a thread about challenging our intuitions of consciousness. — Skalidris

Hi all,

I added you all to this reply because I think my comments here relate to the discussions that have been had thus far.

I have been rethinking my own intuitions on consciousness. In particular, I have been considering Christoffer's claim that consciousness is an illusion. I ask myself, in what sense could it be thought to be an illusion?

There are at least two ways of thinking about it (that I can presently think of). One way is to say free will is an illusion. I disagree with that assertion. On the other hand, when one says "consciousness is an illusion" they could mean something like -- you are not your thoughts. In that case "I think, therefore, I am" would be kind of a non-sequitur. You think. Yes. You are. Yes. But you are not because you think. After all, I would say we may not have that much control over our thoughts as far as I can tell, so I see no reason to think that our identity should be linked to our thoughts.

Negative thinking, patterns of thought, insofar as we identify these things with consciousness, it is easier to see how consciousness is an illusion; it is an illusion just as negative thinking and patterns of thought are an illusion, they are part of a script so to speak. In addition, a person is not identical to or the same as a mental illness they may have - mental illness does not define anyone.

For the sake of clarity, I do think we have free will and that we are responsible for what we do and what we say, even though I don't think we have control over our emotions and maybe not our thoughts either.

Nevermind, I guess "scientific miracle" is not a thing and I'm just making up words.

Thus the experimental discovery of the atom (or more accurately, the proton in the atom) by Ernest Rutherford (edited) : unpredicted, but explainable in natural terms.

I don't recall where I heard about it before. I was thinking it was like a miracle insofar as it does not adhere to known natural laws or regularities, but that it is an occurrence that can ultimately be explained by natural laws. And so it is an occurrence that would be contrasted with a veritable supernatural miracle.

Concerning 1., the further assumption you need is that physical laws, were we to understand them completely, would explain the purported miracle. — J

I think Philosophim intended this as an implication of the view, although I think you are right that it is an assumption that is necessary for the argument to work.

you need to show why particular miracle X requires a physical explanation. — J

Not sure I agree -- so-called "scientific miracles" (like the discovery of the atom), in my opinion, do not need to be shown to be physical, we can assume that they just are physical. But perhaps you are defining "miracle" to exclude "scientific miracles." If so, how would you define miracle in a way that does not include "miracles" that are "scientific."

Although, I suppose one could hold the view that everything physical is miraculous, including the regularities of physical laws, or at least that every scientific miracle is a supernatural miracle.

I'm not really committed to any kind of illusionism, but if consciousness is not a reality (and I think it is), then I guess we could think of it as a kind of illusion, sure.

It is as if we were saying our emotions analyzed our emotions, no?

I guess I'm unclear on how the mechanics of a self-referential system would work.

You're asking the wrong person because I have the same question; I don't think consciousness is an illusion.

instead we experience some emergent phenomena of "being" — Christoffer

The illusion is our experience of ourselves to be more advanced than what we really are. We don't see the strings that pulls our behavior, wants, needs, thoughts and actions, we only experience the sum of those strings and it makes us feel like we are in control and have agency — Christoffer

The strings are our emotions - the predictive system; you're saying that's what controls our actions.

But then I'm confused when you say:

And so our new layer of predictions analyzed our own emotional behavior and started to mitigate them when needed. — Christoffer

The predictive system can study itself?

in this sense I think you mean to be free from the emotional driving forces and be able to always act without biases to any needs. — Christoffer

That is not necessarily what I mean when I speak of "seeing reality as it is." As I am presently using it, I mean seeing reality in contradistinction to the way reality is seen through the lens of an apparent illusion of consciousness.

Still, it seems to me that any sort of illusion of reality would be weeded out by evolution in favor of a more honest interface, seems to me like that would have an evolutionary advantage.



I'm not sure I understand the question; I guess I take it as given that an illusion is necessarily differentiable from non-illusion .

By "naturalism" Plantinga seems to mean non-belief in God in this context. It appears that someone who does believe in God can, according to Plantinga's proposals, maintain that our cognitive abilities are reliable. Although it's possible I have misunderstood Plantinga.

Wouldn't there be the possibility to know one's emotions and thereby know why one is acting? And, is it not the case that if we know how we are going to act, we have the ability to act in a manner contrary to what we are conscious of?

And, if consciousness really is an illusion, why the illusion? Wouldn't we be better equipped evolutionarily speaking to see the truth; reality as it really is.

That is clearly a contradiction, as it cannot be both that causation is an infinite regress and that there is a first cause. — Michael

Saint Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between per accidens and per se series; the distinction may be relevant to this discussion.

The world has such depth, I doubt we will ever run out of things to argue about. :wink:

Fair point, I fully support a method that would rule out natural explanations.

Hence, all physical & mental forms in the world can be traced back to a single unitary monistic First Cause (???). Some call that Prime Mover "G*D", but in view of the information function, I call it "The Programmer". Below, I have pasted my own Graphs of Reality*3*4 — Gnomon

Right, an informational basis of the universe would seem to hint towards a mind of sorts.

Right, but my point is, if it seems like a supernatural mind contributed to an apparent miracle (viz. understanding, intent), then we might as well say that a supernatural mind contributed to a veritable miracle.

Surely that is context dependent though. If the miracle is: "my coffee mug is floating!" I don't see how that would suggest any sort of supernatural mind. If the miracle is something more like "we ran out of wine at the wedding but the coffee turned into wine!" That, to me, would suggest a supernatural mind that has understanding.

the definition of "miracle" given here presupposes the existence of a Godlike bein — alan1000

Aren't you just assuming here a "no-miracles" disposition? Because as it has been defined, a miracle would effectively prove a Godlike being, would it not? I see nothing logically infelicitous about belief in miracles.

In my opinion, if there were an easy answer to quantum-classical issues it would be elucidating the correct theoretical understanding, although I think we would have figured it out by now if it were a merely theoretical problem; that suggests to me that answers to such issues, if there are answers to be found, will depend on empirical observation and experimentation. But that depends on asking the right questions, which is kind of theoretical I guess. I myself am not sure what "the right questions are" in regards to a quantum-classical bridge. Are there any quantum physicists in the house?

Oh contraire mon frère, this is more something we thought we knew at the high point of reductionism. The case for this is now more difficult. IMO, it would be foolish to assume reductionism as a given until it is decisively disproved, since reductionism itself was never been decisively proved in the first place. Reductionism trades off millennia old intuitions and philosophical arguments, and this might be grounds for dismissing it as much as supporting it. — Count Timothy von Icarus


You bring up a good point, but rather than swing between supporting or dismissing, why not simply recognize the need for a more complex and nuanced view? — wonderer1

To put that in my own words, I would say "reductionism" is ill-defined. Perhaps a properly defined reductionism may not be at odds with emergentism at all.

One clue to the puzzle of Personal Experience may be that both Consciousness and Energy are special forms of non-specific Generic Information (the power to change form ; to transform ; energy?). And in human experience, Information is also Meaning, Significance, Relevance to Self. — Gnomon

The information is basic. Metaphorically. Because what is transformed is the physical into the mental, no? Or is it the physical into the physical? Energy, mind…what do they have in common? Nothing, and that’s the point – one must transform into the other by means of a unity that is the(i)re.. informational content. Information is meaning, but it is also wave functions. A graph of reality?

Transformation implies what? – that what is transformed becomes what it is not. If I am seeing red, and this is a transformation of an informational content (as I am calling it), then either I am not seeing red or red is not red. Phenomena, nouema, what’s the real red, what I see or what is there, a quantative signal -- A mathematical entity?

We interpret the Information. Whose interpretation? The brain’s I guess. Mine or yours? Too many questions. “Excuse me, am I interpreting this correctly?” “No, although your brain is.” “Okay, great.” Can meaning be physical? I would think it would have to in some sense if it is in this universe. “I’m a doctor, not a linguist Jim!”

There are two senses of a why question. There is the “why” in the sense of more of a where… where did this come from, “why” is it here. Then there is the purpose sense: “why” am I doing such and such, for the sake of what. “How” is a different question, but if you’ve got answers then I’m all ears, metaphorically speaking.

In conclusion, I’m not a fan of abiogenesis because I don’t see how something that lacks a kind of self-motion can acquire it. And I agree, panspermia has never been much of an answer.

True, it is a dichotomy I guess, but I think it is worth the trouble because of its explanatory power; namely in explaining why brains are conscious and why rocks are not conscious.

Good questions. Were it the case that the use of b-matter turned it into a-matter, that would seem to preclude it from use in an artificial brain, but that seems to suggest something like an observer effect, maybe. And I'm not sure how to articulate a difference, other than to say that b-matter is made of b-protons and b-neutrons, not sure if that answers though.

How does the 'history' change the actual 'formula' which results in consciousness? — AmadeusD

Perhaps the history doesn't change the formula; the formula changes the history.

Perhaps there are just different kinds of matter (a-matter) and (b-matter). b-matter happens to be able to arrange into conscious brains, a-matter cannot. Nothing is necessarily non-physical in this explanation of consciousness. And I don't see why different kinds of matter is controversial or anti-scientific; after all, if you accept physics you would already believe there to be variations in matter such as protons and neutrons and electrons.

But as you say here with "history" is what I mean by guiding principles, something that affects a system to form complexity in a certain way. — Christoffer

"guiding principles" "to form" "goal" I don't mean to be overly critical - do you mean these terms metaphorically or literally?

Thanks for your comments. I've had somewhat of a shift in perspective the last couple days. I now think the question you cited -- why is this energy conscious -- may not be the most productive. It would be like asking, why are coyotes alive, but rocks are not? The fact is, coyotes are alive and rocks are not. So the answer both for consciousness and living organisms, in my opinion, has to do with the biological history to which both belong. On that understanding, we needn't postulate anything extra or in addition to the physical.

Is that a fair reply or is there something about the question (or your answer) that I am missing?

You got it!

Is it possible for any system of pipes, valves, and pumps to be conscious? Or for consciousness to emerge from such a system? — RogueAI

Although wonderer1 and Christoffer may disagree with me, I think it is not possible. And I think it is not possible because of the kind of history that is needed, specifically a biological history, for consciousness. This may be more of a local, as opposed to a global explanation, of why one system is conscious but not another, but I think a historical explanation is adequate.

I am of the opinion now that consciousness may be fundamentally physical, at least I have no qualms with that being the case.

I am unfamiliar with the change from a supernatural to a natural explanation as a "reduction." I am more familiar with taking two scientific fields (chemistry and physics) and reducing one to the other.

I interpret your second question to be asking "can" sciences be reduced? I think the answer to that is yes.

How, precisely, would you define reductionism?

Here is a definition of reductionism: "a science can be reduced to another field of study if that other field of study gives a coherent account of the initial science."

What do you think of this definition?

On this understanding, chemistry and even consciousness is reducible to physics. Although, physics would not be reducible to chemistry.

In terms of a complete explanation of something, I think what is problematic is not that chemistry or consciousness are irreducible, but that physics is itself incomplete. I think this may not be a problem with reductionism on its own terms (as I have defined it), rather it is a problem with the field of study that some other field is reduced to.

Okay so if I'm understanding you correctly, what I'm calling a physical process emerges from, is a result of, not the physical fundamentals, rather it is the result of the interaction of those fundamentals where that interaction results in properties that were otherwise not present. As an analogy, H2O, the result of interaction between atoms, is a liquid at room temperature, while oxygen and hydrogen atoms, the constituents, do not have the property of being liquid at room temperature.

Thanks for referring me to that article.

In the interest of responding in a not unreasonable amount of time, I'm going to go ahead and write what I'm thinking.

The objection is well said.

I understand you to be objecting to the reduction to physics on three grounds which I will now summarize: 1. incomplete explanation, 2. potentially untrue, 3. raises questions.

To your first point, I think what I am looking for if I were looking for a physicist's explanation of tasting coffee, is whether we can describe the experience in terms of atoms and so on. Given that there seems to be a level of analysis at which the tasting of coffee can be elucidated in terms of atoms and laws discovered by physicists, I am content that that analysis is adequate, if not complete from the subjective perspective.

If we are talking about human behavior, I do not think physics can adequately describe that, but given that physics is supposed to acquire knowledge about atoms and planets and such, I don't think human behavior is the right domain for physics.

Okay javra, thanks for your comments.

all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical — javra

Why would it trouble us if everything was reducible to the physical?

Seems to me that all those thoughts are just physical processes.

I get the sense there is something about physicalism that has not been articulated that you are concerned is problematic?

But this move probably requires jettisoning a lot of what makes physicalism "physicalism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure why that is so. Unless by process metaphysics one is arguing that only processes, not the physical constituents involved in the process are real? If that is what is meant, that's starting to sound like some kind of idealism in my opinion. In any case, that is not what I mean by "process physicalism."

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically...

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction").

Not first thing in the morning
— frank

No energy until coffee. — wonderer1

ALL IS COFFEE - NotAristotle (c. 2000 - 2200)

Hi Christoffer, I find myself inclined to endorse what I will coin "process physicalism." Due to religious commitments, I do not think "all of reality" is physical. But I do think consciousness may be one of the things that can be given a meaningful physical account. And I think science is not only the best method for learning about the physical world, I also think accepting the results of science are crucial for truth and understanding.

What I wanted to ask you is, can you say more about "emergent physicalism?" Is it roughly the same as "process physicalism" (my thesis here is that consciousness just is a physical process) ?

In a somewhat less robust formulation, I maintain that physical processes give an adequate explanation of consciousness.

Nosferatu, see above.