Given the premise that only conscious agents are metaphysically real—or, rather, that the whole of the phenomenal universe is derived in one way or another from conscious agents—I don’t find a means to substantiate block time. Again, I do find a requirement that before and after occur within the first-person point of view regarding apprehensions and creations relative to other and—in a more complex fashion—relative to any cohort of individual agents that can causally affect each other. But this would lead to a variant of presentism. — javra

Right, so that's why we need to dismiss block time, and the hypotheses which give rise to it, and start from scratch. Starting from scratch we have conscious agents who are creating a phenomenal universe. Everything from within the phenomenal experience indicates that time is passing, change occurs. So time passing is the number one premise or assumption of what is the case. The second premise is that there is something which is active, something which is changing. We do create spatial and temporal concepts to understand what is given by these two premises, but to validate past memories and future anticipations through referencing these spatial and temporal concepts is a different issue.

The point I was making is that if we assume the non-spatial point, and give the agent non-spatial, immaterial existence at this point, we can still conceive of the passing of time without any spatial change occurring, simply by assuming the continuous temporal existence of the immaterial agent. The "something which is active" then may be the agent itself. In this way we do not yet need to assume material existence. The next question then is what is the agent doing, and this is where we draw on the concept of creativity.

Conscious agency (i.e., creative power)? — Galuchat

Right, that's how I'm trying to represent conscious agency, as creative power. If we assume an active agent with no causal necessity to move in any particular way because it is immaterial, and no inclination toward any particular intent, then all we have is creative power. What moves the will of that agent other than the desire to create?

BUT you don't agree with Mariner that chaos corresponds to infinite potential (since well, the latter is impossible). — Agustino

Yes, I do agree with that. But just like we can speak contradictions, we can also talk about other things which are impossible, like infinite, unlimited potential, prime matter, and infinite chaos.

Though it is to be noted that perhaps most people on this forum would disagree with us on that point. — Agustino

The idea of unlimited potential may be in vogue right now, but belief in it doesn't make it any more possible. Clearly there are limits to possibility and believing that the impossible is possible is just a mistake. As Aristotle points out in the argument, if there ever was infinite chaos, then there would be no order whatsoever. But we observe order, so infinite chaos is impossible.

Yeah I agree with Mariner, that's why I was arguing that point. To have order is to have form, and form corresponds with actual existence. In Aristotelian metaphysics, the cosmological argument denies the possibility of pure infinite potential, as not actually possible, it is impossible. That argument is the one which allows form to be prior in time to matter, giving the Neo-Platonists the logical foundation for independent Forms.

So as much as we can talk about chaos as lack of order, this makes chaos relative to order, just like potential is relative actuality. But to speak of an absolute lack of order is to talk about something which is impossible, because "chaos", meaning "lack of order", already assumes "order" within its definition, so to assume "absolute chaos" is self-contradicting..

That's quite the post. Let me see if I can, in some way, understand what you are trying to say.

Because this singularity is devoid of otherness, it is also devoid of boundaries via which it can gain a quantifiable identity and, therefore, can well be demarcated as a non-quantity whole. — javra

The space-less point would not have a boundary itself, but as soon as you assume a multitude of such points, there must be something, reified space or some such thing, which separates one point from another. The singular point, therefore, as a whole, must be the whole of everything, the entire universe, and all of existence, because there is no principle of separation. As soon as we assume something other than the point, space surrounding the point for example, we then allow for the possibility of more points, so if the point is singular, it would be all that there is.

As I remember it, as was addressed in a by now ancient discussion on the old forum, we already agree that it is only once two or more geometric points hold presence that space itself holds presence. What I’m reaching at is that while a singular geometric point can be conceived to hold space-less presence, the presence of two or more points entails the co-dependent origination of space. — javra

I don't think you should be so quick to assume a spatial separation between points, because there is another way we can go, and that is a temporal separation. Imagine counting, two comes after one, and three comes after two. If the space-less point is separated from itself by a period of time, then we get such a count, one, two, three, four, five, etc.. Each number represents an appearance in time of the point, and without a premise of continuous existence of the point, through time, we have no means for concluding that the appearance of the point, at each following moment, is an appearance of the same point. Now we have a multitude of countable points which are not separated by space. They have order, identity and distinction according to the passage of time, such that one was prior to two, which is prior to three, etc.. We have a fundamental separation between entities (points), with order and positioning of these entities without even assuming the existence of space.

So we actually can have numerous points without space, and this is a fundamental temporal order, but as soon as we assume numerous points at the same time, then we need spatial separation. The points with temporal separation are identified by temporal order, but how would we identify, and distinguish between the numerous points existing at the same time? We would have to produce a geometry of co-ordinates.

Were we to grant both awareness and creative agency to these geometric points, not only would the presence of two or more points necessitate to co-existence of space but also of time: the creations of one point will occur either before, after, or simultaneous to the awareness/apprehension and/or creation of any other geometric point. — javra

Suppose there is a multitude of creative points with a temporal order. There is no spatial separation between these points, so if taken together in order, they constitute a continuous self. Assumption of a self establishes that the procession of points is of the same point, at a different time, and therefore continuity of existence . Could the points create a spatial separation through the use of geometry? Can a temporal separation be inverted such that it becomes a spatial separation? By creating this spatial separation, the creative agent would create space.

Though mumbo jumbo to some, it can further be noted that base natures of people are (overly) selfish and elevated natures of people are (relatively speaking) selfless. This singular geometric point example is, in so many other words, a perfectly selfless being: the pinnacle of elevated nature as viewed from within space and time. — javra

The repetition of the same point in time, over and over again, as temporal order, is the existence of the self. This is the temporal continuity of existence. The selfless act I believe, is to give of one's temporal continuity, in order to create a spatial unity with other points existing at the same time. The question at hand is how it comes to be that there are multiple points existing at the same time. The different points cannot be of a different universe because they exist at the same time. How does it come to be that the points may have spatial separation in the first place, that there may be numerous selves?

As I said, just because it doesn't fulfill the structural conditions for being music, doesn't mean that any noise chaos. Would you say that the noise of people talking is chaos? If you are trying to claim that some noises are chaos, you need a better argument. I don't think there is such a thing as a noise which is chaos.

You are only trying saying that non-musical sound is "chaotic" in relation to the structured sounds of music. It doesn't have the required structure to call it music, so you just call it noise. But noise isn't chaotic, it's very nature is that it has its own cause and structure such that it is highly intelligible, and therefore not chaotic.

Okay, let's think in terms of music. According to you, chaos corresponds to silence, which metaphorically is pure potential for sound. According to me, this is wrong, because silence in music is more primordial than chaos. A musical rhythm is order. Pure noise, without meaning or purpose, that would be chaos. But pure noise, just like a musical rhythm, is still an act, and not a potency, as silence metaphorically would be. — Agustino

Music is the subject. In relation to this subject, pure noise may be the potential for music. How is there any actual music in pure noise? All you are doing is changing the subject from music to sound, in order to say that sound is still something actual, because it is not actual music. So the real subject here is sound, not music. Now the potential for sound, again will be something actual, but not an actual sound, and we could proceed ad infinitum.

The point which you don't seem to be getting is that noise, in relation to the particular order which is called music, is chaotic. But noise itself, as an actual thing is not chaotic, it is ordered by whatever produces it from the potential for it. So the actual thing which serves as the potential for something else, is chaotic in relation to that thing which it is the potential for, but if you look at this potential as an actual thing itself, it is not chaotic. But this is to change the subject. So you only convert potential from chaos to order by changing the subject.

Where does honesty lie in this approach? For example, here at tpf, I hide behind a username. The people I commune with probably don't interact with me in my everyday life, so in a manner of speaking they do not know who I am. I am undercover. This gives me two distinct options, which I can choose from depending on my personality. I can pretend to be a different person from who I am in real life, and express things which I do not actually believe, in which case I am being dishonest. Or, If I am shy and have difficulty expressing my self in face to face communications, I might find that I can be more honest about my true opinions at tpf than I can be in real life.

Now consider a dialogic therapy. The person would be clearly identified, such that there would be no hiding of the "who" is saying what. If the person is afraid to express one's true feelings out of fear of some sort of judgement how can that person be encouraged to express oneself honestly? I ask this because if you are talking about diseases like schizophrenia, I believe the capacity to be honest with oneself may play a role in the development of the disease.

So it appears to me like honesty is a key component of the parent/child relationship. The child is encouraged by the parent to be honest, though the child may develop devious tendencies. And if the parent is found to be lacking in honesty by the child, the bond of trust might be broken. How is honesty encouraged in such a therapeutic method?

I'm a bit vague on how the term creativity is being used throughout this thread too. It seems to have some other meaning. — MikeL

I think I brought up creativity. I use it in what I believe is the normal way. It means to bring something into existence, to cause the existence of something. The point was, that all living things express creativity, to different extents, but the creations are not what you might normally refer to as a creation, because what is created are the parts of the living creature's body. This creativity is essential to evolution, because it is responsible for the variations found between individual beings. It may appear to you as an odd sort of meaning for "creativity", because we don't normally think of the living being as creating its own body, but why should we not think in this way, if it is true? We do not think in this way because we have been conditioned by the societal pressures, to suppress the idea of a creator. When we see living things as creators themselves, it leads us toward the assumption that there is a creator of life.

So take Rich's example of moss, or different coloured carrots. The differences which are seen in the moss field, and the differences seen in the colours of the carrots are all expressions of the creative power of the living organisms. I find that seeing these things as creations really helps me to appreciate and enjoy the splendour of life. Instead of looking at "natural beauty" when I look at the vast array of life forms around me, I am looking at the artwork of living organism and I am awestruck by their creativity.

Try looking at a rainbow chart showing the colours of the visible spectrum. Then take a look through a substantial flower garden in full bloom in the middle of summer. See how the living things in this garden have taken a rather boring "natural" spectrum of six or seven different colours, to create literally hundreds if not thousands of different colours, through the use of different chemical structures. Some of those colours and contrasts are so stunning they can stop you in wonder. When you see these colours as a natural beauty you think wow, that's incredible, but when you see them as creations it blows your mind.

So you confuse the immanent purpose of naturalism with the transcendence claimed by theism? Finding creative ways to get the issue backwards as usual. — apokrisis

The "immanent purpose of naturalism". I've never heard that before. Care to explain? I thought naturalism, by definition, excludes purpose. Are you just trying to inject purpose into naturalism in a way which veils the inherent contradiction? Bear in mind, that something created with purpose is artificial, and therefore by the law of non-contradiction, cannot be natural.

One way to look at what he is telling us is that the universe is front of us is filled with so much white noise that we need to filter it in order to understand a truth that promotes our survival. We can take the idea of a Superposition of all information of our world, and suggest that our mind Decoheres it in order to make sense of it (Rich won't like the idea of a decoder as the mind).

In this model of the world our mind has created visual buttons for us to understand the world around us, hiding the complex behind it. The snake, the train. In this instance closer inspection reveals the atoms and molecules. — MikeL

But what if survival is just a side effect? Suppose that it is possible that the mind is trying to do something, and survival is not even related to what the mind is trying to do. Some of the efforts which the mind carries out, happen to promote survival, but this is really irrelevant to what the mind is actually trying to do. So for example, if I was trying to harvest grain to eat, and I spilled it and happened to seed an area, then the propagation of the grain into the next generation is accidental to what I was really trying to do. I say this just to stress the point that if there is intention behind the acts of living things, then that intention is not necessarily survival. It is possible that survival is a side effect, therefore we must seek the real intention.

The question concerned the purpose of nature, of existence in general. Last time I looked, that lay outside any personal concerns I might have. — apokrisis

The mention was of a "transcendent purpose", and the point I made was that this idea doesn't really make sense. Purpose always seems to inhere within us, I have my purpose, you have your purpose, etc.. The only way that purpose seem to get outside us is when we create something with a purpose. Then that thing has a purpose, but that purpose is derived from within the person who created the thing.

When God is conceived of as a transcendent being, then we have nature, and existence in general, being created by the will of God, and this allows that nature and existence in general have purpose according to the intent of God. Therefore the concept of God supports the claim of transcendent purpose. But without God, "transcendent purpose" becomes a meaningless phrase. Furthermore, if we find that we get in touch with God through our inner self, then the question of how God may transcend us through the inside becomes a very difficult problem.

Why would we be compelled to apprehend this unity? — praxis

We are compelled by the evidence. The fundamental concept of mathematics is unity. The entire conceptual structure of numbers is based in one concept, the unit. And this unit, "one", is itself immaterial. Then the numerical structure is built on the assumption that there are numerous different units which are the same. Since the units are the same, "different", here implies a separation between them, such that "two" signifies multiple units which are the same but different (due to separation). Furthermore, the entire structure itself, as a structure, is also necessarily a unity, consisting of "the numbers", and this unity is necessary in order that the numbers are intelligible. Intelligibility, is associated with coherency which is the property of a unity. The individual unities, the numbers starting with one, as well as the entire structure, are all completely immaterial, non-dimensional.

Then we can move toward the higher mathematics such as algebra which works entirely within the immaterial realm of symbols, and find that the symbols signify nothing material, everything conceived of is in the realm of non-dimensional numbers, unities of units. or we can move toward the lower mathematics such as geometry, where the non-dimensional is applied to the dimension. Notice that the starting point in geometry is the non-dimensional point, and we build up the dimensions with lines, circles, and spheres. The non-dimensional point again is a fundamental unity. It is indivisible, and therefore the most pure unity in relation to spatial existence. This indivisible point is the unity which allows us passage from the realm of spatial existence to the non-spatial.

But the physicalist who denies the reality of this fundamental unity denies passage into the non-dimensional realm. The evidence though is overwhelming. These immaterial, non-dimensional units, and unities are used continuously by mathematicians and scientists, with very productive results, so they must be real.

Further, we assume objects, which form the basis of many logical proceedings, as we attribute properties to objects. The object again is a unity. Newton assumed the unity of the object, as something taken for granted when he produced his laws of motion. But objects have long been known to be divisible, so taking unity for granted was a misleading position which the principles of modern physics have moved beyond. Now we have no basis for the assumption of a physical unity (object), because even what was once considered to be an object is now believed to be a process. However, as evidenced above, unity, and the unit (object), remains fundamental within the immaterial, non-dimensional, conceptual realm. .

But how could transcendent purpose be validated? Is personal revelation or religious tradition enough to talk about purpose in that universalising sense? — apokrisis

Here's another example of why I say your ontology is backward. You look outward for purpose. But clearly we must look inward to find purpose, and purpose is something which comes from within us. If you derive purpose from outside of yourself, you are taking someone else's purpose, working for someone else's intentions instead of your own. The only way to have true purpose is to be true to yourself, and this purpose comes from within, or else it is not your purpose.

When we go deep deep within ourselves, we find the uniting principle at the deepest internal level, not being imposed on us from the outside. And this is why Rich, with a very odd sort of ontology is on the right track. We may look outward, at a vast external world but there is only separation out there. Any appearance of unity in the external world is just that, an appearance. When we turn inward, we find the true principles of unity, and unity is the basis of all mathematics and logic.

So the puzzle which we find here is how is the unity of objects which appear to our senses as being at great distances from each other, achieved through the inside. When we look to a smaller and smaller point of space, artificially, or theoretically, dividing space to a smaller and smaller point, we approach the issue of infinite divisibility. So we assume that somehow this divisibility has to stop. We can go in two directions. We can take an infinitesimally small point of space as our limit, or we can jump to the non-spatial, dimensionless point. Those who do not make the dualist inspired jump to non-spatial existence, and assume an infinitesimal point as the limits to reality, are locked into a physicalist system which does not recognize the reality of non-spatial existence.

But if, in the platonic tradition, we recognize non-spatial existence as the true basis of reality itself, we open up an entire realm of non-spatial existence to our inquiring minds. It lies within, or underneath all of physical existence, which, being non-physical, cannot be perceived by the senses, but only apprehended directly by the mind. From this perspective we can apprehend the existence of information at non-spatial, dimensionless points, and the unity of those points through the means of that information.

We have two opposing directions, one toward the inside, the other toward the outside. I say we proceed toward the inside. You say we proceed toward the outside. Relative to each other we are both backwards. Your backwardness is the drab, everyday backwardness of all those cave dwellers, the entire scientific community. My backwardness is a special gift.

Thanks, any time I'm told that I have a special gift (which is exceedingly rare), I will not hesitate to take that as a compliment.

Do these two have a substantial disagreement at all? — Pneumenon

Do any of the billiard balls have a mind of their own, and the capacity to move one's own body in the way it wants? If not, then your "ecosystem" is not a proper representation of the real world in which we live in, which has living things that can do this. If so, then both Mr. Reductionist and Mr. Irreductionist are of track.

Rational animal, thank you. It's a qualifier that makes a fundamental diifference. — Wayfarer

I don't think I would call that difference "fundamental". What is fundamental, is that we and other animals are all animals. So when I said to apokrisis, that minds are not trapped by language games, this is because other animals which do not necessarily play language games still have minds. The point being that language is not a necessary feature of a mind, but a mind is necessary for language. Apokrisis, with a reverse, or inverted, ontology, assuming semiotics as fundamental, wants to claim that language brings mind into existence. Since the reverse is really the case, minds bring language into existence, this is just a further indication that apokrisis promotes a backward ontology.

I fully accept the facts of evolution, but I believe that once h. sapiens crosses a certain threshold, she is able to see things in a way that are not simply 'biologically determined'. Such, indeed, is the meaning of the 'sapience' after which our kind is named. — Wayfarer

What is the point to assuming such a "threshold"? Each particular animal is different from every other, I am different from you. One species is different from another. Why consider that there is a special difference between humans and other species? That doesn't make sense to me. All species are different from each other. But human beings are different in a special way? Consider if we carried that principle to individuals. You'd be saying "all human beings are different but I am different in a special way". Sure, we have that special talent of being rational, but other animals have there own special talents as well. What makes one special talent more special than another special talent? I think we could only justify this by relating this special talent to something further, like God, and saying that this talent brings us closer to God therefore it really is special.

The world we do see, comprises the evolutionarily-conditioned experience of that world, which is shaped first and foremost by the requirements of survival. — Wayfarer

Where evolutionary theory misleads us is with the idea that the special traits of the different species are created by the survival process. It is a fact, that the special traits which we can observe today, are the ones which have survived, but this does not lead to the conclusion that these traits were caused by survival. The traits must have been produced by the creativity of the living creatures in the first place. This creativity, which is the actual cause of variations and species is completely neglected by evolutionary theory, which dismisses it as randomness. Imagine if we looked at human acts this way. To conform in your activities is to be normal, but to be creative is to produce something out of line with the norm, something which considered in relation to the norm could only be apprehended as random. All creativity in human acts could be considered as nothing other than randomness.

Indeed I could argue that part of the intuition of philosophy itself, is to transcend the purely biological, the instinctive side of the organism that is purely concerned with survival and propagation. — Wayfarer

This is where I think perhaps you misunderstand the purely biological, instinctive side of the organism. To be creative is just as much of an instinct as is survival and propagation. Each individual has one's own instincts, and of these three, some will emphasize one more than the other, we are all different. Just because the field of biology has focused on instincts like survival and propagation because they do not have the tools to understand creativity as it falls outside the limits of inductive reason, this does not mean that creativity is not biological. It just means biologists will see creativity as random acts.

The point I was making was comparing Hoffman's analysis with traditional metaphysical accounts of 'appearance and reality'. From the standpoint of evolutionary theory, metaphysics doesn't really make any sense, as it really can't be said to provide any kind of survival advantage. I threw in the 'selfish gene' as I regard Richard Dawkins as epitomising biological reductionism. For him, whatever exists only does so because it represents a survival advantage. Even reason and language are depicted in evolutionary terms, as 'adaptions'. But, asking the question, adapted for what, the answer can only be the propagation of the genes - that is the only rationale possible for evolutionary biology. So metaphysics is completely off the radar for that kind of attitude, it makes no sense whatever. — Wayfarer

So in response to this paragraph, I think we need to respect that there is a whole category of things which living creatures do, which are not done for the purpose of survival, nor propagation. This category can be loosely described as creativity, and metaphysics is within this. But just like other traits we have, which are also created by us, we can only observe those which survive. So survival is more of a conditioning agent, and survival needs to be distinguished from the creativity of the living being, which is the true cause here. Creativity, just like metaphysics, cannot be made sense off from an evolutionary perspective because it does not necessarily increase one's chance of survival, nor does it necessarily increase propagation. However, it is an essential part of life which cannot be overlooked.

I'm an animal, aren't you?

Quite true, if you believe in the idea of language games. But it's quite obvious that we can think and act without using any language. So the mind is not trapped by these language games, as many believe it is.

But that epistemic problem is accepted as the starting point of pragmatism. — apokrisis

Then pragmatism cannot provide the basis for any serious ontology because it does not give mind its proper priority with respect to reality.

Well in fact it is. — apokrisis

I don't think so. Ontologically it is the very same position as those cave dwellers, a complete misapprehension of reality.

I don't see consciousness as anything fundamental in the world, just what it is like to be a really complex version of a modelling relation. — apokrisis

So what is really the story is that there is a systems perspective. Instead of life or mind being ontic simples - animating spirits - they are understood in terms of a particular species of complexity. And the job is to seek explanations in those terms. Once you get that and start looking around, you find there are a whole range of people and groups who have been feeling the same elephant. They might all use different jargon. But they are arriving at the same kind of insights. — apokrisis

The problem is that "the world", "complexities", and "systems" are all things created by the mind. Now you're trying to turn this around, and claim that the world, and complex systems create a mind. So you have now committed the error of being twice removed from reality, which Plato warned us against. The conscious mind creates "the world:, then claims that this world created the conscious mind. So the conscious mind, in this representation is twice removed from reality as the thing created by the world, instead of the thing which creates the world.

So your perspective is no further along than Plato's people in the cave. Instead of looking directly at the mind, to know and understand the mind itself, you are looking at the world which the mind has created, and trying to understand how this world could have created a mind. Misunderstanding is therefore inevitable.

But you were saying there was a conscious choice to believe in the reality of something like your keyboard. We had to agree to agree somehow. It's not really a choice if I can't then make a choice about that belief. I would hardly qualify as an agent. — apokrisis

I don't see your point. The choices you have made have lead you to believe that I have a keyboard. The fact that you haven't the will to go back and analyze the correctness of all these choices, giving you the option to change your mind about this, does not mean that you do not have the choice to do so, it means that you do not have the will power. And if you had the will power to go back and doubt all these choices which factor in to you believing that I have a keypad, and you still choose to believe that I have a keypad, then the very fact that you've done this is evidence that this is a choice you have made.

You are now arguing for beliefs we can't not believe, choices we can't in fact make, etc. — apokrisis

I really don't understand why you don't apprehend this as a choice. The only reason you are saying that it's a choice "we can't in fact make", is because it is a choice you have already made. Nevertheless, you still have the option to doubt, reassess the choices you have already made, and perhaps change your mind.

But he seems to be saying objects consist of conscious agents - that objects are constituted by conscious agents, not that objects are constituted by the perception of them by conscious agents. You see the distinction? It seems very like panpsychism, but then he denies that, also. Complicated. — Wayfarer

I see the difference but I don't see it as panpsychism. I see the existence of an "object" as dependent on justification. Justification is the means whereby we agree on things. So numerous conscious agents together, in agreement produce an object. This is a form of "objectivity". An object is conceptual, and me conceiving of something does not, in this perspective, produce an object, although if we have agreement amongst us we have an object due to this objectivity. This justification, and agreement can stand as the basis for the objectivity of knowledge. So for instance, if you take the mathematical objects, they do not exist as eternal objects in the platonic sense, they are created by human beings in conception, justification, and agreement. This form of "objectivity" allows for objective knowledge without the need for independent Platonic Forms as "objects".

So he doesn't deny that there's an objective or mind-independent world; he simply denies that this describes the nature of experience (and therefore knowledge derived from experience.) He says that his theory accounts for the nature of knowledge and experience in such a way that it is consistent both between different subjects, and within itself; so more a 'coherentist' than a 'correspondence' theory. — Wayfarer

If we adopt this perspective, how I interpret what Hoffman says, we have to be careful about creating ambiguity between different senses of "objective". If he claims that there is an independent, "objective reality", then this reality is not objectified by the existence of objects, because objects are created by conscious agents. So it is more difficult to escape idealism than he may claim. If he claims that independent reality is objective, he needs some form of justification for this, and will end up with a different sense of "objective" which is not grounded in the usual realist claim of independent objects, but some other form of grounding.

But, sometimes you can be wrong. George and Alice can have a theory about, I don't know, 'how to mix rocket fuel'. George's attempts, however, never actually work, either he blows himself up or it fizzes out. Alice, meanwhile, has now been abducted by Kim Jong Un and forced to work on his rocket program - because her method works. That's not simply 'disagreement', it is supported by facts, by outcomes. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is a very important difference, one which we should all come to respect. If we say "truth" is what human beings agree on, the accepted knowledge of the day, then we are really saying that every statement which is justified is true. Objectivity in knowledge is produced by justification and agreement. But if we respect the fact that even widely accepted knowledge may end up being wrong, then we look for something else to ground "truth" in, and this is what exists independently of human beings. So if we claim that there are "objects" which exist independently, we need to support this position. We need to find the physical basis of "an object". What does it mean to be an object, existing independently from how we as human beings are perceiving the world. Modern science, relativity theory, and process philosophy, all tend to lead us toward the conclusion that objects are produced by human perception. So if we want to maintain the realist assumption of real independent objects, we must find the physical basis for this assumption.

It is not a matter of wishing, it is a matter of believing, that is what conceptualization consists of, deciding what is. If you believe that I have no keyboard, then obviously, for you I have no keyboard. Perhaps you believe I am posting through some other means, voice recognition?

I agree with szardosszemagad we pay our taxes voluntarily. Income tax is based in what is called an honour system, you voluntarily declare your income and pay the tax which is due. Of course if you lie, then that's fraud and you will be punished.

Yeah but Hoffman appears to be saying that what we perceive to be the objects of experience - the metaphorical table of philosophical debates - are really a 'complex dynamical system of conscious agents'. That's what I'm not getting. — Wayfarer

Objects are themselves conceptual, so they are a product of, created by the complex dynamical system of conscious agents.

With your version, what happens when your conscious choice about the facts of reality conflict with my choice as a fellow agent? — apokrisis

Then we have no agreement. I conceive of the object in my way, you in your way. The object is as it is to me, and it is as it is to you (model-dependent realism). Some process philosophers will deny that there even are any objects.

When we agree, concerning what is and is not, we can create objects. When we do not agree, all we have is processes which have varying descriptions depending on one's perspective.

Fair enough. You could say it is holding momentum, kinetic energy, a Jedi Forcefield. I don't care. What is it? Can you point inside the atoms and say, other there is the kinetic energy? — MikeL

OK, here is one way of looking at this: "The object has momentum". Here is another way of looking at this: "The object has kinetic energy". Each of these is a statement which relays information about the object. It is not necessary to believe that the information is intrinsic to the object, because the information is purely conceptual. In one case the information concerns the concept of "momentum" and in the other case it is the concept of "kinetic energy". Each of these is a concept within human minds, "momentum" and "kinetic energy", so it would appear that it is impossible that this information is inherent within the object,

However, it may be the case that the "object" itself is purely conceptual. Then we would have to say that the concept "object" inheres within the concept of "momentum", and also within the concept of "kinetic energy". Whenever we refer to momentum or kinetic energy it is implied that there is an object which has this property. So we can say that "object" is within the definition of "momentum", and "kinetic energy", just like "animal" is within "man". This is Aristotelian logic. Object is within kinetic energy like animal is within man.

Can you find where conscious agents gets a serious definition? I couldn't. So that's where the handwaving becomes a frantic blur. — apokrisis

It's really not that difficult. We are conscious, we are active, therefore we are conscious agents. The conscious agent decides, chooses; one's own actions. Where do you find the mysterious handwaving?

We know that when energy acts directionally on mass it causes acceleration. We know that when we release the energy input, constant velocity results (unless in some other interference field). The magnitude of this constant velocity is dependent on the point of release during the acceleration. The more acceleration it acquired the higher the release velocity. Thus as it continues on ad infinitum at this higher velocity relative to its buddy that didn’t get accelerated, it must be now be holding something inside it that makes it different to its buddy. We know its mass has increased because of the acceleration, so what happened?
There’s not much to play with for a non-quantum mechanist such as myself. We have mass and we have energy. We gave energy, the object acquired mass. Somewhere along the line the energy we gave was swapped for mass. — MikeL

Let me put this in Newtonian terms so that I can understand. To begin with, it is not energy which acts on the object, it is force. The amount of force is equivalent to mass times acceleration. At a constant velocity the object has momentum, which is mass times velocity. If you insist on saying that the object must "now be holding something inside", when it has momentum, you could say that it has kinetic energy. But you could just say that it's holding momentum inside. How do you conclude that acceleration causes the mass of the object to increase?

Now, if you live in the really anti-government states, like much of the south, you are a net dependent on the federal government. Those federal government hating states get more from the Feds than they send to Washington. — Bitter Crank

That's to be expected, the ones who hate the government the most are going to give the least and take the most.

In fact, I did call the fucking police one time when I got my place attacked in the UK and guess what - they came in 2 days, and ended up doing almost nothing, just saying how sorry they were... — Agustino

At least they said they were sorry, instead of finding something to charge you for.

Actually, I did give context. Here it is again... — John Days

What I meant by "context", is the context in which the statement was used, the bible, not the context of your personal example. I have no doubt that you can produce an example which would make what you're saying make sense, but we need to consult the context in the Bible, to see what was meant.

God wanted to make it clear to both Moses and pharaoh that he was not just another name on the long list of Gods to be trotted out and categorized into his appropriate box. He didn't need a special title to prove anything to pharaoh". — John Days

Right, God didn't need a special title (a name) so what he gave was a brief description of Himself. He didn't want to be known as just another name, but as the one who "is". Therefore His brief description of Himself was "I am that I am". It's very clear from the context, in the Bible, that when Moses asked for a name, God's response was a refusal to give a name. He wanted the Israelites to know Him as "I am", and this is not to signify a name, but to signify existing, being at the present time.

The context is that of a CREATOR who is able to exist in the past, present, and future all in the same instant, AND is able to exist outside of all 3 of those concepts at the same time. — John Days

Now you're speaking nonsense. Where did you ever read that God is able to exist in the past, present and future, as well as completely outside of these, all at the same time. That's pure contradiction, and I've nowhere heard that God supports contradiction.

Nah, you've misunderstood the point. The answer was "I am that I am" and it was given in an unpronounceable series of letters (i.e. no vowels). The vowels were added later to make it pronounceable. The point was that God can be who or whatever he wants to be. We humans like special titles and designations because they help us to quickly organize information, but invariably we end up giving the titles special meaning which go beyond organizational utility. — John Days

Well that's the thing about ancient writings, you can interpret them in many different ways. If you are trying to assert a specific interpretation as "the correct interpretation", this requires reference to context, not personal feelings.

Even if your suggestion that "I am that I am" is correct in the sense of an eternal present, we're talking about the creator of time/space/matter in this context. How can you suggest that a being who is able to exist outside of time/space/matter is somehow contradicting itself by saying, "I exist right now"? — John Days

I don't think you read my post. If God is said to be "now" in an absolute sense, then this contradicts the premise that "now" is relative.

No. It is a universal. It is the fabric. Imagine the ocean as the universe with waves and waves everywhere. First you must be able to imagine it. Right now, all you can imagine are billiard balls. — Rich

Unless you can explain to me how the waves in the ocean can exist other than as an activity of the water molecules, it is pointless for you to ask me to try to imagine such a thing.

There cannot be a discussion until you can imagine otherwise. — Rich

I am all ready to imagine this universe of waves, but you have to explain to me how these waves exist if not as particles moving. Otherwise I will just believe that you are making unsubstantiated claims.

I agree MU makes the same mistake in complementary fashion. He thinks physicists really might believe fundamental particles to be dinky spherical objects. — apokrisis

In case you haven't noticed, I'm talking about molecules not fundamental particles. How could I believe a molecule to be a spherical object when they are always depicted otherwise? As for fundamental particles, I don't think that physicists have any idea of what their physical form is. For all they know, they could be some form of wave interaction like Rich insists.

OK, now that we have obliterated separation between electrons, protons, neutrons in a single molecule, you want me to show you how separation is obliterated between molecules.

Ok, look at the molecule. That is how multiple molecules will look with differing amplitudes. BTW, non-locality and entanglement has been laboratory demonstrated at the molecular level. — Rich

The point being that if there is no separation between molecules then a wave is impossible. Clearly the separation has not been obliterated or else waves would have been obliterated as well.

For whatever reason you need to hold on the anachronistic particle view of the world, so hold on to it. When you are ready to change then change. My guess is that you have some matter-mind philosophy which is dependent upon particles. — Rich

If we get rid of the particle view, waves become an impossibility, as a wave is an activity of the particles of a substance. If I did not support a particle view of the world, I could not believe in the existence of waves.

You seem to believe in some nonsense waves without particles.

Look at it. There is no particle anywhere. — Rich

Looks like a molecule of water to me. How is that not a particle?

There is no separation whatsoever. — Rich

The separation is between one molecule and another, and it is this separation which allows a wave to propagate in water.

//edit// Where is 'the realm of possibility'? You might say 'it doesn't exist', but then, there are some things which are in the domain of possibility, and some things which are not. So there are 'real possibilities' - but they don't actually exist anywhere. Which, in the context, is significant, I would have thought.// — Wayfarer

The realm of possibility is the future. The difference between a real possibility and an unreal possibility (something said to be possible but actually impossible) is determined by the past. What has already occurred, in the past, determines what is possible in the future. If you take a presentist perspective, neither past nor future "exists", because existence is limited to the present. If you take a dualist perspective you can allow that both the past and the future have actual existence, but there is a substantial difference between the two (substance dualism). Therefore the realm of possibility, remaining always ahead of us in time, in the future, is very real, but since it has not yet received material existence at the present it is apprehended only by the mind, and not the senses

The image is of electron density. Do you not understand that the vast majority of the mass of a molecule is found in the protons and neutrons, not the electrons?

I checked the reference, the depiction is of the "electron density" of a particular molecule, not a depiction of the molecule itself. I don't think you know what you're talking about. The electrons account for an insignificantly tiny portion of the overall mass of the molecule.

Better represented would be there measurement of a what appears to be a particle is a manifestation of the experiment. A wave in the ocean may strike a rock and one may only perceive the strike on the rock (the perturbation), but that specific observation is a reflection of what the observer was looking at at. Had the observer shifted his gaze, he would see the complete wave. No particles anywhere it is all waves. Particles are remnants of some (not all) ancient philosophies. — Rich

You don't believe that the water consists of molecules of H2O? And do you not believe that the wave is an activity of these molecules?

Actually the worst possible metaphor, which is entirely anachronistic is the one you are using, that is a billiard ball-like particle. No such animal anywhere in modern physics though apparently the idea still persists in academic philosophy. — Rich

No, I'm referring to molecules, and we all know that they are no billiard ball-like particles. Nevertheless they are particles. You are just creating a straw man position, claiming that when someone speaks of particles they mean billiard ball-like particles.

I have no idea why you keep insisting on particles. Such a notion is antiquated though unfortunately it is still part of some science curriculums. — Rich

I wouldn't say that it is antiquated. The idea of molecules has not been replaced by anything yet.

The problem is that there is no longer any such thing as a particle. What we have is a wave that manifests itself in different ways depending upon how it is being observed. But quite literally particles no longer exist as a reasonable description of nature. Wave fields are closer: — Rich

You seem to be missing the point, "wave" refers to an activity of particles, so it makes no sense to say there is no particles, only waves, because a wave is composed of particles, usually moving molecules.

A "field" is a mathematical structure so it still makes no sense to say that a wave exists in a field rather than in a substance composed of particles.

Waves are the best metaphor to understand particles and fields. — Rich

Notice the word "metaphor" here? Like I said, you are taking things which are wave-like, then trying to produce a definition of "wave" from these wave-like things. So you produce a definition of "wave" which doesn't require the wave to be a movement of particles. But this is nonsense because "wave" is used here as a metaphor, and you are trying to say that this metaphorical use of "wave" refers to a real wave.

If one wishes to begin to form some sort of image in their mind of what the nature of nature might be, one must begin to think of the substrate as a continuity of wave forms as opposed to particles separated by .... what? — Rich

The problem, as I said already, is that I think of a wave as a bunch of particles interacting in a certain way which produces the form of a wave, like a sound wave, or a wave in water. So there is no such thing as thinking of "wave forms as opposed to particles" because a wave form is a form that a group of particles has.

There are no points and there are no boundaries. — Rich

How could there be a wave form without points and boundaries?