If we’re serious about destroying all oppression we could all just kill ourselves. But in the meantime I say Hamas first - the aggressor and oppressor.

Hamas is like an amoeba, it can’t be destroyed, or removed. This is the legacy of the Israeli oppression of Palestinians.

That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:

People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here.

indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?

Again it’s about risks, probability.

Putin may attack NATO out of a more hawkish calculus though to the extent NATO countries show lack of resolve (due to economic dependency) and/or fear for escalation (for lack of readiness and will to fight for allies).

Yes, he might have a trick or two up his sleeve.

First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”

This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors?

Secondly, I argued that the conflict in Ukraine and in Palestine are straining Western public opinion and nurturing conflict of interests among allies, to the point that for example a US candidate for the next presidential elections like Trump dared to say “he would encourage Russia to attack Nato allies” if they do not comply with Trump’s demands.
Besides, I do not think EU governments and advisors are downplaying the gravity of such claims, or the US questionable commitment toward the Ukrainian conflict.
https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nuclear-warfare-detterence-manfred-weber-vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-war/
Poland's foreign minister on concerns the U.S. will abandon Ukraine, Europe 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHxjutEfhww)
If you do not see that, again do not bother answering me.

I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning.

If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?

That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU.

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.

When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East?

Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps?
As I’ve already said the only critical resource these players have to play with is oil. But the leverage this can exert is waning and I don’t see how this can be in anyway pivotal atm. Putin could play around with this perhaps, I don’t know.

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S.

It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too.

So this weakening you talk about, I agree has happened, but is well and truly now in the past(the wild card of a Second term for Trump excepted), Whereas you are suggesting it’s in the future and that it will deepen. I see a sea change, one in which Europe pulls together and strengthens along with a closer alignment with U.S. and a significant weakening and failure in Russia.
(Again there’s that word hegemonic, it would be useful to distinguish between hegemonic powers who are superpowers and those who are not.)

You seem to be grounding your arguments mostly on possibilities, but that’s not enough to assess likelihood. Sure it could be just a malaise that the West will manage to overcome, but it is too soon to see in Western re-arming a new stable trend that will succeed in building collective strategic deterrence, despite all persisting conflict of interests. While the decline of the US deterrence and leadership has just kept notably growing since 9/11.

Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now.

Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/

Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle.

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population

There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. Yes there are people’s who hate other peoples in the region, or call for their eradication etc. But this is just heated rhetoric. Of the states in the region, some are wealthy and benefit from international commerce travel etc, these states want to hold onto their comfortable lifestyles. There are states with authoritarian leaders like Iran, Egypt and Syria who are struggling with poverty and keeping power and extravagant lifestyles for themselves and their friends. There are poor countries who just bump along the bottom. None of these countries want war, or hegemony.

(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Yes, China does seek to work with many countries like this around the world. This is a risk to the west, because of what it could, but might not lead to.

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. But has its own fears of Islamophobia and terrorist attacks in Russia.

Clearly mine is just a speculation. But a principled one because I take into account strategic logic of geopolitical players and historical circumstances to assess likelihood. And the conclusion is that we have reasons to worry about how things may evolve in Ukraine but also in the Middle East given the current predicament.

Agreed, with the added emphasis that Putin has hegemonic designs on neighbouring countries and is actively invading them.

Your argument seems mostly about downplaying the evidence I bring, insisting on the need for the US to have a strong EU to counter Russia and China, insisting on the fact of European re-arming, and on the incumbent crisis in the Middle East due to climate change.

Close, I’m insisting on the importance of U.S. EU coalition and cooperation to counter China (this requires the neutering of Russia) and observing a change in EU to re-arm, which will deliver it.

I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling.

What I counter is:
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.

As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of important geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it)

2. Insisting that the US needs something doesn’t imply it will get it. Besides the pivot to China, may lead the US to appease Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe to turn Russia against China (which is the raising power, geographically closer to Russia than the US), as argued by various political analysts including Mearsheimer. Indeed, Trump's approach to Russia can be in line with such view (https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/24/donald-trump-s-plan-to-play-russia-against-china-is-fool-s-errand-pub-70067). Russia’s appeasement in Europe on the other side may be costly for EU/NATO/Ukraine, and also turn more destabilising than the US may tolerate (if not to Trump’s administration, to post-Trump’s administrations) , soliciting a hegemonic competition in Europe.

You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office.
Yes that route of appeasement may become U.S. policy, although I would say where it may have seemed rational before the invasion of Ukraine, now following the invasion, it’s is entirely irrational. It
essentially takes the deep trust and cooperation between U.S. and Europe, squanders it and then pretends to have trust in Putin’s regime. Only Trump would be so stupid. Putin would take them for whatever he could get, while winking to Xi Jingping.
Besides notions of turning Russia against China faded a long time ago and prior to the Ukraine war, the U.S. and EU had tried on many occasions to cosy up with Putin and it got nowhere, in fact it had the opposite effect. Now we have BRICS.

3. European re-arming is a recent phenomenon so it doesn't help much to assess the future and effectiveness of the collective European defence strategy (considering various strategic factors like defence industry, conscription, nuclear, etc.) given its controversial costs

I only need to refer to one event which in a moment changed the course of EU foreign policy. On the day of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the EU with nuclear attack, while invading a large country on its border. Putin’s legacy.

for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric

This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.

(and often pro-Russian)

Lol.

4. Climate change is definitely an incumbent challenge that concerns the entire world, and Middle East governments are aware of its risks and urgency, especially due to how exposed they are. That doesn’t mean they are doomed to succumb to a climate crisis or to geopolitical irrelevance, given how pro-actively and effectively they are already acting wrt climate change and evolving geopolitical challenges.

Climate change will result in oil becoming a stranded asset. Also these countries may become dependent on food imports, when the desert cooks.
Interestingly just last week Dubai experienced 18 months worth of rain in one day.

I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.

It’s relevant if that anger goes beyond the point of rationality. But you take us back to the Chechen war, things have moved on since then. Putin’s megalomania has grown top heavy. The myth that the nuclear deterrent still works has been eroded. Putin may not invade a NATO country by conventional means( as you say yourself). I wouldn’t be at all surprised if Putin had attacked Ukraine if accession to NATO were in the pipeline.

So my counterfactual is not arbitrary.

Quite, however that alliance may have been on Putin’s mind from that time. Putin was around then, just not in power.

On the other side if we are talking about starting from the current conflict, it would be certainly problematic for political and strategic reasons wrt NATO and wrt Putin, still I think Putin would have big problems to start a war against NATO if the non occupied part of Ukraine was successfully fast tracked into NATO (like Finland), as Putin is even having problems to end the conflict in South and East Ukraine.

Yes, Putin is now in a weak position. Going back to where this line of thought started. That there are differences in foreign policy between U.S. and EU, such that U.S. would seek to keep EU down, or weak. Again I’m just not seeing it. The alliance between them is strong and in lockstep. The status of Ukraine, or the expansion of EU and NATO to the east is not a controversial issue between them.

I’m not sure the US will preserve its superpower status so defined in the next decades if certain strategic alliances are necessary for the US to keep its superpower status:

I repeat, I wasn’t talking about U.S. keeping, or not, it’s superpower status. That status is strong. The alliance with the EU is to counterbalance future threats from China

technological gap is already decreasing, military projection is already grown unsustainable, monetary dominance is challenged or worked around, and reputational costs are mostly against the US. So the US power projection as world power can be severely damaged in the longer run.

Yes and this is the threat to U.S. China is winning the economic war and U.S. needs friends, another powerblock in an alliance to shore this up.

Second, if the US needs a strong EU as an ally to sustain its power projection wrt rival alliances, I don’t think it will evidently succeed either because a strong EU will never materialise, and if it will materialise it still will at best balance not overwhelm rival alliances, even more so, if the contribution of Middle-Eastern regional powers can weigh in.

And the alternative? (I don’t need to repeat my comments about the EU in this regard.)
The Middle Eastern regional powers are small fry, Turkey is not far off a failed state and the Arab states just want to hold on to their decadent lifestyles.

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, Europe will turn into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

This is the flawed argument I was referring to.
I think the best you’ve got here is some sort of general malaise and internal collapse in the EU, or U.S. The EU is now rearming and stronger as an alliance due to the example of the U.K. (having left the EU). Also as I say if Ukraine joins, it will provide a considerable boost in numerous ways. The U.S. is in a more precarious position, (I see Trump more and more as a busted flush now) but is still strong militarily and can print money to pull itself out of the malaise.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Weak argument, unless we are talking of a world slipping into distopia. Climate change might deliver this though.

Concerning the Middle East, I find at least the leaderships of regional powers like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough aware of their geopolitical role and strength, despite rivalries and vulnerabilities. They are open to balance the US hegemony in cooperation with Russia and China. They try to develop their sphere of influence even beyond the Middle East in Asia and Africa.

I wouldn’t tell that to anyone in Saudi atm. Again more of a liability than an advantage, I would say.

And even though they will exploit their oil as a main source of revenues, they are already planning for a post-oil transition (https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/lists/the-middle-easts-sustainable-100/, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-gulf-region-is-planning-for-a-life-after-oil/a-67067995, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-021-01424-x).

Yes, however there might be severe climate issues there in a few decades. Saudi has some dubious practices including building ski slopes in the desert and depleting water tables, something they’re doing to U.S. water tables too. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/16/fondomonte-arizona-drought-saudi-farm-water/

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Sounds more like a liability for China, Russia etc.. Also it would mean them getting into bed with these Islamists you talk about.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

The only way I see what happens in the Middle East playing anything approaching a decisive role is if it distracts the coalition of support for Ukraine enabling Putin to make more ground.

There is some logic into the 2 hypothetical scenarios you have described but given the current circumstances I’m less certain about their likelihood. And the end of the Ukrainian war may look more messy than an uncontroversial victory or loss.

Yes, of course, I was talking of the more easily defined outcomes. I would think that if it were not that clear cut, the perception of success, or failure of Putin as a leader would determine how the world see’s it. I could well see an iron curtain following close to the current front line, but I would see this as a win for the West and a failure for Putin. So my points would still hold.

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.

Are you sure about that?

Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front.

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.

I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset.

It seems a good location for Mad Max style movies

Now you’re getting the picture.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.)

All right, so it’s not that you do not see. You do not see anything new. Even though foreign policies can be inherently controversial, especially if motivated by aggressive hegemonic ambitions, maybe the Gulf War was the least controversial among them.

There have been tensions between the US and the EU about economics.
Now we are talking divergence about security needs, military alliance, wars, genocides on top of the economic tensions. That’s the reason of concern especially if power balance wrt aggressive competitors is at stake as you too pointed out.

Controversial enough to threaten the alliance, to threaten U.S. support for and trust in a powerful EU.

If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh

I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can argue that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did

How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back?

I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.

You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo.

Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance

I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering)

Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites.

So I wouldn’t discount this factor when talking about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Yes, I know, but I’m talking about changes, or pivot here, between superpowers. As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China.

We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other.

What’s new. This has been going on for decades with every conflict the U.S. has been involved in.

That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to.

So am I, the Israeli conflict won’t have big geopolitical consequences.
The Ukraine conflict will have big geopolitical consequences, but the direction of policy here hasn’t changed for decades. It’s the fallout from the Cold War and the U.S. and E.U. are pretty much in lockstep.

So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?

Not U.S. superpower status, rather the strength of the anti China alliance.

What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis with Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.

The partnership between the U.S. and the EU will have tensions, so what? If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now. Is that what the U.S. wanted?

if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?

At no point have I said anything about the U.S. superpower status. Its position as a global superpower is secure and isn’t going to change.
I’m saying if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will greatly weaken and threaten the EU (as opposed to EU status if Russia loses the war). This will leave the U.S. vulnerable on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Perhaps bullet points will help.
If Russia wins;
1, Russia strengthens, becomes a threat to EU on her borders.
2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.
3, Russia becomes strong re-establishes the Russian empire forms a strong alliance with China.
4, U.S. is vulnerable on two fronts from China and from Russia via threat to EU. While China and Russia are in strong alliance.
5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.

If Russia loses;
6, Russia is greatly weakened, may even collapse.
7, Putin is seen as a failure, pariah
8, Ukraine becomes part of EU, NATO.
9, EU becomes strong with no threat on her border.
10, EU forms strong alliance with U.S.

In both cases a strong alliance is formed between two large powers. In the first case between China and Russia in the second case between U.S. and EU.

Now going back to the Israel Palestine conflict.
There is no global shift in power, with either outcome in the conflict. Israel either becomes an isolated country bristling with weapons. Or Israel collapses and becomes another failed state in the Middle East. Either way it makes no difference to the geopolitical balance in the world.
Let’s say Israel goes to war with Iran. Again two more failed states with no change in the global power dynamic. There are other things that can happen in the region which could have geopolitical consequences, like oil, or conflicts between larger regional players. But they are not influenced that much by what happens in Israel Palestine.

I see the issues you raise and they will have to be grappled with by the parties to the coalition. Provided the U.S. doesn’t veer off in another direction, Trumpism, for example. I don’t see any major problems going forward.

American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really?

Yes, but I don’t see any controversial policies on the horizon. I say this because the foreign policies of the U.S. which have led to the majority of conflicts they have engaged in over the last period, since WW2, have now faded. Namely the struggle against the commies. Although I wouldn’t be surprised if an equivalent paranoia regarding China were to develop. Although I would expect this to be trade wars rather than land wars.
I’m in agreement with SSU that the so called Islamist threat, is rather over blown.

So, yes, the fact of the European rearming sounds good wrt the Russian threat, but this brings other political and economic concerns too, some of which are about the US leadership

I would think that this depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war and whether Russia can retain some sort of superpower status. Hence my description as pivotal.

On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe un exploitable to its hegemonic competitors too

Yes, this is a factor, I’m not up to speed on how this played into the Ukraine crisis since the collapse of the USSR. But I acknowledge it, although I don’t see any reason why the U.S. and EU interest would diverge much on this issue. I reiterate though that the U.S. seeking to weaken or exploit the EU, or NATO for some political reason does seem nonsensical here.

I limit myself to point out that Europeans can’t give for granted the U.S. partnership, if that means equal partnership, especially in matter of security, as history has shown, starting with NATO (“created to ‘keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’”) and all other examples of unilateralism in Middle East or toward Russia

Europe wouldn’t achieve equal partnership in terms of arms for a long time. It would take many decades to come anywhere near. The geopolitical shift here is towards the east. When it comes to China the U.S. needs a powerful Europe on its side. If they cut Europe loose and Europe becomes bogged down in wars with Russia, or collapses. It would leave the U.S. exposed on two fronts. The pacific front and the Atlantic front. With her being pulled into conflicts in Europe and in the pacific at the same time. The U.S. needs a strong Europe just as Europe needs a strong U.S..As I say, the post WW2 settlement is in the past now thanks to Putin.

This unilateralism for the U.S. has been undermined by the economic cue of China through globalisation. The U.S. economy is weak, the overstretch involved in policing the world is becoming to expensive.

Concerning NATO, the US is currently struggling between a historical intent “on preserving a 70-year-old framework that lets Washington call the shots and put its interests first” (https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nato-problem-defense-procurement-training-research/) at the expense of American tax-payers, represented by Biden, and Trump’s America first approach (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/) which arguably aims at preserving NATO but more at the expense of European tax-payers (while threatening to withdraw from NATO otherwise).

This supports my point, the U.S. needs to help the EU to become strong and strengthen NATO.

There is however a strategic issue here one may overlook: the problem is not just how much the Europeans spend for their defence and NATO, but how much they buy from the US defence industry at the expense of the European defence industry.

Yes this is something to guard against, but not for reasons of competition with the U.S. but for the economic benefit of the EU manufacturing her own arms.

I’ve also given my take on your take: “you didn’t clarify in a principled way what your very high bar is, nor offered evidence that ‘the deliberate starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens’ is a direct consequence of Israel’s decision”.

I’m deferring to the ICJ on this. However, I’ll eat my hat if the starvation of a captive population by restricting food and water turns out not to be genocide.

Sure. But maybe you didn't get the sarcastic intent of my comment.

I did find it amusing.

First, I doubt that it’s the more likely than a frozen conflict scenario where victory and loss remain uncertain, controversial and exploitable at the expense of Russia and/or EU.

I was talking about the stakes, big stakes. Yes the war could grind on, could result in some sort of negotiated settlement. I did point out earlier and in the Ukraine thread a while back that the big shift here, the ground breaking change initiated by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Is that Europe will now re-arm, the post WW2 settlement in which the U.S., the U.K. and to a lesser extent France would provide the security for Europe under the umbrella of NATO, has ended. Now the EU will re-arm and likely create a European army. What happens in Ukraine won’t change this and this will be Putin’s legacy.

Second, the US likely doesn’t want Russia to win (too much), but maybe not to lose (too much) either, because China could profit from Russia's weakness to increase even more its hegemonic influence in Central Asia, at the expense of the US.

Yes, I agree that a long drawn out war is fine for the U.S.
But I really don’t see this talk about the U.S. wanting to keep the EU weak. Or that she would not see the benefit of an alliance with a strong EU?

The isolationist trend in the US politics which Trump likely aims at representing doesn’t seem to worry much about the fate of the EU and NATO, even less motivated to push European hegemony. In this predicament, Europe can very much turn into an arena for hegemonic conflict. Better to not confuse expectations with wishes about the outcome of this hegemonic race. Meanwhile, France shows some intent or velleity to replace the US in safeguarding/leading the EU, we will see.

Trump is an idiot and a populist, so he will certainly destabilise the situation in his personal interest. But if you look at what he said about NATO, it was just him playing hardball to get EU countries to stump up their fair share to NATO funds. This is not an issue now, as these countries will be making these investments, care of Putin. Also he says he will end the Ukraine war in one day. I doubt he will succeed short of somehow handing Ukraine to Putin on a plate, something which isn’t in his gift. If he just withdraws U.S. support to Ukraine, he will be giving Putin a green light to move on Kiev. This will result in the outcome I was talking about where Putin will bring the war to Europe now, or in the future.

Anyway I don’t see Trump getting his hands back on power, he is currently drowning in a sea of litigation and sleaze, not to mention his signs of dementia.

even less motivated to push European hegemony.

Better to not confuse expectations with wishes about the outcome of this hegemonic race.

You are introducing the idea of a race to world domination, or something, we’re not playing a game of Risk here. Why would U.S. “push European hegemony”, more like U.S. would work with EU as a partner and friend.

So bombing and killing more than 30K Palestinians is not a genocide according to your very high bar, but the starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens is, right?

You seem to be shouting here, I’ve given my take on this.

Palestinians should surrender before they lose whatever they have left. What a shame it didn’t happen years ago. So many lives could have been saved.

Presumably you mean Hamas should surrender?

The West can "forget the issue", but the geopolitical shift with Arab nations aligning to BRICS and taking a bigger role cannot simply be ignored. Or rather one may ignore it at their own peril.

This equates to selling your soul to the Chinese, it may be a prickly relationship.

I get that the conflict in Ukraine is of primary importance for the EU and Russia, but if you are focusing on the swing of power between China and the US, I’m not sure that the difference between likely outcomes either in the Ukrainian conflict or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would make a difference for China and the US. As you say “the struggle between the two is primarily elsewhere”. Besides the conflict in Ukraine still looks far from being settled in a way that is amenable to most certainly boost China's or the US's hegemony.

Well the difference in outcomes is enormous for the EU and Russia. It is important for the balance of power between the U.S. and China because if Russia wins, it will bolster Russia’s position on the world stage and become a serious threat to European security. This would weaken the EU and probably lead to another European war in a decade or so. Where as if Russia loses in Ukraine, it will likely result in Russian collapse, splintering of her client states etc, strengthen and clearly define the EU to include Ukraine. This will likely put the EU on course for superpower status and a strong ally of the U.S. The U.S. and EU working together in coalition through NATO would be a formidable foe for China.

with cascading dividends for world hegemonic powers (the US, China or Russia) because the US then would be facilitated in pulling out from the middle east and re-invest its military capital/troops elsewhere to contain China. Yet, as I anticipated, it’s not easy to pull out from the middle-east:

Yes if the U.S. were to pull out from the Middle East it would change things, but as you say it’s not likely any time soon.

I already answered that question. Russia and the US are the first ones to come to mind. Both may have strong incentives to play divide et impera strategies in Europe to preserve their supremacy.

Nonsense, the U.S. is most powerful working alongside a powerful successful EU. If the U.S. were to go down this line you suggest, it would lead to the break up of the EU, the advance of Russia, and a generation of wars in Europe, which would try to draw the U.S. in many times and which would guarantee China’s hegemony with Russia as her side kick. Regarding Russia, she has been trying to meddle in Europe for a long time, nothing has changed in that.

The prospects vary among superpowers. But only in the EU the situation looks so worrisome in all domains at the same time, at least now.

Yes, the EU is fragile as a fledgling Union, however I don’t see it failing any time soon. The mutual benefit to the member states is to strong a motivation to avoid collapse.

What act are you talking about? The massacre of October 7 is the act carried out by Hamas. This act can be accused of being genocidal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_in_the_2023_Hamas-led_attack_on_Israel . Is such act genocidal or not, to you? If not, what DEMONSTRATES that it is not, to you?

Yes the supporters of Israel and the Jewish lobby etc will naturally claim October 7th as genocide. But if we set the bar so low it will bring thousands of small conflicts around the world into the definition. My bar is very high and I have heard numerous legal specialists on the media casting doubt on what is a genocide in this situation. As I say, for me it is the deliberate starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens, happening as we speak.

You have introduced the distinction between “pivotal” and “distraction”, without clarifying its implications, at least to me.

The implications are that in the case of the Ukraine conflict the difference between the two outcomes, 1, that Russia wins and incorporates Ukraine into Russia and 2, that Russia fails to win Ukraine and Ukraine becomes incorporated into the EU. Would have far reaching and profound implications for the geopolitics between Europe and Asia (and by implication between the West and the East) for a generation or more.
By contrast, the difference between likely outcomes in the Isreal Gaza conflict will not make much difference to geopolitics either way. I don’t see any significant wider geopolitical ramifications. (Please provide some, if I’m wrong). Any linking of these alternative scenarios to a swing of power towards China, or away from the U.S. is weak as the struggle between the two is primarily elsewhere. Russia and the U.S. have been playing proxy wars in the region since WW2. This is just another of those.

The first (Ukraine)is pivotal geopolitically, the second (Israel) is little more than a distraction for any big players in the geopolitics. I can’t see how more simply I can put this distinction than this, one is geopolitically significant, the other isn’t.

why the US looks concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict way more than about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The difference is that the U.S. has an interest in one and not the other.

For example the Middle East is pivotal to Israel and the Jews as much as Ukraine is pivotal to the Europeans, right?

The difference being Europe is an important world power, with geopolitical heft. Israel is a small Western outpost in an area in which there are no big geopolitical players(including Israel).

To the extant the pro-Israel community in the US (Jews and Evangelicals) is influential to the US foreign policy (and arguably it is), then the US can’t simply pull out from the Middle East just because Middle East is a distraction wrt the competition with China in the Pacific. To use your own words, since Israel is pivotal for pro-Israel Americans then, by extension it is pivotal for the U.S., right? If so, what was the point of invoking the distinction between “pivotal” and “distraction” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, again?

I meant a distraction in a general sense. In that it is a region in which the big geopolitical players throw something from time to time, have a proxy war, or play some games with oil, or something. Which may distract the voices flying across the world for a while from other concerns. But things settle down again after a while and the big players settle back to their established positions.
I agree that Israel is a unique case of U.S. involvement, which can draw the U.S. into proxy wars. But this has been going on for a good while now in one Middle Eastern country, or another, no change there.
Again Russia and her proxy’s and the U.S. and her allies in the region are having a spat, just like they have been for god knows how long. China will see it for what it is, a skirmish in an intractable situation in an unimportant region.

You sound more convinced than convincing. I understand that circumstances are motivating Europeans to think more strategically and re-arm. However geopolitical analyses sound more uncertain about the outcome of this wake up call.

Yes there are complexities to the situation, I’m simply describing the major shift, a profound development in European security planning. The majority of the member states of the EU are successful wealthy countries. Yes there is some economic turmoil around the world currently as a result of the pandemic and the Ukraine war. But they are quite capable of spending a percent or two of their budgets on this.

what are the “wide ranging resources including the longer term opportunities for growth” you are referring to?

Industrial, technological, innovative resources from a coalition of advanced Western nations. As I have pointed out, Europe has the opportunity to develop solar energy in its southern states to fuel the northern states, also wind farms in the North Sea. The economic activity of developing the accession states in Eastern Europe to similar levels of advancement is a big economic opportunity. Ukraine has great agricultural resources, which will be valuable with climate change.

Germany depending on Russia for oil and on China for export

Germany is making a rapid move away from Russian energy supplies, it will take a while to make the adjustments. Their trade with China is mutually beneficial. If China ceased trading with Western powers such as Germany, it would provide an economic boost and opportunity for whomever replaces the supply, markets would adjust. As I say, China undercutting Western countries with their manufacturing is the main drag on economic activity and growth in those countries. Not to mention China’s economy being dependent on such trade.

They can try to exploit European vulnerabilities AGAINST Europeans at convenience.

Who will be doing this?

So even if there is a potential for growth, there is also a potential for decadence. Indeed concerns about EU’s decline are persistent and widespread in all domains: population, economy, politics, technology. Here some related readings:

Quite, issues faced by many countries around the world at this time.

I know, I can’t see the EU failing to provide enough support.
— Punshhh

Most certainly not enough to support a Ukrainian offensive, right?

Imagine the response from European countries should Russia start to make substantial ground and look likely to occupy Kiev.

So you can scan “intents” directly from people’s heads now? If you dismiss evidences of Hamas’ massacre and declared intents against Israel, others can dismiss your capacity of scanning intents from people’s heads or even retort it against you: one can scan in Nethanyahu’s head he has no intent to commit a genocide and calling Hamas animals is just hot air.

I have said more than once that it is only for the specialist investigators who will testify to the ICJ to determine what is in the heads of these terrorist groups. Maybe I should get back to you in 10 years when they have concluded their work. In the meantime all we have is personal opinion, or judgement.

What’s the argument? Dude, I didn’t join this forum to make a survey about people’s opinions or to socialize. I welcome actual arguments if you have any. If you don’t, we’re wasting time here.

Ahh, Neomac’s requirement for in depth arguments again. I’ve given my argument. Let me give it again.

I think it is important to bear in mind that genocide is not the intent in itself, but intent and the carrying out of the act intended. So even if it can be demonstrated that Hamas had the intent, I don’t see it being demonstrated that the act, (according to the Israeli’s), intended was carried out.

In other words, it doesn’t matter what intent there is, it only becomes genocide when that intent, sufficient to meet the bar of genocide, is acted out on the ground. Hamas was not capable of acting out a genocidal act, all they were capable of was an incursion across the wall, to massacre anyone they found and return home for their evening meal. Doesn’t look like genocide to me.

There is within environmentalism a kind of despair which often afflicts one. Rather like the lightbulb moment when one first realises the full magnitude of the climate crisis. It is written about in the book, The confessions of a recovering environmentalist. However once one has passed the next stage after that of acceptance that it’s going to happen and one might as well enjoy life in the meantime. Rather than put it on hold, that an equilibrium can be reached.

Here is the problem, if the quantitative element is totally irrelevant than that definition sounds good also to claim that Hamas’ massacre on October the 7th was a genocide. And any accusation of proportionality as intended by many pro-Palestinians here (1 zillion of Palestinian children casualties vs one Israeli soldier casualty) would be equally irrelevant to defend Hamas’ crimes from the accusation of committing a genocide.

Yes, it could be argued that Hamas committed genocide on October 7th. But for me it doesn’t qualify, on two counts;
Firstly, the intent, I don’t see those Hamas insurgents having in their heads an intent to harm the racial group of Israel. But rather to commit a violent raid in a small area outside the wall. I know there are calls from people in important positions in the Hamas hierarchy who have called for the eradication of Israel etc. But this is sounding off, hot air. Arabic people often engage in this kind of rhetoric.

Secondly, the act of genocide, The Hamas attack was not capable of hurting the racial group of Israel. Yes, it did hurt the people in and connected to the incursion. Who have been very vocal and it has caused a lot of turmoil within Israel. But there was no way in which the racial, or ethnic group of Israel, or the Jews was under threat, or being harmed. In a genocidal sense.

I think it is important to bear in mind that genocide is not the intent in itself, but intent and the carrying out of the act intended. So even if it can be demonstrated that Hamas had the intent, I don’t see it being demonstrated that the act intended was carried out.

Don't take it personal, but I do get a bit fed up with being told my language and/or attitude is the problem. The solution we are going for at the moment is 'most people die', along with a mass extinction.

They don’t mean you. They mean the people who inform the ordinary voter.

I don’t know what you take to be “pivotal” in geopolitics.

Like a fulcrum, an arena in which large hegemonic goals, or failure depend on a relatively small arena. Whereas a distraction is an arena where hegemonic powers can become preoccupied meaning they lose focus elsewhere. Ukraine is pivotal for both Russia and Europe and by extension for the U.S. and to a lesser extent China.

I see the pulling out of Afghanistan as part of Trump’s demented behaviour, it was Trump who set that ball rolling and Biden couldn’t easily reverse the decision. And Trump by the way who pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal.

As far as I’m concerned, a narrow-minded distinction between “pivotal” and “distraction” can mislead us into discounting or underestimating the role played by circumstances in guiding or misguiding geopolitical efforts.

Again, I don’t see what is happening in the Middle East as pivotal, even though it can generate an awful lot of hot air.

Still the Chinese military build-up, posturing and meddling in other conflicts is understandably taken to signal the US should prepare for the worse anyways. And we should not forget that there are also preventive wars.
Anyways, maybe the US under Trump would not be interested in a conflict with China either:

Yes, more demented behaviour from Trump. There are by the way signs coming out of the U.S. that Trump is suffering from dementia and so won’t make it to the election in a fit state. Everyone around the world is building up their military atm. The issue of Taiwan is tied up more in diplomatic relations and commerce between China and the U.S. than in terms of military showdown, as I see it. I will cover this in my last paragraph.

You sound pretty confident, I don’t know what evidences you have to support your claims. For example 10 years seem enough time for Russia to restore its pre-war capacity for another push

This presumably would be funded from Putin’s war chest. The money saved up from a few decades of selling oil and gas to Europe, including to Ukraine. All income streams which have stopped suddenly. Russia has been able to sell some oil to China and client states, but I doubt it would make up the shortfall. What other income would Russia have? She is under the most severe sanctions and the ruble is worthless. But I don’t have the figures, so I accept that it may be possible that Russia can rearm for another go in ten years. In the meantime, which was my point, Europe will have rearmed and with the appropriate weaponry for such a fight.

Again, you sound pretty confident, I don’t know what evidences you have to support your claims

I’m not making specific claims just making broad observations. For Europe to rearm over the next ten years would be easily financed from the current level of economic activity. Provided there is sufficient incentive( which Russia provides).

financial crisis, pandemics, wars, and the crisis of the Western world order under the pressure of a more assertive Rest,

These issues (excepting the pandemic) did not affect the EU as much as the U.S., U.K. etc. apart from the effects of globalisation.
Also Europe in the longer term, which I was referring to when I said it would become a super power is inevitable. With a population over 500 million and wide ranging resources including the longer term opportunities for growth, why wouldn’t it?

To keep Russia bogged down in Ukraine, the West still needs to adequately and promptly support Ukraine as long as needed.

I know, I can’t see the EU failing to provide enough support. They will be aware of the pivotal nature of the war. I know U.S. funding is under question atm, other countries will provide funding from time to time. Japan for example provided I think $15 billion a few weeks ago.
There may be a calculation which Putin has made, that his war chest will outlast the efforts of the coalition supporting Ukraine. If this is the plan, then Russia will likely be a basket case by the time this stand off were to play out.

Economic growth is possible if input, output, shipping are secured, free, and sustainable from and to China. But we are seeing a resurgence of global security concerns, Western protectionism, national demographic decline that may compromise the Chinese economic growth.

Yes, in some respects China might be in a malaise of some sort. I expect that they were hit hard by the effects of the pandemic and that they will bounce back to an extent.

I want to highlight the extent to which the economic miracle of China over the last 30 years, has impoverished the West. Although it wasn’t just China, but the whole Asian region. People in the West didn’t realise what was happening at first and even now even those who have realised haven’t grasp the extent of it. Simply China has undercut our manufacturing base resulting in outsourcing to Asia on a mass scale, accompanied with mass closures and decline of the same manufacturers in our countries. Alongside this was outsourcing of call centres, admin. Meanwhile China invests the capital they’ve made from this all around the world and dumps commodities like steel in countries struggling to keep those industries afloat. Compounding the movement of wealth and prosperity away from Western countries.
One example is that my father in law makes use of for financial expediency. He mends electrical goods and repeatedly finds the parts available directly from China with free postage. Often at one tenth of the price of producers in our own country, who would charge for postage. Much of our IT equipment is made in China, or other Asian countries.
This is why countries in the West are struggling economically, with some in considerable decline. Increased protectionism and economic problems in China will actually alleviate this situation. Further more if China were to end up in a war with the U.S. the economic fallout would dwarf the economic effects of the pandemic and could collapse the global economy.

:up: :up: I've had cold sweats from intermitten suspicions – recognition(?) – that 'the singularity' has happened already (ca.1989) and It is/They are covertly – indecipherably – doing it's/their own thing via 'the dark web', etc. The Simulation Hypothesis (or The Matrix) might be a tell, no?

Yeah man!

You know those Hindu bodhisattvas with a thousand arms, a thousand cobras coming out of the top of their head, sitting in a thousand petal lotus. Go figure.

Been there done that, met the guy.

I think that Bibi will in the end achieve to get Israel into similar international position what Apartheid South Africa was.

Israel has more advanced hardware and technology at hand.

Yet it sounds implausible that a quantitative condition (e.g. for the death toll) and cumulative condition (among the listed acts) are strictly applied, since in this case even killing one person would amount to a genocide, if intent is proven. So I guess those conditions are present (to prove intent) but treated with greater discretion by the jury/judges. Yet maybe the Israelis can play around international laws by smartly exploiting legal ambiguities to their advantage. In this case this is a problem of international laws.

Yes, I was aware of these definitions. I have thought about the case of one person’s death at length. In the end, I concluded that it’s not the deaths that are pertinent, but rather the harm and intent to harm a national, ethnic, or racial group.
I agree international law needs tightening. However I think the parameters are sufficient currently for the judges to reach a finding.

I find it hard to believe they wouldn't make huge waves in society both politically and technologically. As for whether people believe they're truly good, I'm sure they'd be ridiculed as much as revered for their actions. Certainly controversial.

Whatever this being were to do to demonstrate their powers, or knowledge, they might just be an advanced being kidding us.
I would go further, that we are incapable of understanding, or knowing that they are omniscient, or omnibenevolent. The whole thing is way beyond our capacity to understand, to grasp.

Another way to look at it is that such a being might already be here, there might be loads of them. How would we know? You could say, well if they were here, wouldn’t they bring an end to suffering? Well maybe they know something we don’t ( they are omniscient after all).


Also, without wanting to put a dampener on proceedings. It was the catholics who invented these concepts for their apologia. They are in the end illogical in any philosophical sense.

rael has allowed 15,413 trucks into Gaza during the past 157 days of war. Oxfam says the population of Gaza needed five times more than that just to meet their minimum needs. In February, Israel allowed 2,874 trucks in – a 44% reduction from the month before.

Let's put for the denialists these numbers into perspective. Prior to the war there was 500 trucks entering Gaza with food and supplies which was already quite perilous[/i]. That would be in 157 days 78 500 trucks into Gaza. That's one fifth.

Most of those trucks are going to southern Gaza. In the north mass starvation is already well under way.

How would we know the being was omniscient and omnibenevolent?

You can keep calling it “genocide”, but you have no sentence from an authoritative tribunal that supports such an accusation. And legally speaking, it is really hard to prove the genocidal intent.

The genocide is the deliberate starvation of approximately 500,000 Palestinian citizens in the north of Gaza. The establishing of genocidal intent sufficient for the ICJ will be for specialist investigators to establish.

Maybe that depends on where and what you are looking for. As far as I’m concerned, the Middle East, Europe, the Pacific, Africa, South America are contended/contendable spheres of influence for 3 major hegemonic powers: Russia, China and the US. Controlling these areas means controlling their economic/security input and output and whatever transits through them.

Yes, to a degree, although I consider Russia a waning power, which is punching above it’s weight these days. The new president of Argentina recently pulled back from BRICS. Which may have something to do with trying to tie his currency to the dollar. I expect Mexico to form greater alliance with the U.S.
However China has been making economic alliances with South America for a while. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri
So there will be a tension there, I expect South America to pull in behind the U.S. though when climate change turmoil increases.

The Middle-East is important for commodities like oil and gas, and for international routes (commerce of goods, oil/gas supply, internet supply). Besides that region is source and exporter of Islamic Jihadism, that can spill over in other areas of interest (like Africa and Europe). That’s not all: as a hot area the middle east nurtures the international contest in military supply (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/11/fear-of-china-russia-and-iran-is-driving-weapons-sales-report) and as failed governance area criminal business thrives (https://www.arabnews.com/node/1944661). All that sounds particularly worrisome if WMDs are involved (https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/why-a-wmd-free-zone-in-the-middle-east-is-more-needed-than-ever/)
So there are several reasons why the Middle East can very much be subject to hegemonic interest and struggle, and wars in Middle East can get more news attention than the war in Ukraine (not only in the West).

Yes, I agree on these points, however the Middle East is like a cauldron around which the hegemonic powers stand and takes turn to stir from time to time. There are a number of risk factors in that region, such as crime, Jihadism, oil price, WMD, money laundering. But there is also the risk of more and more failed states and the hegemonic powers don’t want to get drawn in to much. So I don’t think it plays a pivotal role in geopolitics, more a distraction. Although I have long thought that it would be most advantageous for Russia to seek to control the area, but they have failed in the past and don’t seem to mesh culturally with the Arabs.

Russia and China as competitors of the US (the former primarily in East Europe, the latter primarily in the Pacific) are interested in getting the US overstretched: inducing the US to divide attention and energies in multiple conflicts like in Ukraine, in Israel, in the Red Sea perfectly serves that purpose.

Yes, however this would only play out if China enters into conflict with Taiwan. Which I doubt they would want to do.

The geopolitical link between what happens in Israel and the hegemonic conflict between super powers is candidly stated by involved parties:

Yes, like the way Netanyahu encouraged Hamas in order to give him the opportunity to ethnically cleanse Palestine. But China doesn’t operate like that. She spreads Maoist ideology and colonises in a less violent way.

Russia and China do not need to get more directly/openly involved in the conflict in the middle east: indeed, they may just want to maximise the military/economic/reputational costs for the US to their benefit while minimising the costs for them, and for that it could be enough to abstain from helping to fix the middle east crisis or contribute to keep it alive (e.g. by helping Iran and other forms of triangulations).

Yes, this goes back to my cauldron analogy.

As long as the West is eroding its power of deterrence against a more assertive Rest, the question remains: how can the West, the US, Israel deter without escalating? And that’s not all, when the tide of historical circumstances will favour the Rest, we should also expect that the Rest will come back at the West

Yes, an important question, however there is only one one military force anywhere near capable of taking on the U.S., China and as I have suggested, China is really not interested in a conflict with the U.S. under any circumstances.

Even if Russia is weakening, that’s maybe true also for the West. Europe in particular is weakening economically

The weakening of Russia is in a whole other dimension compared to Europe and China. Russia is destroying her fighting age men as cannon fodder, has destroyed her lucrative trade in gas and oil with Europe. Is now under the strictest economic sanctions and is sinking into a deep dark authoritarianism reminiscent of the dark days of the Soviet Union. By contrast Europe is feeling the effects of having those fuel supplies suddenly cut off, but will soon bounce back and as I said will now rearm after 70yrs of relying on U.S. and U.K. guarantees of security.

And the possibility of a European decline is ominously looming

Myths around the economic malaise, or decline in Europe are overblown. (Here in the U.K. this has been used as an argument for Brexit for internal political reasons). It’s true there has been a slow down in growth due to the economic pressures of globalisation along with all affluent countries. But the opportunities for economic growth in the E.U. are large with the expansion including Eastern European countries, not to mention Ukraine, offering the opportunity to bring their economies up to speed with western standards. Also once the economic woes of southern European countries is remedied the E.U. will become quite the superpower.

Even the hegemonic power of the US is strained by national challenges and the pressure from international competitors. Besides, if the US wants Russia to be bogged down in the war in Ukraine

You fail to see the significance of this. Currently Russia is dangerous for the whole Eurasia continent and particularly for Europe. Her becoming bogged down in Ukraine will weaken her for a generation while Europe rearms. This neuters the only serious threat to global stability at the moment. The last time this happened in WW2, a deranged tyrant spilled out across Europe. This time it won’t happen, Putin is now powerless and a pariah on the international stage.

Notice also that if China manages to establish a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, amongst the major oil suppliers (with the possibility of widening the strategic alliance of oil/gas exporters over Nigeria, Kuwait, Algeria, etc. maybe through the BRICS), this could be a non-negligible threat for the West

Yes, this is a looming threat. Although it is an enterprise which will be controlled solely by China and will result in all these other states becoming controlled in a malignant way by Chinese authoritarianism, (to sell their souls). China knows that she will win the economic war in the long run and will not be distracted by wars in the meantime.

A part from the fact that the Chinese economy has run into some serious troubles (https://time.com/6835935/china-debt-housing-bubble/, https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24091759/china-economic-growth-plan-xi-jinping-crisis), if you want a deeper risk analysis for hotter conflicts involving China you can find lots of interesting readings on the internet, like this one:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/04/china-war-military-taiwan-us-asia-xi-escalation-crisis/

Interesting and something to watch.

There is another dimension to this which I predict will become the primary driving force in geopolitics over the next generation. Climate change, as I said at the beginning of our conversation I see the world retreating into 3 fortresses, when climate change hits, the U.S., Europe and China with the rest of the world descending into failed states.

Interestingly an important resource for Europe in this outcome would be to have the Ukraine grain production within Europe. Something which I expect will become pivotal in preventing Russia becoming powerful again in a world ravaged by climate change.

You mean that since Israel is disproportionately stronger than Hamas and can erase Hamas from Gaza, then Israel must yield to Hamas’ demands? Or that since Israel is disproportionately stronger than Hamas and can erase Hamas from Gaza, then Hamas can’t help but fight Israel to death? Do these conditionals make sense to you?

I’m not proposing a solution. It’s a comment on the how the suffering of the Palestinian people can be alleviated and who of the two sides in this conflict can deliver this. The comment in bold below seems to be a claim that a Hamas surrender would deliver this. Are you sure about that?

Better in what sense? For whom?

The suffering of Palestinians.

If Hamas had surrendered prior to committing the 8/10 massacre, then this would have spared the Gazans the current brutal retaliation. Any time Hamas surrenders in exchange for a cease-fire, then this would spare Gazans further brutal retaliation. If Hamas doesn’t surrender but it returns the hostages in exchange for a cease-fire, then this would still spare Gazans further brutal retaliation. So if the purpose is to spare Gazans Israelis’ brutal retaliation or further brutal retaliation, then not committing the 8/10 massacre, surrendering, returning hostages would be (or have been) all available options to Hamas. Wouldn’t they?

What is happening now is something more than a brutal retaliation for 07/10. It is the deliberate starvation of a captive population. A genocide.

Anyway, my comments were in response to someone else. I don’t see the point in going over this again, our positions and understanding has been aired. I’m preparing a response to your reply to me about the geopolitical situation.

Well there is a crime being investigated at the ICJ.

The population became expendable when they voted in Hamas.

I doubt that was on the ballot paper.

So what? War is neither a beauty contest nor a fair play contest.

You keep saying this, asymmetrical war is a reality, I’m not saying that it’s a question of morality, fair play here. But rather an imbalance in agency. The only agency Hamas has had since October 8th is the option of releasing the hostages and surrendering themselves. Israel has wide ranging agency and propaganda machinery. Not to mention the thing I said about apartheid.

Also if Hamas had surrendered, the course of this situation might not have been much better than where we are now. Certainly if they had released the hostages, but not surrendered, it may well have been considerably worse than that.

So if Palestinians are doomed to suffer whatever price Netanyahu is willing to inflict on them (at least until Hamas keeps hostages and Netanyahu is in power), who is going to help them? If it is the Great Satan to do it, what would be the benefit for the Great Satan?

I was replying to someone else.
Anyway, it looks like the Great Satan has a conscience after all. He is going to provide humanitarian assistance.

No less than the Palestinian population is expendable in the pursuit of Hamas’ objectives, right?

Yes, however this is an asymmetrical situation. Israel is an occupying force with state of the art weaponry. Hamas is a small band of terrorists with basic weaponry. Also the idea that Hamas can spare the population by handing back the hostages and surrendering, or something. Works on the assumption that Israel doesn’t have an ulterior motive, or can be sufficiently trusted.

That would be a start. But until the hostages are released/accounted for, their being kept seems to me a carte blanche for the Israelis and their IDF.

This answers my question then. The population is expendable in the pursuit of Israel’s objectives.

As well, there are the issues of crimes committed on Israeli territory, the perpetrators subject to Israeli law.

You seem very one sided in these comments. What about the crimes committed by Israeli’s in the West Bank and Gaza? Or is it that carte blanche thing again?

It all seems too simple: release the hostages, surrender criminals, try to move on to peace. Who could object to that, and why?

It does all seem to simple.

Ambiguity. They should provide in Israel refugee camps? Or they should provide refugee camps for refugees that are themselves in Israel?

I don’t understand what you’re saying here.

But perhaps more significant is that you seem to feel that the Israelis should do something - and there may be lots of reasons why they "should." But the Arab neighbors appear to be completely unwilling to touch the Palestinians with even the proverbial ten-foot pole. Why do you think the Israelis "should" do something and not the Arab neighbors; and by the way, is there anything you think the Palestinians or more to the point Hamas should do?

There may be numerous reasons why Palestinians aren’t in refugee camps in other Arab countries. Firstly the Palestinians say they don’t want to leave Gaza because they won’t be able to return when the fighting stops. Secondly the Israeli’s won’t let them leave. Thirdly the other Arab countries might not want to see Israel push them out of the territory and annex the land as part of Israel. To be seen as complicit in ethic cleansing.

And I think you should make unequivocally clear your own view on the hostages. Do you agree with me that the hostages must be the first order of business? Or if not, then what?

I doubt that they are the first order of business for Netanyahu. For Hamas they may be a bargaining tool. Personally I would want the hostages to be returned unharmed along with the Palestinian people being left unharmed.

If you think the Israelis have a choice, what choice is it that you think that they have?

There is an easy solution here. Israel should provide refugee camps for Palestinian refugees in Israel.

But unfortunately, pure terrorist governments don’t want to fight like this because they’d lose. Raping, kidnapping, and beheading people as a policy of “resistance” will have consequences for the territory they do govern, as long as they hide within that population. It indeed sucks all around.

The Gaza issue is unique and so normal war comparisons don’t easily apply.
Gaza has been little more than a prison for many years, so a comparison would be like the inmates forming a government within the confines of their detention. You say that the terrorists hide within the population, like human shields, perhaps. This doesn’t apply because the territory is so densely populated that this can’t be avoided unless the terrorists walked out into a few areas of open land at the margins, where they would be mowed down with machine guns.

My question wasn’t aimed at you. It was a response to what someone else said.

It looks to me though, judging from the behaviour of the Israeli administration that the lives of the Population of Gaza are expendable.

So unless the hostages are returned, the whole population of Gaza is expendable?

And if they're murdered, then everything is off the table.

Simple question, how many Palestinian deaths is to many?

At what point do the IDF say we’ve gone to far and stop?

So even war on terror (i.e. against Islamic Jihadism) in the middle east was a political strategic move not just a compulsive reaction, as much as NATO expansion in Europe and inclusive economic globalization (especially addressing potential competitors like Russia and China). All of them were long-term strategies testing the US hegemonic capacity of shaping the world order through hard and soft power, even if it ultimately wasn’t planned and dosed well. Democratization (and economic growth) seemed the best way to go to normalise relations, preserve peace and quell historical grievances (as it happened for Germany and Japan) so the US, after the Cold War, in the unipolar phase, had the time window to think big and take greater risks.
Even terrorist attacks of Islamic jihadism, including the 9/11 attack, aren’t just isolated punitive operations against some past grievance, but steps toward more ambitious ideological goals

Al Qaeda was a U.S. client terrorist group created to aid the U.S. in its war on Communism. Who came back to bite its master. It was only loosely affiliated to any militant Islamist groups (I don’t want to get into this now, but rather focus on the broader geopolitical situation).

Again I don’t see the U.S. having any interests in the Middle East other than the supply of oil from the Arab states and protecting the Western outpost of Israel. They want to maintain the status quo in the area for these reasons. They were happy for Syria to be thrown to the wolves in the fight against Isis and now they are only maintaining a presence in those areas to prevent the rise of Isis in the region over the next period.
As such I don’t see the Middle East as an important arena of geopolitical, or hegemonic tension.
I don’t see any signs of wider conflagration, or broader hegemonic locking of horns, or WW3, resulting from this crisis. Neither the U.S. or China wanted this.

The primary geopolitical game being played currently is by Russia in Ukraine and as far as the West is concerned (geopolitically) that is going nicely in that it is keeping Russia occupied and gradually weakening her. This is also providing the incentive for Europe to re-arm and wean herself of Russian oil and gas. There is however the increased affiliation of Russia with China to consider. However I would expect this to result in a reluctance for war from this coalition once the Ukraine war has played out. This will most likely result in a new Iron curtain dividing Europe from Russia, as I predicted in the Ukraine war thread. Russia will pull back from China when they realise they would be required to sell their soul.

As I said before, why would China enter into a ground war, or dabble with proxy wars, when she is already winning the economic war?

“Property” as a legal term presupposes a legal system. Israel doesn’t acknowledge the Palestinian legal system. But it acknowledges to some extent the international legal system, so to that extent, Israel may be compelled to abide by what international law establishes for Palestinians

You can dress it up all you like, it doesn’t change the facts on the ground. The people living on that land were expelled by an occupying force. This is why they hold a grievance and it’s still happening in the West Bank. Indeed it has happened continuously since 1948.

the international status over Palestine was the one proposed by the UN resolution 1947 which the Palestinians rejected. So Israel forcefully imposed its rule with the main support of the US at the expense of the Arab/Palestinian aspirations in that region.

So now we see what happened, it’s not difficult, it’s not complicated.
And yes I know about the Jewish Nakba, that was an inevitable consequence.

I think you’re over egging the geopolitical perspective, but I find that interesting to. I’ll have a look.