By relational, I mean that information depends on engagement with the substance, otherwise the substance is not a vehicle of informing. There is no information in the substantial form itself because information is always for another, or said another way, information does not fulfill its purpose apart from being for another.

You used the term "critique;" does that mean you think something in the liberal tradition, broadly construed, is worth salvaging, or is it all ideology?

It is ironic that the very totalitarianism liberalism is accused of would seem to be the reality of any state system that would seek to externally enforce the virtue of its citizenry in a nonliberal society.

Is liberalism perfect, perhaps not, but as Vera Mont pointed out, any lack in a liberal society is a consequence of the vices of its citizenry, not a systemic failure of the liberal nature of that society.

As Banno said, what ought the alternative to liberalism be? Does a pluralistic society have an alternative available?

I think the objections that have been forwarded may be leveled against the culture or economic system, not liberalism. After all, cannnot the objections against industrialization or against the discontent toward capitalism, or against technocracy also remain prevalent in a nonliberal or facist regime?

I think another potential issue is the eternal possibility of repentance, faced with an eternal afterlife with no further consequences, why would someone repent? Don't you think the horizon of death, that is, our finitude, is what demands repentance of us?

Okay, I see, then one actually can be subject to infinite punishment, correct? Assuming they never repent (and given an eternity to do so). That is even without perfect culpability, the refusal to change heart is, in itself, meritorious of punishment.

Wouldn't an implication of your view be that everything is ultimately permissible in some sense? Moreover, it would seem to imply that it doesn't matter what we do because even without repentance for sin, there would be salvation. Does that strike you as theologically sound?

MoK, you want to say the information just is the form, right? That's fine, but if you go that route then you seem to be implying that the information just is the form and is contained therein. But if this is the case, information would not appear to be an act that requires engagement between interpreter and interpreted, as JuanZu has suggested it is. For JuanZu, information is relational, not intrinsic to any substantial form. You might respond that the creation of the sculpture is relational, and I think that is correct, but without the audience there would appear to be something, let's say "incomplete," about the information.

Okay, now I think your trichotomy of object, audience, and artist is spot on and I also agree that the audience is the interpreter. Contrary to my initial thoughts, it is the interpreted who transcribes the substance into an informational content, that is, into a substantial form through which information can be had, that is, what I have called the communicative act.

And since the communicative act of informing is a two way street, we may add that just as the artist communicates to the audience (but where such communication is itself obscure to the artist because he knows not what his art means to the audience), so does the audience communicate to the artist and leave an impression on him -- "what a beautiful sculpture" or "I don't really get it."

It is interesting because you said the substance informs the interpreter. I have heard that great artists talk of a marble block "speaking" to them of what to sculpt.

Perhaps this is the right way of looking at it, but I would qualify this appraisal by affirming that the substance in itself is not doing any informing, and instead aver that the interpreter must first interpret, translate, transcribe the substance into a "form" that is understood by it as information. This I will call, tentatively, the communicative act. Interested in JuanZu's thoughts on this.

I think what is being said is that the object lacks form, but the interpreter, through an act, communicates information and thereby gives the substance a kind of form; think of the artist molding the clay.

Can You give me more context to that question? — JuanZu

I have in mind the USB stick. It appears as it is, but the information, that is the written document file, is in a sense encoded in the USB stick. That is what I mean by the information being other than it appears.

While information may be an act, not a substance, it would seem to rely on substance for its instantiation because there is something that is acted upon. In other words, for there to be an act of interpretation, what is there must be translated into what is meant. Does that sound right?

I just don't think God can be a man. — Bob Ross

Would you elaborate on why you think this? Is it not in God's power to have a trinitarian existence and to take human form? Does your thinking change if the man is a perfect man?

Do you think all information requires some kind of interpretation? Is information always other than it appears? Is there always the-thing-itself, and in addition, the information that may be interpreted from that source?

making God the victim — Bob Ross

Exactly, have you heard of the doctrine of the Trinity?

"What you did not do for the least, you did not do for me." (To paraphrase the Gospel).

Perhaps one way to think of it is that to sin is to value some temporal good above God; that is, to worship an idol; that is to prioritize something over God; and that is to will the sacrifice of God for the sake of some temporal good. Hence sinning contributes to the sacrifice of Christ.

It may make sense to think of everyone as "God's property" though a more sensible description is that of father to son or daughter. If someone physically harms another, they would be physically harming a son or daughter of a father, where such father will surely be offended. So it is with God. That is not to mention that, according to my understanding, Jesus suffers the weight of all sin at the cost of death, so any sin even if it is against another other than Jesus, still directly offends Jesus, who is therefore the one with the authority to forgive.

Sure, could be random, that doesn't change that Bob2 likes a different book than Bob1, the source of the difference doesn't really matter, what matters is that that source that has affected Bob2 would have affected Bob1 were he made aware of it.

I am not sure if this has been proposed although javra may have been suggesting a similar notion concerning the realities of lived experience. What I want to stipulate is that Bob1 likes this book, maybe he is reading Watership Down. But then Bob2 comes along and likes Game of Thrones better as a novel. But I thought Bob1 said Watership Down was the best. Does this not point to something like the fungibility of the will. Sure, it may be conditioned by desire, but it is not set-in-stone, as it were, towards a particular, though it may be moved towards some form. We might say something like, had Bob1 read GoT, that would be his favorite book, not that he could have known better, but that it is true that he would have chosen it had he known of it. What do you think? Does this make the will free in a way that a free will libertarian would accept? Is the will in this way acceptable determined by desire and other factors consistent with the deterministic position?

I’ve stopped feeling joy because of it, I think that if I do something I like it means I value joy and pleasure and would have to accept the experience machine and plug in. — Darkneos

I encourage you to seek out a professional therapist. Feeling a lack of joy may be indicative of a mental health need or signal depression.

I think your questions are apt. Indeed, if we are just chemical processes then there isn't a fundamental difference between us and the machine that is purportedly sending the experiences to us.

Epistemic humility is certainly a virtue. On what basis do you think everything are chemicals? Are you 100% certain? Are you willing to subject your emotions to this belief? In fact a large number of people, probably the majority, will disagree with your claim that everything are chemicals. Do you know everything? Are you God? If the answer to these questions is no, then I don't see why you wouldn't be open to beliefs such as those involving souls, justice, God, love, and other such transcendentals. But don't take my word for it alone, you said the problem bugged you, that something doesn't seem quite right about it. Is there something transcendental about that itch? Can you explain it in chemical, biological, or evolutionary terms?

Here is my first impression of the paper:

The proof relies on "thought objects" and an intentional theory of reference. Wherein the thought object referred to by the saint, in a locution of constitution reference, is God, the saint attributes to this "object" "that than which nothing greater can be thought." It is precisely that the thought object God, referred to constitutively by the saint, that is not referred to constitutively by the atheist. Rather, the atheist wants to deny that the thought object picked out by the intention towards God has the description "that than which nothing greater can be thought," and thereby refers to God only by parasitic reference to what the saint is proposing after reflection.

What I am saying is that, supposing that there are simple things at the end of the composition, these simple things are explained in essence by the whole of which they are a part. That is to say that their essence or identity is conditioned by the whole of which they are a part. — JuanZu

:ok:

Okay, I think I get it now. So it is not composition itself that is at issue. Rather, that a part should be responsible for composition when it itself is dependent on the whole at least for its mereological function as part; that's what is at issue.

Again, correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be asserting that even if some composed being were grounded in simple parts, those parts could not have composed the whole because their function is determined by the whole of which they are parts. And if their function were to compose a whole, they would already have to be a part of the whole of which they acquire their function from, which would render composition impossible by that part.

That is an important qualification because without it, one might incorrectly suppose that a whole could be fully grounded in its parts, which you maintain (and I agree) does not work.

Correct me if I am wrong -- are you saying that there are no composites, composition is impossible?

matter has the potential to be divided endlessly — Gregory

Perhaps.

Why must this prove that matter ends in a supernatural mind? — Gregory

Whether matter is infinitely composite (and similarly whether or not it is infinitely divisible) or not, anything composite requires a composer. Maybe something composite could be composed by something else composite. However, all composites have to be grounded in something simple or else nothing would ever be composed.

Why is this the only explanation? Can calculus offer some light? Can modern physics? — Gregory

If there is anything in the universe that everything else is composed by, I think we would all like to know about it, especially physicists.

Also, how familiar are you with Kant's second Antimony? — Gregory

Kant's second antinomy has perplexed me before. I am now quite sure that there is no reason to think the thesis of that antinomy is true. On the other hand, the antithesis seems to also lack any basis (unless the notion of a "simple part" is problematic).

I further suggest that any mathematical question may well be ontological already so that the expression of a mathematical matter in ontological terms is not of itself problematic.

Very well Gregory, then I object to your objection on the grounds that the mathematical question that my argument is accused of misrepresenting has not yet been stated. I contend that the existence of said mathematical question ought to be considered dubious in lieu of its actually being stated or of a proof of the existence of that mathematical question in place of an explicit statement of the purported question.

A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, let’s call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible — Bob Ross

Here is another way of arguing for premise 5 from the original argument:

1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.

A composition dependence cannot go to infinity of its own power.

I absolutely agree with what you said in the counterargument conclusion, #3. God cannot be a mere part within the created order.

I think the original argument can be revised with some small adjustments so that the simple that the composed relies on is external to that composition and not a part of it.

To say more, the argument necessitates either A. a simple part, or B. something other than the parts that the composed composition is composed of that is itself simple. In that case, any composed composition having infinite parts would itself require something other than itself, or its parts, for its existence, namely God.

Excellent.

My only quibble is to discard premise 6. I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.

That is to say, physically, we may be constituted by an infinite series, but as you said, such a series cannot existon its own.

Here is an argument for the existence of God:

1. If anything exists, then there must be something that exists.
2. If something depends on another for its existence and the second thing exists, then so must the first.
3. If everything depended on another for its existence, then nothing would exist.
4. Therefore, if anything exists, and there exist things that depend on another for their existence, or not, there must exist something that does not depend on another for its existence.
5. Consequently, if anything exists, there must exist something that does not depend on another.
6. Something does exist.
7. So, there must exist something that does not depend on another.

Note: this argument is similar to the "argument from being" formulated by Norman Geisler.

I do not see why not.

Just to be clear, your post makes it look like Leontiskos was making that assertion; that is not true as Leontiskos was not making that assertion; only I was making that assertion.

If I were to represent your first argument symbolically, the first one would be:

P→Q
~P
Therefore Q.

But that is clearly not a valid argument. So why is it that the way I've represented your argument does not align with the original non-symbolic argument?

the validity of the argument (which has to do with guarantees regarding the value of the conclusion). — Leontiskos

Yes, agree. :up:

every inference relies on the notion of "follows from." — Leontiskos

That inferences relies on -follows from- is surely true of deductive arguments; that inductive arguments rely on inference would seem to be true, but I do not know if I would characterize the inference in an inductive argument with -follows from-.

"My main point here isn't to suggest that Descartes made an intentional argument proving God by arguing that failure to accept God led to an incoherent solipsitic position. I just think that by working backwards and seeing what Descartes required to avoid solipsism you can come to the conclusion that God is necessary for Descartes to avoid that."

"It would just mean you can't know anything without God."

I think this is a good reading of Descartes.

"So, given his arguments -- at face value -- he knows God exists, rather than it being faith-based"

Maybe Descartes can be interpreted to be making this argument:

If not for faith in God, I, Descartes, wouldn't know anything after methodological doubt. (Knowledge requires faith in God).
If I, Descartes, have knowledge, then God is real.
I, Descartes, have knowledge.
Therefore, God is real.

See how the argument guarantees knowledge of God, and yet that knowledge depends on faith in the first place?

"how they interpret being and "...exists"." Could you say more about that?

"Descartes could reply that Sartre has no right to claim externalization on the basis of his methodological doubt."

We might ask: Why not? What's wrong with externalization, Descartes? But then we might add that externalization appears to be implicit in methodological "doubting."

"So there is no permissible metalogical argument as follows:

(1 ^ ~1) → 2
∴ 2"

Agree, I think; correct me if I have this wrong: by metalogical I take you to mean a logical "move" (such as MP) that is not identical to its truth function.

Apparently, it is not just arguments with contradictions that are problematic.

If it is settled that any premise in an informal argument is demonstrably false, it is unclear whether such an argument's conclusion can be true and yet the argument still be valid, where a valid argument is signified only as an argument that operates with the material conditional. If all valid arguments use the material conditional, arguments with some false premises could seem to still have a true conclusion.

But this seems wrong, at least to me. If any premises are false, a valid argument will result in a conclusion that is necessarily false, according to my non-standard understanding of validity in an informal context.

You may agree. But if you do, then any argument that is valid will turn out to be, in the relation of premises to conclusion, either [true true], or [false, false]. But that is the truth function of equivalence. Indeed, were you to exclude [F, F] as a degenerate case, your resulting truth functionality for a valid argument [T, T] would be truth functionally equivalent to "conjunction." You may argue that either of those truth functionalities is the case, and yet that an argument is still structurally but metalogically MP, although what you meant by calling an argument structurally and metalogically MP would be unclear to me.

In any case, I am not sure I agree that an argument is MP in any formulation, as putting an argument in terms of MP would seem to lead to the result that every argument had an "infinite regress" of premises. What I mean is:

P
P→Q
Therefore Q

Is really..

(P^(P→Q))→Q
P→Q
P
Therefore Q

Is really...

((P^(P→Q)→Q)^(P→Q)^P)→Q
(P^(P→Q))→Q
P→Q
P
Therefore Q

Ad infinitum.

Thanks for the links. So then I think Gensler would say the argument I have is similar to the first of his two circular proofs for modus ponens. The circularity is, interestingly, a result of the structure of the argument, not because of any specific premise.

My version of the argument is missing the inductive element that would cause the argument to be justified, if still circular. It's like a track record argument for perceptual abilities.

Perhaps, in addition to an inductive argument for modus ponens, an argument from coherence can be made. For instance it seems that if modus ponens failed, then MT or RAA would also fail.

1. If MP could be false, then RAA could be false.
2. But RAA is not false.
Therefore neither is MP.

(MT isnt a premise, however the argument is structurally MT). That is to say if MT is veridical, and so is RAA, then that would guarantee the truth of MP.

"So my question about the Cogito was, Which sort of "thought" is it?"

For Descartes it may only be the former, for Sartre it may be both. Though for Sartre I would say that the latter is "cogito" only in a way that is mediate; that is, present but only through phenomenal "glasses." Not to say that such glasses are not needed for the rendering of the phenomenal in terms of thought (it (the phenomenal realm) contains a kind of solution to the problem that it (the phenomenal) posed in the first place when consciousness encountered otherness (read: the other, opposition, negation of self) and the phenomenal became "a reality" to consciousness.

In other words, when thought discovers someone as-they-are through phenomenal encounter, the phenomenal collapses into noumenality. But this is the same as the noumenal encountering the noumenal.