I think it would be a mistake to claim to know that things are inherently unintelligible, because it is hard to see how one could obtain sufficient confidence in that opinion to call it knowledge. On the other hand I find it entirely reasonable to hold an opinion that things are inherently unintelligible. I would definitely not call an opinion knowledge, or even a claim. — andrewk

I find this to be an odd thought. To me it seems, in a strange way contradictory, to hold an opinion which could never be proven as knowledge. What sense is there in that, why not remain open minded on the subject, undecided, skeptical? You know that opinion requires a judgement that such is the case, so once you move from being doubtful to holding an opinion, you might just as well be making the claim. Your actions will be representative of this opinion, even if you do not go so far as to state the claim.

I can see how, for pragmatic reasons, one might proceed from such a premise, a proposition which could never be proven true, but could in principle be proven false. But any intent, other than the intent to prove that premise false, would be misguided. Conclusions derived from this premise would be very unsound, and therefore misleading. So of what good is such an opinion? Clearly the atheist doesn't entertain this thought in an effort to prove it wrong. All that's left as a possibility, is that this opinion is misleading the atheist.

By the way, the first place I came across a suggestion that the universe was unintelligible was in Stella Gibbon' book "Cold Comfort Farm", in which Flora, the protagonist, reads a book by the Abbé Fausse-Maigre - a RC priest - which is described as proclaiming the fundamental unintelligibility of the world. Suggestions of unintelligibility are not particularly associated with atheists. — andrewk

It's important to distinguish between "unintelligible" due to the state of the human intellect, and "unintelligible" due to the state of the thing which one is attempting to understand. Wayfarer and I went through this argument already. Wayfarer insisted that Aquinas designated God as unintelligible, unknowable, and I insisted that Aquinas designated God as highly intelligible, having the same type of existence as an intelligible object (immaterial). Finally I went to the source, and determined that what Aquinas says is that although God is by His essence most supremely intelligible, He is actually unintelligible to the human intellect because the human intellect is dependent on the material body. So despite the fact that God is the most highly intelligible being of all existence in His essence, God remains unintelligible to the human intellect until the human soul is separated from the body. We were both right, God is most highly intelligible, yet also unintelligible.

The point being that "unintelligible" means something different in theology than what it means to the atheist. In theology there is no such thing as an aspect of reality which is inherently unintelligible, because it is God's creation, and everything God does is with reason. Therefore "unintelligible" can only refer to that which cannot be apprehended by the human intellect. But the atheist allows that "unintelligible" could mean something which cannot be apprehended by any intellect. So to take an atheist definition of "unintelligible", and apply it to theological use of "unintelligible" is equivocation.

Yes that is approximately my position, although (1) I would replace 'claiming' by 'speculating' and (2) it would be overly simplistic to describe me as an atheist tout court. But I do know people who strongly self-identify as atheists that, like me, expect reality is ultimately unintelligible to humans or to any finite being.

Perhaps we are not in disagreement then. — andrewk

Perhaps not in disagreement on this point, but I think that the atheist's perspective is unphilosophical, and unwise.

The reason is that if we allow speculation into the possibility that certain aspects of reality are inherently unintelligible, then these speculations will inevitably turn into claims by some atheists. So when we reach something which appears to be unintelligible, many atheists will be quick to claim that the unintelligibility is inherent within the thing. So we have instances like people claiming random chance mutations in evolution, abiogenesis, and those who argue, that the universe emerged from some unintelligible vagueness.

If we accept such claims, as some do, then there is no need to inquire further, we claim to know that such and such aspects of reality are inherently unintelligible, and therefore can never be understood by any intellect, so there is no point in trying. This would be a philosophical laziness don't you think, to end the inquiry with the conclusion that the thing cannot possibly be known?

So what's the point in even speculating into this possibility? There is no way to prove that things are inherently unintelligible rather than just unintelligible due to intellectual deficiencies, unless you know that the intellect inquiring is the best possible intellect, so this is meaningless speculation. Such speculation can only lead to two conclusions, 1) that it's wrongful speculation, or, 2) the conclusion that there is something inherently unintelligible. But to conclude that something is inherently unintelligible is blatantly unphilosophical, and wrong, and 1) is that the speculation itself is wrong. Therefore the only philosophical approach is to assume that everything is inherently intelligible given the appropriate intellect.

What corresponds, or does not correspond, with reality is the meaning of the proposition, what it means. But isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well? So the meaning, what the proposition means, is real, and existent, whether it is possible or impossible.

1. An object that is describable as a logical contradiction is metaphysically impossible. (e.g. square circles are metaphysically impossible) — Relativist

How would you describe meaning as an object?

I can see no logical connection between lacking a belief in God and believing that everything can be understood. I know know-it-all theists and mystical, I-know-nothing atheists, as well as know-it-all atheists and mystical, I-know-nothing theists. The two dimensions are orthogonal.

At best there could be a correlation but I don't even see any sign of that. Do you have any evidence for this claim other than a throwaway line here or there from a celebrity atheist? — andrewk

OK, so let's delve a little deeper into this then. Let's assume that there are aspects of reality which appear to be unintelligible to human beings. The theological approach is to assume that these parts of reality are inherently intelligible, but require a higher intelligence, such as God, to understand. The atheist approach denies the higher intelligence, God, leaving the atheist with the assumption that there are aspects of reality which are inherently unintelligible.

So the difference is in the way that we judge "unintelligible". The theist assumes an absolute, God, and any aspect of reality cannot be validly said to be unintelligible, just because human beings cannot understand it. The theist refers to a God which could understand it. The atheist assumes no such absolute, and if a part of reality proves to be unintelligible relative to human beings, the atheist can validly claim that this aspect of reality is inherently unintelligible. So the theist places the reason why anything appears to be unintelligible squarely on the deficiencies of the human intellect. There is no other reason why something could appear to be unintelligible because there is nothing that is unintelligible (principle of sufficient reason). The atheist however, is justified in claiming that unintelligibility is a feature of reality itself, that there are aspects of reality which are purely random or some such thing, which by their very nature are impossible to be understood.

Courage is obviously not an external goal. — InternetStranger

We were talking about the meaning of the word "objective". Why do you bring up "courage" which is a disposition? You haven't shown any relationship between the two, so as far as I can see you are speaking irrelevant nonsense.

The point was made in my first post. You dismissed it and came back with some contradictory statement so I gave up, and went for the one-liner.

The theist that agrees that God is unintelligible and we can say nothing meaningful about Her is a rare beast indeed - but all the more admirable for that. — andrewk

This is contradictory. To say "God is unintelligible to the human intellect" is to say something meaningful about God.

2. If x exists then x is metaphysically possible (converse of 1) — Relativist

I don't think you've avoided the problem I brought up. How do you account for the existence of impossibility? You've limited "exists" such that it can only refer to possibilities. Why privilege possibilities over impossibilities? If you allow that possibilities exist, why not also allow that impossibilities exist?

Can you use the word "philosophy" for matters unknowable, un-assertable, un-arguable and indescribable? — Michael Ossipoff

Why not? Philosophy is to inquire into the unknown, and as unknown, we must allow the possibility that it is unknowable, unassertable, unarguable and undescribable. We will not know until we try,

That's why I limit what I call "metaphysics", and use the word "meta-metaphysics" for matters of what-is that are (or might be) unknowable, non-describable, non-assertable, non-arguable.. — Michael Ossipoff

How do you propose to identify the unknowable from that which is simply unknown?

What you said, writing at lengths about alleged properties of God.

OED gives: "A Traveller is not to imagine pleasure his object." 1665 — InternetStranger

That's odd, my OED says "something sought or aimed at; an objective point"

This is somehow not what telos or even 'final cause' in Scholastic usage means. — InternetStranger

I disagree, I think that's exactly what telos or final cause is. Why do you think it is otherwise?

My experience is quite the contrary of this. Most theists I've encountered do not recognise that at all. Instead they write and speak at length about alleged properties of God - what She can do, what She wants, what She thinks, what She has said, what books She has dictated. — andrewk

That doesn't even resemble theology to me.

I'd be pretty confident that Russell had read Aquinas and understood the claims of classical theism. — andrewk

I highly doubt that anyone has ever understood the claims of classical theism. It is the nature of that beast, that there is an element of unintelligibility there. That is what atheists like to poke fun at. But the unintelligibility inherent within such theism is the result of the deficiencies of the human intellect, trying to gets some principles to approach what is beyond the intellect's present ability to apprehend.

This is a common, but not essential, difference between the atheist perspective and the theist perspective. The theist recognizes the vast reality which is beyond the capacity of human understanding, and that the unintelligibility of God is a reflection of this. The atheist tends to believe that all reality can be brought into human understand, like a theory of everything, or something like that.

The word objective is ambiguous. It can mean "bright line rules", things most people in a given society understand such as speed limits, it can also mean "independent of humans". — InternetStranger

You forgot the meaning of "objective" which unites both of these two distinct meanings, and that is "the objective", in the sense of a goal, or aim. The objective, in the sense of a goal, is what we agree upon, to work together toward. This is what inspires us to accept the rules, the thought of working together toward objectives. And, being common to many, the objective's real existence will be independent from each of us, therefore "independent from humans".

So, if metaphysics is philosophy, then it's over-ambitious to say that metaphysics can be about Reality, unless you claim that words can accurately describe Reality. That's an issue that i don't want to debate, but if you say that metaphysics's range of applicability includes ultimate Reality, then you're implying an assertion that words accurately describe Reality. — Michael Ossipoff

That conclusion doesn't follow. You can talk a bout something without accurately describing it. So metaphysics can be about reality without accurately describing it.

I know it doesn't literally. — mcc1789

So your speaking metaphorically then. What does that have to do with objectivity?

That the sun will rise and set is independent of my opinion. Whether or not I happen to agree with it, this will happen nonetheless. — mcc1789

The sun does not rise, nor does it set. The earth spins on its axis and creates the appearance of a rising and setting sun. Notice that the subject here, the thing which is active, is the earth rather than the sun, so the statement you made which implies that the sun is the active subject, is clearly false.

1. Logical contradictions do not exist. — Relativist

Why would you say this? Clearly it's a false premise. Logical contradictions do exist, I encounter them quite often. Here's an example: the circle is square. In order to justify this premise of yours, you'd need to either show how these things which appear to exist as logical contradictions are either not contradictions, or exist as something other than contradictions.

If your understanding is not contradictory, your explanations certainly are. — Galuchat

I've thought about this issue, and I've come to realize that the problem here is not with ambiguity in the word "intent", or "final cause", or the word "end",we're beating around the bush here. Our difficulty in communication stems from ambiguity in the word "form".

This word, "form" has taken on many different meanings from Plato, Aristotle, Neo-Platonists, Christian theologians, through to modern usage. I started with a strictly Aristotelian use of "form" in the definition of "soul", and you responded with a Thomistic understanding of "soul". The point being that the meaning of the word "form" had already gone through a Neo-Platonist transformation between Aristotle and Aquinas, providing the ontology which allows for the independent existence of Forms.

That seems to be where we have disagreement, on the existence of independent Forms. Aristotle did not explicitly develop any ontology of the independent existence of forms, but his metaphysics leaves open the possibility of this, by providing the basic principles which act as a foundation. The ontology of independent Forms was then developed by Neo-Platonists through application of Aristotelian principles and reference to Plato's Timaeus. This ontology was accepted in principle into Christian theology. You seem to hold some atheist prejudice whereby you will not approach these Neo-Platonic principles, which are completely consistent with Aristotelian metaphysics, claiming that these principles are strictly "theological", as if this means unphilosophical.

So, Aquinas changed the meaning of "soul" from "form" to "mind" and separated it from "body" for theological reasons. — Galuchat

The principles of separation of the "One", the "Soul", and the "Intellect", from the material body, were already produced by the Neo-Platonists, who were more "mystical" than "theological", and these principles were received into Christian theology by Augustine and later theologians. The principles were not produced for "theological reasons".

In my opinion, you have been presenting a view of Final Cause which Aristotle would not have endorsed. — Galuchat

Have you never read Aristotle? Final cause is clearly defined in his Physics as "that for the sake of which" 194b. Walking is for the sake of health, so health is the cause of walking, in the sense of "final cause". If you doubt me, look it up.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, "that for the sake of which" is called "the end". Human activities are carried out for a purpose, this is the end. The activity is the means to the end. The problem he addresses is that usually even the end itself is for the sake of something else, a further end. This produces a chain of causation (in the sense of final cause); this is desired for the sake of that, which is desired for something further, etc.. He seeks to put an end to this causal chain, and posits happiness as the ultimate end, what all other ends are sought for the sake of.

I really don't understand what your problem is. What do you think is meant by "final cause"? What makes you think "final cause" ought to be disassociated with intent? You really don't explain yourself very well. Why don't you try?

If the soul (mind+form of the body) is the source of intentional activity, and we must look to something other than the mind as the source of intentional activity, then is it more accurate to say that the form of the body (and not the soul) is the source of intentional activity? — Galuchat

As I understand, the soul is not the form of the body. It is an immaterial form, prior to the body. This is where dualism comes into play, and where the Neo-Platonists, consequently Aquinas, differ from Aristotle,. There are material forms, which are forms of bodies, and also separate immaterial forms.

I'm just trying to determine whether (given Aristotle's avoidance of psychological terms such as "intent") the use of even "nonconscious intent" to describe final cause should be avoided in favour of another, such as "end" (telos). It seems to me that using "intent" with reference to final cause is equivocal, possibly serving an unnecessary theological (as opposed to strictly scientific) end (read: Thomist viewpoint superseding Aristotelian viewpoint). — Galuchat

I don't see this equivocation. "Intent" and "end" are both applicable terms, one is of the general, the other particular. "End" refers to the particular, best understood as "the good", that which is desired, the particular thing which one is trying to bring about in an intentional act. I'm not sure what "telos" is supposed to mean "Intent" refers to the general, what lies behind the recognition of particular goods. but sometimes "intent" will be used to refer to the particular, as in "what was your intent?". So long as we avoid confusing the particular with the general in terms of usage, there is no equivocation

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specific to the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causes are involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the job of “the student of nature is to bring the why-question back to them all in the way appropriate to the science of nature” (Phys. 198 a 21–23)." — Galuchat

Sure, we need to refer to all four causes to understand all aspects of nature, but he clearly indicates that some phenomena do not require application of all four causes in order to understand them. If some phenomena can be understood without applying final cause, then so be it. Aristotle's intent, in defining the four distinct ways in which "cause" is used, was to avoid ambiguity, because "cause" at that time had all these different meanings. So he insists that the appropriate meaning be applied in each situation of usage, "in the way appropriate to the science of nature", to avoid equivocation.

The intellect (mind) and soul (form of the living body) of the human being are united as one (according to Aquinas, not Aristotle). — Galuchat

United as one, does not deny identifiable parts. It means that the two named things exist within one united being. Different attributes are united as one, in one being, but that does not mean that the attributes are not identifiable as distinct.

So, how is the human soul (mind+form) the source of intentional activity if "...we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity." (as above)? — Galuchat

I think that this question indicates that you misunderstand the meaning of "united as one". When two things are united as one, each part has a different relation to the one united thing. So "soul" could refer to the source of intentional activity, and "mind" could have a different relation to intentional activity, while the two are united as one in the human being.

Also, if Aristotle's final cause applies to all of nature, it may help if you could explain what the final cause of an inorganic object or process (e.g., a volcano or volcanic eruption) would be. — Galuchat

I don't think I said anything to imply that final cause is evident in inanimate things.

Yeah. I did. The spontaneous part of "spontaneous symmetry-breaking" refers to the fact that any old material nudge is going to tip everything in some collective symmetry-breaking direction. So it says, yes, you need some kind of material/efficient cause to get things going. But the very least imaginable fluctuation is going to do that. — apokrisis

Well that's not really "spontaneous" then. That little nudge is the cause. And so it's just as I say. the lipid's tendency to behave in this way, upon being "nudged" is the reason why they are useful, and are produced.

It is a pure accident. Whatever happened, it would have resulted in the same effect. — apokrisis

It's not pure accident, the lipids have a physical constitution which makes them tend to behave this way. Other things don't behave in this way, this behaviour is proper to, and essential to these lipids. So it really can't be said to be accidental.

A classic example of this is a ball balanced on top of a dome. It is going to roll off one way or another of its own accord. Well, it will need a nudge to get going. But there is always going to be some vibration or other that tips the balance. — apokrisis

Have you ever tried to balance a ball on a dome? That very nudge (vibration or whatever) which you say will get the ball going, will prevent the ball from being balanced. So the direction the ball rolls depends on how you place it, because it's never going to be balanced. It's a false example. If you do happen to get something balanced in this way, then it will take a cause to unbalance it, and it will move in some direction or another depending on that cause.


That's right, the model doesn't have to be, and should not be taken as "psychological", that's what I explained. Those who restrict "intent", to conscious intent (psychological), necessitate a psychological model of final cause. This will lead to panpsychism when we try to explain all the purpose (intent) in the world in other living things which are not conscious. That's why we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity. If you read Aristotle's biology you will see that he attributes this immaterial source of purposeful, or intentional activity (which manifests as conscious intent), to "the soul", which all living things have in common. The intellect is a potency of the soul, just like things such as self-nutrition, self-movement, and sensation. All of these being activities produced by final causation (intent), as they are purposeful activities.

They form membranes spontaneously. You forgot, or never understood, what was said. — apokrisis

I suppose we need to define "spontaneously" then. Does this mean "without a cause", or does it mean "voluntarily"? If the former, then finality is excluded, as final cause is a cause. If the latter, then we're talking about a non-physical cause.

Can purpose refer to function or reason instead of intent, and thereby to a strictly physical (as opposed to mental, or non-physical) process?

For example:
1) The purpose (function) of the heart is to pump blood.
2) The purpose of (reason for) photosynthesis is to convert light into chemical energy. — Galuchat

If something acts with purpose, there is necessarily intent involved, that's how "intent" is defined. To act with purpose is to act with intent There appears to be a trend in modern scientific thinking to limit the meaning of "intent" to conscious intent. But conscious intent is just one form of intent, as there is still intent in habits and subconscious acts. Limiting "intent" in this way, to conscious intent, would leave all the instances of purpose, such as those in your examples, left ungrounded. When we say "purpose" we imply "for the sake of something". And "for the sake of which" implies the reason for the act. The act is carried out for this reason, for this purpose. So if the act was carried out for this reason, the act was caused to occur for that reason, and that's the purpose of the act. That's what's known as intent, when an act is caused to occur, for a purpose.

So both of your examples, by referring to "purpose", imply intent. If you say that the purpose of the heart is to pump blood, then you imply that the actions of the heart are caused to occur by the intent to pump blood. And if the purpose of photosynthesis is to convert light energy into chemical energy, then you imply that the activity of photosynthesis is caused to occur by the intent to convert energy. That's why it's common for materialists, and physicalists to deny purpose from these acts, saying that they just come about by chance, "spontaneously", without cause. But It's very difficult to deny purpose from the acts of living things because the evidence is overwhelming. We know that there is purpose (intent) behind birds building their nests, and beavers building damns, and all the various activities which we observe of the living creatures.

Did Aristotle define telos in terms of reason or intent? — Galuchat

I don't think "intent" was a word in Aristotle's Greece. I believe it comes from Latin. In his "Physics" he defined final cause as "that for the sake of which". The example he gave is that if a man walks for his health, then health is the cause of the man walking, in the sense of final cause. The man has an idea, a goal, "health", and this is the cause of him walking. This is commonly called, by us, intent.

"Reason" is a much more vague and ambiguous term. It can be used as "the act of reasoning", or "the reason for". But even as "the reason for", it is very ambiguous, lending itself to all the different types of causation. The cause of something (final, efficient, whatever) is the reason for it. So it's better not to interpret final cause in terms of "reason". And I think if one did interpret it in this way, very strict limitations would need to be put on the definition of "reason".

Yes, the laws of nature are a human construct, but that does not change the fact that they are the best reference for whether or not some other claim is compatible with how nature works. — Read Parfit

So this is what you call our "best" approach to avoiding the cited problem. It doesn't avoid the problem though, so we ought to keep looking for a better way.

The point is, that I don't agree already, so why should I read a book concerning what follows from a premise I don't agree with?

"The reader's familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and he knows what the question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things. In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are. It is only by analyzing the thought which I expressed by saying, "this is a clothes-line" that I realize it to have been an answer to the question, "what is that thing for?" and come to see that I must have been asking myself that question although at the time I did not know I was asking it. — tim wood

The point is, that after a statement is made, we can think up a question which the statement is an answer to, but this does not mean that the statement is made as an answer to a question. This is alluded to here: "In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are." If an individual who makes a statement does not know that the statement is an answer to a question, then it is impossible that the statement was made as an answer to a question. The intent, in making the statement, was something other than to answer a question. So to represent that statement in this way, as an answer to a question, is a false representation. Notice that he calls this being unscientific, and of course metaphysics is unscientific. And the metaphysical statement therefore, does not require a presupposition as per 3).

You don't seem to understand the scientific version of hylomorphism - the kind where global organisation can form "spontaneously" to meet some finality. The word spontaneous is used here to denote that there is no particular local material/efficient cause that produces the global organisation. Instead there is some generalised finality being served which does the trick. — apokrisis

You don't seem to understand final cause. Final cause requires intention, the non-physical. So to say that global organisation occurs "spontaneously" to meet some finality, is to say that intention, the non-physical is involved in this process, expressed by being directed to meet some finality.

In the case of lipids forming micelles, the finality is the usual one of entropy minimisation. The lipid molecules have no choice but to find the configuration which is the least energy-demanding possible. And any kind of nudge or fluctuation at all is going to be enough of a local material push to set that chain of dominoes falling to its inevitable conclusion - a micelle arrangement with all the hydrophobic tails tuck up inside, safely far from any surrounding water. — apokrisis

But lipids don't form spontaneously, their existence is caused. And that causation is directed toward some purpose. That they have a standard, non-random behaviour is what makes them useful.

So for a modern biological Aristotelian, we have our notions of final/formal cause that make measurable sense. — apokrisis

Actually your notion of final cause does not make sense. You claim that organisation occurs "to meet finality" which implies necessarily, "purpose", but then you deny the non-physical, "intent" which is implied by purpose. No physical existent is ever directed to meet some finality without intent. If you remove that non-physical aspect, intent, you do not have a case of a physical existent being directed toward some finality. Intent is the essence of being directed to meet some finality. By removing that non-physical aspect, intent, from finality, you are left with nonsense.

Go read the book. — tim wood

You know, that just because it's written in a book doesn't make it true. Didn't I just demonstrate the first principle of the book to be wrong? Why would I want to read what follows?

I just find it interesting that the concept of time that is most appealing is when it's expressed through change. — TheMadFool

"Most appealing" in the sense of capable of creating very entertaining science fiction? Fiction is very appealing to most people. So when you inquire as to why a certain concept is appealing, you ought to keep that in mind.

Of course the only way to judge the reasonableness of such speculation - which ran ahead of the experiments now being done by Lane and others - would be to actually read his book. — apokrisis

As I explained to Read Parfit, both the evidence and the logic indicate that the correct direction for speculation is into the nature of the non-physical, and how the non-physical "soul" brings about the existence of living physical bodies. That's why I consider reading books with speculations in an opposing direction to be a waste of time.

I don't know if movies represent the general conception of time correctly or not. — TheMadFool

Oh my God. Are you seriously asking whether science fiction movies represent something correctly? It's fiction, fantasy. It's not meant to represent anything.

Parfit argues that we can ask if claims are compatible with the laws of nature. — Read Parfit

You ought to consider that any "laws" are just human constructs. like any other concepts If you think that the "laws of nature" are some independently existing laws, then how would we know whether the humanly constructed laws are a proper representation of the independent laws, or "fictions"? We'd have to ask, are the humanly constructed laws compatible with the independent laws. But all that we have to go on is the world we perceive, the humanly constructed laws, and logic and reason. So it's quite clear that Parfit's suggestion doesn't solve the problem of distinguishing fictitious ideas from non-fictitious ideas.

And don't forget that what follows after a dichotomous separation or symmetry breaking is the arrival at the stable equilibrium of a triadic hierarchical state of order. You get an ending to the breaking when the two limits are in equilibrium with the contents they thus now contain.

Again, because you can't be bothered to study how all this works, you keep falling woefully short of any understanding. I have to keep explaining basic stuff again and again. — apokrisis

But my point is that after any "symmetry breaking", there is no such thing as a dichotomy. "A dichotomy" may refer to a symmetry, but the symmetry has been broken. So if a dichotomy is a symmetry, then if the symmetry is broken, the dichotomy no longer exists. A "symmetry breaking" is not a "dichotomous separation", that is a false representation. It might be possible to describe the symmetry which is broken as a dichotomy of possibilities, but the breaking of the symmetry negates this dichotomy.

If I am woefully short of understanding here, then maybe you can explain how I misunderstand this.

Exactly. You think it is a simple division. And the process view says it is irreducibly complex. Things only reach stability once the separating into polar opposites has arrived at a hierarchical balance where there is also now a connecting spectrum of concrete possibility. — apokrisis

Let's maintain the model/real division. Remember, the separating of things into polar opposites is the model. Symmetry breaking is the real. A symmetry breaking is not a separation of things into polar opposites. A symmetry breaking cannot even be represented as a separating of things into polar opposites. These are completely different things, and it appears to me, like you are somehow claiming "separating into polar opposites" (dichotomizing) is a model of symmetry breaking. But this appears to me to be completely false.

You might insist that you've explained this "basic stuff again and again", but all I've seen is that you use these terms in this way again and again, as if symmetry breaking is a form of dichotomizing, but in reality these two are completely incompatible.

Hardly. All things warm are now specified in concrete fashion because they are related to the extremes of a dichotomy. There is the hot in one direction, the cold in the other. So now the warm has its own definite and measurable location somewhere on the spectrum of possibility just established. — apokrisis

The "extremes of a dichotomy" are the principles of the model. The warm things are real. You are speaking as if the model is right there within the real warm thing. In relation to the warm thing, hot is in one direction, and cold in the other direction. But these relations are the model, they are not a part of the warm thing.

What do you understand about process philosophy? A big fat zero so far. — apokrisis

That is a statement which reflects your capacity to explain. When you use terms in an idiosyncratic way, as you clearly do, then you must explain yourself, rather than repeating the same idiosyncratic phrases over and over again, if you want someone to understand what you are trying to say.

I find it a little embarrassing for you that you deny that lipids can spontaneously from in the right conditions — Read Parfit

If it's true, then where is the evidence? Where are all these lipids which are spontaneously forming in the right conditions? Or is it simply the case that "the right conditions" just don't exist and therefore lipids just aren't spontaneously forming? And, "the right conditions" is a convenient fiction which substitutes for "magic".

Yes. Let's see if you can just remember the definition of a dichotomy as that which is "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive". So there is a process of separation towards reciprocally-matched limits. Two contrasting limits on "the real" emerge into view according to the distance each can each put between itself and its "other". — apokrisis

Do you see, that this process which you describe is not suited to a dichotomy as you define it? The process might be a movement toward a dichotomy, or away from a dichotomy, as defined, but if there is such a dichotomy there is not room for process without breaking the terms of "dichotomy". Also, the dichotomy cannot describe the limits on the real because this would not be jointly exhaustive. Anything within the limits, being not the limits themselves, which is the entirety of "the real" would be excluded from the dichotomy under the designation of "jointly exhaustive".. That's what I tried to explain earlier. If you place limits on the real, then the limits are not part of the real. And according to your description, it is impossible that "the real" partakes in any dichotomy, limits or otherwise, because everything which is real is not mutually exclusive of everything else that is real, each being real. For these reasons there is no room for a dichotomy in your process philosophy. The dichotomy cannot be real, and must be disposed of, dismissed as a false premise.

You make the right noises about dichotomies only then to collapse everything back to your happy simplicities of pairs of terms that are then neither mutual nor exhaustive anymore so far as you are concerned. — apokrisis

That's because I normally use "dichotomy" in the more general and common way. In the most general sense it is a simple division into two, a separation. In a more strict sense, it is necessarily mutually exclusive, nothing can cross the line. This leads to the idea that things which are opposed to each other, like hot and cold, form a dichotomy. But notice how all things which are warm are excluded from that dichotomy. And in your definition, which is an even more strict, mathematical sense, "jointly exhaustive" is included. Do you see, as I explained above, that if we adhere to this very strict sense of "dichotomy", there is no room for any dichotomies in the reality described by your process philosophy? Dichotomies are fictions which ought to be dismissed as false premises.

Then maybe you will have the logical wherewithal to take a next step. — apokrisis

Actually, the question is do you have the balls to take the next step which is dictated by the logical wherewithal. Dichotomies are incompatible with your process philosophy. One or the other has to go if you want metaphysics with consistency. Which will it be?

It's an absolute presupposition of my political thinking, such as it is, that American style democracy, while at all times a work-in-progress, is the best form of government possible.

Simple enough and any number of people could have said it. Give it a "metaphysical' try. Remember, no presuppositions allowed! — tim wood

It's a political presupposition, not a metaphysical principle, therefore not a "first" principle. So what am I supposed to try, to turn it into metaphysics? To approach it as a metaphysician would require that I deny it as a presupposition, and seek the further presuppositions which ground it. What makes you think that democracy is the best form of government possible? Plato described democracy as the worst, other than tyranny, but explained how democracy inevitably degenerates into tyranny. I can't remember exactly why he said this would occur, but I think it's the result of democracy allowing the rulers to be the people with the strongest desire to rule. In reality, the task of being a good ruler is the most difficult job, so the ones most fitted to be good rulers recognize this and want the job the least, while those who want the job, generally want it for reasons other than to be a good ruler.

Really! Example? — tim wood

We did an example, the example of "God". But as I said, "free from presuppositions" is the ideal which is striven for. It will probably be never be completely obtained. That's why later metaphysicians who turn to earlier first principles, will discover presuppositions underneath those first principles, and need to discard them in search of the true first principle.

1) Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question. — tim wood

I don't agree with this one right off the bat. We very often make statements simply to inform people of things we know, which others do not know, without being questioned. These statements are not made in answer to questions. I walk in the door and say to my wife, "it's raining out". That statement is not made as an answer to a question.

When we deny the truth of 1) we introduce a completely different way of looking at the world from the one described by those numbered statements. From this perspective, when we make a descriptive statement concerning the world, like the one in my example, it comes from a desire to describe the world, not from a question about the world. This better represents the philosophical attitude which is more of an attitude of wonder rather than of questioning. So a philosophical "inquiry" is recognized as an investigation toward describing and understanding rather than as an interrogation.

This is key to understanding the rejection of your described role of presupposition. The question is particular, and pointed in a specific direction, by the presupposition. Wonder and inquisition is general, not necessarily directed in any particular way by any specific presuppositions.

I think the facts support my assertion that lipids spontaneously form in the right conditions like those that exist in a alkaline hydrothermal vent. — Read Parfit

That's why Requarth said "speculation far outpaces evidence" in Lane's book, and why I say you invoke the magical appearance of a membrane.

What are you talking about. This is modelling. So to the extent that we know the thing-in-itself, the dichotomy of the discrete and the continuous is the conceptual division that would describe a separation of the real - whatever that is noumenally speaking - towards its "real" phenomenological limits. — apokrisis

OK, let's start from the beginning again, and see if I can understand what you're laying down. You have given me two distinct dichotomies, the dichotomy of discrete and continuous, and the dichotomy of the model and the reality which is modelled. The question concerns the reality of the discrete and the continuous. How do the two dichotomies relate to each other?

So here, we're back to saying that the discrete and continuous are only part of the model. However, you are saying that this model, which utilizes "discrete" and "continuous", describes a real separation within the real thing which is modeled. Am I correct in this description? If we use the discrete/continuous model, our description of reality implies a real separation between the distinct parts of reality.

Thus if we are talking about our ontic commitments, then containers and contents are both equally "real" in that modelling sense. Likewise our notions of the continuous and discrete as the limits on possible existence. — apokrisis

This is where you loose me. Within the model, the discrete and continuous are completely distinct. They are defined as incompatible, one cannot partake of the other. They are defined in such a way that the one excludes the other in opposition. So if we switch now to a container/contents model, we must either maintain this principle within the container/contents model, or else we are switching to model which is different from the discrete/continuous model.

Now, the discrete/continuous model employs two distinct elements which are mutually exclusive, by definition, therefore there must be real separation between these two elements within the reality modeled, for the model to be accurate. The question is, is reality like this, that it consists of two distinct elements which are necessarily separate by way of opposition, or is the model flawed. If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this model is flawed, reality should not be modelled by two opposing terms each of which excludes the other, by definition, such that there is a real separation between these two elements. You are saying that reality ought to be modelled more like container/contents, where there is no real separation between the two defining elements of reality.

So here is the problem I have, which I've been trying to relate to you. If we model reality in this way that you are proposing, how would we distinguish between, and identify, the two defining elements, the container and the contents, within the thing which is being modelled? If we cannot have principles of identity whereby the identification of one would exclude the possibility of the other, such as in the discrete/continuous model, then how would we ever know whether we've identified constituents of the contents, or constituents of the container? Do you see what I mean? Why would we model reality as container/contents if we cannot produce principles whereby the container can be isolated from the contents? If we produce such principles of exclusion, we just go back to the two distinct, mutually exclusive parts of reality, like the discrete and the continuous. If your argument is that reality just isn't like this, there is no separation of parts in this way, then why even apply a dichotomy within the model at all? If there is no such separation in reality, then to model it with any type of separation, like container/contents, presents us with a faulty model. Either the dichotomy is real, and we provide for real distinct parts in the model, or we completely dispense with the dichotomy in the model.

You are getting it ... by trying so hard to get it wrong! Spectacular. My job is done. — apokrisis

So I was right then. You talk about the discrete and the continuous as if there is some real difference between them. But when you describe the way that existence really is, you claim that there is no way of distinguishing between them within real existing things. Everything is a mixture of the two, and with respect to which features are discrete or continuous, which are the contents or the container, you cannot produce any principles for identification, because the two are fundamentally inseparable, and therefore cannot be identified individually. Sounds like the recipe for Zeno's paradoxes.

Here's the problem, or I think it's the problem. It seems to me you a) want to uncover and learn what presuppositions are actually being presupposed (which is one definition of Metaphysics), and b) then want to "prove" them. — tim wood

No, (b) is not what I meant at all. When I uncover a presupposition, I said I seek to validate it. I do not mean to "prove" it, but to uncover the further presuppositions which support it. Then I need to investigate those presuppositions, etc.. In this way we seek a first principle, one which is not grounded in any presuppositions. So (a) is a correct representation of what I am saying, we seek to disclose presuppositions. But the second part (b) is what you are not seeing in the same way as I. The second part as I see it, is to "create" a principle which is not based in any presuppositions, and this is the first principle.

And when you manage to get to an "absolute" presupposition, which by definition never becomes a proposition in the thinking in which it operates but is instead like an axiom, then it's useless to try to "prove" it, because usually it's not provable, or, because its function (axiom-like) is to be presupposed. — tim wood

This is where we really go our separate ways on this subject. The "absolute presupposition" you refer to, I assume, is what I called the first principle. The problem is that the way I understand it, it is not a presupposition at all. It is created then and there by the thinking mind which apprehends it, so it is not something presupposed. Once the thinking mind gets past all the presuppositions, it is free to create whatever principle it wants, and this is not a presupposition, nor can it be said to be based in presuppositions. It is new, original, first.

Further, you say that it is useless to try and prove this "absolute presupposition", which I say is not a presupposition at all, but a first principle. But I think that it is necessary to prove the first principle. This is because it is a principle created by the free thinking mind of a metaphysician, free from any presupposition, so the metaphysician must necessarily prove it, to distinguish it from some random thought. So the metaphysician must prove the first principle to others, and the proof will be very simple and acceptable because it will be produced from empirical evidence rather than presuppositions. Then it may be accepted as an axiom, a self-evident truth, a simple principle which is immediately accepted due to the evidence.

God for example, is an absolute presupposition of Christian faith. People who fail to understand this are forever worrying at the question of God's existence and any "proof" of that existence. That failure is held to be the flaw in Christianity. But Christians announce their creed as, "We believe...". Now what, as a "metaphysician," do you do with that presupposition? — tim wood

So to take your example of God, let's assume that a metaphysician came up with "God" the creator
as a first principle. This would mean that prior to the conception of God, a metaphysician went through all the existing presuppositions to get to the bottom. Suppose there were numerous gods, one god for this, another god for that, etc., and these were the existing presuppositions. The metaphysician goes through, and dismisses these presuppositions, and creates a new first principle, God, the creator of everything, which is a completely new principle, not based in any existing presuppositions. Then the metaphysician needs to prove this principle in order that it be accepted by others. so a simple proof is offered such as, we see that there are existing things, and we see that there is a cause of existence of things, and this cause is God, or something like that, so that people accept God as the creator of existence. Remember, the argument at that time would not need to be complicated because the people were already predisposed, by the existing presuppositions concerning gods, to accept that gods are responsible for the existence of things.

The understanding that I have of Metaphysics is that it is the historical science of determining the presuppositions held by different groups at different times, and nothing further. — tim wood

This is not metaphysics at all. What you have described is the history of philosophy. What would make you think that this "historical science" is metaphysics?

That might be your subject. And the only way you understand any subject. — apokrisis

Hey, you brought it up, not I. It is your subject, look:

So the mathematical debate seems to hinge on whether "the real" is discrete or continuous. — apokrisis

Remember that post? It's not my fault that when I try to engage you on this subject, you simply tried to change the subject. You brought it up, and made many very bold sounding assertions, but instead of backing up these assertions, you changed the subject, and claim that it's my subject.

What's so difficult? Being reciprocal is why the discrete and the continuous would map naturally to a hierarchical story of the smallest vs the largest. That is the nature of the relation being describe. The bigger one gets, the smaller the other gets. — apokrisis

But when things are related, and one is designated as the largest, and another is designated as the smallest, it is not the case that the largest contains the smallest. They are considered, and compared as separate entities, or else this relation could not be established. So if you begin by comparing the continuous to the discrete, asking which one is real, as you did, then you switch to saying that one contains the other, then you have changed the subject. You do not mean the same thing by "continuous" and "discrete" that you meant in the first place. Do you recognize that this is equivocation?

I thought it meant the space within which every possible number exists in bounded fashion. — apokrisis

This is nonsense, you cannot conceive of a number existing in space. This would require either a very odd definition of number, or a very odd definition of space, or both. The nearest thing would be to draw a number line, but that would be a representation, just like a numeral is a representation. You might conceive of a number line in the way you describe, but there is no "space" in this conception because it doesn't have the required dimensionality to qualify as "space". If you remove all requirements for dimensionality in a concept of "space", without replacing those requirements with other requirements, then "space" could refer to absolutely anything. And so, what you have said here is nonsense.

It is a limit on any continuity - the least amount of continuity imaginable. Just as continuity is whatever is the least unbroken state of affairs that you can imagine. — apokrisis

Wait a minute. You said that the continuous is like the container, it constrains, or restricts, limits the discrete. Now you are saying that the discrete limits the continuous. So now the discrete is the container, and the continuous is the contents. It appears like in reality you really have no way to differentiate the contents from the container. They both coexist and there is no way of saying that one is the contents and the other the container because each, the continuous and the discrete, seem to have features of container as well as features of contents.

This is exactly the point I was criticizing you on, which I was hoping that you could demonstrate a way of avoiding. I was saying that it appears like your metaphysics claims that the two, the discrete and the continuous, are inherently combined such that there is no possible way to separate them, and all of reality is just an indiscernible mixture of discrete and continuous, or container and contents.

Can you conceive of a way in which the discrete and continuous, as in the analogy of the container and the contents, can be differentiated from each other? If not, then there really is no container/content, or discrete/continuous, and all this talk is meaningless at best, or even deceptive or misleading.

As I say, your non-process view of metaphysics keeps crashing into paradoxes because it believes in ontological absolutes rather than a logic of relations. You keep demanding to be shown something fixed and concrete that answers to your mechanistic conviction that reality has to begin in counterfactual definiteness, rather than definiteness being a relative outcome. — apokrisis

A logic of relations requires that there are things which are being related. If there is nothing which is being related, then any described relations are meaningless. "Smaller than" has no real meaning without something to refer to; "smaller than X" . Described relations cannot on their own produce, or lead to definiteness, as an outcome, because it is necessary that there is something substantial, definite, to begin with in order to produce definiteness at the conclusion. That's simply the way logic works, the conclusion cannot contain more "definiteness" than the premises.