I had a bad dream last night. I was back in school and I had to write a paper on transubstantiation. It was the day before the paper was due and I couldn't find any information on it. It was as if it didn't exist.

The ritual is transubstantiation if and only if the substance changes, and whether or not the change occurs has nothing to do with what people believe or what people claim or what word people use to describe the ritual. — Michael

My claim is that the substance changes.

Maybe this is missing something? You can correct me if I'm misrepresenting your position — ProbablyTrue

That's about it. And the reason why transubstantiation occurs iff communicants have faith, is that substance is something we assume, to support our observed experience of the temporal continuity of existence. So there is no problem with saying that at any moment, this particular object ceases being bread, and starts being body of Christ, because it just requires shifting our assumptions concerning the temporal continuity of existence.

The further issue though, is what supports our assumption of substance. There is an observed temporal continuity, but why, what supports this? This is where we appeal to God. So if we say that the substance changes from bread to Christ, then without the assumption of God, we can say anything, because it's all human assumptions. With the assumption of God, it is necessary that God goes along with this transubstantiation, to ensure that it's true. Why wouldn't He?

. If it states that the thing is the same as itself, then that's what it is. — Sapientia

You are just asserting "that's what it is", in the very same way that the Church asserts "that's what it is", referring to the articles of the Eucharist. So you're being hypocritical now denying that the Church may do this, when you are doing the very same thing.

But that's not what the law of identity actually says though. Do you understand a difference between the word "same" and the word "what". If I say "X is the same as X", this says nothing about what X is. The word "same" indicates no options. "What" indicates a choice made from options. To say "what a thing is", indicates that one has made a choice from options. What it is, might be bread, might be body of Christ, whatever, "what" implies options.

If you're saying that what a thing is, is something other than itself, then you're contradicting the law of identity, and are therefore mistaken. — Sapientia

I've explained this very clearly to you. It's is absolutely necessary that what a thing is, is other than the thing itself, and this does not contradict the law of identity. It is necessary because all sorts of fictional ideas qualify as "what a thing is", but are not actually things. That is why Aristotle introduced the concept of "substance" into his logic, so we can distinguish fictional things (which are only logical possibilities), from existing things, substantial existence. "What a thing is" does not necessitate that the thing has substantial existence, therefore "what a thing is" is necessarily something other than the thing itself, because the thing itself has substantial existence.

What items? You need to be clearer. We start with a wafer and wine. These items are consumed, and a ceremony is performed. I do not believe that the ceremony changes the items in any way. So we are left with consumed wafer and wine. End of. — Sapientia

You've got the temporal order wrong. The ceremony is first, then the objects are consumed. I went through this with Hanover already. Hanover claimed that the ceremony accomplishes nothing, but clearly it does accomplish something. The attitude of the participants toward the items is changed. And, as I said "substance" is an assumption which we make concerning the physical existence of objects. If the substance of the objects changes, this implies that the assumptions of the people, concerning the objects changes, and therefore the attitudes of the people changes. The substance of the items changes, and the evidence, the change in the people's attitude demonstrates this. Is that so hard to understand?

If you believe in God, then the assumption of substance, which is made by human beings, is supported by God. If you do not believe in God, the assumption of substance is difficult to support, and that's why process philosophy is so popular today. But if you do believe in God, then the belief is that God goes along with transubstantiation to support this change of substance. And there is no reason to believe that God would not support this.

You're being pedantic. — Michael

Right, the topic is substance. You come in and start to talk about properties as if properties were substance. I point out to you that we're talking about substance, not properties. You say I'm being pedantic, as if someone might think that the difference between substance and property is a trivial difference. Confusion with respect to this subject, "transubstantiation", is the result of failing to be pedantic. I thank you for expressing that you think I've demonstrated this virtue.

The point is that they're not just choosing to use the term "Christ's body" to refer to whatever substance the bread actually has. They're claiming that it has a particular substance. — Michael

Did you not read what I said about substance? Substance is what a thing, any thing, every thing, is assumed to have. There's no such thing as a particular substance, except as a particular thing, like there is no such thing as a particular existence other than as a particular thing. Substance, and existence are what all things are assumed to have, as things. The substance which a thing actually has can be no different from the substance which a thing is assumed to have, because substance is nothing more than an assumption in the first place, an assumption which is made to account for the claim that the thing has real material existence.

The thing is what it is. — Sapientia

I went through this already. You misrepresented the law of identity. It does not state that a thing is what it is, it states that the thing is the same as itself. What the thing is, is something other than this. If a thing, and "what it is", are one and the same, then a thing would be a form without matter. We must account for the fact that a real thing has material existence. If a thing, and "what it is" were one and the same, then all kinds of imaginary things, like unicorns and such, which have a "what it is" would necessarily be actual things.

The only "difficulty" I have with that is that it's false if taken literally, as it is supposed to be taken, as a Catholic would maintain, as has been corroborated. — Sapientia

As I've explained to you, it is true if taken literally. There are items which are named body and blood of Christ, and these items are body and blood of Christ because that is what they are called. Take that literally! These particular items are referred to by these words, body and blood of Christ. Therefore these items are literally the items which are called body and blood of Christ. That is the literal meaning. There is no falsity here.

You create the falsity by insisting that "body and blood of Christ" must refer to something other than these items. You are not taking it literally, you are insisting on another meaning of "body and blood of Christ". Based on this other meaning, which you refer to, which is not the literal meaning given by the Church, that these items are the items which are called body and blood of Christ, you claim falsity. Therefore it is only by refusing the literal meaning, given by the Church, that these items are literally the items called the body and blood of Christ, and referring to some other meaning, which you conjure up in your mind, that you claim falsity.

I agree with you that it's about substance, and I agree with Michael that you're being pedantic. — Sapientia

Michael's argument relied completely on reference to "properties". You agreed with Michael. Now you agree with me, that we are talking about substance, and not properties. My argument is that if taken literally, transubstantiation is a valid explanation of the sacrament of the Eucharist. You may describe me as a pedant all you want, that's fine because my whole point is that adhering to the literal meaning is necessary for maintaining the validity of the Eucharist. But you seem to be lost, claiming that adhering to the literal meaning renders transubstantiation as false, but then you agree that I am the one being pedantic.

When the Christian claims that the bread is the body of Christ, he isn't just choosing to use the label "body of Christ" to refer to the bread; he's claiming that the bread has certain properties. — Michael

Well maybe some Christians told you that, but these Christians obviously are not familiar with the doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is clearly stated that what is referred to is the substance, that's why it's called transubstantiation. It is also stated that the accidents, which are the sensible properties of the substance remain as those associated with bread and wine. Otherwise the Church would have no way of accounting for the fact that the body and blood of Crist look and taste like bread and wine.

Come on Michael, the Church has been an institution for close to two thousand years. Do you really think that it could have maintained that status by saying something so irrational as what you represent here?

And if the bread doesn't have the necessary properties required for it to be the body of Christ, then the Christian's claim is false. — Michael

As I say, you are very clearly, and totally wrong here. All you need to do is read some quick information about transubstantiation. Properties are irrelevant here, what we are talking about is substance.

That's not what I said. I said there's a difference between assessing facts and decreeing facts. In the first, you take a look at the world, you assess what you see, and you say "there's a dog." In the latter, you assert as an authority what the facts are. — Hanover

I still don't see any difference. Assessing the facts amounts to taking a look and saying "there's a dog". Decreeing the fact amounts to saying "there's a dog". Before you can decree, as a fact, "there's a dog", you must necessarily assess the facts. And if you assess the facts, and say "there's a dog", all you are doing is decreeing the facts. If you are decreeing "there's a dog", with completely disregard for whether or not it is a fact, this is something completely different from decreeing facts, and is irrelevant to our case here.

I really do no not see any difference still, perhaps you could try again.

The priest must perform an act to make the transubstantiation occur, but that's not what is meant by performative. I must put water in the freezer to make it ice, but my act is not performative from a linguistic perspective. That is to say, the priest's acts do not constitute a performative act to the extent that what he does necessitates the metaphysical event of transubstantiation. It is entirely possible that what he does accomplishes nothing at all. — Hanover

Clearly the priest's act is performative, because it is by this act that transubstantiation occurs. And, it is also very clear that it is impossible that this act accomplishes nothing, because following this act the participants respect the items as the substance of Christ's body and blood, and proceed to take part in the sacrament. The act definitely accomplishes something. So you are very wrong on both counts here.

The tangible referent of the transubstantiation would be the transformation of the bread and wine to flesh and blood, which would occur, according to Catholicism in a non-empirically verifiable way. Regardless, something (whatever it might be) changed, and that changed thing would be the referent. — Hanover

It is very clear that something tangible changes in transubstantiation, and this is the attitude of the people toward the items. As I said, "substance" is an assumption we make. So if the substance of the object changes, then this means that the people's assumptions concerning the object change. And that is what we see in the change of the people's attitude toward the objects. Therefore there is real tangible evidence that transubstantiation has occurred.

That's what I'm saying. Words decribe things, they are not the things themselves. — Sapientia

I fully understand this, and I agree with you. But we are talking about "what the thing is". What I am asking is if you believe that there is a "what the thing is" which is other than words, or some other type of symbol? I do not believe there could be. But if you do, I know you probably can't tell me in words what this "what the thing is" would be like, but could you give me some other indication of "what a thing is" which wouldn't be words or symbols?

I justify that claim by appealing to the law of identity, which states that a thing is what it is. — Sapientia

This isn't quite right though. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself, identical with itself. It does not say that a thing is what a thing is, it says that a thing is itself. So we cannot derive "what it is", from the law of identity. That's why we must proceed toward description to derive what the thing is. But I don't think you can have a "what the thing is" without words or some sort of symbols.

In English, "the body of Christ", in accordance with a literal interpretation, means the body of Christ, and nothing else. The word "body" would refer to his body, meaning his flesh, bones, organs, appendages, and so on. The name "Christ" refers to Jesus Christ of the Bible, who Christians believe to be the son of God, and who, so it is said, was crucified around two thousand years ago. — Sapientia

Right, now according to the doctrine of transubstantiation, the items of the Eucharist are the body and blood of Christ. Why do you have difficulty with that? Do you not understand what transubstantiation means?

I already understand what transubstantiation is, so that entire explanation was unnecessary and a complete waste of time. It would help if you were charitable, but you have not been charitable. On the contrary, you have insinuated that I know nothing about transubstantiation, even though I can explain what it is, and in fact have already done so.

Like I said, I do not have a problem with that in principle, nor do I think that it's impossible. I just don't believe that it happens. And I don't believe that it happens, because I do not have good enough reason to believe that it happens. — Sapientia

I have a problem with this claim, so I'll be brutally honest. I think you are lying. I don't think you understand what transubstantiation is at all. I think that if you really understood what it means, and thought that it was possible, as you claim, then you couldn't avoid seeing that it is going on all the time. Instead, you do not believe that it happens, therefore I conclude that you lie when you claim to understand it.

Yes, thank you. Michael gets it. — Sapientia

See, my claim that you are lying is justified. You really know nothing about transubstantiation. It is all about change of substance, as the name implies, and nothing about change of properties, and this is stated in church doctrine. You and Michael both know nothing about transubstantiation.

Jesus Christ! If it's a matter of faith, then we agree. That's why I don't believe in transubstantiation. But if it's a matter of faith, then why the heck are you trying to argue the case? Arguing is what you do when you think that there's a reasonable case to be made. Faith is what you resort to when you don't have a clue, but are overcome with emotion. — Sapientia

I've been saying this from the beginning, transubstantiation relies on faith. When the faith is there, it occurs. If there is no faith it cannot occur. However, the fact that you do not have faith doesn't prevent transubstantiation from occurring, because it occurs by means of all those who do have faith. So no matter how much you argue against it, you will not prevent it from occurring unless you kill the faith in all of those involved, so that they quit doing it. Good luck with that, but you need a better approach. Claiming that transubstantiation does not occur, just because you don't believe in it, is not the right approach. This is like arguing that because you do not believe in God, therefore God doesn't exist.

MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does. — Harry Hindu

Sure, we make inferences about the cause by examining the effect, that's exactly what I said. What I said is that we cannot "measure" the cause by examining the effect. The detective and prosecutor make a judgement which is not based on measurement of the cause. If it were a measurement of the cause, we wouldn't need a trial, a judge, nor jury, we could just refer to the measurement to see if the person measured up as guilty or not guilty.

Why are you asking a question about a distinction I never raised? My comment was that there was a difference between assessing facts and decreeing facts. I clarified that by quoting what I said, but you instead just re-asked the same question, ignoring my prior clarification. — Hanover

What you said is that there is a difference between reporting facts and declaring facts. I said there is no such difference. You attempted to clarify by saying that there's a difference between assessing facts and declaring facts, or something like that. I was unable to grasp how you were trying to categorize these things so I asked twice for you to provide me with a comprehensive clarification. Care to try again, because I still don't see the distinction you're trying to make?

Sure, and physicists can get it entirely wrong. They might describe a photoelectric effect completely wrong and a simple auto mechanic might get it right. A physicist has expertise in his field, but if his statements don't correspond to reality, then he's wrong. And so it is with the transubstantiation. A Catholic scholar can speak to the issue of what it entails, but he can be wrong. And this is my point: the Catholic position on transubstantiation is declarative and indicative, but in no way performative. If it were, it would mistake the Church for God, as if it could create reality as opposed to simply report on it. — Hanover

This is all meaningless to me I do not see the basis for your claim that transubstantiation is in no way performative, and that this is the Church's position on it. I think your wrong on this point and the rejection of my argument is wrong on this point. Clearly the Eucharist is a sacrament and transubstantiation is therefore performative.

Let us suppose that I tell everyone that I can literally turn rocks into gold. As a result, millions come every Tuesday to my house where I pray over rocks and then I produce a nugget of gold as proof. I call this change "transcombobulation," Let us then suppose that I am discovered later a fraud or that I was just confused. It would be correct to say that transcombobulation never occurred. What actually occurred was that I held a big meeting that turned out to be a big pile of nonsense. — Hanover

This example states that you were discovered as a fraud. It is not comparable with the Eucharist unless transubstantiation has been discovered as a fraud. All your argument amounts to is that it's possible that its a fraud. But as I said, the Church has been carrying this out for hundreds and hundreds of years, with millions of people, and continues to do so today. No evidence of fraud that I can find. What evidence do you have of any type of fraud? Don't you think that it would have been stopped by now if it was fraud?

The Church is claiming a change to the wafer and the wine at some level and if that doesn't occur, then transubstantiation hasn't occurred. Whatever the mysterious change is, it must occur for transubstantiation to occur. — Hanover

It's not a mysterious change. It is a change of substance. And all that is required to understand this change is to understand the nature of substance. Don't you agree that each and every thing, to be a thing, necessarily has substance? To say that a thing has substance is to say "that it is". But to say "that a thing is", and to say "what a thing is", is to say two different things. So "substance" doesn't tell us anything about what the thing is, only that it is. This allows that "what" the substance of a thing is, can be anything which we say it is.

My comment only was that "transubstantiation" had no tangible referent and the only thing it could refer to is a particular state of confusion, but I did not make a general comment that words without direct referents were always confusing. — Hanover

Of course "transubstantiation" has no tangible referent, because "substance' has no tangible referent. If transubstantiation had a tangible referent it would be contradiction, or equivocation in the use of "substance". That is exactly why there is no tangible change to the object in transubstantiation, substance is not tangible, it is only intelligible as an assumption, it is what we assume that an object has, in order that we can say that it exists.

Process philosophers may deny the existence of substance. But without the assumption of substance, the temporal continuity of an object is very difficult to account for. Once we have identified the temporal continuity of an object, as substance, then we can play special language games with that substance, as the Church does, because we are not referring to what the thing is, only that it is.

You might call this fraud, but that's only because you are refusing to play that language game, and so you cite some other rules which are contrary to the rules of that game, to rationalize your refusal. The loser is you though, as the quitter is the loser. By quitting the game, rejecting these rules, and adhering to those contrary rules, you deny yourself the capacity to understand the nature of substance. And if you persist, adhering to process philosophy in your denial of substance, you will find as the process philosophers before you have found, the need to turn to God in the end. Then you'll just have to start the game all over again.

Because calling it something else means only that it would be called something else. It wouldn't change what it is, by which I mean the definition which truly describes the object, which would be the definition of bread. What you're doing is erroneously conflating two distinct things, and the logical consequences of doing that lead to an erroneous stance on the issue. — Sapientia

It's all words, definitions, the whole shebang. How can you say "what a thing is" is something other than the words which refer to it. That is what you're saying isn't it? If not, then the words which refer to it are what it is. So if it's called "body of Christ" then it is body of Christ. That is, unless you are saying that there is a "what the thing is" which is other than the words which refer to it. How would you justify that claim? Does God decide what it is, using something other than words?

Alternatively, if you mean that it would literally be the body of Christ, then you're simply mistaken, as it's not, it's bread. — Sapientia

What do you mean by "literally" here? If this name, "body of Christ" is assigned to this object, how can you get more literal than that? "Body of Christ" literally means that object which the name is assigned to. You are claiming that the named object is bread, through some association or metaphor, disregarding the literal name "body of Christ". So it is you is not adhering to what is literal, and who is simply mistaken.

No, that transubstantiation has occurred is your faulty assumption. I have no problem whatsoever with assuming a name change, but your assessment of the consequences of such a name change is erroneous. I attribute this to the fact that you're just not as good at grasping this sort of thing as someone like Hanover or myself. — Sapientia

It is not a name change, it is transubstantiation. This means that the underlying substance, which we assume to be there, in order to ground our experience that the object has a temporal continuity of existence, changes at some point in time. The object's appearance to us, through our senses does not change, only the substance changes. The object's real existence is known through its temporal continuity which is grasped by the mind. The mind allows that temporal continuity (the substance of existence) to end at some point in time, and begin again as a different substance, at that point in time.

The object has been assumed to have continuous existence under the name "bread" until that point in time. From that point onward its temporal continuity is known under the name "body of Christ". This is the object itself which is being referred to with these terms, not the object's appearance through our senses. The nature of temporal existence, and the principles of logic allow that we can say that the object was called X up until this point in time, at which point we start to call it Y. At each successive moment of time, the object is naturally a different object, we only assume that it maintains identity as the same object with continued existence. All that is required is that we release this unnatural assumption for a moment, allowing that the object has a different identity before and after that moment. You seem to think that there is something inherently wrong with this, but there is not.

I think that this is the weakest argument for transubstantiation that I've so far. It is begging the question. — Sapientia

No it's not begging the question, its appeal to authority, but when the authority is demonstrated to be authoritative there is nothing wrong with an appeal to authority. If the child asks the parent, why do you insist that I call the colour that the sky is "blue", and the parent says it's because millions of people have been calling it that for hundreds of years, then the parent's authority is justified. Likewise, if the Church has been carrying out this activity for hundreds of years with millions of people, then their authority to call this process "transubstantiation" is justified. And your claim that there is no such thing as transubstantiation, that it is a fiction, is untenable.

No, I am open to the possibility that its substance has changed as purported, but for me to believe that it has in fact changed, I must have good enough reason. I don't have good enough reason. You have not provided good enough reason. Therefore, I don't believe it. — Sapientia

Exactly as I said when I joined this discussion, it's a matter of faith. The only reason to believe is faith. You have no faith, you have no reason to believe. Why should you believe that the colour of the sky ought to be called "blue", and not some other name? Faith. Why should you believe that the items of the Eucharist ought to be called body and blood of Christ, and not some other name? Faith. There is no substantial difference between these two examples.

Well what's the point in talking about something you know nothing about if you don't want to learn something about it, unless you're going to at least pretend to know something about it?

I have no intention to change their minds. I think the idea that there's reality which is beyond our capacity to sense, but can still be known by the mind, is way beyond both of them. For them, if it looks and tastes like bread, then it must be bread, regardless of what its true substance is. I just like to see if I can bullshit my way through anything. If the leaders of the church can do it, then why can't I?

On the other hand, an example of radiation is the sunlight heating a brick wall or your body. The light itself is not hot, just as the microwaves that heat the coffee are not themselves hot. In both cases the theory is that the radiation agitates the molecules to move faster and this faster movement manifests as heat. — Janus

I had a thread once where I asked about the nature of heat radiation. There is a curious thing about the radiation of heat. In the way it is described, it appears like in order for an object to radiate heat, there must be an object to receive that radiation, just like in conduction, there must be a colder object to receive heat from the warmer. But many argued that an object may radiate heat into nothing, vacuum space, or something like that.

I think the issue is in the definition of "heat". Heat is a measurement of energy transferred from one object to another. Therefore radiation, as the medium between one object and another, is not actually heat until it is received by the other object. So for heat to be radiated requires that it be received by another object. And although we say that heat is what is transferred from one object to the other, the radiation itself, which is what exists between the objects, is not actually heat, it is the means by which heat is transferred.

Again, my understanding of that account of causation is that object A can cause object B to go from being potentially X to being actually X only if object A is itself actually X. — Mitchell

I think that this is very clearly a misunderstanding. According to Aristotle's law of identity, an object is the same as itself. No two objects may have the same identity. So if an object becomes actually X, it is impossible that the object which caused it to be actually X, could itself be actually X, as that would defy the law of identity. Two distinct objects would be actually X.

He would have done better to have presented the Aristotle or Aquinas version. — andrewk

I think that's probably right. Feser's argument seems to be long and convoluted. Aquinas' is less so, but still quite complicated. Aristotle's cosmological argument is the most simple, and easy to understand. As I explained in a post above, it leads to the conclusion of an actuality which is prior to temporal, contingent things, so long as we deny an infinite regress of things.

The problem is that "time" in its general conception, is defined by the activities of those contingent things. This puts that actuality, outside of time, therefore eternal. So Aristotle proposed eternal circular motion, a circle so perfect that there could be no beginning or end. This is similar in conception to the modern Hartle-Hawking no-boundaries proposal. The theists take Aristotle's cosmological argument and adapt it for their purposes. But this increases the complexity by adding principles to adapt this pre-temporal actuality to God.

The bread would remain bread, despite what it is called. — Sapientia

Why would the object be bread if it were called something else? You go on about "meaning is use", but you seem to have no clue of what that means. Use is the act of calling something by a name. What that name means is determined by this act of calling something by that name. If we stop calling something by that name, and start calling it by another name, then the thing is known by the new name. So if we stop calling the thing "bread", and start calling it "body of Christ", then the thing is known as body of Christ, by that very change in usage.

That would result in contradiction. — Sapientia

No, it would be contradiction if it were bread and body of Christ at the same time. But there is no reason to believe that it is still bread, transubstantiation has occurred, so it is not bread. That's your faulty assumption, that it's still called "bread" after being designated "body of Christ". And by this faulty assumption you claim contradiction. It is you who says it's bread in order that you can accuse contradiction, but that's a straw man, it's not bread its body of Christ. Transubstantiation has ensured that it will no longer be called "bread", it will be called "body of Christ". And as you affirm, meaning is use.

What I said was: "The Church's authority is to speak with authority on assessing and gathering facts, but it doesn't have the inherent power to decree an event." — Hanover

I'll repeat my question. How is "assessing facts" something other than deciding what is and isn't fact?

The comment wasn't declarative; it was performative. — Hanover

Do you realize, that in the act of transubstantiation, the word is both performative and declarative (as you describe these two)? Therefore I do not think that your distinction between these two is relevant.

Your position is that the Church has the authority to state what occurs during transubstantiation, so once it has so decreed it, it is that without question. — Hanover

Yes, "transubstantiation" is a concept proper to the Church. The Church has the authority to state what occurs during transubstantiation. Likewise, "photoelectric effect" is a concept proper to physics, and physics has the authority to state what happens during the photoelectric effect.

The Church's declaration that transubstantiation results in the bread and wine transforming into the blood and body of Jesus is a declarative statement, not a performative act. — Hanover

That is not what the Church declares. There is no transformation, it's called transubstantiation. The two are completely different. One is a change in form, the other a change in substance. When the substance changes, in transubstantiation, all the accidentals, which are what we sense, remain the same. Only the substance changes.

They are assessing what has occurred and telling us what happened, but the simple act of declaration does not make it so. That is to say, the Church could be wrong in its assessment. — Hanover

Let me see if I can interpret what you are insinuating here. The Church has been carrying out this procedure in hundreds or thousands of locations, numerous times every year, for hundreds and hundreds of years. They call this procedure "transubstantiation".

You are saying that maybe the Church is wrong, maybe transubstantiation has never occurred. What about all these millions of instances of the very same thing occurring, with millions of participants, which the Church has called "transubstantiation"? Are you saying that these events never happened? Are you saying that the events happened, but the Church is wrong to title the event transubstantiation? What are you insinuating?

On what would you base such an accusation? Have you taken part, such that you have first hand experience? If so, from what you have said above, it appears like you were expecting a transformation instead of a transubstantiation. Perhaps your experience was such that you observed no transformation and so you fallaciously concluded that there was no transubstantiation.

If the church defines transubstantiation as an actual event where wine turns to Jesus' blood, then there is no referent in my opinion. The word points to nothing other than confusion. If "bigfoot" refers to an actual humanoid creature, then it has no referent. — Hanover

I assume that if there is an event where water turns to gas, and this is called "evaporation", then in your opinion there is no referent to this word, the word points to nothing but confusion.

That I say bigfoot exists doesn't make bigfoot exist. — Hanover

You are not decreeing this as a fact, so the example is not relevant. If you were decreeing it as a fact, then it would be no different from reporting it as a fact. That someone might dispute the facts which you report is another issue.

The Church's authority is to speak with authority on assessing and gathering facts, but it doesn't have the inherent power to decree an event. — Hanover

How is assessing facts other than deciding what is and is not fact?

It is entirely possible for a phrase or a word not to have a referent (e.g. "the current King of France," Bigfoot, jkldjdc). — Hanover

Sure it's possible, but in the case of "transubstantiation" it is very clear that there is a referent. We can approach the issue two ways. The philosophical way is to proceed with an open mind to analyze the thing referred to as transubstantiation, in an attempt to understand it. The biased way is to proceed as Sapientia does, with a preconceived notion as to what "transubstantiation" means ( a piece of bread is transformed into the body of Christ), and determine whether the thing being referred to as transubstantiation is according to this preconception. In this way she comes to the conclusion that transubstantiation is a fiction. But it is only a fiction according to this preconceived notion, and in reality there is still a very real activity going on which is called "transubstantiation". The only thing exposed is that Sapientia misunderstands transubstantiation.

Why can we measure the effects of "physical" on "physical" events, but not measure the "non-physical" by it's effect on the "physical", and vice versa? — Harry Hindu

We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing

His example of the coffee getting cold because of the cold air from the air conditioner. Also, his interpretation of "Formal Causality" seems to suggest a "transfer" of Form, in this case the form coldness. If all he is saying is that the cause of hotness or coldness must be some existing characteristic of the cause, but not specifically actual hotness or coldness, this account of qualitative change seems to be so vague as to be uninformative. — Mitchell

I'm not familiar with the examples, I'm only going on what #3 says, along with my understanding of the Aristotelian explanation of causation. It may seem uninformative, but it becomes important in the context of the cosmological argument.

If we look at all material things as temporal, meaning that they come into existence, and contingent, meaning that the potential for them precedes the actual existence of them, then to avoid an infinite regress of material things we must assume a first material thing. By the description, or definition of "material thing", it is necessary that the potential for that thing existed prior to the thing itself. Now we need an actuality to account for that potential being actualized, so we must conclude that there is an actuality which is other than a material thing.

OK. But, second, according to Feser, not only must the cause of the change from cold to hot exist prior to the change, and bring about the change, but it also must have in actuality hotness: what causes hotness must itself be hot. — Mitchell

I see in #3, that the cause must be "actualized as existent":

3. His claim that the existence of anything is the result of the actualizing of the potential to exist by something already actualized as existent. — Mitchell

How do you infer that the cause must be a particular type of actuality "itself be hot"?

The distinction I'm making is between reporting the facts and decreeing the facts. — Hanover

There is no difference between these two. To report the facts is to decree what the facts are. You are trying to make a boundary, a distinction, where no boundary or distinction could possibly be. Your example expresses a distinction between a rule, what ought to be done, and what is fact, what is the case. So your example of a decree is the decree of a rule, what ought to be done, not the decree of a fact, (what is the case), which is really nothing other than reporting the fact.

Either transubstantiation occurs or it doesn't. I think that's a fairly uncontroversial statement. — Hanover

That's not even an issue. Transubstantiation occurs, that is a fact. There is something which is referred to as transubstantiation, and to deny this is to deny a fact. So the question is what is transubstantiation. To ask whether transubstantiation occurs, is to deny the fact in skepticism, then ask whether the fact is a fact. It's a pointless exercise because one will inevitably come to the conclusion, yes there is something which is going on which is called transubstantiation. Now let's proceed to see what this thing, transubstantiation, is. So it doesn't matter what religion you are, you can refuse to take part in the ceremony if you have no faith in it, but that doesn't matter. Unless everyone refuses, then it will still be going on, and there will still be something called transubstantiation, and therefore transubstantiation will still be a fact.

Microwaves cause something to go from cold to hot. On his model of causality, this is because the microwaves are actually hot! — Mitchell

I believe I explained this in the other thread where you posted. To go from cold to hot, a potential to an actuality requires an actuality, but the actuality is not the same actuality as that achieved. So the microwaves are an actuality, but they are not necessarily actually hot.

We have the potential for something, say the potential for the food to be hot. The food is not actually hot, and there is no necessity that the food will become hot. That is the key to understanding potential, the lack of necessity, contingency. So with potential, that particular potential may or may not be fulfilled. And, there are countless other possibilities, potentials which may be fulfilled beside that one. The food might become warm, it might get burnt, it might not get heated at all. This is contingency.

What happens to the food, which potential gets actualized, depends on the efficient causes applied. This is why an actuality, an activity, is required to actualize any potential. So the argument is that if anything actually exists, then prior to that existence was the potential for that thing which exists. However, a further actuality (activity if you like) is required, to bring that actual thing from the potential for that thing to the actual existence of that thing.

The notion of a simultaneous cause (item 5) goes against the common understanding of what a cause is, as well as all coherent philosophical definitions I have seen. — andrewk

I do not think that "simultaneous cause" is Aristotelian. In my understanding of Aristotle's four ways that "cause" is used, cause is always temporally prior. Some people interpret final cause (and this is probably a more common interpretation) as posterior. This is because they apprehend the existence of the material object caused, as the cause, and do not acknowledge the immaterial form which is prior to the object's material existence, as the actual cause.

I believe it is this ambiguity in meaning of final cause, which leads to the idea of a simultaneous cause. When the final cause, as the cause of existence of an object, cannot be properly located, as prior to the material existence of the object, and the need to assume it only arises after the material existence of the object, then it is positioned as simultaneous with the object (as a type of compromise).

I can't disagree there

I was talking about assigning a name "the body of Christ" to an object. You were talking about what "bread" means, and what "body" means.

However, all your stated principles supported my claim. You said "Meaning is use". So if "body of Christ" is used to refer to this item, then that is what this item is. You are clearly wrong to be calling it "bread".

If a fish is in water, is it wet, or can we only call it wet when taken out of water? — Posty McPostface

I suspect there's something fishy going on here.

If we go down that path, we are going to be immersed in quantum mechanics. — Banno

I don't know about you, but I'm supersaturated with QM.

No, that's your problem. What do expect me to do about that? It would help if you read the case that I've been making and then made a specific criticism or request for clarification. — Sapientia

Hey, the case you've been making is irrelevant to what I'm saying. You first engaged me, not vise versa. So if you don't want to listen to me then...

The Church has decided nothing, but would allege only to have reported the facts as they are. They don't get to decide, like they're the Supreme Court and it's their rules. — Hanover

You don't think so? You don't think that they must decide what the facts are before they can report them? They have decided what the facts are, concerning Christ. Are you familiar with the word "creed"?

There is also much dispute as to what the euchrist is, with non-Catholic, but very Christian denominations asserting that the wafer and wine are but symbolic representations of the body and blood. Why are the Catholics the ones who ought be given the authority to render the decree as to what it is. Are they more learned and knowledgable? — Hanover

Well, isn't there always a bunch of shit disturbers who refuse to accept the word of authority?

Christ is the named subject, and we are trying to identify the body and blood of this one called "Christ". You don't agree with the Church's identification. You haven't made a clear case as to why you think that the Church is wrong. Sounds like you have a personal problem to me.

3. His claim that the existence of anything is the result of the actualizing of the potential to exist by something already actualized as existent.


...

#3 seems to treat existence as a property that something may have as either potentially or actually, similar to the potential for hotness. And that just as something that is actually hot "activates" the potential for hotness in another object, so to something that exists activates the potential for existence in another. — Mitchell

What is meant by #3 is that the existence of things are contingent, and that they are temporal, meaning that they have a beginning and ending in time. So for example. let's say that a particular thing came into existence at some time. Prior to that time, this particular thing did not exist. But in order for that thing to have come into existence, the potential for it to exist must have been there at that time. The potential for the thing does not necessitate the thing's existence though, because when there is the potential for something, it may or may not come into existence. So we need to assume something actual which necessitates (actualizes) the thing's existence, to account for the fact that it actually did come into existence.

We are talking about Christ here. That is a proper noun. You're just making shit up trying to support your unjustified claims.

I am sure that you're committing a fallacy of some kind. — Sapientia

OK so you think that the Church ought not insist that the elements of the Eucharist are actually the body and blood of Christ, because you do not believe that they actually are the body and blood of Christ.

I argue that they, being the leaders of the Church, and having knowledge about Christ, ought to be the ones to determine what is the body and blood of Christ, and therefore what ought to be called the body and blood of Christ.

Your argument is that you're sure I'm committing a fallacy of some sort?

I suggested that we scrap that rule. — Sapientia

As I said what do you think gives you the authority to tell the Church what "body of Christ" refers to? I would think that there are many in the church who know far better than you, what this phase means. So your suggestion that this rule be scrapped is nothing but the actions of a rebellious shit disturber.

The problem is that it's not simply wordplay, as you make out, like calling a cat "a fish". It's supposed to be taken literally, like thinking that a cat has gills. If it was merely wordplay, then I wouldn't have the same objection. — Sapientia

That's what I said, it's not a matter of word play, it's very literal. As I said, it's an example of the power of the Word. I am Metaphysician Undercover by the very fact that this is what I am called. Those items are the body and blood of Christ by the very fact that this is what they are called. This is not word play, it's simple reality.

What I am disputing is that a literal interpretation is true, and that bread literally transforms into the body of Christ once the Eucharist has taken place. — Sapientia

When they take that object, which you call bread, and say that it will be called "body of Christ", then by the very fact that that's what it's called, "body of Christ", then that's what it is body of Christ, just like I'm MU by the very fact that that's what I'm called.

You only wish to cause trouble, saying that your name, "bread" is a better name for it then "body of Christ".

What do you mean "let them call it that"? Firstly, it's not simply a matter of calling an item "body of Christ", as though it were just a name. Secondly, I couldn't stop them if I tried. I simply disagree with that interpretation for reasons that I've spoken about at length. — Sapientia

You seem to misunderstand the power of the word. When there is an item which we call the table, then it is the table by the very fact that we call it the table. If we called it by some other name like the desk, then it would be that name, the desk. So when the Church calls a certain item "body of Christ", then it is body of Christ, because that's what they call it. Why do you dispute this, saying that according to your interpretation they ought not call it body of Christ? Do you believe that you have a superior interpretation of what "body of Christ" refers to then the leaders of the Church?

The problem with the rules of transubstantiation that we've been discussing is that they require a literal interpretation. Scrap that rule and you scrap the problem. But good luck with scrapping that rule. — Sapientia

As you said in your last post, meaning depends on rules, so if we scrap the rules, we scrap meaning, and this is a problem.

If the Church wants to say, that this item is called the body of Christ, and this is the rule, then where's the problem? And because they call this item by that name, that is the name that the item has, and then that is the Church's rule. There is no problem here. The Church says this item is called "body of Christ", and so this item is the item called "body of Christ".

The only problem is that for some people, such as yourself it seems, "body of Christ" means something different. So these people desire to disallow this rule, claiming that the thing referred to by the rules of the Church as the body of Christ is not actually the body of Christ, the body of Christ is something different. So the people who are creating a problem are the shit disturbers such as yourself, who are disputing this rule to say that this item is not the body of Christ.

But I see no reason to dispute this rule, if "body of Christ" is what the Church wants to call this item, then let them call it that. Why would you insist that "body of Christ" ought to refer to something other than this? What would give you the authority to tell the Church what "body of Christ" ought to refer to?

And what you never seemed to have grasped despite your voluminous posts in this thread, over several months, is that the fundamental claim of Platonic realism is that Universals are real, and don’t simply exist in individual minds. — Wayfarer

I totally understand that. But I disagree with Platonic Realism. Some of the reasons for my disagreement are explained in that last post. Other reasons for that disagreement I have been explaining throughout the thread. It is not the case that I do not grasp the fundamental claim of Platonic Realism. It is the case that I find it to be an untenable position.

All of the specifics discussed such as triangles, numbers, and so on, are simply illustrative examples. In this respect, I think Samuel’s understanding of the issue is much nearer the actual Thomist understanding than your own. — Wayfarer

As far as I know, the Thomistic understanding is not a Platonic Realism, it is more accurate to say that it is a Neo-Platonic Idealism. There is a big difference between Platonic Realism and Neo-Platonic Idealism. The principal difference, as I described earlier in the thread, is that Neo-Platonic Idealism validates the existence of independent Forms, through the existence of particulars, such that real independent Forms are particulars, emanating from the One, while Platonic Realism maintains the untenable position that universal forms have real independent existence.

That sounds like knowledge to me, someone knows the meaning of something, not "faith."

In this respect, people might well ought to call you Metaphysician Undercover in the situation you describe. People can fail to understanding meanings/ascribe the wrong one. — TheWillowOfDarkness

When the issue is the naming of objects with words, as is the case with "Metaphysician Undercover", "the body of Christ", "the blood of Christ", and "the child's room", then understanding and knowledge consists of being able to establish the appropriate relationships between the words and the objects. No understanding of "meaning" is required. What is required is faith, or trust, that these words ought to be related to these objects.

Meaning is rule based, and has nothing to do with faith. If X means Y, then X means Y, whether I have faith that it does or not. — Sapientia

You sure have an odd set of rules. It allows you to equate two distinct things, "X means Y". Isn't that no different from saying "bread means body"? I see no reason to believe your rules are any better than the rules of transubstantiation.

If a child somehow depends upon "faith" to understand "clean your room" means clean your room, and a Catholic relies upon "faith" to believe in transubstantiation, surely "faith" has two different meanings.

If not, are you suggesting I have as legitimate a right to believe in unicorns as I do transubstantiation as I do rocks? — Hanover

The point I made, is that the items referred to as the body and blood of Christ are actually the body and blood of Christ, because this is what they are called. These are their names. Likewise, I am actually Metaphysician Undercover, because I am the object referred to by this name. And, the thing referred to as the child's "room" is actually the child's room because this is what it is called.

Faith is required, because if someone says no, that is not the body of Christ, which you are calling "the body of Christ", that is what I want to call a cracker, then for that person the thing referred to is not the body of Christ, it is the cracker. For the others, who have faith, then the thing called 'the body of Christ" is really the body of Christ, because that is what it is named, "the body of Christ".

I am only Metaphysician Undercover by means of the faith that those have who believe that this is the proper name to call me. If everyone started to think that they should call me something else, so they programed the computer to put my name in another way, then despite my insistence that you ought to call me by Metaphysician Undercover, I would be known by that other name.

Likewise, if the child has faith that the thing called "your room" is really its room, then the child will believe this, and know what is referred to by "your room". But if the child has no faith in this, and thinks that the thing referred to as "your room", really has a different name, and the child only knows that thing by the different name, for some reason not learning "your room", then it will not understand "clean your room" when told to clean its room.

The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you don't seem to understand is that the "universal form" is the abstraction, a description which we use to describe the objects. We have a description of the hydrogen atom, electrons, neutrons, protons, weight, etc. This is the "universal form" of the hydrogen atom. So indeed, all the hydrogen atoms which are judged to be hydrogen atoms, are connected by this universal form. But this connection is one produced by that human judgement. It's artificial as a connection produced by the judgement that they are the same type. They are thus "connected" to each other, as hydrogen atoms, because they've been judged to be hydrogen atoms.

To make things easier, more straight forward, let's say that we've divided out from the vast reality, these individual things, parts, and each of these parts, though it is different, is also similar, and due to that similarity, we call each by the same name, "hydrogen atom". Notice the first premise, we separate these things out, we individuate them from their environment, which is the whole vast universe in which they exist. The problem is that we can't really completely separate them from everything else, so no matter what we do, they are still fundamentally a part of a larger whole. And, like I explained in the last post, either a thing gets its identity by being a part of a larger whole, or it gets its identity from being an individual, whole itself, but it can't be both because this is contradictory. In reality, a thing is part of the larger whole, and cannot be absolutely separated, so this is its true identity.

There is an assumption that hydrogen atoms have individual, separate existence, as individual things, and this is what gives them their identity, according to the "universal form". But this is not really a true assumption, the true identity of each hydrogen atom is as a part of a larger whole. It is an artificial identity which we have created in this act of individuation. In reality, they always exist in an environment, as part of that environment, so none of these hydrogen atoms ever really have completely independent existence as independent things, in an absolute way. The universal form lacks in truth in this way, and this lacking is known as the accidentals which are proper to each individual.

Now, you say that the fact that these things are similar means that they are connected in some way. And you claim that this connection is the universal form, which is known as the hydrogen atom. In reality, the connection is that they are all a part of one larger whole, one universe, and so they really are connected, just as you say is necessary, in order for them to be similar. But this connection is through the natural environment of their existence, it is not through the universal form. Why they are similar is a function of their position within the whole, not a function of the universal form of the hydrogen atom. The universal form, the form of the hydrogen atom, is the principle by which we individuate these parts, divide them out as separate entities. Therefore, the inverse to what you say is what is really the case. The universal form is not what connects these things, it's what divides them out into separate, but similar entities. This division is artificial. In order for us to know the real connection, how they are all part of one and the same universe, requires that we know the particular form of the particular thing, which is the universe, not the universal form of the hydrogen atom.

So for example, imagine that there was one fundamental particle, like the ancient atomist thought, or what Aristotle called prime matter. Each instance of this particle would be precisely the same as every other, only having a different spatial location. All of reality would consist of different combinations and patterns of this one repeating particle. Such a particle would be like a point with only a location in space because it could not have any spatial form, or else that form would be in principle, divisible itself. In that case, we in theory, divide down the universe to a most fundamental object, and if we followed your principles, we would theorize that if we know the universal form of that fundamental object we have what is required to understand the entire universe. The problem is, that in doing this we have really just flipped the whole problem inside out, and haven't solved anything. That fundamental particle could have absolutely no universal form, in order that it might constitute all material forms, and suddenly, the "form" of all things becomes the relationships which these particles have with one another.

So, when we in theory, we divide down the universe into parts, such that we can identify the parts according to similarities, and classify them according to universal forms, what we do is create less and less different types, and more and more objects of these different types. What this indicates, is that what constitutes "a different type", is principally the difference in the relationships which the parts have to each other, not a difference in the part itself. Therefore when we come to understand the universal form of a particular type of part, say the hydrogen atom, this universal form, which is a human creation, is not a principle of the connectedness of things, which would really be found in the relationships between parts within a larger thing, it is a principle of division.

Let me stop you there. I agree that it's a matter of faith. However, nothing is true by faith, whether you capitalise the first letter of the word or not. — Sapientia

Sorry to have to shatter your illusion, but without faith, nothing is true. Without faith words have no meaning. And without meaning there can be no truth to the words. Truth and faith are fundamentally tied, such that all truth is dependent on faith. Have you not noticed that "trust" and "true" are of the same root?

Perhaps what you meant to say is "nothing is true by faith alone", and that would be debatable. However, "nothing is true by faith" is clearly false, because every truth requires faith, so in reality (which is far from where you live your life of illusion) everything is true by faith.

But the number of masts on a ship is a physical thing. You see the masts and can feel them. So you have failed to show what exactly is non-physical. Try again. — Harry Hindu

I think you misunderstand the situation. You don't see the masts, you don't see the ship. What you see is the flag. The flag is the only physical thing here. In this instance of occurrence, the number of masts, and the ship, is non-physical. The fact is, that the person hoisting the flag may not even have seen any ship nor any masts, so this aspect is clearly non-physical. In this particular physical occurrence, which is the occurrence of the flag, it is quite clear that the masts and ship are non-physical. If you haven't yet, in 67 pages of this thread, capacitated yourself with the ability to understand this, then maybe you should give it up.

Why do you insistently claim that information is both physical and non-physical, when in reality you haven't apprehended the non-physical aspect?

Again, information/meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. It doesn't matter if there is some mind that is part of the causal chain. — Harry Hindu

I very explicitly explained how information/meaning is not the same as cause/effect. Cause/effect implies a direct, necessary relation between two things. Information/meaning implies a system of interpretation as a medium between the two. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between the two, the relationship is contingent on interpretation The two, cause/effect, and information/meaning are clearly not the same at all, and your claim is nonsense.

I think they are effects of causes. Does not the fact that one is misinterpreting, deluding, or hallucinating inform you of some state of their body? Doesn't one's misinterpreting, deluding, and hallucinating have some causal effect on the world? — Harry Hindu

What the hell are you talking about? What is the case, is that we can interpret correctly, as intended by the author of the sign, or incorrectly in a way not intended. What determines this is whether the person interpreting utilizes the appropriate system of interpretation. How does the fact that a person misunderstands, due to hallucination or any other reason, tell you anything specific or informative about the state of the person's body? What kind of nonsense principles are you appealing to?

What exactly are you interpreting? What does it mean to interpret? Doesn't it mean that information/meaning is there in all causal relationships that you are trying to get at accurately? To misinterpret something is what it means for there to be a true causal relationship that you didn't get at accurately, right? It means that there is a causal relationship independent of your mind that you either get at (interpret) or don't (misinterpret). — Harry Hindu

As I explained, the causal relationship is irrelevant. When we see a signal created by another person, we know that the person is the cause, and the signal is the effect. That is taken for granted. But it is of no value in helping us to interpret the signal. What allows us to interpret is knowing the proper system of interpretation.

So we cannot look at a signal, and interpret its meaning, by referring to its cause, as you seem to think, that is a dead end method. It leads nowhere. It is a dead end, because all we will see is that a human being created the signal. We cannot see the human being's intent so we cannot know what the human being meant with that signal. Looking for the cause of the signal cannot give us an answer to what is meant by the signal, it's a dead end. We will see that the human being meant something, and so there is a "cause" of the signal, but we'll have no idea of how to determine what the human being meant. Therefore this is useless in determining meaning. The only approach we have, toward interpretation is to determine the proper system of interpretation, and this will allow us to interpret the meaning.

If I have to explain this again, I'm done. — Harry Hindu

OK, I think you're done, because you keep reverting back to what has been demonstrated to be nonsense.

Physics doesn’t believe in the reality of these things anymore. It believes that Reality, physical reality, is waves and forces and energy in timespace (or something like that). — Dominic Osborn

I think that this is fundamentally untrue. What is expressed by physicists is the reality of quantum mechanics. And a quantum is inherently a discrete, individual unit. So physical reality as represented by quantum mechanics, is still discrete individual things.

Wave functions and field theories are mathematical (therefore non-physical) principles which are applied toward understanding this physical reality of quantum existence. The quanta of physical reality are then expressed as particles. It is metaphysical speculation, and not physics itself, which assigns reality to the non-physical fields and wave functions, rather than the quanta of physical existence, the particles. What is the case is that the exact nature of the quantum, or particle of existence is not understood, so speculators turn to the mathematical theories rather than the empirical observations, as a more accurate description of what is real.

Here's the issue with transubstantiation. By the power of the Word, the things referred to as the body and blood of Christ, are actually the body and blood of Christ, because that is what they are called the body and blood of Christ. But this is only true by Faith in the power of the Word. So the physical appearance of the objects, (look and taste for example), is not how one would expect the body and blood of Christ to appear. So to believe, you must release yourself of the preconceived idea that you have of how the body and blood of Christ would appear, and allow yourself to believe that the body and blood of Christ would appear as the items referred to as the body and blood of Christ. Then the items referred to as the body and blood of Christ actually are the body and blood of Christ.

1. What exactly is the distinction you are trying to make when using the terms, "non-physical" and "physical"? What exactly does it mean for something to be "non-physical" as opposed to "physical". — Harry Hindu

That's pretty straight forward. Generally, things sensed and understood through the laws of physical are physical, and those which aren't are non-physical. In the context of this thread, we are talking about information, so there is the physical signal which is sensed, and the non-physical, what is meant to be signified. In the example of the op there is a flag as the physical signal, and the non-physical idea represented is the number of masts on a ship. There is necessarily a system of interpretation which relates the two.

Can you provide a specific example or two of when it would be useful to make a distinction between "non-physical" and "physical" when talking about cause and effect and information flow? — Harry Hindu

In all cases of information we need a clear distinction between non-physical (what is signified), and physical (signal) or else the system of interpretation cannot be properly applied and the signal may not be properly interpreted. The interpretation will be corrupt. This is the case in hallucination, there is not a clear distinction between what is physically real, and what is non-physical, the interpretation. All cases of misinterpretation are cases of not properly distinguishing between what is proper to the physical aspect, and what is proper to the non-physical.

No. The effect (whatever effect we are talking about) is a representation of it's prior causes. It has nothing to do with whether or not some cause, or some effect is "physical" or not. All effects carry information about their prior causes. All effects are representations of their causes. — Harry Hindu

When the cause is intention (final cause) we cannot necessarily determine the cause from the effect unless we have the proper system of interpretation. So in the case of the intentional presentation of information, the fact that the effect (the physical sign) is a representation of the cause (what is meant, or intended) is irrelevant to the matter of interpretation. What is relevant is the system of interpretation.

No, it wouldn't be useful because there could be instances where the cause and effect sequence we are talking about is all "physical", or all "non-physical". — Harry Hindu

This doesn't make sense. The fact that something could be all physical, or all non-physical is clear evidence of why we need to be able to distinguish between the physical and non-physical in order to produce an accurate interpretation. If something were completely physical, yet you apprehended a non-physical meaning behind it, this would be delusion. If something were completely non-physical, all in your mind, and you thought that it had a physical presence, this would be hallucination.

It then becomes an arbitrary matter of what part of the chain any group of people are discussing. — Harry Hindu

Do you think misinterpretation, delusion, and hallucination, are arbitrary matters?

So if there is no further argument against information being the relationship between causes and their effects, and the only arguments are simply about the kinds of information (the kinds of causal relationships, like between concrete and abstract thinking with the different causal relationships each one has, or between the "physical" and "non-physical" and the different causal relationships each one has), then I think we are done here. — Harry Hindu

That information is a relationship between cause and effect, is what is insignificant. It is insignificant, because in order to determine what is meant (cause), from the physical signal (effect), it is required to know the system for interpretation. So the fact that one is the cause, and the other is the effect is completely irrelevant to the matter at hand, when there exists information, because the matter is to interpret, and knowing that one is cause and the other effect as a fact, does nothing to help us interpret. It's like looking at a physical thing, and saying I know for a fact that this physical object is a sign, while having absolutely no idea how to interpret it. Without having any idea of how to interpret it, how would you know for a fact, that it is a sign?

I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point though, was that the concept of one changed, evolved. My proposal was that in the original sense the concept of "one" did not allow that one could be divided. But then someone proposed the principle of fractions, which would require that "one" be redefined such that the one could be divided. There are numerous examples of evolution in mathematical principles. The addition of the numeral 0, and negative integers is one example. More recently we have what is called imaginary numbers. Before imaginary numbers, there was no square root of -1, that was disallowed by the conceptual structure. Now there is a square root of -1, it is allowed.

I think that identity is a different issue. Say that something is identified as "the one". We can say that the one is divisible into halves, quarters, etc.. But to say that it is divisible is to say that it is potentially two, four, etc., it is not actually two or four, because according to its identity it is one. If we actually divide it, say in half, then it no longer has its identity as one, because it is now two. I believe that this is an important ontological issue which is often overlooked.

We commonly say that an object is composed of parts, molecules for instance. So we talk about the object as if it has a dual identity, it is one object, but it is also a bunch of molecules. But this is contradictory. Either we have identified one object, or we have identified a number of objects, but they are clearly not the same identity. What has happened is that we have given mathematical equivalence to the numerous molecules, and the one object, and we think that just because there is a mathematical equivalence, they have the same identity. But they do not. In reality, we identify the object, and say that it is potentially divided into molecules, but the molecules don't really have identity as actual individual things unless the division is carried out. And if the division is carried out, the original object no longer maintains its identity. To have both identities at the same time is contradictory.

It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, that is my position exactly.

But then it must also have a universal form in order to be part of the genus or species it belongs to. If this was not the case, then two things made of the same material could in principle behave completely differently. E.g., two rocks composed of the same minerals, when put in contact with fire, could react differently, such that one could be inert, and the other one could blow up. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how you draw your conclusion here. Suppose that two distinct atoms of hydrogen are both very reactive. Why must they be members of a "universal form" in order that they will both react in a similar way? They are similar, that's why they behave in a similar way. Yes, they are members of the universal form, hydrogen, but that's a human designation based in our determination of similarity. The human designation of this universal form, "hydrogen", is how we, as human beings understand the similarity. The reason why there are such similarities is not covered by the human concept, and this is the reason why they behave in a similar way, because they are similar. So the "universal form", does not account for why there are things which behave in a similar way, it just describes the fact that they do. That there are similarities is neither accounted for by the particular form, nor the universal form, it is something different altogether.

But this would be absurd. We could never know any generalities; only particulars after having done particular tests on each one of them. Furthermore, we could never perform any inductive reasoning, such as "all rocks made of this mineral are inert to fire", or "all fires are hot", or "no human can breath under water", etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

We can make these conclusion because there are real similarities, and real consistencies. But "universal form" refers to the way that we understand these similarities and consistencies. "Universal form" refers to a described similarity. The description of the similarity is not the same as the cause of the similarity, so we can't really say that the "universal form" gives us the reason why inductive reasoning works. The universal form follows from the inductive reasoning, as a description of the similarity, but we have to dig deeper if we are to determine why there are such similarities. and it is answering this question, why are there these similarities, which would tell us why inductive reasoning works. The universal form does not do this for us.

The texts are there, read them. — Πετροκότσυφας

I've read, here's some quotes:

They agree in what they do. Mathematical truth isn't established by their all agreeing that it's true—as if they were witnesses of it. Because they all agree in what they do, we lay it down as a rule, and put it in the archives. Not until we do that have we got to mathematics.

It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgment

They are determined by a consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion. We all act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way.

The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of logic is not an agreement in opinions, much less in opinions on questions of logic.

See, correct or incorrect in mathematical procedure is determined according to whether we behave in a manner which is consistent with those who have gone before us, not according to some rational principles of what constitutes right and wrong. An "empirical proposition" (descriptive rule) becomes a prescriptive rule (what one ought to do). If this were reality, we could not employ rational principles to demonstrate that what has been common practise in the past, is actually wrong and ought to be changed, because common practise is necessarily right by the definition of what constitutes the right procedure. Therefore knowledge could not evolve. It is extremely faulty (illogical) epistemology.

We walked on the moon in 1967. In 1968 MLK and RFK were assassinated, the cities burned, and in the following years the country realized the government was lying to us about the war in Vietnam. US society has never been the same. — fishfry

Actually the date of the first moon walk was July 20, 1969. Following that, there was a massive party of celebration at Woodstock, New York, from Aug15-18 1969.

Yes I have. I even explained to you the mechanism by which the cause is logically prior to the effect via the act/potency distinction. — Agustino

I saw no such explanation. What you said is this:

Yes, there is a priority in terms of potency and act. The line (or point or whatever) is a potency of the pencil which actually exists. This logical asymmetry between the two is what guarantees the logical priority of one over the other. That is why the pencil can cause the line, but the line cannot cause the pencil. — Agustino

This provides no argument that the cause is simultaneous to the effect. What you seem to be saying is that the potential for the effect is simultaneous with the actual cause. But your conclusion is just a category error. It's like saying that the potential for sunrise tomorrow morning exists simultaneously with the actual setting of the sun tonight, therefore the sunrise is simultaneous with the sunset. Do you see the category error of mixing actual and potential in this way?

Except that he says mathematical propositions (like other formal propositions) acquire their sense from extra-systemic applications, otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs. — Πετροκότσυφας

So that's a very big difference, isn't? It's the difference between truth as coherence, and truth as correspondence. I say that 2+2=4 because it is coherent within the logical system of which it is a part of. You say that 2+2=4 because this corresponds to something real. What does it correspond with? People using those symbols that way, and getting the results that they want.

The problem with your perspective, is as I've described, you have no basis for the claim that 2+2=4 is "right". The fact that you can use 2+2=4 to get the results which you want, does not make 2+2=4 "right", because getting what you want is not always what is right. The fact that 2+2=4 is a part of a coherent logical system is what makes it right. That is why your perspective is wrong.

The issue you raise, that "otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs" is not relevant, because correspondence is established by firm ontological principles. The Wittgensteinian approach is an attempt to avoid the need for ontological principles. As I've demonstrated though, it's a failing attempt because it gives us no realistic approach to the judgement of right and wrong, while firm ontological principles provide us with an approach to that judgement.