But I don't think that this is the case with §371. I think instead that this fits with my ongoing criticism of Metaphysician Undercover; that what was once thought of in terms of essence is better thought of in terms of use - grammar being the rules of use. — Banno

I've never disagreed with you, on this point. Saying what the essence of a thing is, is just a matter of following a specific type of rule. Where I disagree with you, and Wittgenstein as well, is in what constitutes "following a rule". I believe that when a person follows a rule, one hold a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. Wittgenstein describes "following a rule" as being judged to act correctly, in relation to a rule. When an individual is judged as consistently doing the right thing (or saying the right thing), then that person is following a rule.

The difference being in the relationship between "rule" and "correct". In my understanding, a person may have a private rule, and follow that rule, and the rule might be correct or incorrect in relation to the judgement of others. In Wittgenstein's description, correct and incorrect follow from whether or not the person is following a rule, so it is impossible that a person could follow a rule, and be incorrect. My understanding makes following a rule neither correct nor incorrect, allowing that the rule itself may be judged as correct or incorrect.

There's a difference between what a thing is and what a thing is called. They might call it the blood of Christ, but if it isn't the blood of Christ then they are wrong, just as if I call the 45th President of the United States Barack Obama then I am wrong because the 45th President of the United States isn't Barack Obama. — Michael

I look at that as a pointless argument. What a thing is, is dependent on two things, how you define your terms, and your judgement of the thing in question. Naming a thing is much more fundamental than this, allowing us to avoid both of these problems. We assign the word to the thing, and the thing goes by that name. This is not saying what a thing is, it is identity, it is giving a thing an identity. In the case of the sacrament of the Eucharist, it appears very clear to me that the ceremony is a ceremony of naming the objects, giving them a new identity in the eyes of God, like baptism is, and marriage is, these are instances of giving things (people in these cases) an identity within the structure of the religion.

It is very clear, that in the sacrament, the Church is assigning these names to these objects, giving them a particular identity. It is not looking at these objects and judging whether or not they fulfil the conditions required by a definition to be called by these names. Your argument is really a straw man because the sacrament is a case of naming items, not a case of describing what a thing is. The priest does not look at the object, and state the name suited for describing the object, the priest assigns a name of identity, to the object This is what such sacraments consist of, giving things a particular identity (naming them) in relation to God.

Whatever it is you're talking about it has nothing to do with Christian theology. — Michael

The fact that you started into this discussion talking about properties, instead of substance, demonstrates that you have even less knowledge of Christian theology than I have. And I must say that your understanding of such sacraments is very deficient. When the priest declares the man and woman husband and wife, do you believe that what the priest says is a falsity, because the man and woman are not married at that time? That appears to be the logic you are using. Do you not see that they are husband and wife because the priest has named them as such. Likewise, the articles of the Eucharist are body and blood of Christ because the priest has named them as such. Your argument, that even if the priest has named them as such, the priest is wrong if they aren't really such, is completely missing the point, because they only are such by virtue of the priest naming them as such.

To make a coherent argument you need to demonstrate that it is wrong for the priest to name them as such. Or, you need to demonstrate that the priest has no right to name them as such. But to say that the priest is wrong, if they aren't really such, is just nonsense, because they are really such by virtue of the priest naming them as such, just like the man and woman are husband and wife by virtue of the priest naming them as such. That is the way these sacraments work. The Church is wrong only if it is wrong for it to assign these names. The question of whether or not the objects are the proper objects which the words refer to, can only be determined by determining whether or not the church is wrong in assigning these names. So to go at this from the opposite direction, and say that the Church is wrong if the items are not the body and blood of Christ is just backwards. We must take it for granted that these items really are the body and blood of Christ, because that's what the Church calls them, and determine whether or not the Church is wrong in calling them this.

I believe this is both proof that morality is subjective and that the world is worse for it. — Philosopherstoned

Worse than what? If there is no such thing as objective morality, you can't compare to this. If objective morality is a possibility then you cannot say for a fact that morality is subjective.

It has nothing to do with not respecting naming practices. It has to do with stating the facts. Whether or not the wine is the blood of Christ is a factual matter (where transubstantiation is said to be literal), not a naming convention, much like whether or not the 45th President of the United States is Barack Obama. — Michael

See, you are still making the same mistake. You are referring to the object as wine, when in fact, it is called the blood of Christ. We are trying to determine what it is in fact, what is the proper name for it. So when you ask what is the fact, is the wine wine, or is the wine blood of Christ, you have just begged the question because you have already premised that it is wine. The appropriate question is whether the object is properly called wine or whether it is properly called blood of Christ.

I'll make things easier for you, in light of unenlightened's comments. Instead of you justifying your description, which calls the stuff wine and bread, you can show how the Church's naming is logically inconsistent. Let's say that "body and blood of Christ" refers to the flesh and blood of the person, Jesus, who died on the cross, as well as the items in the sacrament. All you need to do is to show inconsistency in this naming practise.

The Church claims that the substance of the flesh and blood of Jesus are the same substance as the items of the sacrament, and this justifies the naming practise. So we need to provide an understanding of "substance", which denies that this is possible, or at least to make it highly unlikely. It appears to me, like "substance" is what all individual, particular things have in common, it is one universal. So I don't see how the substance of one particular object could differ from the substance of another particular object, if it is one universal, therefore all objects would be of the same substance and there is no inconsistency.

Your question doesn't make any sense to me. There are people eating bread and drinking wine. Some claim that the substance of the bread and the wine literally changes into that of the body and blood of Christ. — Michael

This is a very peripheral, perspective dependent, subjective, description of the situation. Let's get beyond that, right to the point. You are describing the people as drinking wine and eating bread. The Church is describing them as drinking the blood of Christ, and eating the body of Christ. Clearly there is inconsistency between these two descriptions.

My claim is that you have no respect for the naming practise of the items of their sacrament. So you are using unacceptable names to describe the items being consumed. Unless you can justify your use of unacceptable names, then your description is also unjustified. You might attempt to justify your description, that the people are consuming bread and wine by referring to the sensible properties of these items. But the principles of the sacrament request that you do not refer to the sensible properties of the items, as these are accidental to the substance which is being consumed. Such an attempt would only prove that you have no respect for the naming practises of the sacrament.

So how do you justify your description that they are consuming bread and wine, without demonstrating the validity of my charge, that you have no respect for the naming practises of the items of their sacrament?

I'm not really interested in what some individual Christians believe, as those beliefs are all over the place. What I'm interested in is the act of transubstantiate itself, and this is how it is presented by the Church itself, in the sacrament. I have never taken part, so I cannot claim to know exactly what takes place.

Your objection seems to rely on the claim that there is some sort of predication going on here. Could you justify this claim by referring to the sacrament, and the act of transubstantiation itself, and not by referring to what some Christians believe about it.

I don't see the relevance of your example. There is no predication, simply naming of objects

I have yet to see a demonstration otherwise. Hanover was trying to make a distinction between reporting what is the case, and decreeing what is the case, but failed to substantiate this distinction.

As far as I see, there are objects of the sacrament which are named, and the objection is to the naming of these objects.

Here's another way of demonstrating how your way of looking at this issue is completely backward. We can designate names to objects for any purpose, whether its for a logical proceeding, or any other proceeding, we name objects. Wittgenstein explains this at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, the tradesperson names the object, the apprentice learns the name. So for example in a trial court there may be an object labeled "exhibit A". What this says, is that for the following intent and purpose, i.e. the following trial procedure, this object will be known as exhibit A. And in a logical proceeding we'll say "let X be...", so that the object described is known as X.

In a similar way, the Church stipulates that for the intent and purpose of the following sacrament, the objects will be known as body and blood of Christ. Furthermore, the Church insists that for all intents and purposes these items will be known as such. What this stipulates is that there cannot be a practise in which these objects are known as anything other than body and blood of Christ. Therefore in relation to any practise, these objects must always be known as body and blood of Christ, so it is impossible that the objects might be known by any other name. What the Church has claimed, is nothing more than ownership of these objects; it has claimed all rights of usage for these objects, as well as naming rights with respect to that usage. Would you deny them these rights?

Some people are better looking, have bigger dicks... — Bitter Crank

Who cares about a dick when someone else has got a bigger IQ?

thought of this too. The relational words ''before'', ''after'' require no time measurement. However these are, I think, a matter of sequentiality and sequentiality doesn't need time. For instance (sorry for being repetitive), 2 comes after 1 but before 3. See? We can make sense of change without involving time. The words ''before'' and ''after'' don't necessarily require a concept of time and these words are the only qualities of time. What do you think? — TheMadFool

I think that you are trying to make an argument by equivocation. In one sense, the word sequential refers to a succession or order in time, and in this sense, the words before and after are applicable. In another sense, the word sequential refers to a succession or order in space, and in this sense before and after are not applicable.

So you refer to an intermediary sense, a succession of numbers, and the assumption would be that numbers may be applied to either a temporal order, or a spatial order. The problem is, that when numbers are applied to a spatial order there is no proper use of before and after. Other than by convention, right is not before left, bottom is not before top. Likewise, in the application of numbers, 1 is not before 2, and 2 is not before 3. One is before the other in the act of counting, but that is a temporal succession.

In conclusion, the words "before" and "after" in the primary sense involve time, and in another sense they may refer to space. To argue by conflating these two is to argue by equivocation. Furthermore, your premise that before and after are the only qualities of time is false, because before and after are merely derived from, abstracted from, future and past. And if you were to replace "before" and "after" in your argument with "past" and "future", you'd have no argument.

One thought I did have, for example, from a Cartesian perspective, is that I am composed of two substances: mind and body. It would make sense to say therefore that the properties of the person-object are that it is composed of those two things. That would make a substance a property, and while the identification of the mind substance/property could not be empirically shown by putting it under the microscope and seeing it, it could certainly be identified behaviorally in the person through the display of consciousness. This whole issue made me question your claim that the interjection of the body of Jesus into the wafer could not be known by the person except by faith because it is not the case that substance changes are per se undetectable. — Hanover

I think you still misunderstand the nature of substance. If a person is composed of two substances, then the person is two individual objects. To say that one thing is two substances would really be contradictory because substance is what validates the existence of the thing, so this would be like saying one thing has two existences. So substance dualism says that the human person is composed of two distinct things, body and soul, and this is why the soul can persist as a thing even without the body. It is usually argued that Aristotle's system is not consistent with substance dualism.

You're really just turning things around, saying that there is one thing (person) with two substances mind and body. This allows you to say that the one thing, person, has two properties, body and mind. The proper understanding of substance dualism would be more like two things, body and soul, each with properties. Each of these would be an individual substance.

If you check Aristotle's "Categories" Ch. 5, "Substance in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse." In no way can primary substance be a property, this is what is explicitly excluded from the definition. "Substance" refers to the individual thing itself, not a property of the thing.

In fact, the way I saw it is that you simply divided the world into two sorts of properties: those that were detectable and those that were not. A wafer therefore has things you can know about it and things you can't. In fact, I'd go as far to say that the real words one should use instead of essential versus accidental properties is undetectable versus detectable, at as it relates to this discussion. — Hanover

It's really not a matter of dividing the world into two sorts of properties, it's a matter of dividing the world into properties and the particular thing (substance), which has the properties. This is sometimes explained as "what the thing is" (properties), and "that the thing is" (substance). In any case, the substance is the existing thing which is said to have the properties. In the case of transubstantiation the existing thing, substance, changes from being the substance called "bread", to being the substance called "body of Christ", while all the sensible properties stay the same. So at this time all those sensible properties, which were prior to this, attributed to the substance that was known as bread, are now attributed to the substance known as body of Christ.

But to your over-riding point that this is all some sort of language game and that I am just rejecting their word usage, I'm really not. — Hanover

Yes that is exactly what you are doing, rejecting their word usage. When you accuse someone of saying something untrue, you are rejecting their word usage. The Church has said, that for the purpose of our ceremony, we are not going to call this object "bread" we are going to call it "body of Christ". You object, saying that it shouldn't be called body of Christ unless it really is body of Christ, so they are engaged in some sort of deception. They say it really is the body of Christ, God ensures this, so there is no deception. It's just a matter of you rejecting the way that they use words, and how they turn to God to justify this usage.

I'm being offered no evidence whatsoever of the claim they're making.. — Hanover

The only claim they're making is that they are authorized to call this object "body of Christ". What you're failing to grasp, is that anyone is allowed to use any words they want to refer to any object. We don't need evidence to support our usage when we refer to objects with words, but if someone thinks that the word usage is wrong, then they'll point this out. If people are ok with the usage, they'll go along with it.

And so the difference between a system that I make up on the spot and the Catholic one is simply they came up with theirs first? We can pretend its longevity is based upon its validity, but that would simply overlook certain political and historical realities. — Hanover

This is pure, unabashed, conceited vanity. Do you really believe that you could come up with a ceremonial practise which would be in use two thousand years from now? Come on. Not only is it a "system", but it is a practise. That's where I think the root of your misunderstanding lies. You are looking at this as if it were a logical system or something like that, which is reducible to a set of claims. It's not, it's a practise. And that's why "word usage" is the proper representation of transubstantiation rather than "assertion", or "claim". So if you look at it for what it is, a practise, (not instinctual, but learned practise), which has persisted for that long, then you might start to grasp the gravity of it.

But I think ideas can be persistent because they are functional without being true. — unenlightened

You may have noticed that I have been purposely staying away from "truth" here. My argument from the beginning has been that transubstantiation is a valid verbal practise, this would most likely base its validity in its functionality. Only when Michael pressured me on the fact that my position is inconsistent with that of the Church, did I turn to truth. I agree that there's a claim of truth, as it's God who makes the spoken words true. But I believe that without God we do not have real objective truth to any words, as truth and objectivity are based in inter-subjectivity without God. At this point, without God, I don't think there's a real line between true and functional, as true appears to be a special type of functionality.

The point being that longevity offers us nothing in terms of proof of value or whether it'd be better to finally abandon it and move on. — Hanover

This is false though, longevity is proof of value. For human beings to preserve something, it must be of value to them, so if it is preserved it has value. Value though is inherently subjective, what I value is not necessarily what you value. Longevity is proof of a value which is passed from one generation to the next. Because it is not of value to you, you can refuse the practise. But if the practise still continues, you cannot deny that it has any value, just because it has no value to you, because the fact that it continues demonstrates that it has value.

How do we measure time? Don't we use repetitive/cyclical change like a pendulum or the cycles of an atom? I don't know if such cyclical phenomena are peculiar to this universe but without them time simply can't be measured. The idea of a space-time frame of reference is predicated on our ability to measure both (space and time). Without measurement time is meaningless don't you think? — TheMadFool

I see no reason to believe that a thing must be measurable to have real existence. Some philosophies distinguish between qualities and quantities, and although we reduce qualities to quantities in order to measure them, some philosophers argue that quality is more fundamental than quantity such that there are fundamental qualities which cannot be reduced to quantities.

Nor do I believe that without measurement something is meaningless. It is by seeing meaning in something that we develop the will to measure it. So meaning is prior to measurement, and it is very likely that human beings saw meaning in time prior to having the capacity to measure time. Therefore time without measurement is still meaningful.

The parked car cannot be considered in isolation if we are to bring into consideration - as is done above - the relief of the owner when they see the car is still there in the morning. In that case, at a minimum, the system that needs to be considered includes the car and the owner, who certainly will change in the course of the night - possibly being sleepless and in any case being relieved when she sees the car is still there in the morning.

I suggest that, in order to make sense of the owner's worry, the system should also include all local car thieves and vandals. They will be out and about stealing cars during the night. The car is there in the morning because they chose to focus their efforts on other vehicles.

So it seems that change is critical to this example. By contrast, what if we were to postulate a universe containing only a single car and nothing else - no owner, no planet, no thieves? We'd further have to assume that the car was made of special atoms that never underwent radioactive decay and never shifted position. In that case we could say that there was no change and hence no time either. — andrewk

Change is not necessary within the system though. You posit change outside the system to demonstrate that time has passed. But this is only for demonstration purposes. If we remove the need for demonstration, which is the same as removing MadFools need for measurement, we can assume a system with time passing and no change occurring.

But as I said in my post, this system would remain as such for an eternity unless an activity comes from outside, to cause a change within. The system would have time passing, but no cause of change within it. If we want to introduce change such that the system does not remain eternally static, we have to get it from somewhere. Either way, we need an external system, either to demonstrate change, or to escape the static eternity.

Change can be conceived of as simply a sequence of events. — TheMadFool

A sequence of events does not constitute change. Each event is a different object, and there is no change here, just a row of separate objects. To be called "change" you have to draw a connection between these events, and this is what the continuity of time does.

I read though 20-odd pages and individually selected the appropriate ones (ignoring any joke comments that only belong in the shoutbox). Took some time. — Michael

Wow, that's a lot of work, it takes me fifteen minutes just to find a particular post sometimes.

The problem is that transubstantiation is no different than any other faith based belief, where followers just accept the impossible as a tenant of their faith. — Hanover

Isn't any type of word use essentially the same type of "faith based belief"? So if you reject transubstantiation, you make the statement, "I have no faith in the way that they use words". But you cannot make any valid statement about whether what is expressed by transubstantiation is true or false, without addressing the nature of substance. And if you do, you'll most likely realize that there is nothing there to prevent the validity of the concept of transubstantiation.

From the perspective of a modern scientific viewpoint, substance is taken for granted. And what is taken for granted cannot change or else that would contradict "taken for granted". In religions, substance is not taken for granted, it relies on the will of God. So "taken for granted" is not absolute, it is relative to God as "granted by God"; therefore substance can change by the will of God. How can we ever make a judgement about which of these perspectives is "true", when they are probably equally false, just different ways of representing the unknown?

My point is that I don't agree that the path to enlightenment is paved with being open to the legitimacy of all other beliefs, but more often the opposite: rejecting nonsense and moving on. So , coming to the party with no preconceived notions about the legitimacy of the Church, these beliefs strike me as no more or less valid than a faith based system I could create on the spot. — Hanover

I see a big problem with this perspective. Very few things persist through time, the ones which do are massive objects like the earth, sun and stars. An "idea" or "belief" is not at all massive, it's very fleeting, and as we grow older they slip away to failing memory, until we die, and they're gone. To have a belief which may persist for generation after generation of human beings requires a very structured system of communication, word use. Ever play the game "Whisper Down the Valley"? Your decision to reject as "nonsense" a system which has allowed ideas to persist for hundreds, even thousands of years, is not a rational decision.

We can look at grammar as the means by which we make what we say comprehensible to others. We often overlook the fact that the way things appear to me may very well be an inversion of the way that they appear to you. For example, if we are facing one another, to my right is to your left, what is behind me is in front of you, etc.. Grammar provides us with the "objective" perspective.

The knot example is very interesting, because it can be very difficult for some people to learn a knot by watching another demonstrate it. You need to have the capacity in your mind to recognize that your perspective is an inversion of what the person demonstrating the knot is doing, and switch your perspective intuitively, to follow the demonstration. This is a matter of putting yourself in the position of the person demonstrating. That's what grammar is, an attempt to put us all in the same position, so that we can easily understand each other. It is the backbone of communication.

This discussion was created with comments split from The Shoutbox — Michael

Just out of curiosity Michael, how did you separate all these transubstantiation related comments from the non-transubstantiation related comments in The Shoutbox thread?

I believe that real knowledge with respect to this subject is a noble goal. Whether or not it will ever be obtained by anyone, in any absolute sense is not really relevant. I think it is only by having a belief like this, that it is to some extent achievable, that we can be inspired to broaden our horizons and uncover principles previously unknown. By previously unknown, I mean unknown to any human being. I think that enlightenment involves getting a glimpse of what is unknown to everyone, somehow seeing that it is there. By getting a glimpse of the unknown, we realize how vast the realm of the unknown actually is, and in some instances how and where it relates to the known. We can then proceed to develop strategies to approach it.

A similar (seemingly, to me) approach that comes from a very different heritage is that of Nagarjuna, who makes intricate quadrilemmic arguments that the notion of substance is incoherent. I don't agree with his arguments, finding them logically flawed, although I agree with his conclusion. — andrewk

I agree that the concept of substance is fundamentally incoherent. It's just like the concept of God in that way, it is something assumed because we apprehend a need to assume it. Then it ends up being just an assumption which stands in place of real knowledge, and this is why it is fundamentally incoherent, it is not real knowledge.

So it seems to make sense to proceed on the basis that the stability will continue, while the more philosophical will bear in mind that the stability could cease at any instant. — andrewk

That the stability which we've known in the past, (what was), will continue indefinitely into the future (what will be), is precisely that fundamentally incoherent concept, which stands in place of real knowledge. So if we want real knowledge we need to approach this issue.

Physicalists can't constantly retreat into yet to be discovered physics. Of course, new physics has to be admitted, but the line says that all new things will adhere to the fundamental principles of physics. — tom

The physicalist relies on the possibility that things not now understood by physical principles will in the future be understood by physics. Therefore the onus is on the non-physicalist to demonstrate that there are aspects of reality which are impossible to understand with the principles of physics. There are a number of ways which this can be done, all of which are usually rejected by physicalists as unintelligible, indicating that the average physicalist is not really interested in understanding the nature of reality.

If one accepts Essentialism - that every object has a metaphysical 'essence' which is what it really 'is', and which is only accidentally and unreliably associated with its sensible properties. — andrewk

It's not quite essentialism which is at play here, because it is the concept of substance which the Church latches on to. The reason why there has been so much to debate on the subject is that "substance" is left rather ambiguous by Aristotle. It is introduced to "substantiate" logic. But Aristotle discusses "substance" in a primary sense, as well as "substance" in a secondary sense. In the secondary sense, it appears to substantiate "what a thing is", referring to its species (and this might be what you refer to with essentialism). But in the primary sense "substance" substantiates "that a thing is", referring to its material existence.

Here's my question then: Is there any more to it than that? — andrewk

The varying worldviews here are fundamentally different, and a worldview provides the basis for any epistemology, so the potential ramifications with respect to human knowledge are broad. Consider, as I said earlier in the thread, that one could adopt the premise of process philosophy, and deny the need for substance altogether. This would completely avoid the need to consider the reality of substance.

However, as the most influential process philosophers have found out, there is an aspect of reality which I would describe as a temporal continuity of sameness, which needs to be accounted for. If we do not have "substance" as Aristotle suggests, or God as the theologians suggest, to account for this, we'll just end up turning to some other mystical principle. How we account for this continuity will influence our knowledge concerning the world. For instance, Newton's laws of motion take this temporal continuity for granted, as inertia, in the first law. If it can be demonstrated that the temporal continuity of massive (substantial) existence ought not be taken for granted, then Newton's first law is undermined as unsound.

By using division you seem to be renaming the present rather than describing a way how we encounter the present and make it intelligible. — bloodninja

What I notice is a distinct difference between past and future, in reference to events, one referring to events which have occurred and the other to events which have not yet occurred. Therefore I encounter the present as that which is responsible for this difference, the separation between them. So that is exactly what I am describing, a way that we encounter the present and make it intelligible. It is intelligible as the separation between past and future.

Note however that the past and future are just as ambiguous as the present. — bloodninja

Actually I do not think that the past and future are ambiguous. What has occurred, and what has not yet occurred is a very clear distinction. It is only the present, when things are occurring, that there might be ambiguity as to what has or has not yet occurred. An event occurring cannot be said to be past or future. So the ambiguity is due to not having a clear division, and that is the present.

You can't because, to get to the crux of the matter, you can't measure time at all. — TheMadFool

Why not? Just employ fishfry's closed system analogy. The only difference, I suggest is to allow that time is passing within that system. There's a closed system, a world, in which nothing is changing but time is passing. The passing of time is not itself a change, and is occurring right within this world. The passing of time need not be measured to be occurring, and there might be an immeasurable amount of time which passes before a change occurs. We would ask how could change suddenly occur when there was no change before, and the cause of the change must come from outside the system. So, as fishfry points out, it is meaningful to talk about a system in which time is passing and no change is occurring.

You left out present as the division between past and future.

The presence is real. That is to say, it is ontological and objective. — Michael

The presence of Christ is real whether or not God exists, but what "real" means differs accordingly. That something is "true", "fact", or "real" requires a judgement. If it is not God which makes this judgement then it is human beings.

In so teaching the Church rejects the view that faith is the instrument that brings about Christ’s presence in the sacrament. — Michael

I agree, the church would stipulate that it is God which brings this about. But for the atheist there is no God. For the atheist what is "real" is so by human judgement (including assumptions that there is reality without human judgement, which itself is a human judgement). So that there is reality, for the atheist, requires faith in human judgement. And, by the same means that any reality is real for the atheist, faith, the presence of Christ in the sacrament is also real.

Of course the Church rejects that faith is the means by which Christ is present, because the Church recognizes the role of God in this occurrence. But for those of us who do not recognize God as real, the presence of Christ in the sacrament, is just as real as anything else. This is because without God, our entire reality is based on faith in human judgement. And, without God, so is the presence of Christ in the sacrament, real by faith in human judgement. So even for the atheist, the presence of Christ is real, in the same sense that anything else is real, it is real by faith.

The difference being that the faith is not attributable to the atheist, it is only attributable to the participant. So the atheist only claims that the judgements which I have faith in are more real than the judgements which you have faith in. Of course one human judgement is not more real than another, so this is not a proper approach. The proper approach is to argue that one judgement is better than another.

It would be fact if God existed, and if God did so, but God doesn't, so God can't. — Sapientia

If God doesn't exist, then the only way that fact is determined is human judgement. That there is fact independent of human judgement is a matter of faith, if there is no God. So if there is no God, then whether or not transubstantiation is a matter of fact, is determined by human judgement. The Fathers of the Church are in a much better position to make this judgement than you are. And if you suppose that there is a "fact" of this matter which is independent from human judgement, then this "fact" is solely a matter of faith.

When the Christian claims that transubstantiation occurs he is claiming that the bread's objective substance changes into the objective substance of Christ's body. He isn't just claiming that this is his (inter-)subjective judgement. Therefore if there isn't a God who changes the bread's objective substance into the objective substance of Christ's body then the Christian's claim is false. — Michael

I don't recall any reference to "objective" or "objectivity" in the claims of the Church. That's the term I was using to describe the difference between whether or not there is a God. The Church claims that it is fact, and as I demonstrated, it is fact whether or not there is a God. God makes it a truly objective fact, while the lack of God makes it a fact by means of inter-subjectivity. Without God we have no facts other than those provided by inter-subjectivity.

Alright, so you have an object, a cracker. It's accidently made of wheat and essentially made of crackerness. The priest says his prayer and now it's essentially made of Jesusness and accidently made of wheat. The substance has changed. It's now made of Jesusness and wheat whereas it used to be made of crackerness and wheat. I get that Jesusness and crackerness aren't necessarily made of matter because essences are a bit mysterious, but it's not a regular old cracker any more, right? — Hanover

To begin with, that the object is a cracker, is a judgement. So let's just say we have an object. That it is an object requires that it has substance. Therefore we assume that it has substance. You judge it as essentially crackerness. This is a judgement made from your perception of its properties. That judgement says nothing about its substance. Since the object is essentially crackerness to you, you claim its substance is the substance of a cracker. The priest tells you its substance is now the substance of Christ, regardless of how you judge its properties. So if you have faith, you follow, and accept this. For you, being one of faith, the substance of the object is now the substance of Christ. And it is a fact because God ensures that it is a fact. Without God, any assertion that X is a fact, amounts to nothing more than a hocus pocus language game.

Right, so your original arguments were non sequiturs. You're accepting now that transubstantiation requires divine intervention. And that there is a God who intervenes in such a way is certainly something that can be argued against. — Michael

No, there's no non-sequitur, because the arguments hold with or without God. Without God, substance is a human assumption, it is whatever we say it is. With God, substance is assumed to have objectivity. Divine intervention just provides objectivity to transubstantiation.

See, you still haven't demonstrated a difference between asserting something as fact, and what is really fact. If something is supposed to be fact, this means that it has somehow been judged as fact. If the judgement is not made by God, then it is made by humans. So if God is not the one judging that the items are body and blood of Christ, then it is humans who are making that judgement. Either way, the argument holds. To assume God is to assume real objectivity, to assume human judgement is to assume objectivity by means of inter-subjectivity.

Then you accept that it is false to argue that transubstantiation happens simply because the Church says it does. Your arguments are a non sequitur. — Michael

It's not "simply" because the Church says so, nothing with the Church is simple, but it is because the Church says so. God follows the word of the Church. The Church requests this from God, and God gives. Therefore what the Church says is the cause of the occurrence. It's like requesting something in prayer, which comes true. God is the immediate cause of that thing occurring, but God does this in response to the prayer, so the prayer is the cause of the occurrence.

But my request is for you to set that aside and get stuck in, as I have done. — Sapientia

I don't like that phrase "get stuck in". What do you mean by that? I only conjure up an image of being Catholic, and being "stuck in" this sacrament, without the will power, nor capacity, to free myself from it.

So for now, I will reply to what interests me and not get "stuck in" to something that I might regret later, like quicksand. In case you're not there to pull me out.

The accidental properties remain unchanged but an essential change to the substance occurs, thus rooting this whole discussion in ancient Greek philosophy, I assume to offer an explanation for why there is nothing empirically verifiable when transubstantiation occurs. — Hanover

Ok, now you've distinguished between accidental properties and essential properties. A change to essential properties doesn't constitute a change in substance, it constitute a change in the type of object, the substance would stay the same.

I don't see how this is responsive to what I said, which is that a substantial change can occur without a name change, as I don't see how linguistic theory impacts metaphysical change. — Hanover

Since "substantial change" is something we judge, and somewhat arbitrarily, according to our principles of judgement, I don't see how you can support that claim, unless you appeal to God to support this type of substantial change. Then like I said, God could make a substantial change which we wouldn't even notice.

I can't make it the case that the water in my glass is the blood of Zeus just by saying that it is, or by creating a religion and having others perform some ritual and claim that the water is the blood of Zeus. — Michael

I know, you need the will of God to assist you. If everyday you refer to that item as the blood of Zeus, and everyone else around you refers to it as the blood of Zeus, you will keep thinking, it's not really the blood of Zeus, it's really just water. But if by the will of God, it is the blood of Zeus, and you have faith in this, then you will believe that it is the blood of Zeus. And of course, it really is the blood of Zeus, by the will of God.

But you think likewise, and I wouldn't believe you if you said any different. Plus you've been very uncharitable, yet I set that aside and got stuck in. — Sapientia

Oh yeah, remember this?

I just like to see if I can bullshit my way through anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

You think I'm very uncharitable, I think you are extremely uncharitable. So there!

He's saying that the facts are such that the bread satisfies the pre-established meaning of the term "the blood of Christ". His claim isn't true by fiat. — Michael

Right, the pre-established meaning appears to be what the Church has established, and this is that the items referred to are in fact, the body and blood of Christ. You're like Sapientia, are trying to reach, in equivocation, for some other meaning. But this is the meaning you, or Sapientia attempt to establish, and therefore not the pre-established meaning.

Sorry Sap, but I lost interest when I hit this part:

What matters is the fact that I'm right, you're wrong, and I know that to be the case. — Sapientia

Just as to assert the proposition "I have £1,000,000 in my bank account" isn't just me naming the amount in my bank account (which is actually less than £1,000,000). — Michael

That's completely different, it's predication, stating a property of your bank account, it's not naming an object. The example is not relevant.

We could know the substance changed by its behavior prior to altering its name. — Hanover

You are making Michael's mistake, mixing up properties for substance.

I replied to everything I thought was relevant, maybe repeat the part that you have a special interest in.

The Catholic Church claims that the utterances of the priest result in the metaphysical alteration of the bread in an actual way. Those utterances would alter the substance even if the name remained the same and the substance would be whatever it is even if it lacked a name. — Hanover

This is nonsense, the utterance are the name change. You are proposing a scenario in which the name change occurs (the utterances), without the name change occurring.

In the case of a named article, the name represents the substance, that's why an object can undergo changes while maintaining the same name. Transubstantiation occurs by the power of the Word. The priest changes the name, God goes along with this and changes the substance. If God changed the substance of something, and the name for it didn't change, we would have no way of knowing that the substance changed.

There's a difference between calling the colour of the sky "blue" (an act of naming) and calling the items of the Eucharist "the body and blood of Christ" (an act of asserting a proposition). — Michael

As I said with Hanover, I don't recognize the distinction you are making. To assert the proposition "this item is the body of Christ", is nothing other than to name the item as the body of Christ. A proposition is by nature a proposal, and no matter how it is asserted, it may be rejected. So your use of "asserting" here is just a red herring.

Transubstantiation (unlike the Eucharist) isn't the sort of thing that is established by fiat. One cannot simply dictate that the substance of the bread becomes the body of Christ, just as one cannot simply dictate that the shape of the Earth is flat. — Michael

Are you familiar with the term "substance"? It appears like you are not.

So we aren't measuring someone's guilt or innocence (the cause) based on the evidence left behind (the effect)? — Harry Hindu

No, we may measure the evidence (the effect), and make certain inferences concerning the cause, and then we make a judgement concerning the person's guilt or innocence. It is important to recognize that these are inferences, because "inference" implies that certain principles, premises are applied for a logical proceeding.

So we have first our measurement, by which we apply certain measurement practises. Then we apply specific premises, such as conditionals (if... then ...), and make some conclusions to assist our judgement. It is important to recognize that these logical proceedings, with the application of such premises, are not measurement practises.

Also, you should recognize that these logical proceedings, which apply premises, and rules of logic to produce conclusions employ non-physical principles. A measurement may be carried out by comparing two physical things, but logical process employs non-physical principles. So we only judge the cause from the effect through the application of non-physical principles.

I had a bad dream last night. I was back in school and I had to write a paper on transubstantiation. It was the day before the paper was due and I couldn't find any information on it. It was as if it didn't exist.

The ritual is transubstantiation if and only if the substance changes, and whether or not the change occurs has nothing to do with what people believe or what people claim or what word people use to describe the ritual. — Michael

My claim is that the substance changes.

Maybe this is missing something? You can correct me if I'm misrepresenting your position — ProbablyTrue

That's about it. And the reason why transubstantiation occurs iff communicants have faith, is that substance is something we assume, to support our observed experience of the temporal continuity of existence. So there is no problem with saying that at any moment, this particular object ceases being bread, and starts being body of Christ, because it just requires shifting our assumptions concerning the temporal continuity of existence.

The further issue though, is what supports our assumption of substance. There is an observed temporal continuity, but why, what supports this? This is where we appeal to God. So if we say that the substance changes from bread to Christ, then without the assumption of God, we can say anything, because it's all human assumptions. With the assumption of God, it is necessary that God goes along with this transubstantiation, to ensure that it's true. Why wouldn't He?

. If it states that the thing is the same as itself, then that's what it is. — Sapientia

You are just asserting "that's what it is", in the very same way that the Church asserts "that's what it is", referring to the articles of the Eucharist. So you're being hypocritical now denying that the Church may do this, when you are doing the very same thing.

But that's not what the law of identity actually says though. Do you understand a difference between the word "same" and the word "what". If I say "X is the same as X", this says nothing about what X is. The word "same" indicates no options. "What" indicates a choice made from options. To say "what a thing is", indicates that one has made a choice from options. What it is, might be bread, might be body of Christ, whatever, "what" implies options.

If you're saying that what a thing is, is something other than itself, then you're contradicting the law of identity, and are therefore mistaken. — Sapientia

I've explained this very clearly to you. It's is absolutely necessary that what a thing is, is other than the thing itself, and this does not contradict the law of identity. It is necessary because all sorts of fictional ideas qualify as "what a thing is", but are not actually things. That is why Aristotle introduced the concept of "substance" into his logic, so we can distinguish fictional things (which are only logical possibilities), from existing things, substantial existence. "What a thing is" does not necessitate that the thing has substantial existence, therefore "what a thing is" is necessarily something other than the thing itself, because the thing itself has substantial existence.

What items? You need to be clearer. We start with a wafer and wine. These items are consumed, and a ceremony is performed. I do not believe that the ceremony changes the items in any way. So we are left with consumed wafer and wine. End of. — Sapientia

You've got the temporal order wrong. The ceremony is first, then the objects are consumed. I went through this with Hanover already. Hanover claimed that the ceremony accomplishes nothing, but clearly it does accomplish something. The attitude of the participants toward the items is changed. And, as I said "substance" is an assumption which we make concerning the physical existence of objects. If the substance of the objects changes, this implies that the assumptions of the people, concerning the objects changes, and therefore the attitudes of the people changes. The substance of the items changes, and the evidence, the change in the people's attitude demonstrates this. Is that so hard to understand?

If you believe in God, then the assumption of substance, which is made by human beings, is supported by God. If you do not believe in God, the assumption of substance is difficult to support, and that's why process philosophy is so popular today. But if you do believe in God, then the belief is that God goes along with transubstantiation to support this change of substance. And there is no reason to believe that God would not support this.