Oh I see, so then you are saying that there would have been nothing today if everything were contingent because there would have been nothing before any contingent things and that that nothing would have prevented all the contingent things from existing entirely. Do I have that right?

Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. I am asking you: "if everything is contingent, would there have been nothing today because there would have been nothing after all contingent things existed, or because there would have been nothing before all the contingent things began to exist?"

Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude — Metaphysician Undercover

And would you say the nothing that occurred happened after all the contingent things passed away, or would you say the nothing occurred before the contingent things were generated?

prior to now — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the crux of the matter. The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated?

By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent.

I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived. — Metaphysician Undercover

But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent."

There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the original argument I formulated (1-4) does not make use of the past or future, rather it only discusses the present, so again I am not sure how my use of "now" is different than Aquinas'.

you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent?

I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not see where the objection was in these two paragraphs.

This does not resolve the issue with "now". — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:

1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being.

Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too?

You said you would start the sim as a zygote. I am asking: what is the difference between this zygote and a zygote in reality? Or is the zygote you are postulating a mere simulation of a zygote? If so, that seems problematic.

What is the difference between the simulation and reality if you are constructing "simulated people" based on the same historical states that result in non-simulated people? If the physicalness of both systems is identical in all respects, what is the difference?

Picture 'reality' R0 as the trunk of a tree. It has 9 boughs (S1-S9) coming out of it, the simulations being run on R. Each of those has 10 branches, labeled S10-S99. Those each in turn have 10 sticks (next level simulations (S100-S999), Then the twigs (S1000-S9999) and the leaves (S10000-S99999). Every one of those simulation has say 10 billion people in it, so a given person is likely to be simulated (all except the ones in R0), and most of those (90%) find themselves in the leaves — noAxioms

Ah, I see, thanks for explaining!

Regarding your objection re: physicalism. The problem with conscious people within/part of a simulation has to do, in my opinion, with the historical necessities of consciousness. That is to say a simulated person does not have the requisite history to be conscious. We need not evoke anything supernatural in this description of consciousness, we can keep everything purely physical. All we're saying is that someone that is conscious must be alive, and someone alive must come from someone else who is alive, that is, from the womb.

You are proposing that the sequence of contingent beings has a beginning, in order to avoid the infinite time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude, which would indicate that in that infinite time there would be a time of nothing. But contingent beings must have a cause. If there is a first contingent being, one which is prior to all other contingent beings, it cannot have a contingent being as its cause, then its cause is necessary, and this is necessary being as distinct from contingent being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not exactly, what I am proposing is this: First, let's assume that all beings are contingent only; that is, that there are no necessary beings. On that assumption, whether the principle of plenitude is applicable or not, but especially when it is applicable, the problem I articulated is salient. The problem is not that there are contingents posterior to "now." The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only.

That is why I am forwarding the argument that I forwarded. But you mentioned an objection to that argument:

This is sort of like Aristotle's law of identity. Whatever exists [now] must be what it is, and not something else. This is expressed as the following necessity: "A thing is the same as itself". Notice though, that this relates to a thing's essence, what the thing is, which cannot be other than the thing's essence, what the thing is. But this principle has not been extended to a thing's existence, as you propose, and I believe it cannot be, for the following reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure if the law of identity can be extended to a thing's existence either. Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false.

And I would like to address the further objection you described concerning "now" --

In fact, the "now" changes as we speak. Therefore we cannot make the proposed statement, "it is necessary that what exists now exists now", because time has past between the first "now" and the second "now" such that they refer to different times which accordingly have different existents. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment.

I don't think someone who knows they live in a machine/simulation can truly be happy.

I take your question to be whether God would bless one with knowledge of the good even if that person lived in a world that was merely simulated. I think the answer may be yes, although I do not say this with certainty but with a speculative mind.

It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..."

And I think I can now better appreciate what you are saying about the principle of plenitude, but...

I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection.

First of all thanks for engaging in this discussion with me.

Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says.

Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved.

Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory.

Lastly, the argument I am suggesting is grounded in the law of noncontradiction. We both agree that contingent things exist now. I maintain that, to avoid contradiction, the contingent things existing now must exist now (but can not-exist at another time). But if something must exist now, then there cannot be nothing now. But if everything is contingent then there could be nothing now. However, there cannot be nothing now based on the law of noncontradiction. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent i.e. there must be a necessary being

It is unclear to me why there would be more leaf worlds, could you spell that out for me?

I think I have heard it said that if a future people decided to make a simulation, they would make A LOT of such simulations. And these simulations would be nested -- simulations within simulations. If there are a huge number of simulations within simulations, that means only a small number of these simulations will be simulations that do not have a simulation that they are themselves running. But if we are living in a simulation, we must be living in one of the simulations that is not itself running a simulation. In that case, the odds that we are living in a simulation would be astronomically small.

On the other hand, I do not think we would be conscious if we were "in" what you are calling an actual simulation. But we are conscious. Therefore, we must not live in a simulation.

In any case, I know I am not living in a simulation.

I see what you are saying about contingents requiring an efficient cause. In fact, I think you are correct. However, I am not sure that that is Aquinas' argument in the 3rd Way. The argument for an efficient cause of an accidental series is covered in the 2nd Way I think.

because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now — Metaphysician Undercover

-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now.

To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings."

And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not.

What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being.

I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not.

That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being."



Do you think there are any "necessary non-beings" ? A square circle perhaps.

"How long I might live is not up to me, but how I live is within my control." -- Seneca. I like this quote. I think the Stoics emphasize concerning ourselves with what is within our control, rather than the things that we do not have control over such as the circumstances that we find ourselves in.

Marcus Aurelius says in so many words that death is (A) natural, and (B) not evil (also not good, it's neither). He seems to say that when viewed "objectively," what is happening is dispersion of atoms; he recommends us not to be afraid of death.

Stoicism's views on death seem off to me. Stoicism seems like kind of a hopeless philosophy in my opinion. The concern I have is that stoics seem to condone suicide. Cato the Younger is an example; not to mention Zeno (founder of Stoicism) and his follower Cleanthes both killed themselves. I think suicide is always wrong.

I also think the "objective" attitude of stoics like Marcus Aurelius may be a form of dissociation, particularly concerning one's emotions.. seems unhealthy to me. I think it is better to address trauma rather than "objectifying" it.

I would not be as concerned with A and B, that is, whether I am right or wrong in thinking I am free. The more pressing matter appears to be C and D, whether I deny my obligations or fulfill them. If someone does indeed deny their obligations on the basis of determinism, then that is surely a negative outcome. Perhaps some empirical research may be helpful in finding out if determinists make decisions consistent with their deterministic convictions.

Leontiskos and Wayfarer, thanks for the links.

I read the link to Feser and found what he had to say helpful and interesting; it appears very similar to the background information Wayfarer articulated earlier.

Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."

To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:

1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.

To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.

Thoughts?

But something to consider is that, if the Universe had existed eternally, and everything in it has a finite lifespan, then again, nothing would exist now, as everything that could have existed, would have already perished, as the amount of time involved is infinite, and no addition of finite durations can add up to an infinite sequence of time. (This is not stated explicitly in the argument, but it is part of the background to the family of arguments). — Wayfarer

I see, yeah, the argument does make more sense with that background in mind. Still, the argument would be easier to follow had he said, "by necessity, everything must not exist at some time if everything were contingent" or something like that.

No need to apologize Wayfarer. Thanks for your comment. The argument you just stated is a good one, convincing to me. My concern is that Aquinas does not say "there must have been a time when nothing existed." He says "there Could have been a time when nothing existed." That, in a nutshell is the issue I take with the argument as well as the reason I suggest it needs interpretation. At the same time, I think Aquinas is a really smart dude, so I'm like "what am I missing about his argument?"

Because 1. I've been giving it a lot of thought the past few days 2. I wanted to have a philosophical discussion 3. I wanted to hear what others thought about it 4. I want to learn and develop my views and understanding. I don't have all the answers believe it or not Wayfarer. And I don't think the argument is pointless but, like I said, I do think it requires some sort of interpretation. But thanks for calling me out on my posts because it gave me the opportunity to reflect on them.

1. Because I might be wrong. 2. I want to hear others' interpretations.

My point here is that, at face value without interpretation, Aquinas' argument doesn't actually say anything. Sure there could have been nothing now, but if there could have been something now, even if everything was contingent, then what work is Aquinas' argument doing?

Thanks for the question. The point is notsomuch that necessity must be derivative, but that where it cannot be self-imputed (as in this case a possible being by definition cannot of itself be necessary), then necessity must be imputed by another, a necessary being. If one possesses tallness and is the only person in the room, then I would say the necessity of their being tallest is something they can "self-impute." The individual has the necessity by virtue of what they are in that case.

Yeah, I am somewhat confused about the distinction between necessary and possible. From my perspective, everything in the past and present are necessary. But at some point in the past they would have been merely possible as they did not yet exist, and projecting into the future may at some point cease to exist. Does that make everything a fusion of necessity and possibility? It's difficult to make sense of.

Thanks for the reference to David Hart re: the contingency argument. I will look it up.

Am I understanding you to say that a contingency argument proves causation, but that it may only prove, at most, an infinity of contingent causes? If so, what would you say to one who objects to infinite contingents on the grounds that none of the members of that infinite would possess the existence necessary to pass along existence causally? Unless I have misunderstood you..

NotAristotle is not Aristotle — Fooloso4

Never... in my time here at the Forum have I ever heard such a bold-faced, unconcealed, blatant accusation! How dare you! I maintain, and have ever maintained, that I might, or might not be, Aristotle. It has not, not even for a minute, been my disposition that I either am, or am not Aristotle, with 100% certainty! And I'm not sure where you get the notion! Instead, I have always sought the middle ground, and I am most emphatically insulted and otherwise taken aback to hear such misanthropy!

:wink:

Aristotle: And tell me, Plato, is the form you speak of the same or different than the form that is in the particulars I investigate?
Plato: It is different.
Aristotle: Yes, I thought you might say so, for if it were the same, then by investigating the form in the particulars I would be seeing outside of the cave, don't you think?
Plato: That sounds right to me.
Aristotle:Tell me though Plato, how is the Form different than the form in particulars?
Plato: How do you mean?
Aristotle: Well, a great action is great by partaking in greatness; isn't that so?
Plato: It is.
Aristotle: Well, if a great action partakes in the Form of greatness, and the greatness of the Form is different than the greatness of the action, then either one is not great, or the other is not great, for by being different, they differ in the form of which they either participate or are participated in.
Plato: Quite so.
Aristotle: Well then greatness is not great.
Plato: Hmm, I see. Yes, that appears to be a problem.
Aristotle: It is Plato, it is quite problematic. So you see, I think you were wrong to say that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Plato: Yes, I must have been mistaken. So now I say that the Form is the same as what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Aristotle: I was afraid you would say that.
Plato: Why is that?
Aristotle: Because, if the Form of greatness is itself great in the same way that a great action is great, then it will be necessary for there to be a form that includes both the great act and the greatness that is present in the Form of greatness. And then there will need to be a form of that, and a form of that, and so on and so on.
Plato: Oh dear Aristotle, that seems quite problematic too.
Aristotle: Quite so.
___: Excuse me, excuse me, if I may interject...
Plato: Why, is that you Socrates, old friend?
Socrates: Yes, it is I, Socrates.
Aristotle: What did you wish to say?
Socrates: Just this, I think Plato was right in what he said at first, namely, that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to the quality that is partaken of.
Aristotle: And why is that?
Socrates: Well for just the reason you stated, if the Form is the same, then it will need a Form above it, and in that case it is not really the Form of what is partaken of it.
Aristotle: Well how will you overcome the objection that Plato and I just discussed: that greatness is not great if the form is different than that that partakes in it?
Socrates: By saying that greatness is great, Aristotle, but that the Form of greatness is great in a different way than the greatness of a great action.
Aristotle: How is that?
Socrates: A great action is great, but in a qualified way. Meanwhile, the Form of greatness is supremely great, there is nothing not great about it; it includes not only a great action, but every other greatness. By being so great, it is, as it were, a different kind of greatness than the great things and actions and qualities that partake of it.
Aristotle: Hmm, well said Socrates.
Plato: Well said indeed.

I would add that there are important ways in which consciousness is not an illusion. Emotional, experiential, rational, doxastic content, means something, points toward something true, is important.

Maybe that is an unfair question because consciousness may be undefinable. I guess what I want to know is: why defend consciousness as not an illusion; what's at stake? Why is consciousness not being an illusion important to you? What does consciousness mean to you?

A lie is an illusion is it not? Well, what misleads more, the lie or the liar?

Would you define the "consciousness" you say is not an illusion?

It may seem strange, but I would say negative thinking is more illusory than positive thinking in that one who thinks negatively (about themselves or about others) is, in my opinion, further from the truth; they do not see themselves or others as-they-are-in-reality; that is, with understanding/patience/and in a word, love. Maybe it's somewhat tautological, but I think illusion is separation from truth.

Agree, if there is not any kind of relationship then it is difficult to see how there can be responsibility, reconciliation, accountability, forgiveness, contrition, reward, gift, mercy.

Yeah, I'm not sure we can give a coherent account of responsibility without free will.

I see your point, yeah I guess I think people's actions can be "a problem."

Sorry Mentos but I don't think people are "problems to be dealt with." People "have problems," maybe, but no person is "a problem" or "the problem."

I think we may think of responsibility in relational terms. We are responsible to another for our actions. Responsibility doesn't entail punishment, rather it entails the possibility for reconciliation (a relational "event" that is mediated between persons); at least, that is how I see it.

Without free will we would still be responsible to each other? Walk me through that.