We weren't designed by evolution to be smoking weed, if you believe in evolution that is. — Agustino

How do you know? Maybe the desire to smoke weed was caused by evolution. And, maybe smoking weed causes changes which could become evolutionary.

The issue of interaction is even more complicated than you might think. Plato proposes a tripartite person, such that interaction between the mind and body is carried out through a third thing, spirit, or passion. This third thing, which is a medium between body and mind, makes it even more difficult for science to get to the mind. Science cannot even get a grasp on the emotions, which are proper to that third thing, the medium, the spirit, because it has no access to the influence of the mind on the spirit.

By making the argument that science can NEVER explain the mind, you are implying that they don't interact... — Harry Hindu

That's not true. The scientific method is a very specific empirically based method. If two things are interacting, and only one of them can be observed empirically, then "scientific understanding" can only be extended to that thing which can be observed. One could make predictions about how the unobservable thing would influence the observable, and these predictions may or may not be reliable, but since this could produce no statements about what the unobservable thing is, it doesn't qualify as an explanation of that thing.

If the mind isn't "physical" (again I despise using these terms, "physical" and "mental" as it is what creates the problem Nagel is pointing at), or isn't made of the same stuff as "out there", then how is it that they both interact at all? Again, we should be talking about causation, not "physical" and "mental" substances. — Harry Hindu

That different "stuff" can't interact is a nonsensical idea. It's only if you define those two sorts of stuff as incapable of interacting that the idea is supported. That the mental and physical can't interact is not supported by the concept of "causation" unless you limit causation to efficient cause. However, the concepts of will, intention, and final cause, demonstrate that such a restriction is unjustified.

One could even say that the forms are outside of space and time in the sense that they make space and time possible. — t0m

Not so much ‘outside’ as ‘prior to’. — Wayfarer

One point which I've been trying to make in this thread, is that it came to Plato's attention that these Forms which are outside of, or prior to material existence, are not the human conceptions of universals as is commonly attributed to Platonism in the modern representation, they are, as described in "The Timaeus", the forms of individual, particular objects.

The conclusion that there is an immaterial Form, which is prior to the material existence of each and every particular object is derived from two principal premises. One of the premises is concerned with the nature of intention, will, "the good". The other premise is concerned with the nature of material existence in relation to the passing of time.

Aristotle uses a slightly different method to prove that the form is prior to the material existence of the object. He produces his law of identity, which is an inductive principle derived from the uniqueness of every particular material thing. Every material thing is unique, so a prior form is necessary to ensure this uniqueness. This also can be derived from the principle of sufficient reason. There must be a reason why every thing is unique.

The public\private dichotomy does not help us here, and it is not toward it that my use of the term "public" was aimed, but rather to the fact that the initial act of assignment, the first time someone establish that & means "and", that must be at least at some point be shared to the processors — Akanthinos

This is what I claim to be mistaken though. It's very likely that the first time someone wrote down that symbol, it had meaning only for that person, until that person explained to someone else what it means. We find this in mathematics quite frequently. A physicist producing a theory will introduce a new symbol. That symbol has meaning only for that physicist, within that theory, until other physicists are exposed to the theory.

How come that is not the very same subjectivism you’re criticising in the top paragraph of your post? — Wayfarer

In the top paragraph, addressed to apokrisis, I am not criticizing subjectivism I am proposing it as opposed to apo's objectivism. Apokrisis claimed that the words of communication exist as actual constraints on interpretation. I insisted that Apokrisis has this turned around, what constrains interpretation is the habits of the individual who is interpreting. In relation to interpretation, the words are just a passive thing being interpreted, and the interpretation depends on how the individual recognizes them. So all constraints on interpretation must be in the mind of the interpreter.

Apokrisis turns final cause around, such that it is not associated with the will and intent of the individual, but it is supposed to be the function of some phantom being, called "society", as if society has its own intentions and thereby constrains individuals to do what it wills.

The point I made was that words can only constrain an interpretation, they can't determine an interpretation. . — apokrisis

Then the words are not actual constraints, they are potential, or possible constraints. The listening being must take the words into ones mind and convert them into actual constraints. But this itself is an act of interpretation, so it is impossible that the words act as constraints on interpretation because interpretation must occur before the words are converted from possible constraint to actual constraints. The words which exist within the hearer's minds are only representations of the spoken words, they are interpretations, that's how we can mishear. So if the words actually constrain something, it is something other than interpretation. Perhaps the person might use the words to help exercise some constraint over one's own behaviour, but this is posterior to interpretation.

The best my words could do is constrain your state of mind in a suitable way so that you more or less shared my intended meaning. You would have the same point of view - down to the level where any differences didn't make a meaningful difference. — apokrisis

It is possible, that I could allow your words to have some influence over my state of mind, but again, this is posterior to interpretation. The only influence which they have on my state of mind, is dependent on how I interpret them. So they do not constrain my interpretation because the interpretation is prior to any affect that they have on me. The affect which they have on me is the result of my interpretation.

But my words can fail even to achieve that. You can categorise the incoming text as a bunch of internet static lacking any embedded signal. So I can't determine your state of interpretance. And much of the time, I can't even limit its free variety in any measurable way.

And that's fine. That is what semiotics explains. — apokrisis

So why did you claim that the words are constraints on interpretation then? If the words can be interpreted as something other than words, then how is it possible that the words are constraining this interpretation? They are not even words according to this interpretation.

Remember that in the context of the discussion about ‘reality of universals’, I mean by ‘realism’, not ‘modern realism’, but ‘realism with respect to universals’. It has a very different meaning to today's realism. — Wayfarer

Yes I understand this. What I was pointing out, is that some modern forms of realism assume the basis for the reality of universals, in the reality of social conventions, rather than in the reality of independent Ideas (Platonism). But when the "social convention" is analyzed it turns out to be nothing more than a similar disposition, attitude, or manner, in many different individuals. This renders it completely subjective, leaving the important point, the means by which the similar manner is produced.. Subjectivity is ruled by what appears as "good" to the individual. So now we have to turn to "the good" (the common good), to ground the reality of universals. That forces a turn toward God and religions, where "the good" is studied, and best understood.

Apokrisis right now is refusing to acknowledge the subjectivity of social conventions, claiming "a social belief system". But we all know that all belief systems are particular to the individual human being, and any claim of a "social belief system" is just a generalization, it isn't a real thing. So Aprokrisis' argument just takes us in a vicious circle.

If the meaning of a sign is determined by the author or by the interpreter, then again communication would be impossible. All direct conversations would be spent trying to establish a common vocabulary and semantic, and all indirect communication would be simply impossible. — Akanthinos

Why do you say this? Once a habit of recognition is established, meaning is determined on that basis. There is no impossibility here.

The meaning of the sign is established at the moment of its formation as a sign. "&" means nothing until someone assigns meaning for it, by making public another bit of information with at least some degree of authority, which is that "'&' means 'and'". Before this, "&" was the sign of nothing except perhaps of random human activity as scribble. — Akanthinos

I don't think that you understand meaning at all. I can write &, and it has some meaning for me. it symbolizes something for me, without making anything about what it symbolizes public. Meaning is not something public. It can be made public, but it is inherently private.

How can the sign carry its function if it doesn't not act as a restraint on interpretation? — Akanthinos

A sign does not carry its function. Its function is determined by the mind of the author or by the mind of the interpreter. If this were not the case, misunderstanding and misinterpretation would be impossible, because the sign would always deliver the correct function to the interpreting mind. Since the interpreting mind often makes mistakes, then it is necessary to assume that the function of the sign is determined by the mind.

Weither 1) is true or not does not impede the function of a sign to inform. As long as a non-null amount of meaning can be assigned to a sign, communication can still occur. With 2), however, you can quickly see how this would deprecate languages. You cannot build a language out of nothing but variables and expect it to be able to describe the feeling of kissing a cute girl. — Akanthinos

I really can't grasp your point. How does this argue that the function is within the sign, not within the mind.

You yourself believe that the Platonic forms amount to 'social conventions', and then fault the realists for thinking that! — Wayfarer

Where I fault the realists is in what type of existence they give to social conventions. Instead of giving real objective existence to things like concepts and ideas, as you and other Platonic realists do, they give a faux objective existence to these things as social conventions. The problem is that this is not real objectivity, though it is claimed to be. It is a disguised subjectivity, which is sometimes called inter-subjectivity. So instead of recognizing that the real essence of the social convention is to be found within the manners, habits, and disposition of the individual human beings, they base their principles in the assumption that there are real existing objects which are referred to as social conventions, (laws and rules of language, etc.). Those realists just switch out the real objective existence of Platonic Ideas, for the real objective existence of social conventions. But the essence of the social convention is that it is a similar property which individuals have.

I’m posting you carefully worded thoughts. I’m hoping they might constrain your state of mind so that we share some point of view. — apokrisis

The words don't constrain my mind at all, that is a completely deterministic assumption. All the decisions concerning interpretation are made within my mind. My mind makes these decisions based on principles within, not the words, because I don't know what they mean until I've already interpreted them.

Yet your responses come back as saying your understanding is at best vague or uncertain. Or actually you are in the habit of interpreting signals you can’t follow as “this just has to be wrong - it is not the formula of words that I am accustomed to responding to with the return signal of a thumb’s up,” — apokrisis

I can follow the words, but my mind follows the words due to habits it has produced. The constraints on my interpretation are these habits, they are not the words.

So sure. Signs can be intended to function as constraints, but they can regularly fail in that intended function. — apokrisis

So you admit, that signs fail as constraints on interpretation. So why insist that they are? It is not the case that sometimes words constrain and sometimes they do not. The fact that they sometimes bring about the desired affect is due to the power of the interpreting mind. The words themselves have absolutely no power over the human being.

.

I agree that with no container, there is no information. But as I have previously stated, it does not follow that the container is an essential property of information, as it could simply be the cause to its existence. — Samuel Lacrampe

The container is not the cause of existence of the information, it is part of the information package. The information must be put into the package, so the container cannot be the cause of the information. There is a thing which is said to contain information. The information and the container are two parts of the same thing Certain properties of the information which can be held by the container are restricted, or constrained, by the type of container. The container restricts the information. That is why it is false to say that the same information can be contained in different containers, because each container has restrictions proper to itself only.

And I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook. — Samuel Lacrampe

These two types of media do not give you the same information. You are ignoring the accidentals. When the accidentals are ignored, this is insufficient for calling something "the same", according to the law of identity.

Furthermore, we can prove that a container is not essential to information because we can imagine information being acquired directly through telepathy. The fact that we can imagine a thing proves that it is logically possible. And if logically possible, then a container is not an essential property of information. — Samuel Lacrampe

The fact that you can imagine something does not make it possible. Yes, you can create a logical possibility, through definition, like I can imagine that "circle" has the same definition as "square", making a square circle logically possible. And that's all you've done here, defined information as independent from the container, through your imaginary telepathy. But until you prove that telepathy is possible, your definition is meaningless.

I think that if you push this analysis further, you'll see that you are not actually acquiring the same information in those two cases. — Akanthinos

That's right, this is the point I've been making since the beginning of the thread. The faulty analysis is defended by the claim that "same" is used in a casual way, like two different people might be driving the same car. But this is philosophy, and this use of "same" is a premise to a logical argument, so we need to adhere to a rigid law of identity. When we adhere to the law of identity in our designation of "same", the argument fails on the faulty premise that "the same" information is transmitted by different media.

A more causally-explicit way of saying this would be that a sign has the function of constraining an interpretation.

So the actual physics of a sign falls away - even though a sign, as some kind of mark, is always also physical.

The causally important things going on are that signs are intended to have meanings. A purpose must exist. And signs then have an effect in terms of constraining or limiting some form of freedom or uncertainty. — apokrisis

I think that this is an incorrect representation. The sign itself does not constrain the interpretation, it is completely passive in this respect. All constraints on interpretation occur within the mind of the interpreter and this can be expressed as habit, or lack of habit. There are no constraints on interpretation within the sign itself.

So what gets transmitted through a variety of transmissions is not the actual information, like some precious substance or cargo. It is the constraints that would limit another mind's state of interpretance. It is the container rather than the contents that get delivered. — apokrisis

So you carry forward this faulty representation, claiming that what is transmitted within the information package is these constraints on interpretation. But such constraints really only exist within the interpreting mind. The only constraints within the information package, are constraints on the physical world, which have produced the order which is apprehended as information., And this order is interpreted as information, according to the constraints within one's mind.

But constraints are also transmissible - due to semiotics. — apokrisis

This I insist is a false premise. And if you think that semiotics proves that constraints on interpretation are transmitted, you need to demonstrate this proof. The material realist assumes that constraints on interpretation are transmitted, but this is a false assumption, because such constraints are either innate within, or learned by the living being through repetition. They are not transmitted to the living being through the sign. How could they be, if the being has to interpret the sign to determine the constraints required for interpretation?

The forms are what are not sensible i.e. they’re ‘intelligible’. Hyle - matter - morphe - form = hylomorphic. Trying to keep it simple here. The Thomistic arguments on the nature of the soul are close to those about how many angels could fit on a pin. — Wayfarer

In this section, Aquinas first makes it clear that the intellect is not the soul itself. It is a power of the soul. So we're not discussing the nature of the soul itself here, and the important thing to notice is that following Aristotle, the powers of the soul are individuated according to the material body of the living creature. So Aquinas explains how the intellect is distinguished from the other powers of the soul, vegetative power, power of sensation, etc.

He agrees with Aristotle, that there is a need to assume a passive intellect, in order to account for the intellect receiving intelligible forms. As such it is of the same nature of matter, which receives forms. This is the proper sense of "inform", to receive forms, be acted upon by forms. Aquinas states though, that the passive intellect is immaterial, and I see this as an inconsistency because he doesn't explain how anything immaterial can be informed. He already agrees that to be informed requires that the thing being informed receives forms in a passive sense, like matter receives forms.

The active intellect is what abstracts, it puts the sensible objects into an intelligible form. We cannot say that the passive intellect receives the form directly from the sensible object, or else it would have the exact same form, and be that sensible object. So it is required to assume an active intellect, which abstracts a form, but not the same form, from the sensible object.

It seemed to me that you were taking the position of nominalism, perhaps without knowing you were doing that. Note that is not a personal criticism but I think in the context it is worth bringing that out. — Wayfarer

I take neither a nominalist nor realist position on this, because both are too simple. The realist position, as I said, takes social conventions for granted, so the analysis which it provides does not go deep enough to understand "the good". "Realism" is a misrepresentation of the Scholastics, perhaps a nominalist "straw man". So the nominalists simplify even further from the simplification already implied by "realism,". There are two levels of simplification, one simplifies the Neo-Platonist/Arsitotelian analysis/synthesis of the scholastics to a realism (which is a faulty representation), and the other, by claiming that realism is inaccurate (which it is, due to the unjustified simplification) simplifies even further.

My view also - the active intellect is what perceives the forms or ideas - it is 'intellect' proper. The passive intellect receives sensations. That is what that passage I quoted says. — Wayfarer

I was just reading up on this in The Summa Theologica. The issue is a bit more complicated. Following Aristotle, Aquinas says that we must assume a passive intellect to account for the difference between potentially understanding and actually understanding. The passive intellect provides the potential to receive the intelligible forms. There are some confusing statements involved here, because the passive intellect must be passive, or receptive, to every possible form in order that we can potentially know all forms. This makes it similar to prime matter, as pure potential, but Aquinas states that it is purely immaterial. I think that because it has no particular form, it cannot be a material thing. In any case, it seems to be what you call the intellect proper, as what receives the forms or ideas

The active intellect is said to be what makes things intelligible. It acts to produce the abstractions which are received by the passive intellect. So he goes into the analogy with light, or the sun, which makes visible things visible. The active intellect must make things intelligible in a similar way. So the questioning turns to where the active intellect is located. Is it something independent from the human being, is it within the human being but the same for each human being, or is it within the human being with particular differences according to the differences of each person? He goes toward the third option, but maintains that there must still be an outside principle, like God, which the active intellect takes part in.

I would summarize by saying that the active intellect makes things intelligible by rendering them into an intelligible form. The passive intellect receives the intelligible form, and this is what is actual understanding. So there are two distinct types of potential involved here. The passive intellect is the intellect's potential for understanding. The active intellect puts the material objects into a form (abstract) such that they have the potential to be understood. These two together produce actual understanding.

It's real, but only as a matter of convention. — Wayfarer

But this is a very important question, what is "a matter of convention"? We have to be able to assign some sort of reality to social conventions, or else everything falls apart, all knowledge, all morality, society, all humanity falls part. we cannot just take these things for granted. The Wittgensteinians argue that there are real rules of language use, which are out there, somewhere, which we must follow, or else we are wrong, not following the rules. But there are no such rules. We are free to use language as we will. They just take it for granted that such rules exist, and really cannot demonstrate the existence of them.

However, formal rules of language use are extremely important to higher education, science, mathematics and logic, just like rules of morality are extremely important to higher living. The two are very closely tied together, as it is by following these rules that we evolve toward "higher" existence. We cannot take them for granted. And if we cannot take them for granted, then we need to create them, and find ways of encouraging human beings to follow them.

The important point about the OP, is articulating an idea of what is real but not material - a genuine metaphysic which grounds meaning in reality, not in social convention or language. — Wayfarer

The examples of the op rely on convention. How does one know what the signal means? By convention. You take the conventions for granted, just like the Wittgensteinian realists. They for their purpose, you for your purpose. The idealist realist is really no different from the materialist realist. By shying away from language and social convention, I think you are missing the essence of the immaterial. What is it which is at the root of all social conventions? The good. What is it which Plato says renders the intelligible as intelligible? The good. What is the active intellect?

Sure do. What does the active intellect do, that the passive intellect can't? — Wayfarer

If I remember correctly the Aristotelian distinction between passive intellect and active (agent) intellect, is not much more than a mention of the need to assume both, to maintain consistency with hylomorphism, matter being passive, form being active. The soul is an immaterial form, while the powers of the soul, the different capacities including the intellect, are potentials, and therefore associated with the material existence of the living body. The potencies manifest as "habit" (another concept not well developed by Aristotle). We look at "habit" as a way of acting, but Aristotle defined it as what the beings "has", and you can check the etymology on this word. The being has the power to act in a particular way.

To the point though, there was discussion among the Arab philosophers who followed Aristotle, as to how to position the passive and agent intellect. One argument was that one is the property of the individual, while the other is the property of a communion of individuals. I'm not sure how Aquinas resolved this (I'll check this and get back to you), but I think that he proposed that each individual has both passive and agent intellect.

Nominalism: the doctrine that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality. — Wayfarer

I'm not too familiar with nominalism, but assuming this definition, and the quoted passage from me, then to make me nominalist you would have to argue that an agreement between human beings is not something real.

Modern realists, following philosophers like Wittgenstein will argue that there are real rules which govern the way that we use words. "Conventional use" implies real conventions. The real rules are supposed to be independent of individual human beings. However, these realists refer to things like definitions to support that position. But definitions are descriptions of how words are used, they are not prescriptive rules which govern the activities of human beings, like ethical rules are. So there is equivocation between descriptive rules and prescriptive rules, and the majority of modern realism is supported by such equivocation. For example, some say that the laws of physics govern the activity of matter. But the laws of physics are human descriptions, produced by inductive reasoning. It is impossible that they could have any governing power over the activity of matter.

You do realise that in many of your responses to that issue, you have taken a position which is basically nominalist, i.e. opposing the A-T analysis? — Wayfarer

I've justified my responses by referring directly to what Aristotle wrote, and my understanding of what Aquinas wrote. So your claim that my responses are "opposing the A-T analysis", only indicate that you have a misunderstanding of the A-T analysis.

Do you recognize the distinction of passive intellect and active intellect? Or are you ready to deny that this is part of the A-T analysis?

The market growing at a fast rate is instability? Are you kidding me? — Agustino

Rapid growth, like rapid decline, is indicative of increased high-frequency trading, which is instability in the market place.

In the introduction, he says that a professor of his once noted that ‘everyone is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian’. I think by temperament, I’m the former. — Wayfarer

Even better though one could be like Aquinas, both Platonist and Aristotelian.

But, according to A's 'hylomorphic dualism', particulars are always composed of matter (hyle) and form (morphe) - and the form is what is grasped by the intellect. Both the intellect (nous) and form (morphe) being immaterial. — Wayfarer

The form of the particular may be what is grasp by the intellect, but the intellect only grasps what it apprehends as essential, missing the accidentals. So its grasp of the forms of particulars is imperfect, and we need to account for this fact in our metaphysics.

What Aquinas argues, is that this imperfection is due to the human intellect being not completely immaterial. So he develops Aristotle's distinction between passive and active intellect. The passive intellect, whereby we receive the forms of things through sensation, must be of the nature of potential, or matter, in order that it can be "informed". I believe that the active, or agent intellect is supposed to be the immaterial aspect of the intellect.

You can read it all here. — Michael

Wow, that's a big pile of evidence of some serious tax evasion and undisclosed lobbying.

Why does it suddenly go up at a faster rate ever since Trump was elected?! — Agustino

Do you understand the market? That's called instability.

The indictment contains 12 counts: conspiracy against the United States

That sounds rather serious.

Assumptions make an ass of u and me. Ha, ha, ha, I'm funny aren't I?

Sorry, but I think your last two paragraphs do not at all represent or paraphrase the passage that we're referring to. But it has been a helpful discussion, for me at least. — Wayfarer

Right, those paragraphs express what I take as important consequences of what is said in the quotation. Maybe you have different concerns? I'm glad we managed to have a productive discussion though

I too read this as saying that each particular thing has a particular form associated to it. But I could be misreading it, because my understanding is that forms are generals, not particulars. E.g., particular rocks participate in the one form of rock-ness, and particular rivers participate in the one form of river-ness. — Samuel Lacrampe

That is Plato's theory of participation, you've expressed it well. It is drawn from his earlier work, and represents his efforts to make sense of Pythagorean idealism. There's a good representation of it in "The Symposium", with the Idea of beauty.

As I explained earlier in this thread, as Plato started to grasp the difficulties involved with that type of idealism, his understanding evolved, such that the form of idealism which he ends up supporting is quite different from this. In The Republic, he exposes "the good", and finds the need to assume divine Ideas. This brings on a completely different type of idealism, because the divine ideas are ideals, the best, most perfect conception of each class of general concepts. Now the independent Idea must be an Ideal, the best possible conception of "just", or in the case of your examples, the best possible conception of "rock-ness", the best conception of "river-ness" .

But this throws a wrench into the whole structure of participation, because now the individual things, with their unique particularities cannot properly participate in the Ideal, because the Ideal must be an unique perfection in itself, and the particulars are lacking in this perfection. This produces the notion that all things suffer from privation. But the reverse of that is that all things have a perfection proper to themselves, and it is this perfection which makes a thing the thing which it is. This gives two possible directions. One is that "perfection" is proper to the ideal universal conception, the other is that "perfection" is proper to each particular object, that which makes it the unique object which it is. The latter choice is supported by material existence, material existence is good (though some mystics claim matter is evil, and go the opposite direction assuming all material existence is privation). In comparison, the ideal universal conception is an untenable principle because it cannot be produced, while material existence is evident. So we choose the direction which assumes that there is a perfection which is proper to each individual material object, making it the object which it is.

That is why Aristotle goes on to produce his law of identity so as to represent a perfection which is proper to each individual particular, in itself, "a thing is the same as itself". So any individual thing is identifiable as having a unique, particular form, which is proper to itself only. It is not identified in the way of the sophists, by a general form, which allows that a multitude of similar things have the same identity.

2) By the law of identity, the information stripped of its container is not merely a copy in each separate container, but is in reality one and the same thing, because all the properties that make the information is the same in all containers. The same info is acquired whether it is obtained from a book, an ebook, or an audiobook. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is the point which I objected to in this thread. It is physically impossible to strip away the container from the information package, because then the information would be lost. Without the container, there is no information. So the container, which makes the existence of information possible is just as essential as the contents. There is no contents without a container. Therefore it must be accepted that the container is part of the information package.

That is the problem with "the difference which makes a difference", it contravenes the law of identity, which implies that every difference must be respected, by implying that we can disrespect certain differences. When we disrespect those differences, contravening the law of identity, and we remove the container, as a difference which makes no difference, we assume "a difference which does not make a difference". This is just veiled contradiction, or at best, it moves "difference" into the subject, making what constitutes a "difference" completely subjective. So we cannot strip away the container without violating the law of identity, placing identity within the subject (sophistry), rather than within the object according to Aristotle's law of identity.

Neither, but why would one need to be genius or psycoceramic to question the truth of a theory?

Think that puts an end to the discussion. — Banno

Why? Are you adverse to questioning the truth of theories accepted by the scientific community? Such theories are proven inaccurate quite frequently, that's how we advance our knowledge. Come on, this is the philosophy forum, where's you philosophical spirit? The inquiry proceeds in a direction which is contrary to your prejudice so you quit.



Right, that's why we should proceed to doubt and question all of these inductive principles. If we find one which produces a violation of the law of non-contradiction, doesn't that raise a red flag, suggesting that a deeper inspection is required?

That's a good reference, I like it. Now let's get to some specifics. I'll start from the end and go to the beginning.

Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable.

Notice here, that according to the process of human abstraction, what is left in the human intellect, as "the form" of the object, is the essence of the object, without the accidentals. As described, this is an operation carried out by the senses and the intellect. The sensible object is only understandable to the human intellect in its essence, that is without its accidentals.

Now consider this opening statement:

“EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.

Accordingly, each entity in the universe has a form which is proper to it, and it alone. This is the complete form of the object, including all particularities, all accidentals. According to the principles expressed in Plato's "Timaeus", supported by Aristotle, and carried forward by the Neo-Platonists, the form of the material object is necessarily prior in existence to the material object itself, as the cause of existence of the material object. Because the particular form of the individual object is prior to the material existence of that object, this necessitates the conception of separate, immaterial, Forms. The cosmological argument produces the conclusion that there must be an immaterial Form which is prior to all material existence.

So the point to consider here is that the human conceptions, produced by abstraction, do not contain the particulars, the accidentals. They are produced by abstracting from material objects through sensation and intellection, and are therefore posterior to the material existence of the object. The independent Forms are the forms of the particular entities, accidentals included, which are prior to the material existence of these objects as the cause of their material existence.

Therefore the material world, temporal existence, can be regarded as a medium of separation between the human forms (essences) created by abstraction from the material world, and the independent Forms, which include the accidentals, and are understood as prior to, and the cause of the material objects. The riddle involves the question of the relationship between the particular forms and the essential forms. Why is it that objects are known to the human intellect through essential forms, when the actual form of the object is a particular form? As they are both "forms", they are each inherently intelligible, but the particular forms are not apprehended by the human intellect due to its mode of intellection.

What is this 'something other', according to Aristotle and Aquinas? — Wayfarer

I think that for Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, the "something other" is the soul. It seems consistent through these philosophies that the soul is non-physical, immaterial. The soul is the non-physical existence which is part of that immaterial realm.

Agreed, that the speed of light is constant no matter what the frame of reference, is a very flimsy principle, not verified, nor verifiable from human beings' present technological condition, but quite likely not at all acceptable as a universally applicable law. It is an inductive principle induced without proper evidence.

Meta, both Angie and Beth agree as to what happened. They agree that the events were simultaneous for Angie, but not for Beth. — Banno

To agree on contradiction does not make the contradiction go away, it just means that the agreeing parties have agreed to ignore the contradiction. The fact is that the events referred to are not properties of the subject, like personal preferences, they are properties of the objective world. To say that the properties of something completely independent of both Angie and Beth, properties of the objective world, are such and such for Angie, and not such and such for Beth, is complete nonsense because you imply that how the independent, objective world is, is dependent on the observer.

do you really believe that the last 110 years of physics is built on an error? — Banno

If circumventing the law of non-contradiction is error, then yes, that is what I believe, the last 110 years of physics is built on error. Contradiction is rampant in modern physics. But it has been demonstrated in the past, by the sophists in ancient Greece, that circumventing the law of non-contradiction can be very profitable. So to the extend that ignoring the fact that special relativity circumvents the law of non-contradiction has proven to be in some ways beneficial, you might not call this error. It's like lying and deception, from one perspective these things are beneficial, but from another perspective they are error. I look at it from the perspective of the philosopher, which is the desire to know the truth, so I say yes, modern physics is built on error. It employs a misconception of time.

I really don't see any relevance to the topic, nor any ' firm refutation of Pythagorean idealism'. True, he argues that geometric constructs cannot be eternal ideas, but eternal ideas are nowhere denied in Aristotle. — Wayfarer

That's correct, eternal Forms are not denied by Aristotle. What is denied is that human ideas are eternal ideas. Now follow through with the simple deduction used by the Neo-Platonists.
P1. (from Aristotle). It is impossible that the mathematical and geometrical principles used by human beings are eternal ideas.
P2. (from Plato) We still apprehend the need to assume eternal Forms (forms outside of, or prior to temporal existence).
C. Therefore the eternal Forms are categorically different from the mathematical and geometrical ideas used by human beings.

Clearly, that is not what was said. — Banno

Are you kidding?

From Angie's frame of reference, events A and B occur at the same time.
From Beth's frame of reference, A occurs before B. — Banno

My interpretation:

You are saying that from A's frame of reference X is the case, and from B's frame of reference not-X is the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are you denying Meta?

That A and B are simultaneous for Angie, or that A and B are not simultaneous for Beth? — creativesoul

Either A and B are simultaneous, or they are not. As in other cases of objective truth, "for Angie", and "for Beth", are irrelevant to what is at issue, you are just throwing them in as red herrings.

But the words have no meaning without the frame of reference, just as speed has no meaning without the frame of reference. — litewave

That's not the case though. Speed might have no meaning without a frame of reference, but words do not require a frame of reference to have meaning, you are just making that up. Words had meaning long before physicists started talking about frames of reference. Also, "simultaneous" has meaning without a frame of reference. Philosophers as far back as Aristotle, and beyond, spoke of simultaneity without a frame of reference. It's only relativity theory, which insists that simultaneity is meaningless without a frame of reference. When people believed in absolute time, the meaning of simultaneous was not dependent on a frame of reference.

It is a statement without meaning, and meaningless statements are neither contradictory nor non-contradictory. — litewave

It is only a meaningless statement if you allow that "simultaneous" is defined by special relativity. Otherwise it is contradictory. That's clear evidence of what I have argued, special relativity circumvents the law of non-contradiction by defining "simultaneous" in a particular way.

So it's still impossible to reply to anything? Why would anyone purchase a sponsorship?

It is a fact that A and B can be and/or are simultaneous for Angie but not Beth. That has to do with the difference between the speed of sound and the speed of light. There is no contradiction. — creativesoul

If you don't see the contradiction in stating that it is a fact that A and B are both simultaneous, and not simultaneous, then I can't help you.

The sense that is relevant here is the sense of "simultaneous"... — creativesoul

So, are you saying that the word "simultaneous" means something different in frame of reference A from what it means in frame of reference B. If so, it doesn't, it means the same thing in both frames of reference. What varies is the determination of which events are simultaneous, not the sense of "simultaneous".

"In the same sense" refers to the meaning of the words of the statement, not the frame of reference. If you take "in the same sense" to refer to the frame of reference, then you are still just circumventing the law of non-contradiction by saying that two statements must be taken within the same frame of reference to have the same meaning. This is like saying that statements could have a different meaning for me than for you, so "in the same sense" is rendered meaningless.

I tried to access the site but my software prevented me from going there, citing malicious adware, or something like that.

No, in the context of special relativity it is meaningless to say that X or not-X is true unless you specify the reference frame in relation to which X or not-X applies. It is just as meaningless as saying that an object moves at speed 300 miles per hour without specifying the reference frame in relation to which the speed applies. There is no "real" speed that exists irrespective of a reference frame. — litewave

We're not talking about the speed of an object though. What we are talking about is simultaneity, whether or not it is meaningless to say "at the same time" without specifying a frame of reference. As the op points out, "at the same time" is a crucial part of the law of non-contradiction. If special relativity allows that the meaning of "at the same time" is dependent on the frame of reference, then it circumvents the law of non-contradiction by giving "frame of reference" a higher priority than "non-contradiction".

If the determination of "is", and "is not" is dependent on the frame of reference, then "frame of reference" is simply given priority over the law of non-contradiction, allowing that both "is" and "is not" are actually the case depending on the frame of reference. How is this any different, in principle, from giving priority to "subjective perspective", such that what "is" and "is not" is dependent on the subject's perspective?

Anyone check up on the old PF recently?

It is true both that:
events A and B occur at the same time from Angie's frame of reference, and
A occurs before B from Beth's frame of reference. — Banno

Right, "A and B occur at the same time" contradicts "A occurs before B". No matter how you qualify this with frames of reference, you do not negate the contradiction. The contradictory statements refer to the described object, while "frame of reference" refers to the point of observation. What is true or false of the object cannot be changed by changing the point of observation because this implies that mere changes to the point of observation can actually change the object. To avoid contradiction you would have to say that Angie and Beth are observing different things.