Here is a definition of reductionism: "a science can be reduced to another field of study if that other field of study gives a coherent account of the initial science."

What do you think of this definition?

On this understanding, chemistry and even consciousness is reducible to physics. Although, physics would not be reducible to chemistry.

In terms of a complete explanation of something, I think what is problematic is not that chemistry or consciousness are irreducible, but that physics is itself incomplete. I think this may not be a problem with reductionism on its own terms (as I have defined it), rather it is a problem with the field of study that some other field is reduced to.

Okay so if I'm understanding you correctly, what I'm calling a physical process emerges from, is a result of, not the physical fundamentals, rather it is the result of the interaction of those fundamentals where that interaction results in properties that were otherwise not present. As an analogy, H2O, the result of interaction between atoms, is a liquid at room temperature, while oxygen and hydrogen atoms, the constituents, do not have the property of being liquid at room temperature.

Thanks for referring me to that article.

In the interest of responding in a not unreasonable amount of time, I'm going to go ahead and write what I'm thinking.

The objection is well said.

I understand you to be objecting to the reduction to physics on three grounds which I will now summarize: 1. incomplete explanation, 2. potentially untrue, 3. raises questions.

To your first point, I think what I am looking for if I were looking for a physicist's explanation of tasting coffee, is whether we can describe the experience in terms of atoms and so on. Given that there seems to be a level of analysis at which the tasting of coffee can be elucidated in terms of atoms and laws discovered by physicists, I am content that that analysis is adequate, if not complete from the subjective perspective.

If we are talking about human behavior, I do not think physics can adequately describe that, but given that physics is supposed to acquire knowledge about atoms and planets and such, I don't think human behavior is the right domain for physics.

Okay javra, thanks for your comments.

all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical — javra

Why would it trouble us if everything was reducible to the physical?

Seems to me that all those thoughts are just physical processes.

I get the sense there is something about physicalism that has not been articulated that you are concerned is problematic?

But this move probably requires jettisoning a lot of what makes physicalism "physicalism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure why that is so. Unless by process metaphysics one is arguing that only processes, not the physical constituents involved in the process are real? If that is what is meant, that's starting to sound like some kind of idealism in my opinion. In any case, that is not what I mean by "process physicalism."

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically...

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction").

Not first thing in the morning
— frank

No energy until coffee. — wonderer1

ALL IS COFFEE - NotAristotle (c. 2000 - 2200)

Hi Christoffer, I find myself inclined to endorse what I will coin "process physicalism." Due to religious commitments, I do not think "all of reality" is physical. But I do think consciousness may be one of the things that can be given a meaningful physical account. And I think science is not only the best method for learning about the physical world, I also think accepting the results of science are crucial for truth and understanding.

What I wanted to ask you is, can you say more about "emergent physicalism?" Is it roughly the same as "process physicalism" (my thesis here is that consciousness just is a physical process) ?

In a somewhat less robust formulation, I maintain that physical processes give an adequate explanation of consciousness.

Nosferatu, see above.

I don't think Congress is the final arbiter of a determination of whether Trump is guilty. That being the case, each Secretary of state can and should make there own determinations. If Congress disqualified Trump from election on the basis of insurrection after having acquitted him, that would be contradictory. However, it is not Congress, but the Secretaries of states who are currently making the determination. The Secretaries simply are not bound by Congress' erroneous acquittal. To answer your question more directly: is it right to disqualify from election a candidate who has been acquitted by Congressional vote? The answer is absolutely; the Secretaries definitely still have that right. I think it is right both legally, and in this case, morally too.

Comment rescinded.

But seeing as he is guilty of insurrection, I highly doubt he will be acquitted.

Regardless of if he is acquitted for insurrection, I think the Secretary of each state still has a right to make their own determination of whether he should be disqualified from the ballot.

This is a good explanation of how the 14th amendment disqualifies Trump from the upcoming election. https://www.npr.org/2024/01/02/1222389987/donald-trump-maine-election-ballot-2024-supreme-court

Thank you for sharing that.

I don't know much about process philosophy; I am surprised that causal closure is not relevant to it.

I have to say, too, that the whole notion of "non-reductive physicalism" (nrp) is somewhat confusing to me. So it's difficult for me to parse it in process terms or in any terms.

NRP seems to stand in opposition to, as an alternative to, reductive physicalism.

I think it is Jaegwon Kim who forwards the argument against non-reductive physicalism. This argument can be picked-up by reductive physicalists who maintain that causal closure and causal exclusion prohibit non-physical mental events (or at least these principles render non-physical mental events casually inefficacious). This seems to me like a strong argument for physicalism. I myself am not an adherent to physicalism because I believe in supernatural explanations in addition to physical explanations.

the behavior of a boulder. — wonderer1

:lol: hey, that boulder's misbehaving, im gonna give it a piece of my mind!

There is ego and there is conscience. Therefore there is duality. Where there is duality there is choice. Where there is choice there is freedom. Therefore, there is freedom.

Existence is magical and fascinating. — Philosophim

Yes, it is! :100:

I won't get into it too far because I don't think this is the right thread, but I do believe I have a free will and I am not a compatibilist. Whether consciousness is entirely physical, or consciousness is non-physical, I am certain that I am free.

When I reflect on consciousness I try to think of it in physical terms to see your point of view. I put on my science helm (yes, it's a science helm and not a helmet), and I reduce all of reality to the level of atoms bouncing around in the void. Thanks Epicurus or Lucretius or Hobbes or whoever's idea that was. "Here are some atoms in this rock. But these atoms in my brain produce consciousness," I think to myself. And I wonder, "why are these brain atoms producing consciousness? What is special about them?" "Well maybe when you arrange atoms in that way they are conscious?" "But Not Aristotle," I say to myself, "that is entirely an ad hoc explanation and besides, why would the arrangement of the atoms matter?" And I am unable to answer. And that's the hard problem as I understand it. If you have an answer to that problem, I would be happy to hear it.

And I actually do think consciousness as we know it, whether it is itself physical or nonphysical, arises out of physical matter/energy.

How the physical activity produces consciousness is a mystery — Patterner

All we're worried about is the details in how the brain generates it. — Philosophim

I don't think those details are forthcoming Philosophim, and the reason why is that a physical account fails to include consciousness. I think you are right that the brain is necessary for consciousness. But I still have trouble seeing what it is, in physical terms, that is special about the brain and I think that we will never answer that question.

As Patterner pointed out, consciousness is not empirically observable. Water is empirically observable; so is hydrogen and oxygen. We can directly see and measure water as the product of hydrogen and oxygen. We cannot see consciousness as the product of neuronal activity in the same way.

You might say, "well we can observe consciousness viz. the reports of people." That's certainly true but I think it misses the mark.

The question, to my eyes, is really this: why is the brain conscious at all? Or perhaps to put the question more precisely: How is the brain different from non-conscious physical stuff? My answer is that it's not different and that's the mystery.

Do you see where I'm coming from?

I wouldn't go so far as to say that anatomy is the reason why someone engages in activities. A full account of why I, let's say, go for a jog, seems to require consideration of the subjective conscious experience, not just my physiology. If asked why I did this, I wouldn't say "because I have functioning limbs" or "because of my brain states prior to and during the jog." Rather, the reason I went for a jog is because I wanted to get some exercise.

Okay, gotcha, thanks for explaining.

What of your own question begging?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing.
— NotAristotle — wonderer1

I think my argument is something like this:

If consciousness is physical then consciousness can be accounted for in physical terms.
But consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms.
Therefore, consciousness is not physical.

What about that argument is question-begging?

Just what is 'a physical thing'? — Wayfarer

Maybe I'm missing the boat, but when we say "physical" I think we mean things like atoms, brains, neurons, entire organisms, and so on. If consciousness is physical in the same way as the things I've just listed, then SH must be entirely physical, mustn't he? Because Sherlock Holmes would just be his brain, arms, consciousness etc.

Hmm, so you think there can still be truth in a meaningful way even if determinism is true?

To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question.

Can you say more as to why determinism undermines truth or falsity?

Can't why I say something still be true or false, I'm just determined to say what I say? I realize this was a month ago so I understand if you don't recall what you were thinking about this topic.

:lol: good point!

I think the analogy to water breaks down because water just is that arrangement; it is that physical thing. On a physicalist ontology it is acceptable. Because oxygen and hydrogen and water are all physical things, it makes sense, in principle at least, how O and H could form H2O.

Not so with consciousness.

Why?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. So how does something physical (brains neurons etc.) cause/result in/produce something non-physical (and in a very limited circumstance)?

Besides, the problem is not only about not knowing what it is like to be another kind of being — Wayfarer

I just want to point out that I think this is not exactly the hard problem, rather it is what Ned Block has articulated to be the "harder" problem of consciousness. I could be mistaken about that.

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — The Core of Mind and Cosmos

:up:

Physicalism only excludes non-physical concepts from modeling (i.e. explaining) how observable states-of-affairs transform into one another. In this way "the paradigm" is epistemologically modest, or deflationary, limiting its inquiries to only that which can be publicly observed – accounted for – in order to minimize as much as possible the distorting biases (e.g. wishful / magical thinking, superstitions, prejudices, authority, etc) of folk psychology/semantics. — 180 Proof

If physicalism is just an epistemological paradigm and not an ontological commitment, that takes a lot of the wind out of its sails, don't you think so?

No, the point of the argument is the hard problem. The hard problem has never claimed that consciousness is not physical, if we are regarding physical as matter and energy. Matter and energy has the capability to be conscious if organized right, just like water and hydrogen has the capability to be water if organized right. That's the point of the easy problem, to show that yes, they understand that consciousness is a physical manifestation of the brain. But will we ever be able to map consciousness objectively to what it is like to subjectively be conscious? That seems impossible. — Philosophim

I think the hard problem is not answering why consciousness is a physical manifestation, but why a physical manifestation should result in consciousness. And, it is quite unclear why any physical matter/energy arrangement should result in anything like consciousness. The consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms because consciousness is not a physical thing.

Consciousness...

describes the organism as a whole. sure
is a mode of biology. sure
is what he is doing. sure

I'm happy to concede all of those points and moreover to add that consciousness as we know it would not exist if not for the physical system that it is constituted by.

The problem though, the hard problem, is that when we consider the entire organism, or when we consider it at the physiological level, or at the neuronal level. or at the atomic level, or whatever level, we can't give an account of why that matter is conscious. It's obvious that there are conscious people, but why are they conscious? What, in physical terms, accounts for their consciousness. Again, we can't just point to the physiology. In fact, we can't point to anything physical. Why? Because as you said that will only amount to a description of the system in physiological or physical terms; it will not answer the question of why the matter considered is conscious.

Okay, but then I would ask you what about organisms is so special and different than other matter/energy arrangements that makes organisms conscious? Because of the physiology, right? But then, what about the physiology entails consciousness? It would make sense if organisms contained "consciousness atoms" and that is why they are conscious, but they do not; they are made of the same atomic material as other non-conscious matter.

I would think that the difference is that one is a subjective experience while the other is objective biological material; seems to me like a significant difference.

So I say, "how does physicalism account for consciousness?" And you say, "look, you have a brain and brain's are conscious! Therefore you are conscious NotAristotle! That's how we determine what things are conscious, by whether they have brains or not."

But then surely my reply is: "perfect, Nosferatu, now why is the brain conscious?" And how would you answer that in physical terms?

My understanding of the hard problem of consciousness is that it is a problem for a physicalist. Why is it a problem? Because the physicalist has not forwarded a physical account of why any physical system is conscious. Even if, as you suggest, some waveform of energy is responsible for consciousness, a natural question arises: why does that energy produce consciousness, while some other energy does not produce consciousness?