mean that the goal itself is within the subconscious.

Of course the goal has causal power. How else do you explain your current state of walking to the store, if the goal of having tea doesn't have causal power? — Harry Hindu

As I explained, it is not the goal of walking to the store, or having tea, which causes me to walk to the store. It is the decision to "act now" which causes me to go. I could be sitting on the couch for a very long time, maintaining the goal of walking to the store, without actually doing it, if I am unmotivated. So clearly it is not the goal which has causal power. I must be motivated to act on the goal or else nothing becomes of the goal.

The goal itself dictates the actions you are taking now, or else you could never say why you are doing this particular thing now (walking to the store) as opposed to something else (looking for the remote control). — Harry Hindu

The reason why of a particular thing, is not the same as a cause of action.

5. if all suffering is warranted, then a large number of human activities are unwarranted (observation ‡) — jorndoe

I can't grasp this statement. To paraphrase, if suffering is warranted then there are human activities which are unwarranted. How so? If all human activities involve suffering then this cannot be true. If some human activities do not involve suffering it doesn't follow that they are necessarily unwarranted activities.

How do you derive "a large number of human activities are unwarranted"?

We do seem to have that goal of taking the first step. In order to get somewhere, you do initially have the goal of moving your feet from a resting position, just like having the goal to throw a ball, you need to send the signal to the arm to move in a particular way. — Harry Hindu

Imagine that I am out of milk, and I need milk for my tea, so I decide to walk to the corner store. Off I go. I never develop the goal of moving my feet. The goal is what I want, to get milk. I have choices of how to achieve that goal, so I decide to walk to the store. Walking to the store is the means to the end. Once I've made up my mind, the habit kicks in, but the movements required for walking never enter my mind as part of the goal.

So let's take your example of throwing the ball. Suppose you're a quarterback, and the throw must be precisely timed. You hold the goal, to throw, and you hold the ball, to throw. At the exact right moment, you must pull back and release the ball. The motivating factor for the release is not the goal, because despite having the goal of throwing you continue to hold the ball, perhaps even to the point of getting sacked. The motivating factor appears to be the judgement "now", at which time the habit takes over and the throw is made.

I wouldn't say that it is the "initial goal of moving your body" which is the motivating factor, because you can hold that goal of moving your body, without ever moving. These people who have goals without acting on them, we call unmotivated. It is the impetus of "act now!", which we refer to as motivation. And this is separate from the goal, because it may be applied to any goal. That is why ambitious, motivated people may be motivated toward all sorts of different goals. What makes the person motivated is not the goal itself, it's the person's attitude toward the goal.

How is one motivated to create a goal? Is it your discontent about the way things are currently that motivates one to create a goal? Once you create the goal, it is the goal driving you forward and no longer the discontent because the actions you take are directed towards that specific goal that you wouldn't take if the goal were different. There are many ways to alleviate discontent (different goals one could work towards in alleviating discontent) and each one needs a different order of actions to accomplish it. — Harry Hindu

A goal is a mental object, like any conception or idea. It must be conceived. To produce a goal requires thought, and thinking is an activity which requires motivation. I think it is a mistake to represent the goal as driving you forward, because the goal does not drive you forward, it may just sit there in your mind. It is your dedication to achieving the goal, and the will to act, which drives you forward, not the goal itself. The goal itself is a passive thing with no causal power.

What about people like Donald Trump who claim they have the support of the people (remember, he had way more people at his inaugural ceremony than Obama), and create the illusion that they have the support of the people (by staging rallies)? Do you think that this is an indication of divine right, or a will to dictatorship?

Sounds like a dictator to me.

In Europe we called it divine right to rule. — Agustino

Divine right is something completely different. Monarchs may have claimed divine right, as the king might say that it is the direct will of God that I rule. But such a monarchy requires a powerful church and allegiance to that church, to support the claim. The concept can't apply in democracy where the rulers are elected by the people, and anyone claiming divine right would be regarded as a dictator.

So the question I need to ask, I suppose, is what are these 'factors that induce one to act', that are not ideas projected as goals and that you think of as motives and I do not? — unenlightened

This is not a question which is easily answered. The reason I suggested differentiating between the goals and the motivation, near the beginning of the thread, is because I see motivation as that which inspires one to achieve one's goals. And this is different from the goal itself. Motivation is associated with things like "ambition", "spirit", and "passion". You may be correct in saying that when we speak of "motives", as particular things, we refer to the particular goals which appear to motivate us, but when we speak of motivation we refer to the courage or ambition required in overcoming obstacles in the effort to achieve the goals. So I don't think it's really the goals which motivate us, but the passion which we feel for the goals. This is conviction, or determination, the strength with which we adhere to our principles. That I believe is the true motivator, rather than what we refer to as "the motive", or goal itself.

But never mind, as long as we are clear that it is not ideas, or indeed any thought based factor, but something in the physical nature of a plant that it grows towards the light, or makes seeds or responds to the environment in all sorts of ways that we can make sense of in terms of evolutionary function, but the plant itself cannot consider at all. — unenlightened

Is it correct to refer to this spirit as something in the physical nature of the living being? If we reference the Platonic tripartite person, spirit or passion takes an intermediate position between the material body, and the immaterial mind.

A plant's genes encode a repertoire of automatic responses to environmental stresses, that have the effect of making it adaptive to the environment in ways that aid survival. If you want to call these responses motivated, well I sort of understand. And humans have similarly 'built in' responses, that in my language, I tend to use terms such as 'instinct' and 'reflex' for. Propensities to act that one can be aware of and think about, but which originate in the body without thought. Thus hunger is a physical condition that provokes suckling, or crying; curiosity provokes exploration and learning. Drought provokes spinach to run to seed. I call these responses spontaneous because they are unthought. — unenlightened

Yes, I think this is where we get our ambition from, we are born with it, it is instinctual. We do not learn how to be ambitious or passionate about things, either we have that spirit, or we do not. And I think we see this in other animals and plants as well, some are more spirited (motivated) than others. Would you really believe that this ambition is an automatic response encoded by the genes? What if one identical twin is more motivated than the other?

So per my earlier example, but in your language, thirst motivates drinking, but thought motivates the modification of behaviour from drinking some water to making tea, based on remembered previous experience. And one might say that biology, or evolution is motivated to provoke thought as a means to increase the diversity of responses through just such modification by learning. But in humans, thought reaches such a level that it can become wholly antagonistic to the motives of life that give rise to it, and this is the sad condition in which we find ourselves; that the thought that modifies the instinct to run to seed, to delay it rather than accelerate it perhaps, becomes anti-natalism, and wholly opposed to life. — unenlightened

I quite agree with this passage. Could we say that thought mitigates ambition and motivation? So instead of running to get some water as soon as you are thirsty, because you are a highly motivated person, you take the time to make tea instead. But if we follow Plato, he'll let us know that ambition works the other way as well. If you have an idea which you strongly believe in, this will strengthen your ambition and determination. If you believe you are dehydrated you probably wouldn't take the time to make tea. So thought will sometimes soften your motivation, but other times strengthen it. If a person cannot decide when to mitigate, or when to strengthen, one's ambition, or makes the wrong decisions concerning this, it is a sad condition.

How and when do we often move without having the goal to move - when we have a nervous twitch or something? — Harry Hindu

Any time we do something habitual we move without having the goal to make that movement. When I'm walking I'm moving my legs without having the goal to move the legs. My goal might be to get somewhere, or just to wander, but each time I take a step when I'm walking, I do not form the goal of taking that step.

I asked, can you be motivated without a goal and vice versa? — Harry Hindu

I thought the answer to this question is obvious from what I've been arguing. I've been arguing that you need to be motivated to create a goal, but motivation may produce things other than goals.

It's just a matter of studying, and learning different things. Some people like to take numbers and logical principles and apply them to the physical world. Some people just want to direct their attention toward these logical principles directly, and study their existence. It's a different interest, we are motivated in different ways.

Take for instance, the regress of truths. Suppose X is true. Then it is true that "X is true". But it will also be true that " 'X is true' is true", and so on and so forth. In this case we clearly have a regress, but we have no problem in accepting it. — Mr Bee

The only thing that this demonstrates, is that if you assume that something is true "suppose X is true", you automatically plunge yourself into infinite regress. It is not a benign case of infinite regress, because to suppose that X is true is not a benign supposition, depending on what is signified by X, there are logical implications. It seems like a benign infinite regress to you, because you have no problem accepting it. But this is just a manifestation of you having already thrown the problem undercover by supposing that X is true. By doing this, you accept the problem of infinite regress, but you do not produce an infinite regress without problems.

You make it sound as if the laws of physics were “created” and “produced” by magicians who made it so. — Michael Ossipoff

When I clearly stated that the laws of physics are descriptions, this statement is totally irrelevant.

No, the laws of physics were discovered by physicists. …as suggestions about how the physical world works. …as evident relations between certain physical quantity-values. — Michael Ossipoff

OK, call them "suggestions about how the world works" rather than my term "descriptions" if you like. How would physicists "discover" a suggestion? One might discover some by reading books, but there has to be a first time that such a suggestion was made by a physicist, and that physicist made that suggestion, the suggestion was not discovered.

By the way, replying to something else that you said in your previous post, there’s no contradiction between my statements about metaphysics and my statements about physics. Those are separate subjects. I suggest that the notion that those statements contradict eachother results from a conflation of physics and metaphysics.
. — Michael Ossipoff

OK, so your epistemic principles allow that what you believe concerning physics contradicts what you believe concerning metaphysics. I would not allow this, and if I ever found that I was in this situation, or approaching it, I would change what I believe.

As per the contradiction I pointed out, let me give it to you straight. You said:

Modern observations show the currently observed laws of physics operating long before there were any physicists. — Michael Ossipoff

The you said:

So no, I'm not saying that the physical laws exist independent of us. — Michael Ossipoff

Clearly the first statement says that laws of physics were operating before there were any physicists, implying that they are independent of us, and the second statement says that laws of physics do not exist independently of us. Can you explain how this is not contradiction?

How so? The underlying condition is discontent. This wells up in our linguistic brains as some sort of goal to move away from discontent in goal-directed action (get the date, get the ice cream, get the better job, build that career, etc. etc.) which according to Schopenhauer, never ceases to get rid of the underlying dissatisfaction which will always well up into more goals to be directed towards in our linguistic brains. — schopenhauer1

What I'm saying is that the discontent motivates the brain to produce goals and consequently goal-directed action. So I place motivation between discontent and goals, as a cause of goals. The brain in action needs not focus on goals, it may focus on intelligible ideas, logic, or other problems. This is contemplation, but an individual needs to be motivated to focus on these logical problems rather than focusing on goal-directed action as a means of release from dissatisfaction.

Contemplation is an activity, which requires motivation to carry it out. This is the perspective which allows Aristotle to say that contemplation is of the highest virtue. To be virtuous, it must be an activity, and as an activity it requires motivation. So the act of contemplation, which brings about good ideas, and good goals, is only brought about by the motivated individual, just like any other virtuous act.

Yes, that is the difference. But I think it is a real and crucial difference. I say that we do things, without motive, without idea and without a goal. — unenlightened

You are associating "motive" with "idea" and "goal", as if they are equivalent, or as if motive doesn't exist without a determinate goal. But "motive" refers solely to the source, or cause of motion, and there need not be a particular goal in mind which leads to the activity. So I think we have to assign motivation to lower animals, and even plants, which move without having any particular goal in mind.

I think you are misrepresenting what "motive" actually means. You are providing an understanding of the term which limits its use to a particular type of motive, how "motive" would be used in a law court or something like that, "the person's motive", meaning the person's intent. When in common usage, "motivate" has a much more general meaning, more closely associated with "impetus". In this way you seek to restrict the use of "motive", so that an idea or goal provides motivation, but it cannot be motivation which is responsible for the creation of ideas, they are spontaneous or random occurrences. In actuality though, "motive" refers to the factors which induce one to act. And thinking, which creates ideas and goals, is an act.

And this is the escape from the prison of discontented will - that it is merely an idea one has formed about oneself, and it is a mistaken idea. Why go on living? Why have children? No reason, no motive, no plan! Motives are thought excrescences on life that divert it from its course, which is just fine a lot of the time, but thought is the servant of life, not the master. — unenlightened

I agree that we can escape discontent through acting in the world, having a family, becoming socially active, etc.. But this is not necessary, as we can also escape discontent just through thinking, contemplation and imagination. To escape discontent, we do not need to form specific goals, and act in the world to bring these goals to fruition, we need only to think, theorize, and bring about ideas. You might call this living in a fantasy world, but that's what a theorist does and it's effective for escaping discontent. Sure the theory needs to be tested empirically to be proven, but this is not necessarily important to the theorist.



Let me see if I can interpret what you are saying.

Mind" is the name of a verbal concept which can be described as: the set of faculties exercised by a psychophysical being which produce natural and acculturated behaviour. When considered in relation to other verbal concepts (e.g., particular faculties), it becomes a verbal construct (i.e., mental model). — Galuchat

"Mind" refers to a bunch of faculties of a being, each of which produces a particular type of behaviour.

The set of faculties described in this conception of mind are real (i.e., they exist). However, "mind" (conceived of as an entity having these faculties) does not exist. So use of the word "mind" is only intelligible as a convenient way of referring to these faculties collectively, rather than by enumeration. — Galuchat

Now you lose me. Why do you say that the faculties exist, but "mind" does not exist? Let's say "human being" refers to a set of physical parts which perform certain activities. Why would you say that the parts performing the activities exist, but the whole, the human being does not exist? This appears to be what you are doing with "mind". You are assigning existence to each individual faculty, but denying existence from the whole. Just because we can break a thing into parts, this does not mean that the parts exist but the whole does not. How many of these faculties could exist on their own, without being a part of the mind?

If an experiment can be devised which resolves the question: "does the mind exist?", it is an empirical question, and the fact of its existence or non-existence can be established. For example, once it has been decided what constitutes the entity "mind", an experiment using PET, fMRI, MEG, or NIRS technology can determine whether or not it has neural correlates. — Galuchat

If we extend my analogy, you'd be asking what constitutes the entity called "human being", and looking at the parts of the human being, to see which of these parts could be the "human being". Do you see the flaw in this technique, examining the different parts to determine which of the parts "constitutes" the whole. You have defined "mind" as the whole "set" of these faculties, so that's what mind is, just like "human being" is the whole of the living being. So it is pointless to examine the parts to see which of them constitutes the whole, because the determination that the mind is "the whole" has already excluded this.

One might ask, "does the human being exist?", but if you've already decided that the human being is just a collection of different parts engaged in different functions, and that the collection as a whole has no special significance over any individual part, then what point is such a question?

I don't see where you're disagreeing with what I said. The goal would be to move. The difference between wanting to move and currently sitting still motivates us to move. The question we should ask is what comes first - the motivation or the goal? It seems that the motivation comes first as we notice the difference between our current state and the state we want. We then establish the goal and act. — Harry Hindu

My point is that we often move without having the goal to move. We need motivation to move but we do not need a goal to move. But I think we agree by and large anyway, because we both say that motivation is prior to the goal. I believe that a goal comes about from thinking, and thinking is an activity which requires motivation.

Physicists haven’t just been sitting on their hands during the past 400 years. They’ve arrived at some well-established, experimentally well-supported, never falsified laws of physics.
.
And yes, believe it or not, observational evidence indicates that those laws were also operating at times before there were any physicists. — Michael Ossipoff

You don't seem to have understood my criticism. The "laws of physics" are descriptions of how things behave. As such they were produced by human beings. How could they be "operating" before there were physicists, when physicists created them?

No, they’re observed through the senses (often via instrumentation). You can call then “entities” if you want to, but they’re provisional facts, that are accepted if they’re sufficiently confirmed, and never falsified. …eventually increasingly regarded as confirmed instead of provisional. And yes, they’re based on observation of physical events and conditions. — Michael Ossipoff

Laws of physics are produced by inductive reason, they are not observed through the senses. Through the senses we observe individual, particular instances, but a law of physics is a generalization which applies to numerous instances.

You really think that contradicts the statement that there’s observational evidence that currently accepted and used physical laws obtained at earlier times when there weren’t physicists? — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, I really think you contradict yourself. I don't see how physical laws could have "obtained" in any normal sense of the word "obtained", prior to their existence.

Angry-noises and vague, unspecified, unsupported expressions of personal opinion are standard, typical common troll-tactics.

If there's another sample, it won't be answered.

I stop replying to people who show that they're incapable of disagreeing politely. — Michael Ossipoff

Wow, I politely pointed out a simple problem with your metaphysics, without "vague, unspecified, unsupported expressions of personal opinion", and look who's expressing all sorts of anger.

This is the core of Schopenhauer's theory of Will. — schopenhauer1

This is the motivation of discontent. If one is inclined to move due to dissatisfaction, we can't really say that it is a goal or intention which motivates that person, it is just a general inclination toward change.

Inasmuch as it may exist in physical form when it is expressed, it does not "exist only in the mind". In fact, it never exists in a mind, because mind only exists as a verbal construct. — Galuchat

I don't understand what you mean when you say mind is only a verbal construct. Isn't the opposite of this what is really the case, minds create words? A goal can't really exist in a physical form, the words are a representation of the goal. The actual goal always exists in the mind.

'Suck it and see' is not really a motive so much as an attitude to the unknown, that infants necessarily adopt by instinct, and adults learn by bitter experience to renounce in favour of 'sticking with what works'. — unenlightened

This attitude toward the unknown is the philosophical mindset, wonder, the desire to know. Wouldn't you consider that wonder is a motive?

there is no possible motive for drinking concoction X, — unenlightened

So I can't say that I agree with this statement. Do you not think that there is motive behind trial and error? The thing tried in the process of trial and error, must be tried for some reason or purpose, or else there could be no determination of "error". Concoction X is tried for some reason, so there must be motive, but the reason is not evident, and maybe not even to the one who is trying it. Youngsters try all kinds of drugs and their motives aren't clear, but that doesn't mean there aren't motives.

Suppose the child is popping things into its mouth completely randomly, without any determination of "error", and therefore with no motive. Isn't this just the same things as saying that the idea, the goal to put the thing in its mouth, just pops into the child's head from nowhere? So now we're back to the same position I stated earlier. The act of imagination produces this idea from nothing, it just pops into the child's head, what you call "spontaneous action". And this is what creativity is. The difference between what you're saying and what I said, appears to be that you do not want to call this spontaneous action an act of imagination.

The difference between how we'd like it to be and how it is is what motivates us. We aren't motivated when things are how we'd like it to be. We are content. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. Even when we feel content, we are still motivated to act. Moving is a physiological thing, and we are naturally inclined to move. You might argue that we move because we are not content to sit still, but then there are no goals, or "how we'd like it to be" which is motivating us, we are just motivated to move because we are discontent with being how we are.

don't think so. Imagine that terrible time before there was trade with China. The unenlightened of those days would never imagine liking tea in those days because 'tea' was a disgusting concoction of chamomile or blackcurrant leaves that was forced on you whenever you complained of quinsy or the King's evil. That poor unenlightened would have suffered, but never known what it was that was lacking in hie life, to even desire it. So there is no vicious circle that I can see. Like Tigger, one bounces through life bumping into hay-corns and thistles and not liking them much until one bumps into Roo's strengthening medicine, which is A A Milne's metaphor for tea. One learns from experience what one can desire, and the bouncing and bumping is the spontaneous movement of life. — unenlightened

OK, I admit that it is possible, that all goals are produced from prior experience like this. But how do we account for innovation and creativity then? With creativity It must be the case that the act of imagination creates something new and that new thing created must be something in the mind. Suppose we assume that the imagination always uses old parts when creating something new, then there is necessarily some things within the mind which were not created by the imagination.

What are these things, and where do they come from? We cannot class these things as imaginary now, because we've denied that they are created by the imagination. We've defeated your definition which states that all things in the mind are imaginary because we've found some fundamental things within the mind which cannot be imaginary.

Furthermore, for me this casts doubt on the assumption that there are unmotivated actions. I appealed to the idea of the imagination creating something out of nothing, as an example of an unmotivated action. But if the imagination always draws from something already existing when it creates, then aren't those things, which cause it to create what it does, motivating things? How can we get beyond the idea that these things are causes, in the creative act, to assume an unmotivated action?

In the end, all i mean by imagined is that it is something in one's head that is not in the world. — unenlightened

I figured this was probably what you meant, but I like to distinguish between the act of imagining (imagination), and the image, or other imaginary thing (thing in one's head). So as things in one's head, we have all sorts images, memories, words, beliefs, ideas, and of course goals and intentions. But as well as this, we have the act of imagination, and this act may establish relationships, associations between different images, memories, words, goals etc.. This act, as a creative act, will create new memories, goals, etc.. But in this description I assume that there is already content, images memories etc., from which new things in one's head are produced.

Isn't that description inaccurate then? The act of imagination is said to be what produces things in one's head, but it is presumed that there are already things within one's head for the act of imagination to work with. This is a vicious circle. The imagination can only create something if something already exists, but that something could have only been created by the imagination.

Wouldn't it be more precise to say that the act of imagination creates things from nothing? This is not nothing in an absolute sense, but it is the potential for things. So the act of imagination creates things within one's head, not by working with things which are already there, existing content, establishing associations and relationships with these existing things, it creates things from nothing, where there was just the potential for things.

On the small scale, my goal is the cup of tea that I do not have, that does not exist because it hasn't been made, and the logic is that if it had been made I wouldn't possibly have it as a goal, I'd already have it, just as my goal was to write some kind of reply to you, but now it is written, it is a goal no longer.

In more traditional language, perhaps, my desire is always for something that is not, something lacking. What can we call something that is not? An image, a fiction, a notion? The source of such is the past, one's experience - it can only be the past since it is not present, and it is projected onto the future as a goal. — unenlightened

Let's say that you mind creates the goal of a cup of tea. For the sake of argument, let's assume that it creates that from nothing. There is the potential for a seemingly infinite number of different goals, but your mind produces the goal of a cup of tea without consulting past memories, ideas, or any such thing, the goal just pops into your head, from the vast potential. Now your mind must validate, or justify this goal. Is it reasonable, is it obtainable, should it be sought etc.? At this point your mind consults already existing things in your head, drawing associations and relationships, to determine whether it is a good goal or not.

In the end, I think one can only intend something to the extent that it is known, so a creative act is necessarily the interplay of the intentional and the accidental, and that is what I alluded to above when I mentioned doodles. One can act without motive. — unenlightened

So in the end, I do agree that we can act without motive, if you allow that the act of imagination is such an act. The act of imagination will produce goals without any motivation, if we allow that these goals just pop into your head. But before we proceed to act on the goal, we will assess it, judge it, and I think that it is only following this judgement that one becomes motivated. This produces the distinction between two types of acts, the unmotivated "act of imagination", and the motivate act to fulfill a goal, with the medium of judging what is produced by the imagination, lying between these two. Therefore motivation must be related to judgement.

Is a goal or imagination a phenomenon in one's mind or head which can be experienced and perceived? If so, by what is it experienced and perceived? What and where is one's mind (it's intuitively obvious that heads can be perceived, but can minds be perceived)? — Galuchat

I believe you have met a logical roadblock here. I don't think that a mind can be perceived, this is logically impossible, unless one mind could directly perceive another mind. The mind is active in the act of perception, so the mind is the thing which is perceiving. It cannot be the thing perceived or else there would be a nonsensical circle of time, because an act requires the passage of time. By the time the act of perception occurs, the thing perceived no longer exists, so it is impossible that the act of perception is what is being perceived or else time would be circular. It is logically possible that one mind could directly perceive another, but since the mind is not sensed, and things external to a person are sensed, the nature of the sense world renders this physically impossible.

Is a goal or imagination something concrete which can be located in one's mind or head (i.e., either as a part of brain anatomy or neurophysiology)? — Galuchat

I believe that a goal, as an object is just as real as any physical object. So depending on what you mean by "concrete", a goal may be concrete (real). A goal may be identified, it may be analyzed, properties may be attributed to it, etc., just like any physical object. The difference is that the goal is an object understood to exist only in the mind, while a physical object is understood to exist outside the mind.

In logic the expression ''neither...nor...'' has a specific translation:

Apple is red = R
Neither the apple is red nor the apple is not red = Apple is not red AND not apple is not red = the apple is not red AND the apple is red = ~R & R = R & ~R

The ''middle'' that is ''excluded'' is the contradiction R & ~R. — TheMadFool

What you have offered here is a specific interpretation which I have never seen. It is not the interpretation of "logic", but perhaps of a specific logical system which I am unfamiliar with. It is an illogical interpretation to me, for the following reason.

"Neither the apple is red nor the apple is not red", refers to a subject, "the apple", and states that it cannot be determined whether the apple is red or not. Perhaps "apple" is not something which has a colour. Whereas, "Apple is not red AND not apple is not red" negates the subject "apple" with "not apple". From here, you cannot proceed to your third statement "the apple is not red AND the apple is red" because you have negated the subject, "the apple" with "not apple".

There is ontological significance to the difference between violating the LNC and violating the LEM. It reflects how we view the existence of the object, which is represented as the subject. Consider quantum physics, and lets say that the subject is a particular electron. If we violate LNC we would say the electron is at X (spatial temporal location), and, the electron is not at X. But the predication "is at X" is the identifying feature of that particular electron, so if we also deny that the electron is at X, we deny our capacity to identify the object, as the subject referred to in the logic.

So the result of denying the LNC is that we assume a subject, with a corresponding object, but we claim with the denial of LNC that it is impossible to identify that subject. Contradiction is inherent within this position because we claim an object (therefore identify the object, as the named subject), yet we deny the possibility that the object has an identity. Ontologically there is no validity to the assumption of an object, it is a name without anything real that the name refers to, as the thing is described by contradictory terms. If there is contradiction within the identity of the object we deny the reality of the object. But then we proceed to talk about the object anyway, ignoring this.

If we violate LEM instead, then with the same example, we have an electron, the object represented as the subject, and we say that the predication "is at X" is false, and the predication "is not at X" is false. Again, we claim an object, represented by the subject, but the contradiction here is not inherent within the claim of an object, it is in the mode of identifying the object, the predication. We have not found the true method to identify the object. So in this case, the contradiction is believed to be within the description of the object, it is not represented as within the reality of the object (which would deny the reality of the object).

The difference then, is that when we violate LNC we allow that contradiction is intrinsic within the identity of the object, the object is inherently contradictory. This negates the reality of the object as contradictory. When we violate LEM the contradiction is within the way that we are attempting to describe the object, this negates the description of the object as contradictory. In the one case, the object is seen as inherently indescribable, while in the other case, the object is indescribable due to faults in the describing method.

Can you expand on this a bit. Sorry for the trouble. — TheMadFool

The difference between assigning "true" to a statement, and assigning "false" to a statement is that when you assign "true" you exclude all other possibilities, and when you assign false you allow all other possibilities. So the one, "true", denies other possibilities while the other, "false", allows other possibilities.

When you violate LNC you say "X is true" and "not X is true", thus denying any other possibilities. When you violate LEM you say "X is false" and "not X is false" allowing for all other possibilities.

A goal is an image projected into an imagined future, and identified with. Goals are imaginary until they are realised. — unenlightened

I wonder if a goal is necessarily an image, or "imagined". I suppose it depends on what is meant by "imagined", but it seems to me that often a goal is just some sort of vague notion, not an image at all. I want to be satisfied, and happy, what kind of image is that? It appears to be easier to put words to a goal than it is to put an image to a goal. Why? These words don't produce any particular images, just vague notions.

Sure, the architect is capable of associating an image with the goal, but this is not an easy task, and it takes training. So I wonder why it is that we all seem to have goals, but to associate an image with that goal, which may be required in order to bring the goal into reality, doesn't seem to be something which we all have the capacity to do.

Modern observations show the currently observed laws of physics operating long before there were any physicists. — Michael Ossipoff

I cannot comprehend this statement. First, the "laws of physics are produced by human beings, created by human minds. So secondly, when you say the "observed laws of physics", I assume that what you mean is that the laws are "respected" by physicists, not that they are things like entities observed through the senses. Finally, therefore, it is nonsense to say that these laws were "operating" before there were any physicists. What could you possibly mean by "operating" here?

So no, I'm not saying that the physical laws exist independent of us. — Michael Ossipoff

This seems to directly contradict what you said above. Are you sure that you know what you're trying to say?

I didn’t say that a thing and its description are the same. — Michael Ossipoff

You said: "In the metaphysics that I propose, our whole physical world is a system of inter-referring if-then statements, and nothing more.

If-then statements are statements of description. And you said that these statements of description are the physical world itself, (the thing being described).

There’s no reason to believe that the objectively-existent “things” of Materialism are other than fiction. — Michael Ossipoff

Are you saying that there is no such thing as the thing being described, that "the thing being described" is fictitious? What's the point of a description then?

Is ''the apple is red'' AND ''the apple is not red'' also excluded? — TheMadFool

No, this is denied by the LNC. What is denied by LEM is that there is a third option, that the apple is neither red nor not red.

2. If it isn't then it leads us to a contradiction and also, why? — TheMadFool

I don't see why you say this.

So it is excluded ''that neither Socrates is mortal nor Socrates is not mortal'' — TheMadFool

Yes, that's the LEM, it cannot be the case that both "Socrates is mortal", and "Socrates is not mortal" are false.

That means it is excluded that (P & ~P). That's the LNC: ~(P & ~P). — TheMadFool

Correct, the LNC says that it cannot be the case that both "Socrates is mortal", and "Socrates is not mortal" are true.

Do you see the difference between LEM and LNC? One says that two opposing statements cannot both be true, the other that two opposing statements cannot both be false.

What would a TRIvalent system look like? — TheMadFool

According to Wikipedia a trivalent logic has three truth values, true, false, and an indeterminate third value. The third value appears to be best described as "unknown".

2. In LEM what is the ''middle'' that is ''excluded''? — TheMadFool

The excluded middle is anything other than "is" or "is not". Either the apple is red, or the apple is not red, and the LEM insists that there is no "middle", between being red and being not red.

A goal is not an entity, it is a psychological function of human beings. So, a person cannot even observe their own goal; they experience it. — Galuchat

OK, so all you have done here is distinguished between two types of objects, objects which are entities and objects which are goals. You claim that only entities can be observed, thus restricting the use and meaning of "observe". I do not agree with this restriction. I think that a person's own goals may be apprehended with one's own mind, and the person may observe and follow one's own goals.

Also. it appears like you want to restrict the use of "experience", such that one experiences one's goals, but does not experience entities. Unless you adopt some dualist premises, I do not believe that such restrictions can be justified.

What is observed is goal behaviour, described by criteria, and constituting criterial evidence of another's goal experience.

...I agree, but it is the same as observing that a person has a goal. — Galuchat

What is observed is goal behaviour. And if we associate this behaviour with a premise, we can deduce that the person has a goal. But making the logical conclusion that the person has a goal is not the same thing as observing that the person has a goal. The goal is not observed. According to your restrictions, observations are of entities, not of goals. So no matter how well you observe the goal behaviour, you are not observing the goal (which can only be experienced according to your restrictions). Nor have you observed that the person has a goal, you have deduced this.

That was Michael's first post on the Forum. Hey, Max Tegmark believes the universe consists of numbers. As do Pythagoreans, generally. Check out this New Scientist video. — Wayfarer

I like the video, it's a paradox. But Plato and Aristotle proved Pythagorean Idealism wrong, a long time ago, by appealing to substance dualism, and that's how we get beyond these apparent paradoxes.



A physical law is a description of the physical world, one produced by human minds, it is not the physical world itself.

Such an if-then system can fully describe a physical world. ...and is consistent with our experiences and observations. — Michael Ossipoff

See, the system describes the physical world, but don't you recognize a difference between the description and the thing described? How do you make this leap, to saying that the physical world is nothing more than the description?

When I say "I need food" it does not in anyway mean that I long for a piece of cheese. It simply means that I have to eat to survive. — Sir2u

This is what I disagree with. How can you need food without having a longing for it? What validates your claim that you need it, other than your longing for it? Without the longing for it, you are just being dishonest in your claim of needing food, because you are not even hungry. It may be true that you need food to survive, but not now because you're not even hungry, so your statement "I need food" is false.

But you are when you say that they are in the same category. — Sir2u

Two things of the same category are not the same thing, they are in some way similar. So I am saying that desire and need are similar, but not the same.

I don't, if you look at the list it is shown as a synonym for need. — Sir2u

You have "want" as a synonym for "need", and "desire" as a synonym for "longing". Yet "desire" and "want" are commonly synonymous, and you want a categorical separation between "need" and "longing". Why?

Why do you place "want" in the category other than "desire"?

In the metaphysics that I propose, our whole physical world is a system of inter-referring if-then statements, and nothing more. — Michael Ossipoff

The entire physical world consists of nothing more than statements? That's an odd sort of metaphysics

Which it is not because it is not even a synonym of need and therefore not in the same category.
Similar word to longing would be
hankering
yearning
desire

None of which actually imply need.
requirement
necessary
want
necessity
requisite
essential — Sir2u

You're still not addressing the question. The fact that you can name many longings for something absent which are not needs, still does not necessitate the conclusion that need is not a longing for something absent. You may continue to increase your list of longings, showing that none of them imply need, but this will never demonstrate that need is not a longing.

It is obvious I think that while some people think of a desire as being the same as a necessity they are incorrect. — Sir2u

Clearly I am not equating desire and need. If you think that two things are said to be the same, just because they are said to be of the same category, you sorely misunderstand.

The question "Why?" asks for the cause. When the answer is an efficient cause, as is commonly the case in science, we can continue to ask "Why?" of that efficient cause, and answer with another efficient cause. This process may continue indefinitely (infinite regress). To avoid the infinite regress, and put an end to that chain of efficient causation, it is common to turn to final cause (telos).

However, ONLY when an object is ABSENT, is there a need to 'call' it back into presence. — Mark Aman

As a memory aid we make markings, writing. Vocal language is used to communicate with others. The two are guided by completely different intentions and likely developed separately, in the beginning. For example, numbers probably developed in a written form, such as simple marks, prior to ever having a verbal form.

I can long for the girlfriend I had when I was 18, but I don't need her.
I can long for a peanut butter sandwich, but I don't need one.

I need food.
I need water.

Seems to me there is a bit of a difference. — Sir2u

Sure there's a difference but I didn't imply that all cases of longing for something absent are cases of need. I asked how do you conceive of need as something other than a case of longing for something absent. Do you see the difference? If longing for something absent is the larger category, then all cases of need might be cases of longing for something absent, but not all cases of longing for something absent are cases of need.

So I asked you, in response to your post, how is need not a form of longing for something absent. To answer that not all cases of longing for something absent are cases of need, does not answer the question.

But, if you want to think of particularly mass-distribution effects, a more interesting subject would be earths' "wobble" - whether precession as it rotates around the axis or the violence of natural causes - that causes the earth to shake, including droughts, earthquakes and heavy rainfall. So the distribution of mass, basically, is affecting climate change particularly with polar melting, which is pulling the axis. Pretty spooky. — TimeLine

Yes, there are some very interesting facts concerning the earth. The equator is not stable, to begin with. The magnetic poles do not line up with the true poles, and are moving. And, the north/south axis flips from time to time, to mention a few, other than the wobble.

I think it is necessary to distinguish between intentions, or goals, and motivation which is the ambition that aids in successfully achieving ones goals.

Inasmuch as "goal" is synonymous with "intention", it is a psychological expression of a subjective experience which can be observed by others, hence; a natural phenomenon. And inasmuch as people discuss "goals", "goal" is a nominal label. — Galuchat

I don't see how a goal, or intention, could be observed by another. We can discuss our goals with others using language, but this is to offer a representation of the goal, so it is not the case that the goal is observed. Also, we can observe the actions of others, and using some premises, we can make some logical conclusion concerning the person's goal, but again this is not the same as observing the goal. I think that we can only really observe our own goals, and this is an internal observation.

Some dancers are a bit wild and inconsiderate, and you might want to remonstrate, but if a drunk is flailing about knocking people down and throwing up on them, it's time to call in the bouncers. — unenlightened

Hey, I was John Travolta on the floor, back in the day. And despite being drunk, I never knocked people down (bounced off a few and fell down myself though), nor did I throw up on anyone. The bouncers threw me out anyway. I think they were jealous of my moves.

Of all of the forums that I've ever participated in, this is the only one with genuinely effective moderation, ...and with moderation that isn't abused. — Michael Ossipoff

I love the moderation, and the moderators ... honestly. Keep up the good work folks!

I should add that I once received a murder-threat, from a "moderator" at a Spiritual forum. Of course there were no consequences to the perp. — Michael Ossipoff

Probably that Moses... whatever the fuck his name was. He threatened me over at pf, in a PM, and Streetlight dealt with him for me. Thanks Street. Now there's a good reason to ban someone if there ever was one.