Contemplate this:
From Angie's frame of reference, events A and B occur at the same time.
From Beth's frame of reference, A occurs before B.

These two statements are both true for both Angie and Beth.

There is no contradiction. — Banno

Yes there is contradiction here. You are saying that from A's frame of reference X is the case, and from B's frame of reference not-X is the case. So you are saying that both X and not-X are the case, and this is contradictory. Introducing a "frame of reference" does not mitigate the contradiction, just like saying that from "my perspective" X is the case and from "your perspective" not-X is the case does not mitigate the contradiction implied by the two incompatible statements, "X is the case", and "not-X is the case".

To mitigate the contradiction, it is required to say that from A's frame of reference X "appears" to be the case, and from B's frame of reference not-X "appears" to be the case. This allows that the incompatible descriptions of what appears to be the case, may be resolved with what is "really" the case. But special relativity implies that it is really the case that both X and not-X are true. This is contradiction, plain and simple.

For Aristotle, the empirical (or phenomenal) world just is the intelligible world. So you won't find universals prior to or separate from the particulars that they are predicated of. — Andrew M

This is the point I brought up earlier. Each material object has a particular form which is unique and proper to that object alone. This comprises Aristotle's law of identity. This line of thought comes out of Plato's later work, "The Timaeus", in which material existence is "informed", through the process by which matter is given a form. In the Platonic, and Neo-Platonic rendition, the form is prior to the material object, and given to the material object by the divine mind, in the act of creation.

I think we have an important distinction here between ideas as universals, which is central to Pythagorean Idealism, as well as Plato's earlier writings, and forms as the forms of particulars, which comes out of Plato's later work. The difference between ideas as universals, and forms as particulars, manifests in an inversion in the way that one object is related to another, depending on whether that object is a universal or a particular.

So in Aristotelian logic, which deals with universals, the more general is said to be "within" the more specific. The concept of "animal" (the more general) is within the concept of "man" (the more specific), as it is within the definition of "man". The essential aspect, "animal", is the more general, and is within the more specific being defined by the more general. The broader is within the narrower. Conversely, in the case of physical objects, i.e. the forms of particulars, we observe that the more particular, the local, is within the less particular, the global. So for example, the form of the earth, as the form of a particular object, is conceived of as within the form of the solar system, as the form of a particular object. The narrower is within the broader.

These two ways in which forms are related to each other, the way that particular forms are related being inverse to the way that universal forms are related, gets very confused and ambiguous in interpretations of quantum mechanics where a clear distinction between the universal and the particular is not maintained. What is accepted as the particular, the particle, is really just a function of the universal, the field, so that the real particular is not at all defined, it has not been assigned an intelligible form.

Book 9 of the metaphysics is online here. Kindly indicate where in it Aristotle 'refutes Pythagorean idealism'. — Wayfarer

It is at Bk. 9, ch. 8 & 9, specifically 1050b, 1051a. It is first argued at 1050b, that actuality is prior to potency, and therefore nothing which exists potentially can be eternal. Imperishable things must be actual. That is the fundamental principle of the cosmological argument. Then at the end of 1050b, into 1051a, he directs his attention specifically toward the Idealists. In ch. 9 (1051a), he argues that the discovery of geometrical constructs is an activity of the geometer. Prior to this, they can only exist potentially. Therefore geometrical constructs cannot be eternal ideas.

Wikipedia entry 'intelligible forms' — Wayfarer

Notice that the "ible" of "intelligible forms", indicates that their nature is that of potential. The cosmological argument clearly indicates that actuality is necessarily prior to potential. That's the issue I continually point out to apokrisis who adheres to a first principle of infinite potential, from Peirce. The cosmological argument effectively refutes both materialism and idealism because both matter and ideas are reduced to having the same nature, that of potential. In modern metaphysics you cannot distinguish between materialism and idealism, because modern physics has reduced matter to ideas ("fields").

The Neo-Platonists, as idealists, get beyond the cosmological argument by assuming active, (actual) Forms. But this is why there develops a categorical separation between these Forms, which in Christianity are the active divine Forms, and human ideas which have the nature of potential. Neo-Platonists like Proclus give an outline for a structure of order within the divine Forms, but Aquinas develops this order much further, under the name of angels.

First, Aquinas expresses very clearly the separation between human ideas, and the divine Forms which are immaterial, as I explained already. Then according to the principles of Plato's Timaeus, in which immaterial Forms have creative power over the material world, Aquinas discusses a hierarchy of angels, which, being immaterial Forms, have providence over the various aspects of the material universe.

Further, notice that in Kant, the thing-in-itself, the noumenon, is said to be an intelligible object. But the human being, because it creates its knowledge through sense perception, phenomena, has no access to that intelligible object. This is another way of representing that separation between human ideas, which are tied to the human body, and the independent, immaterial, Forms,

So we are back at the very same discussion we had before, concerning the intelligibility of God, only approaching it from opposite sides. I said that God, being an intelligible object, is most highly intelligible, but you said that we cannot know God. Remember, I looked up the resolution to this, in Aquinas' "Summa", and he said that God, being an intelligible object, is in essence, most highly knowable. But God is an independent, immaterial Form, and the human intellect is united with, and therefore limited by a material body. So as much as God is most highly intelligible, the human intellect cannot know God while remaining in this state of being united with a body. That expresses the separation between human ideas, and independent Forms.

That is completely mistaken. The principle of intelligibility in ancient philosophy, was based on the exact opposite of what you’re saying. — Wayfarer

I guess I don't know what you mean by "the principle of intelligibility". It is not found in any ancient philosophy. There is much concern in ancient philosophy with intelligible objects, in contrast with visible objects, but I think that you mean something different than this when you say "the principle of intelligibility".

This is not true at all. No Platonist would ever say that. You're instinctively modernist in your responses. — Wayfarer

You ought to read some Thomas Aquinas, he is very insistent on this point. Human concepts are not independent Forms, because they are dependent on the human being which has a material body. Independent Forms are immaterial, and not dependent on a material body like human ideas are. This is a principle derived from Aristotle's cosmological argument.

The idea that mathematics could be 'the product of a brain' would never occur to Plato or Aristotle. — Wayfarer

Actually, this is the fundamental consequence of Aristotle's cosmological argument, where he firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism in Bk. 9 of his Metaphysics. If ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, they are eternal. But prior to being discovered, their existence could only be as "potential", because being discovered is what gives them "actual" existence. Being discovered actualizes them. However, according to the cosmological argument, it is impossible that any potential could be eternal. Therefore it is impossible that human concepts are "discovered". So they must be created by the human being. Aquinas expounds on this principle, explaining the difference between divine Forms, which are properly independent, separate, and immaterial, and human ideas which are not separate Forms, because the human soul is united with a material body, making it impossible for the human being to possess any immaterial Forms. Any ideas or concepts which the human being holds, are necessarily imperfect, i.e. not immaterial, because the human being is dependent on a material body, and so are the human being's concepts. This is stated very clearly in The Summa Theologica.

That is completely mistaken.
...
This is not true at all. — Wayfarer

I really don't care if you want to insist that what I say is mistaken, and not true. I've read the material, primary sources, and you obviously have not, relying on hearsay. However, you strike me as a person who is very interested in this subject, so I am bringing this to your attention in order that you might research and learn about these principles. This will open your eyes to a whole new way of seeing the Forms. It is what they call "seeing the light", from Plato's analogy between the good and the sun. The good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. Perhaps this is what you mean by the principle of intelligibility.

My understanding is, there is plenty of room for error - we may fail to comprehend or see the Forms. — Wayfarer

But this is not what you have claimed in reference to the Pythagorean theorem. You said that any mind would discover the same principle, or concept. This not only denies the possibility of error, it denies the possibility that there could be a better way of rendering what is expressed by the theorem, in a similar, but different principle.

My point is that we need to allow a separation between human concepts, and the Ideals, which are supposed to be independent from the human mind. That is the conclusion which Plato came to in "The Republic" There is the idea of a bed which the carpenter holds, and follows in producing a bed, but this is intended to be a representation of the divine Idea of a bed. So there is always a separation between human concepts, and the divine, independent Forms. The human concept can only obtain to the level of being a representation of the divine Idea, it is never the independent Form. What you need to respect, is that when we talk about mathematical principles, like the Pythagorean theorem, these are human concepts. As much as they may be intended as representations of divine Ideas, they are not divine Ideas, they are human concepts, and as such they are dependent on the flesh and bones of the human body. This is a point which Aquinas was very insistent on. The fact that human knowledge, ideas and concepts, are dependent on the material body of the human being, is what separates human knowledge from divine Forms.

This is because, as you should know, Plato's Socrates questions the reliability of the senses; knowledge of sensory objects is pistis, or doxa; knowledge of mathematical and geometrical objects is dianoia; knowledge of the forms, noesis. The 'higher' you go, the more certain is knowledge - knowledge of math. is 'higher' than knowledge of material things, knowledge of the Forms is 'higher' than knowledge of math. This is in the Analogy of the Divided Line. — Wayfarer

Yes, I fully understand this hierarchy of knowledge. Notice that knowledge obtained from mathematics is not the highest level of knowledge. That is because even mathematical principles are lacking in perfection. They are deficient because they are produced by human beings and are thus dependent on the material body of the human being. Mathematical principles are not true "Ideals" in the sense of independent Forms, they are human concepts and therefore do not obtain to the highest good, perfection.

Knowledge of the Forms is even higher than mathematical knowledge, because this is what gives us an understanding of the separation between human concepts and the divine Forms. Through this knowledge we come to understand the deficiencies of even mathematical knowledge. That is why it's a higher knowledge than mathematical knowledge, because only this knowledge can point to the errors in mathematical knowledge. The deficiencies, errors, are due to the nature of the human being, it is imperfect, dependent on a material body, but the deficiencies can only be discovered by allowing for a perfection which can only be found in independent Forms.

Wait, that's not right. X believes P, and Y believes not-P. That's not a contradiction. — fishfry

Yes, that itself is not a contradiction. But as Banno stated, the transformation equations make what X believes, and what Y believes both true, so that's where the contradiction enters, in saying that these, P and not-P, are both true. That is, unless you allow that we can say P is true, and not-P is true, without contradiction. You can do this by contriving your definition of "true", such that truth is relative to the observer, or in the case of SR, relative to the frame of reference.

Suppose that for Angie, events A and B occur at the same time; But for Beth, A occurs before B. The transformation formulas in special relativity allow both Angie and Beth to agree with these two statements:

From Angie's frame of reference, events A and B occur at the same time.
From Beth's frame of reference, A occurs before B.

That is, both Angie and Beth, and anyone else that cares to do the calculations, will agree that for Angie, events A and B are simultaneous. — Banno

So Angie believes that A and B are simultaneous. Beth believes that A and B are not simultaneous. The transformation formulas allow that what Angie believes is true, and what Beth believes is true. How is this not a violation of the law of non-contradiction, when what Beth believes is clearly contradictory to what Angie believes?

I thought we agreed that the input cannot come from the same place as the output, and that we cannot conceive simple concepts we have not yet observed, as was the case for the blind person not conceiving colours, a deaf person not conceiving sound, and an emotionless person not conceiving sadness. I accept that the abstraction process is happening in the mind, but the input must come from outside. Or else, how would we test that what I conceive as green is the same as what you conceive as green, if not by both of us observing the same colour located outside of our minds? — Samuel Lacrampe

I agreed that the input could come from outside the mind. I see no reason to believe that it necessarily does, nor do I see reason to believe that all of the input comes from outside the mind. As for your test, it's as I told you, a matter of whether or not we agree, and often we do not. As I told you, I often disagree with people as to the colour of something. So your test, and the fact that we often disagree about things, indicates that input must come from within the mind as well.

If we apprehend a particular object which has a flat surface with three straight sides, then we recognize a triangle in that object. And if our perceptions are true, then the object truly has triangle-ness as part of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

I still do not understand your use of English. I would not say that I recognize a triangle in the three sided object, I would say that I recognize the three sided object as a triangle. Do you see the difference? I recognize a certain object as a car, or another object as a house, meaning that for me these objects fulfil the conditions required for calling them by those names. I do not see the concept of a car, or the concept of a house within these objects. I think that you are using contrived English to support your position that the concept is within the physical thing, rather than within the mind of the observer.

Perhaps it sounds like nonsense, but you are the one suggesting that drawing boundaries is not a sensible way to proceed. So now saying that the boundaries of a thing are the beginning and ending of the thing is not compatible with what you have proposed.

You propose that boundaries are not real. I've shown you how to conceive of this, and that is to make the boundary purely subjective. This means that the boundary is the property of the subject, the subject is the boundary. And this is consistent with what you say, that the subject is not real, and that boundaries are not real. There is nothing here to prevent us from saying that the subject is a boundary. We still have a problem though, because now nothing is real, as everything is incomprehensible without some sort of boundaries. So you need a principle whereby a subject, a boundary, or both, can be real.

I want to know if you've read this material, and what is your opinion of it.

Rather I want to question where the idea of self, and the idea of interiority come from. Once they are given, solipsism becomes possible, the other becomes possible, morality/immorality becomes possible. — unenlightened

The problem is that interiority and externality necessarily arise together. They are conceptual only, and both rely on each other. Like positive and negative, they are just opposites.

How (and why) does one come to draw the boundaries of self, so as to separate self from world? It seems to me to be just as mysterious as the drawing of national boundaries. One side of the river is self, and the other side is foreign, but if you follow the river back to its source, there is no division. — unenlightened

So there is no real boundary between interior and exterior as they are both inherently tied together within understanding, as opposing directions. One is not separated from the other, they are tied together in conception. But as two directions, up and down, toward the positive, or toward the negative, hotter or colder, they are very real. Therefore we can look toward the external, or toward the internal, and these are very real directions, without any real boundary between the internal and the external. They are just principles of orientation.

We can say that the river has a beginning and the river has an end, but the only boundary between these two is the river itself. Now the river is a real boundary. It is not the boundary between the two sides, it is the boundary between the beginning and the end, just like the self is a real boundary. It is the boundary between the internal and the external. There is no boundary between self and other, the self is the boundary, the boundary between internal and external. Therefore the boundary is not real unless the subject, as self, is real, because the boundary is completely subjective, arbitrarily produced by the subject. The real boundary is not between self and other, as the self is the real boundary between the internal unknowns and the external unknowns. Remove the subject, and there is no boundary, no internal, no external, no beginning nor ending. And as much as these opposing terms are imaginary, without the individual imagining them, there is nothing without them.

Are you familiar with Newton's work on light? He did a lot of experimentation with prisms, mirrors, etc., and wrote an extensive speculative treatise on the nature of light, I believe it's in his "Optics", "The Queries". It's been a long time since I read it, but I believe he concluded that light is a particle, but it's a very odd sort of particle, like an inverted particle. Massive, material particles would undergo an inversion within the sun, to become light particles. I believe he provided the basis for the modern "point particle". In any case, his speculations were displaced by wave theories, and only since the twentieth century with the development of quantum physics, have they become more relevant.

No, philosophy is to seek answers, to inquire, it is not to claim that we already have the answers. This is the problem with what you profess, and why it is a false representation of Platonism. If our concepts, what we supposedly "discover", are the way that they must be, because they are some type of independent form, then there is no room for error, it is impossible that our concepts are incorrect. This is the problem which Plato exposed in the Parmenidean, Eleatic, and Pythagorean principles, in general. This ontology of Idealism does not allow for the existence of error within human knowledge. "Knowing is being", what is known is what is. This is exactly what Socrates and Plato rallied against. So you have taken Plato's discussions, and demonstrations which expose the problems of such Idealism, and claim that this is what Plato actually promoted.

In Plato's dialogues, Socrates attacked this relentlessly, and over the course of many dialogues the weakness was exposed. It was exposed through reference to more subjective concepts, the various virtues. It was demonstrated that there is no consistency in these concepts, so it is impossible that the human being's concept is a participation in an independent Idea, because the human being's concept, with its individual idiosyncrasies, and variances, would necessarily be wrong in relation to the independent Idea, and therefore could not be a participation. Once this principle, concerning the nature of human concepts is established, the possibility that they are incorrect (or more precisely, that they are not the best, not perfect), can be extended right into the various mathematical principles, as Aristotle did. What is known, is not necessarily what "is", it is a possibility (one way of looking at things out of many possible ways). This forms the basis of skepticism. Then "the concept", "the idea", is a changing, evolving thing, created by human beings. It is not "discovered", and it can be doubted.

As an example, consider the evolution of the concept of "zero", its relevance to the modern day "equation", "algebra", "possible values", and "possible solutions". The zero, along with the negative integers allow for a possible existence. But the possible existence has no reality accept as posited by a human mind. Mathematics in general uses postulates, axioms, which the human mind must accept as real (like we must accept a premise as true), in order to proceed with the logical process, without regard for the fact that the postulate is itself just something created by human minds. Over time, the postulates change and evolve.

Platonism is more than just a theory for how we know a chair is a chair. It’s a whole principled way of life that is very fulfilling. — MysticMonist

Contrary to what many say, what Plato said, is very applicable in the modern day.

Were any other species of beings - non human but sentient - to evolve on some other planet, then I'm sure they would discover the same thing. — Wayfarer

That's highly doubtful. The other species might develop a system based on forty five degree angles instead of ninety. Or, the species might not even use the circle as the basis for geometry, it could start with the chiliagon for example, instead, and never develop any of the circle based geometry which we use. There are many different possibilities for conceptual structure, depending on what the species is exposed to, and what becomes important to it. Even here on the earth, there are differing world view.

Perhaps the species wouldn't even live on a planet which is spinning like ours. The observations of the stars, planets, and sun, from the perspective of the spinning earth, lead to the circle based geometry which we use. To say that another species, living in another part of the universe, would develop a geometry like ours, is like saying that ants, or bees should develop a geometry like ours. There's just no reason to believe this. We all like to think that our understanding of reality is "the" understanding of reality, but this is just vain conceit.

I think that, for example, that the Pythagorean theorem describes something that is real whether or not perceived by humans. However it is is something that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. So that is an example of an 'intelligible principle', i.e. something which is expressible in terms of a mathematical formulae; but that feature is not 'created by humans', only the notation is a human creation. — Wayfarer

The problem is that there aren't any right angle triangles except those created by human beings. So it doesn't really make any sense to say that The Pythagorean theorem describes something that is real whether or not perceived by humans, because the terms within the theorem refer to things only created by humans. So it is not correct to say that this feature is not created by humans.

The same is the case for pi, and circles. A cirtcle, as well as pi, are concepts created by humans. There are no naturally occurring circles, and that's why pi is an irrational ratio. All of these are concepts, are created by human beings, and are used to assist human beings in understanding the various natural features. They are tools, built by human beings. They are understood as absolutes, ideals, perfections, but without the human mind they have no existence because there is nothing natural that they refer to.

You claim that they describe something which is real, but there is nothing that they describe except themselves, and without the human mind, there is nothing there. The Pythagorean theorem, "the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides, of a right angled triangle" describes nothing but the Pythagorean theorem. Without that statement, which is produced by human beings, there is no Pythagorean theorem, and nothing which "the Pythagorean theorem" refers to.

You need not talk about a river to employ and/or be influenced by Heraclitus. — creativesoul

Oh, so being influenced by someone is what you count as having the same thoughts as that person. Get real.

You asserted that all your thought/belief was original to your own individual and private mental ongoings. — creativesoul

I am not asserting that all my thoughts and beliefs are original to myself, I am asserting that I have original thoughts, and therefore I have private mental ongoings. It doesn't require that all my thoughts are original to conclude that I have private mental ongoings, all that is required is that I have some originality.

The point is that unenlightened denied the reality of individuality, suggesting that it is an hallucination, that the belief in it is an illness, or something like that. I am not denying the reality of inter-subjectivity, communion, what we call "society", I am questioning the motives in giving higher priority to this perceived unity, over the perceived unity of the individual.

It appears to me like the unity of community cannot be given priority without denying the reality of the individual, whereas if the individual is given priority, then the individual may have respect for the community as well.

This is all related to the way that we conceive of the relationship between the parts and the whole. To say that something is a "part" is to imply necessarily that there is something, a whole, which the part participates in. The part cannot exist as an individual because by definition it partakes in the whole. To give the part individual existence is to divide the whole, and say that the part is no longer a part, it is an individual. So this perspective, which gives priority to the whole, in this way, denies the possibility of the individual existence of the thing which is called "the part", simply by designating it as a "part"..

From my perspective, the individual is given existence as a whole, and therefore is not necessarily a part of anything. But from within the individual, there comes the desire to be a part of a whole. The whole, which is the inter-subjective community, has real existence within the mind of the individual, as that which is wanted, but it does not have physical existence, as that which is actual, like the unity of the individual has. So my perspective allows that both unities are real unities, one being within the mind, as a desired end, unlike unenlightened's proposed perspective which renders one of the unities within the mind, an hallucination, the result of illness. So in reality, unenlightened's perspective is the illness because it renders one of the two types of real unities as unreal.

Words point to concepts. Words are man-made and decided upon; concepts are abstracted. — Samuel Lacrampe

Abstracted things are artificial, and decided upon too. What else, other than a human mind would perform the act of abstraction, and whether the abstraction is correct or not, is decided upon by the human mind as well.

2. The fact is that we recognize a concept in some things X, and not in other things Y.
3. This means that properties of that concept exist in X and not in Y.
4. If all the properties in X were accidental to the concept, then the concept would still be present in Y, — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't get this at all. We do not recognize a concept within things. The concept is within the mind, and when we apprehend a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept, we feel justified in calling the thing by the name which corresponds to that concept. Conversely, when we create concepts, we often try to formulate the concepts so as to best represent the thing which is being referred to by the corresponding word. There is no instances of the concept existing within the thing, as the concept is always within the mind.

He gives another example elsewhere using a figure called a chilliagon, which is a bounded geometric object comprising 1,000 sides. To the naked eye, at first glance, it looks damn like a circle - but it isn't a circle, it's a chilliagon. If you were asked to draw such a figure, you might find it a very difficult thing to do, but you would have to produce a thousand-sided figure, not a circle - because you would understand the concept. — Wayfarer

That a universal concept, such as triangle, exists by definition, (i.e., the existence of the concept of triangle is dependent on the definition of triangle), does not provide an argument that the concept is not dependent on "some process occurring in the brain". Any definition requires interpretation, and this is done by a brain. What is non-physical, is the content within the brain, which the brain is using, in the process of interpretation, the thoughts, and ideas, which are used for interpretation. This appears to produce an infinite regress, because some non-physical thoughts are required to interpret physical definitions etc.. But it need not lead to infinite regress if we accept that the non-physical, which is prior to, and necessary for the physical brain activity of interpretation, is something other than concepts. Then we allow, as Aquinas does, that human concepts are inherently tied to bodily existence, without negating the non-physical existence which is necessary for the existence of concepts.

Seemed like it was based upon Heraclitus' bit about not stepping into the same river twice. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything about a river, we were talking about thoughts. That's a category difference and you're making a category mistake with your accusation.

There's something very very odd about one using language that is not of his/her own creation to claim that everything that they think, believe, mean, and/or write is entirely of their own and no one else has ever thought, believed, meant, and/or written the same thing... — creativesoul

There's nothing odd there. The creative person uses the material available to create something new. The creation is in the form. We make patterns. Meaning is not in the words, it is in the way that the words are used, context. A new form is a new object. So despite the fact that the subject matter, the content, might be as old as the hills, new form implies necessarily, new thought.

The issue is the question of priority. If we cannot speak other than what was spoken before, then there will never be anything new said, and we are faced with infinite regress. If it is true that we speak something new, then we must account for this newness within our thoughts. This is our individuality. To deny this individuality is to force us into the absurdity of infinite regress, with the proposition that anything which has ever been said has already been said before that.

Telling people, that they ought to conform, by following accepted conventions is one thing. But telling people that they have no choice but to conform, because they are a product of their environment is the determinist lie. I believe that the indiscriminate use of the determinist lie, which is proposed in this thread, does more harm than good.

The odd thing, to me at least, is the depth of Meta's resistance. — creativesoul

My resistance is simple defence. That person, unenlightened, attacked the creative function of all individual human minds, claiming the mind is a "responsive sensitivity". It was then insinuated that as an individual person, I am not real, I am an hallucination. It is not a selfishness which I express, because defence is concerned with the motives of the attacker, not the self which is being defended.

I put it to the reader that Meta has shown few, if any, original thought/belief. Parroting another's ancient argument or extrapolating upon it without overt mention doesn't count as a private mental ongoing, unless that which has been made public for centuries counts as being private... — creativesoul

Now you have attacked me personally, with the charge of plagiarism. If you have any reason whatsoever to believe that anything which I wrote in this thread has already been said by another person before me, then show me, get right to it and produce your evidence, in the form of a quote please, with reference.

Who published that diagram? The English is not good. It says "a electron", then "an new electron".

Let's say you and I observe a chair. Assuming no false perceptions are present, you would be confused if I said "This is a lake", and rightfully so. Because the observed things correspond to the properties attributed to a chair, not a lake. Sure, some of the observed properties would be accidental, like its colour and location, but some would be essential like having a backrest or being a structure. And no observed properties would correspond to properties essential to the concept of lake, like 'a large body of water'. — Samuel Lacrampe

That is what I do not agree with.

If we are calling a certain object by the name of "X", and I can recognize and call that object X, then it does not follow logically that X must have essential features, unless you define "essential features" in some odd way.

Furthermore, if there is a type of object, which we class as "Y", and we can agree to call some objects by the name "Y", and that some objects should not be called Y, this is even less indicative that we should believe that called "Y" have an essential nature.

Do you not recognize, that in both these cases, our agreement to call objects by a specific name, "X", or "Y", says something about our capacity to agree on this type of thing, rather than something about the objects themselves? Both of these premises say something about our ability to agree on how to name something. Unless you put forward a premise which indicates a relationship between this ability to agree, and the actual existence of the object, you cannot make any logical conclusions about the objects themselves.

Now, you claim that there is a concept of "Y". What does "concept" refer to? Does it refer to the individual's capacity to class an object as "Y", or does it refer to the fact that we can agree to call certain objects by "Y", and that other objects should not be called "Y"? In either case, how do you get to the conclusion that the concept itself consists of essential features? The fact that we agree does not necessitate the conclusion of essential features unless you define essential features as what we agree on.

Because there is no slices in the block, it is a block. The slicing and ordering is done by something outside the universe.

The second law of thermodynamics is a structural feature of the universe. — litewave

The second law is not a structural feature of the eternalist block universe, that's the inconsistency I'm talking about. Either the eternalist block provides an incomplete representation of the universe, or the second law refers to something outside the universe.

I think you need to remove the ambiguity from your categories of "process" to understand the criticism which has been directed at your approach.

First, we understand in general, "processes". Then we have the more particular "living processes". It would appear like we would have some principles, whereby we distinguish living processes, as a particular type of process. Classically one would refer to a living being as carrying out the process, and this would determine a living process.

You have removed this living thing, which is assumed to carry out the living process, so from my perspective you have no means for distinguishing living processes from other processes. Now it makes no sense to classify a process as a living process because there is no basis for distinguishing a living process from a non-living process.

It appears like what you are trying to do, and this would be a real challenge, is to make living processes into the more general category. In this case, all processes would be distinguished in relation to being alive. Sub-categories, different types of processes, would all be related to each other through what you call what counts as alive. Here I can see three categories, was alive, is alive, and will be alive.

Why do you think so? As far as I know, the eternalist block just says that there is no passage of time because spacetime is a static, timeless object. — litewave

That's right, Perhaps I didn't state that very clearly. The eternalist block universe does not allow for any passing of time. Any conception of time passing, would have to refer to a force outside the universe to account for time passing. There is nothing inherent within the eternalist block which would force that force to pass time in one direction, the other, or even random jumping around. The second law of thermodynamics, necessitates that time is passing in one direction, so it represents that outside force. Therefore the two, the eternalist block, and the second law, are incompatible. The second law of thermodynamics describes a force external to the universe, which is imposed on it.

Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: — Samuel Lacrampe

The point is. that things are only "wet" because we call them "wet". That constitutes "the fact" that some things are wet, we agree to call them wet. If we didn't call them wet, then there would be no fact that they are wet. If we agree to call certain things wet, this does not prove that wetness has certain essential properties, it proves that we can agree about which things to call wet.

This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now it appears like you are starting to see my point. We produce our concepts according to how we perceive reality, not according to some "essential properties". We can name essential properties, according to how we perceive reality, agree on them, and use that as a guide in applying the concept, but this does not mean that any particular word necessarily refers to any particular set of essential properties.

Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause. — Samuel Lacrampe

This seems to contradict your claim that concepts have essential properties. If we cannot define "greenness", only experience it, then how can it have essential properties? For instance, I often see as green, what others see as blue. According to what you say, I assume that I am correct in calling this green, and the others are correct in calling this blue, because this is how we each experience the colour. How can there be essential properties of greenness when the same colour is correctly called green by me, and blue by others?

Well if my thoughts are internal to you, then, ... — unenlightened

Each thing has its own internal. The internal of you is not the same as the internal of me. However, I agree that there is likely a way by which we are united through the internal. So we may have grounds for agreement. But I'll maintain that being united through the internal is completely different from being united through the external (by spoken word etc.), as a priori is different from a posteriori.

So we need to dismiss reference to the external (communications etc.) when speaking about this unity. The unity you speak of is not the result of communication and such things, but prior to them, and perhaps the cause of them. We are united from within and it is our claims of external properties which divide us. Therefore an hallucination is not of the internal, an hallucination is of the external.

No, presentations of block universe typically assume a single direction of time, which is usually identified with the direction of increasing entropy along the otherwise bi-directional time dimension. As an example, imagine a gas tank with gas concentrated in one of the corners of the tank. According to the second law of thermodynamics the entropy of the gas tank increases with time, so at the subsequent moments of time the state of the tank will have more and more dispersed gas particles. So there is a series of states of the gas tank, each state having more entropy (more dispersed gas) than the previous state, and this series constitutes an eternalist block. There is no obvious "passage" of time in this block; it's just a series of arrangements of gas particles. — litewave

Right, so the point at issue is the second law of thermodynamics. It indicates that the structure of patterns within the eternalist block are such that we must proceed in our experience of time passing, in one direction only. We cannot proceed in our experience of time passing in the other direction without violating that second law. But the eternalist block allows that we could experience time in both directions. Therefore the second law of thermodynamics is inconsistent with the eternalist block representation of the universe.

I really struggle to make any sense of this. My voice, as expressive of my thoughts and posted on this forum is not external to you? — unenlightened

Your voice is external to me, but it is external to you as well. Your thoughts are internal to you, but they are also internal to me as well, because I have respect for the difference between internal and external, and I understand your thoughts as being internal to you. You apparently have no respect for this difference.

Consider the possibility , or don't. — unenlightened

As I said, I will listen, because I'm interested to understand your motivation. Although you say that your motivation is truth, and liberation, I find it impossible to believe that at this point.

Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ok, so this is where we disagree. I think that in the process of abstraction, the concept is created within the mind, it is an act of creation. I do not believe that the concept is pulled into the mind from a location outside of the mind, I believe that it is created by the mind.

Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is faulty logic though. We call things wet. I say water is wet, you agree that water is wet. We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. In order that we can say that wetness has essential properties, we need to agree again, as to what the essential properties of wetness are. Otherwise I might say that the essential properties are such and such, and you might say something completely different. Since "wetness" is a word that we are using, then if we can't agree on what it means, there can't be essential properties of wetness.

Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. That is order. Now, unless you insist that there is necessarily a first, then this order exists without quantity. So I can recognize an order, of one after the other, without having any idea of the quantity. I come into the middle of a succession, and recognize the order of one after the other, without any idea of the quantity.

When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. The numbers simply express an order. There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. If I owe you two dollars, this does not mean that I have a quantity of negative two dollars. The number line expresses an order, not quantities.

The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. — Samuel Lacrampe

But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours?

Time is a special kind of order. At least in our world this order is defined as the time dimension of spacetime according to the theory of relativity and the direction of this order (the arrow of time) is defined by the increasing entropy (second law of thermodynamics). All of this is already included in the structure of block spacetime. The remaining problem is why this order appears to be "passing" or "flowing", and I am saying that this appearance of "passing" or "flowing" is a feeling, a quality of consciousness, a qualitative aspect of neuronal firings. This is the subjective (experiential) passage of time. I am also saying that this quality of neuronal firings is a representation of a quality of the world, and I am suggesting that this quality of the world can be regarded as an objective passage of time. — litewave

If you use "increasing entropy" to describe the arrow of time, then there is no need to describe the feeling of time passing. The feeling of time passing is just the consequence of increasing entropy. However, increasing entropy is not something included in the eternalist block universe. It is something else which is added. The block universe allows that time could "flow" in either direction. So "increasing entropy" is a concept derived from observations of the physical world, and these observations directly contradict the block universe theory because they indicate that time can only flow in one direction, while the block universe allows that time could flow in either direction.

Causal relations are part of the structure of block spacetime. I think causal relations are a special kind of mathematical/logical relations in the context of the entropic arrow of time where consequences logically follow from causes, if we use a broad definition of "causes" as initial conditions and structural features of spacetime that we call laws of physics. So, if you can logically derive a pattern at some moment of time from a pattern at a prior moment of time and laws of physics, then there is a causal relation between the two patterns. — litewave

I don't agree with this at all, you seem to be just making things up. Yes, causal relations are determined in the context of the entropic arrow of time, but the entropic arrow is not a part of the block spacetime, it is something which is added to the block, to account for our observations of a flow of time. This allows that within the block, someone can distinguish between time-like relations and space-like relations, by assuming causal relations. The observations of causal relations are inconsistent with the block universe, so the block must be adapted by means of light cones and such, to allow for the arrow of time, the observations of causation.

I did mean "same", same doesn't mean completely absolutely identical, nothing is even self-same under the notion of completely in every imaginable way identical, no one ever means that.

When someone tells you that they have the same shirt, it doesn't mean "hey, that's my shirt!" — Wosret

This is a philosophy forum, and there is such a thing as the law of identity. It is fundamental to logical proceedings. If you were using "same" in a casual way, such as the way that someone might say that they have the same shirt as another, then you should have indicated this. Now that you have indicated this, I don't see that you have the grounds for any logical argument. You say that some people have similar thoughts, just like some people have similar shirts and similar cars, and they call them the same but you acknowledge that they aren't really the same thoughts. according to any principled law of identity. So I must conclude that you have no argument.

What then is this huge difference? — unenlightened

You are a different person from me, and we have different interests.

I am saying what I think is true, and my motivation is that the truth is liberating. — unenlightened

I am willing to accept this. You believe that what you say is true, and you are motivated by what you believe is the truth. And perhaps, believing this is liberating for you. But I don't see how submitting my mind to your beliefs, would be liberating for me. What is liberating for me is to believe in my own determinations of the truth, just like it is liberating for you to believe in what you have determined as the truth.

See, you have a way of turning the table on me, such that you now describe "liberating" as the exact opposite of how I understand "liberating". To be liberated means to be freed from such social conventions, so I can only see your claim that to be tied to social conventions is liberating, as an attempt at deception.

But here already is some evidence; we assume, we agree, that my voice is internal to me and external to you, and your voice, vice versa. What then is this huge difference? Externality is internality, seen from elsewhere. It seems a huge difference because it is a matter of perspective, but it is no difference at all; certainly not one to bear the weight of total trust on one side and total paranoia on the other that you seem to place upon it with no justification I can see. — unenlightened

I don't think that you quite understand the relationship between externality and internality. Imagine that a person is a point in space. Within that point is the person's internal private thoughts. Outside that point is what is external. External to the person is another person, another spatial point, with a private, internal aspect. Person A can view person B, through the external, and communicate through the external. But for person A to get to person B's internal, person A must respect the fact that this is the internal of person B. Therefore to think of person B's internal as the external of person A is false it is really the internal of person B.

All things have an internal and an external. When we describe the internal of one thing as the external of another thing, rather than respecting its true nature as the internal of that thing, we make a grave ontological mistake.

Well... obviously snow flakes, nor people are literally identical, like superman and Clark Kent are. For them to be precisely identical, none of their attributes can vary, and nothing that can be said of one, cannot be said of the other, including temporal and spacial location. That doesn't mean that a clone isn't pretty much the same, without being literally identical, as they share many many attributes, with less difference than sameness. — Wosret

If you use the word "same", then I expect that you mean same. If you want to say that people have similar thoughts, then say that they have similar thoughts, don't say that they have the same thoughts.

Whole picture, and discrete details are two ways of looking at things, blurring the individual parts into a whole, or zeroing in on the discrete details, which themselves can be further broken up into discrete parts, that can be called a unity, at different levels of analysis. Calling one more true or real just demonstrates a lopsided, or one sided view of things, in my view. — Wosret

The same goes for the word "unity'. If you say that people fighting amongst themselves are unified, united, as a unit, or a unity, then I have no idea of what you mean by "unity", which to me means undivided.

Responding to me that there could be no communication either if we were literally identical, and literally the exact same person is not to actually respond to anything I've said. — Wosret

You said, that unless we have the same thoughts, communication would be impossible. I said that if we had the same thoughts communication would not be necessary. One, or both of us, misunderstand what "communication", or "same thought" means.

Saying that your thoughts are unique, and only individual to you, and no one else, and me asking you then how it is that communication is possible is to respond to what you've said. — Wosret

Communication is always incomplete, it lacks perfection, that's why there is different interpretations of the same spoken words. That's how it is possible that there is communication without different individuals having the same thoughts. Communication is an imperfect thing. If communication were perfect, without doubt or misunderstanding, then communication would imply the same thoughts in different people. Communication is not perfect though.

Judging by the way you use words like "same" and "unity", and the way that I understand these words, it is very obvious that communication is far from perfect.

I am an external voice, talking to your internal voice, and saying that seeing external and internal as separate is a deep mistake. I cannot give you a reason to listen, unless you listen. — unenlightened

I'll listen, but as I said, unless I can determine your motivation in telling me this, I cannot trust you. I perceive a huge difference between internal and external. So you telling me that this is a deep mistake is apprehended by me with great suspicion, I have no idea what you are up to. And so I will ignore your plea, as an unreasonable external voice, asking me to join it in who knows what kind of adventure. That is, until you demonstrate your motivation, what kind of adventure are you taking me on? I suggest you proceed in making your point, then perhaps I can judge your motivation.

I am asking you in good faith to at least imagine the implications of it not being a lie, one of which is that the experience of individuality is an hallucination - that what we assume to be normal is itself a madness. — unenlightened

Back to this point. How do you convince the person who suffers from hallucination, that what they experience is hallucination? I think that this requires a clear understanding, and agreement between both parties, as to what exactly constitutes an hallucination.

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I'm on record for not liking the way Stanford words that whole section. — noAxioms

That's the norm, Stanford is not a good reference.

Because of causal relations between one thing and another. There is a causal imprint of the earlier thing in the later thing, so the experience of the later thing enables us to identify it as being after the earlier thing. — litewave

But causality is highly questionable in eternalism. You could perhaps assume potential causal relations, through spatial-temporal relations, but to say that there is a causal imprint from one thing on another thing, is just an arbitrary claim. It is like saying that X is similar in spatial structure to Y, and after Y in time, therefore Y caused X, but this is an arbitrary assumption. We cannot deduce a passage of time here without a definition of "cause" which assumes a passage of time. But this premise, the definition of "cause" which assumes a passing of time, would contradict the premise of the eternalist block.

Still, since the intrinsic and the structural identity of a thing are bound up like two sides of a coin (they are identities of the same thing), we can expect that structurally similar patterns will also have similar qualities. We can also expect that the quality will somehow reflect the structure, so it can make some sense that the causal structure of brain processes, which enables the identification of prior and later moments, will be reflected in the experience of a passage of time. — litewave

I do not understand how you are try to relate "structure" to temporal experience. Temporal experience is better described as "order" rather than structure. We may be able to say that order is a particular type of structure, but an argument would have to be made to show this relationship. I understand order in terms of quantity rather than quality, so if the structure you are talking about is order, then this may be why you cannot reconcile structure with quality. 1,2,3,4,5, is an order. So your argument about quality and structure, appears irrelevant to me because you haven't shown how this is related to order. That is how we experience time, as order.

Snow flakes aren't unique and original either, that's also a myth, just like people their formation is correlated to their physical circumstances. — Wosret

Don't give me any of that BS. The article you referred me to very clearly states that at the molecular level it is true that snowflakes are unique. Just because they can class them into a number of different types, just like someone could class human beings into a number of different types, this doesn't mean that they are not all unique. Classing things into different types for the purpose of saying that each is not unique, is the argument of a sick mind which propagates racism.

Given the boundary of self, self-centred behaviour is rational behaviour. But I have removed the given, and suggested it is an hallucination, as the voices some folk hear are said to be hallucinations. So far, your reason has come up with the equivalent of 'why should I doubt the voices?' and 'the voices are very strong'. — unenlightened

So you're telling me that I should listen to the reason of others rather than my own reasoning. I can see how that might be good in some instances, but bad in other instances. How should I distinguish between these two? And if the others keep feeding me BS like Wosret just did, then why shouldn't I tune out those other voices altogether, and trust only my internal voice, the one true voice which I know never has the motivation to deceive me?

If we can't be of one mind, and think the same thing, then how can we possibly communicate? — Wosret

Huh? Communication is by definition between individuals, communion, a sharing of ideas. If the separation between individuals was removed, making them one, there would be no such thing as communication, no need to share ideas because my ideas would be yours.

You seem to be forgetting the fact that to have numerous people thinking about the same thing, requires effort on the part of those people. Without that intentional effort, people will think about all sorts of random things. Do you really believe that people just naturally all think the same thing, being lead (or mislead) by whatever they hear, without putting any effort into deciding what they ought and ought not believe?

I see this as a big problem with social media. Someone can post to a massive public, some random, sick, and ill-conceived thought, and instead of getting shunned by the people around them, or told to shut up and act properly, as would happen if the person spoke up in a small group of people, that posting can find acceptance and following. Amongst the massive number of people who have access to it, a small percentage will like it. Out of a huge number of people, there will always be a small percentage of people who will accept something, and follow it without giving thought to that decision, just randomly deciding, that's something different, it's an idea I can get involved in.

So in a society such as ours, where there is an unbelievable amount of information coming from all different types of groups and individuals, with all sorts of motivations, it is more essential now, than ever before, to be trained in our own powers of decision making. It is necessary to use our own inner voice more than ever before in the past. So instead of denying the inner voice we need to learn how to bring it out, cultivate it, and put it to work where it is desperately needed.

So far, your reason has come up with the equivalent of 'why should I doubt the voices?' and 'the voices are very strong'. — unenlightened

The question is, which voices are the most trustworthy, the ones coming at me from outside, which I have little or no understanding of their motivations, or the ones coming from within, which I have at least some understanding of their motivations. The issue of whether or not the voices are illusions, delusions, or hallucinations is irrelevant, because the voices are there regardless, and cannot be ignored based on some random determination of "hallucination". The issue is the motivations behind the voices, because that is what gives them meaning, intent, what is meant by those voices. If the motivations can be determined, they can be judged. If the motivations cannot be determined, then it may be wise to ignore them as potentially misleading.

Are all of your thoughts and feelings unique and original to you (if they were they would be inexpressible)? Has no one else ever had those thoughts or feelings? — Wosret

I think that every thought is unique, just like every snowflake, and every person is unique. I have never had the same thought twice, (I've experienced deja vu but this is similarity, not the same thought or feeling), so why should I think that someone else has had the same thought as me?

Private suggests that they are no where else to be seen, but if they have been seen in a different place before, could they not be recognized again? — Wosret

I see no reason to believe that the same thought has been in a different place before, How would it get there?


So now you want to make it a conflict of right versus left? You know that such strife exists. But I don't see this as right hand against the left, or one person against another, I see it as one ideology against another. So I don't think your analogy of the right hand versus the left hand works. You need to consider competing ideas instead of competing physical parts of the body. Say that a person wants to do X, and also wants to do Y, but X and Y exclude each other mutually. Now we have an analogy for competing ideologies, competing ideas. How would the person decide which is the better option, X or Y? The person would use reason.

Let's say some people claim A as the better ideology, and others claim B, just like part of me wants to do X, while the other part wants to do Y. It is not really the case that "part" of me wants to do Y, and "part" wants to do X, all of me wants to do X and all of me wants to do Y, but it is impossible to do both. So why is it that part of society wants X ideology, and part wants Y ideology? If I cannot divide myself in this way, how is it that a society can be divided in this way?

How is it that conflicting ideologies can effectively divide societies into parts, whereby they will attack each other, but conflicting ideas within my mind cannot divide me into parts? How is it that I have this very strong unity within myself, which society does not have? This unity which makes up society is deficient compared to the unity which makes up myself, because it will allow different parts with competing ideas to attack each other, but my mind will always use reason to work out such problems without resorting to the destruction of myself. If I were to fall to this level, then clearly I would be ill, but that supposed unity of society is always at this level. Why would I accept this unity of society as a higher unity than the unity of myself?

Both the external world pattern and the pattern of neuronal firings are patterns in an eternalist block spacetime, but every pattern has a qualitative aspect (in addition to its structural aspect); in the case of the neuronal firings it is a conscious quality (quale/experience) while in the case of the external world it is, presumably, an unconscious quality. — litewave

The "patterns" you refer to are a temporal succession, one neuron firing is experienced as prior to another etc. In the block universe, how does one thing get experienced as prior to another?

But as I said, both kinds of the passage of time are qualitative aspects of a static, eternalist pattern. — litewave

I don't see how a passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern. I agree that there is a temporal order to the block, but unless there is something independent from the block, which is moving through the block, I don't see how there can be a passage of time. The conscious subject can only have an experience of time passing because it consist of something which is completely independent of the objective world, and that defines it as a subject rather than an object. The objective block universe has no time passing, therefore whatever it is which is responsible for the experience of time passing, this thing must be completely independent from the objective world. So we ought to assume dualism.

Well some people hear voices, and some people think they are alone. "We experience ourselves as individuals" Is this not performative contradiction? Who is this 'we' that is being given voice to? — unenlightened

"We" here refers to a generalization. I know myself as an individual, so I, believing that others are like me, think that others know themselves as individuals. Perhaps I am wrong, and others do not. If so, then this leaves me as different from others. Doesn't that just reinforce my position that I am an individual, other from others? How do I get out of this trap?

I am asking you in good faith to at least imagine the implications of it not being a lie, one of which is that the experience of individuality is an hallucination - that what we assume to be normal is itself a madness. Then one has an explanation as to why a social creature spends so much time organising conflict. — unenlightened

Sure, I am willing to entertain this as a possibility. My individuality is an hallucination. But what can you give me to help me accept this. Others have said that this is a beneficial way of looking at reality, it would be beneficial to think of myself as part of a whole. Why should I give up on the way that things appear to me, for the sake of what others say will be beneficial?

By the way, I really don't see the relationship between seeing oneself as an individual, and the desire to organize conflict. I see organized conflict as the product of things like nationalism, in which individuals see their group, "us" as being opposed to the thoughts and expressions of another group, "them". Organized conflict is not the result of personal differences.

It seems to me, that I am always totally alone in my mind, because everyone else is outside it. I've learned to accept the gap, and make efforts to understand others. But this doesn't let the others into my mind, it just allows me to maintain relationships.