I suppose if you don’t find that significant, there’s probably nothing that can be said. — Wayfarer
So - in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the distinction between humans and animals is not merely one of degree—it is an ontological distinction. Animals are sentient, but their consciousness is bound to immediate experience. Humans, by contrast, possess rational intellect, allowing for abstract thought, self-reflection, and moral reasoning. This places humans in a separate category, traditionally referred to as animal rationale (rational animals) rather than merely sentient beings. — Wayfarer
I don't think my view is obvious — Wayfarer
It never ceases to amaze me, the ease with which people seem to assume that 'we're just animals', when the difference between h. sapiens, and every other creature is so manifestly and entirely obvious. It's kind of a cultural blind spot, an inability to recognise the obvious. — Wayfarer
The reluctance to acknowledge what I take to be a clear ontological distinction between homo sapiens and other species seems to stem from a broader philosophical commitment—one shaped by the widespread influence of Darwinian naturalism on our conception of human nature. — Wayfarer
Doubt, insofar as it is a relative judgement, presupposes logical thought, of which the subject himself must be conscious. — Mww
I’d go with self-consciousness myself, rather than self-awareness. — Mww
On the same grounds as Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’: even if you suffered complete amnesia and forgot your identity, you would be aware of your own being. — Wayfarer
In the context of artificial Intelligence development, there is danger of AI becoming a determinant of how intelligence is decided and judged. Machines may become the yardstick of how the concept of intelligence is viewed and assessed. — Jack Cummins
What is a Philosophy Forum for, it not for sharing subjective Ideas & Feelings encapsulated in artificial words? — Gnomon
How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to summarily eliminate the entities you don't like? — Gnomon
Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide. — Gnomon
I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too. — Janus
my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another. — Gnomon
the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. — Gnomon
the best overall take-down is The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart, in The New Atlantis, in which he says some of Dennett's arguments are 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' — Wayfarer
If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? — Gnomon
The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and ↪Wayfarer another. What's yours? — Gnomon
Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. — Gnomon
Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? — Gnomon
DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate-idea consumer? — Gnomon
I have a long history of posting critical comments about Daniel Dennett, who is the main representative of eliminative materialism. — Wayfarer
Bernardo Kastrup is strident in his criticism of materialism, with titles such as Materialism is Baloney. But he’s not well-regarded on this forum — Wayfarer
Yes, ↪Wayfarer is not the type to make arrogant or aggressive attacks on debatable philosophical positions. He's usually more subtly nuanced. And his "humble" approach may seem less impressive than the more arrogant assertions of Scientism. — Gnomon
It's less an attack on Physicalism/Realism than a presentation of alternative views of the Mind/Body relationship. — Gnomon
it's not an attack on 'realism' per se. It's a criticism of the idea that the criterion for what is real, is what exists independently of the mind, which is a specific (and fallacious) form of realism. — Wayfarer
That's interesting to me. I think conceptualization of any kind is quite remarkable, even proto-conceptualization. — Manuel
It's tricky to know where the cut-off point between explicit consciousness (such as elephants or monkeys) stops and mere reaction kicks in, maybe a fish or an oyster. But I do believe there is such a point. — Manuel
My spontaneous response is that I think classical philosophy had the insight that we do not, by default, know what anything actually is. — Wayfarer
The issue I wanted to highlight is that I think it's kind of hard to imagine having perception without some minimal intellectual capacities, because then it seems to me it would be hard to retain the perception. — Manuel
Examples of animals suffering from abuse and being fearful of humans for a while seem to suggest some degree of association, which goes slightly beyond "mere" perception. — Manuel
'According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do.' — Wayfarer
My take on collective consciousness more akin to Hegel's 'geist', which describes the way geist (usually translated as mind or spirit) manifests collectively in culture, history, and shared institutions. — Wayfarer
Bingo. You win the lucky door prize. I have no objection to there being a shared reality, in fact, I think consciousness is collective in nature, even though each of us only ever experiences it in the first person. — Wayfarer
For example? — Wayfarer
I think that amounts to a kind of illustration, doesn't it? — Wayfarer
I think there has to be a minimal intellectual component in terms of memory, otherwise I don't see how a creature could perceive without constantly forgetting. — Manuel
They very likely have some primitive concepts. I don't think it makes much sense to postulate a creature having perception absent some minimal amount of conception. — Manuel
But no to the suggestion that matter can be observed without any conceptualization at all. — Manuel
I am saying that each animal species (ants, birds, tigers, whatever) interpret the world the way each species does — Manuel
I don't know what else to say other than to ask why you don't think the examples I give suggest that we see the same things animals do. — Janus
we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless. — Janus
It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?" — Janus
The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. — Janus
Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live — Janus
I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason — Janus
You speak as though that purported "end goal" is a given. — Janus
How would any philosophical truth ever be demonstrable such as to gain universal assent? — Janus
Discussion would still allow for folk to be influenced by others. — Janus
The question was posed to J. — Janus
Well, for those presupposed to doubt it, there are plenty of grounds for doubt. For those predisposed to believe it, there are plenty of grounds for belief. — Wayfarer
"To each there own philosophy" I say, because that takes proper account of human diversity. Would you have it any other way? — Janus
Science typically provides no such axis, as it is generally assumes that the universe is devoid of intrinsic meaning and/or value, so a claim to 'higher knowledge' is often challenged on the grounds that there is no objective justification for it.
For example:
what do you mean by "highest"? Most comprehensive or overarching. most critical, most meta-cognitive? Or most spiritual, most enlightening, wisest?
— Janus — Wayfarer
I don’t think Conze says or implies that. — Wayfarer
The purpose of my quoting the Edward Conze text was simply an illustration of the idea of there being a higher truth - something for which I am generally criticized for suggesting. But to get down to basics, this is because I don't think our culture possesses a vertical axis along which the description of 'higher' makes any sense. — Wayfarer
there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge — Plato, The Republic
That was an excerpt. The entire essay is Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels, Philosophy East and West, 1963. — Wayfarer
Aside from Conze, the principle of monastic lineage in Buddhism and other spiritual traditions assumes the transmission of insight. — Wayfarer
I think you're very much viewing it through the lens of the rejection of dogmatic Christianity and its 'blind faith' — Wayfarer
Or in insight. That was, for instance, the basis of the Buddha's authority - one which was never imposed on others — Wayfarer