The exchange rate of ruble against all major currencies (USD, EUR, CNY) is climbing very fast. That means that all imports are more and more expensive for Russians. Whatever they bought for 75 RUB in December soon will cost 100. But that is even more devastating for Russian war effort, as they have to import lots of parts (e.g. electronics). Due to sanctions they had to pay much more for parts bought through intermediaries, now it will cost them even more. But even before the war due to 'easy' money from the natural resources (and rampant corruption) Russia's economy has been underdeveloped in many areas and relied on imports.

This could be balanced by exports, but recently Russia exports less and imports more. Also last year, to strengthen its currency against sanctions, Russia decided to renegotiate some of its export deals to be nominated in rubles. So a barrel of oil (sold for rubles) now buys two/thirds of goods it bought before (for yuans)...

The ruble aiming high:

... The matter about which we disagree is the consequences and their likelihoods, so you can't invoke your judgement of the consequences and likelihoods as arguments, that's begging the question.

My argument is that because war is so awful, it requires a very strong argument in favour (much stronger than more peaceful options) showing how the consequences will be better and the likelihoods higher.

You can't counter that by saying that it doesn't have this extra burden because the consequences are better and the likelihoods higher. That's the argument we're talking about the burden of.

It's like if I said "It's really important that you prove the cup is empty" and you answer "It isn't important because the cup is empty". It's begging the question. I'm sure I can find a Wikipedia article about begging the question if you're having trouble with the concept. — Isaac

I have specifically argued why your chosen course of action is unlikely to bring the positive consequences and likely to bring about the negative consequences. I have given for that the support of experts (many of your own, it so happens). That is all I am required to do. On the other hand, you are required to show that your course of action is likely to bring the positive consequences and not negative ones. You have failed to do that as, upon examination, both experts you cited claim something else. So what are the reasons you believe that the course of action you propose (whatever it is, as we are still missing any details) will likely bring about the positive consequences and not negative ones?

Who said we don't have to support moral claims? Moral claims are not empirical, they're not supported with facts but with appeal to rational and emotional values like coherence, empathy, consistency... — Isaac

You wrote something else:

That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. — Isaac

My moral sense does not support your moral claims, nor does moral sense of most people.

I agree that coercion will be required. I disagree with using military offensives for that purpose. I disagree for the moral reasons I've laid out above (I value pacifism higher than I value war's potential as a coercive tool). Since these are matters of value, there's no question of deferring to Charap. Charap is an expert on foreign affairs so we ought defer to him in the matter of which strategies might work. We have no need to defer to him on value judgements. He nowhere says that negotiations will fail without decades of military offensives. — Isaac

Then again you need your own proposition of a plan backed up by an expert who says that non-military coercion together with diplomacy will likely work. You were unable to produce one for about two weeks now. As we have seen, just 'look it up' does not work that well, given that you did look up and came up with the plan which, it turns out, you do not support.

If it considers that being outside of the Russian sphere of influence is the cause of those increased HFIs, and believes so so strongly that it is willing to risk utter devastation to achieve it. I've shown (by using the US as an example) that merely being outside of Russia's sphere of influence is not a very good predictor of HFI improvements, and I've argued that the devastation of war demands a very high level of confidence in its benefits before committing. There is no such high level of confidence in the theory that Ukraine will gain massive improvements in HFI merely by being outside of Russia's sphere of influence. The causal connection is weak at best. — Isaac

Yet Ukrainians do see the causal link and are willing to risk the devastation of war to achieve it.

Neither author disagrees with me. That's why I cited them. I Fortna in support of the idea that armistice conditions can be strong enough to support long-term ceasefires. She does not disagree with that. I cited Charap in support of the the idea that (a) we are not currently putting enough effort into negotiation, more is needed, and (b) that and armistice could work in this specific case.

Both experts support both arguments. Fortna is pessimistic about long term peace with Putin. So am I, I expect we will have to see regime change before long-term peace can be achieved. Charap considers it morally acceptable to continue military offensives alongside negotiations on the grounds that they will act as coercive tools. I disagree that this benefit is sufficient to outweigh the cost. Since that is a value judgement, it's irrelevant that Charap disagrees with me on that. I expect Fortna does too. — Isaac

It is not supermarket, you do not get to pick and choose fragments of their arguments which suit you, ignoring the rest. If you agree that long-term peace is unachievable with Putin, then nothing you can propose will lead to avoiding devastation and horrors of war. You cannot 'argue for peace' if you agree that it does not have a reasonable chance, by your own words.

Charap clearly says that the success of negotiations depends on the pressure exerted on Putin, and he does not see any other options of doing that beside military means. Do you think he, the F.E. on foreign affairs, missed all the non-military means of coercion that would likely work?

You still do not have a viable alternative, not to mention an expert who supports one.

Yes, I would. You are continuing to ignore the asymmetry of a burden of proof. If I said "we need to jump off that cliff, I know it's a long way down and we'll probably break both legs, but I really think we need to", and you said "no, we can just take the steps", we do not have an equal burden of proof to show our courses of action are necessary. I have a much higher burden because we really, really don't want to jump off the cliff. We don't really care if we walk down the steps, so showing we need to is no big deal. — Isaac

The example is silly, because it completely ignores the consequences and their probabilities. I have already given you the better suited example: we do not propose to disarm ourselves in the hope that everyone in the world will follow, even though global disarmament is a glorious cause and it would save us many horrible wars. We do not do that, because the likely consequences would be much worse. Very unlikely very positive result does not trump very likely negative results.

And your burden of proof is still the same: 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'.

I'm proposing we don't fight a devastating war, we just leave Russia where they are and negotiate a ceasefire. That's the option any non-psychopath would want anyway if it were possible, so merely showing it could be should be enough to advocate the option. Charap's partial argument does that. He didn't link negotiations to continued fighting, ha hasn't made the argument that an armistice will only work if we also continue fighting, he's just saying that (a) we can, and (b) we ought. I agree with (a), but disagree with (b) because I don't share Charap's view on the sanctity of territory. — Isaac

No, because that option is likely to bring about negative consequences, the most negative of them being the likely future war with Russia in better position. And Charap very much links negotiations to continued fighting, he specifically writes:

An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other.

'require' and 'cannot' being the operative words. Him being non-psychopath, he advises that only because he considers that necessary, and he is a fucking expert in these exact questions, by your own words.

If, however, you were arguing that Charap said we ought continue fighting, I'd dispute that because to make an argument for war you need more than a mere preponderance of evidence, you need a very strong case that it is, regretfully, absolutely necessary. — Isaac

Do you genuinely think Samuel Charap, in researching his position for RAND, just didn't think of all the factors when he declared fighting necessary? Slipped his mind, perhaps? Again, if you think you've come up with some important factors to consider that he's missed he'd be delighted to hear from you, It's his job, after all, to make accurate predictions about these things. You'd be saving him face.

I would be very surprised if, on a philosophy forum, people simply ignored my 'oughts'. If we cannot discuss moral claims, then what is left to us - we just fight it out? — Isaac

Given that we do not need to support moral claims in any way, as you say, then there is not much point of discussing them, is there? You recite your moral claims, I recite mine, we are done.

The point is that political opinions change over time. Germany is currently facing a new problem from the rise of the right wing, who are also opposed to arms sales - for their own political reasons. The US went from Obama to Trump overnight. — Isaac

Sure, but we do not assume that the policy will turn over overnight, because then no policy could be implemented at all. Again, your mere claim is that it is possible, you need a bit more to say that it is likely.

Part of my argument is exactly the opposite. The differences really aren't that great, especially in the occupied regions. Russia's record in Crimea wasn't very different from Ukraine's record in Donbas. I don't doubt for a minute that conditions will worsen and progress toward freedom will be set back, but likewise with another decade of war. — Isaac

The differences between countries in the Russian sphere of influence and those outside of it are pretty significant. Therefore, Ukraine should leave the Russian sphere of influence to increase its HFI.

There aren't any good options, we're picking the least worst, so merely pointing out how awful one option is doesn't really make an argument, you need to compare them. Seeing as the war currently involves conscription, imprisonment, restrictions of movement, the banning of political opposition, the banning of opposition media, the deaths to thousands of young men and women, the destruction of vital services, the disruption of livelihoods and the deeper indebtedness to institutions which have a history of restricting economic freedom and worsening inequality, not to mention the risks of starvation in other countries, and the risk of nuclear war... you have an awful lot of 'bad' to stack up against. — Isaac

If the proposed course of action is very unlikely to bring about the least worst option and quite likely to bring about the worst option, then we ought to choose the course of action which will do neither.

And stacking up is quite simple: Minsk 3 will bring about both oppression AND another war in the near future, with all those consequences, when Russia recovers a bit and has a yet better staging ground for another attack on Ukraine. Therefore, we should not choose Minsk 3. Charap, the FE, agrees.

You still maintain that there is an alternative - because you say so, because you do not have to argue anything. You cited Fortna, she disagrees with you, you cited Charap, he disagrees with you. You oppose war, but do not give any reasonable alternative, beside a crap Minsk 3, because this time, maybe it might possibly, hopefully just work, even though your own experts say it is very unlikely. Policies cannot be shaped by wishful thinking.

... But as I said, I don't think it's relevant at this stage. If you're at the point of assuming there is no such plan, then my providing evidence of one is irrelevant. Anyone with even a passing interest in this conflict would have come across arguments like Charap's so your rhetorical demands for the details show either an incredibly well-structured set of media-blinkers (that somehow you've managed to get through the last year without even accidentally reading any opposing views), or a really odd arguing style in which you think that perhaps if I don't know what the arguments are, that somehow... works as a mark against them? — Isaac

So which of the two options you presented Charap's plan is more compatible with:

There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions.

Given that Charap supports further counteroffensive and military pressure, it would seem that he is for the option two, while you have specifically opted for the option one, however badly formulated. Presenting half of his plan, while ignoring the other half (i.e. the coercion) is somewhat disingenious. If I wrote 'Charap's plan is to keep fighting!', you would most likely object.

I don't know if you've much experience with moral claims, but that's pretty much the modus operandi. Moral claims are about how we ought behave, their whole purpose is that others are also bound by them, otherwise they're not moral claims, they're merely statements of preference. — Isaac

Sure, but do not surprised that others will simply ignore your 'oughts', given they have exactly as strong grounds for their moral claims as you do.

Really? Then what was this... https://www.businessinsider.com/which-house-republicans-voted-gaetz-end-military-aid-ukraine-2023-7?op=1&r=US&IR=T ?

Or https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/05/american-support-ukraine-poll/ ?

Germany's initial cause for hesitation hasn't suddenly disappeared... https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60155002

In what way does this add up to "unlikely"? — Isaac

Yes, the opponents of the aid were outvoted 70-358. Sure, it is a significant opposition, but it still makes cutting help to zero unlikely.

And the poll from half a year ago... I can whip up a few as well:

https://www.reuters.com/world/most-americans-support-us-arming-ukraine-reutersipsos-2023-06-28/

https://news.gallup.com/poll/508037/americans-support-ukraine-war-effort.aspx

That is the way with the polls.

As for Germany, I think that quoting an article from before the war might not be the best indicator of current Germans' attitudes given that in the meantime some things happened, e.g. Russia has attacked Ukraine. Don't you think that might be a factor that would change some minds? It certainly did in case of the quoted Baerbock, who now says:

And my third point I would like to make, because also in Germany, I think always around the world, people ask, “But if you wouldn’t have delivered weapons in the beginning, maybe there wouldn’t be so much fighting.”

I think we have to ask the question the opposite way around: If we wouldn’t have decided on the 27th of February in German parliament – or on the 24th around the world – to support Ukraine, there wouldn’t be 13 million refugees in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine – one million in Germany. The total population of Ukraine is 42 million people. If we wouldn’t have supported Ukraine since February 27th, then we would have seen Bucha, Mariupol, everywhere in the whole country.

Seems her views changed a bit since the article... The article also mentions 'economic ties' which, together with the Nord Stream 2, do no longer exist, so it is even less relevant. Have you read it at all?

I thought I'd been clear. In line with people like Charap, and numerous others, I'm in favour of a much stronger effort toward negotiated solutions than we're currently seeing to end the immediate fighting. I'm also (unlike Charap, I expect), opposed to nationalism so I'm less concerned about territorial occupation. Russia were manifestly wrong to forcibly take control of the Eastern territories, Ukraine are equally manifestly wrong to do so as well. What is wrong is using military force to take control of territory, who 'owned' it is the first place does nothing to mitigate that wrong unless one can very strongly demonstrate that the humanitarian benefit of changing ownership will outweigh the harms from the war required to do so. Here they do not. — Isaac

So Charap's plan is not your plan after all.

Efforts toward negotiated solutions are commendable and actually made (for example, Zelensky is going to the peace summit in Saudi Arabia to hammer out a plan that could be presented to Putin), they are just unlikely to bring any lasting positive result at this point. You do not care about occupation or independence, OK, other people obviously do. I am surprised though that you do not care that the HFI of those occupied will be much lower than those who are not. The rest are just your moral claims which are simply different than the moral claims of others, so they do not need to be addressed.

As to the "lasting peace with Putin" claim. I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I support lasting peace. Full stop. I don't see much of a way in which that can happen with Putin as leader of Russia (I don't see much of a way that can happen with Zelensky as leader of Ukraine either). — Isaac

OK, so you support an option that is unlikely to happen, fully accepting that your suggestions will not be even considered given their impracticality. However, in the meantime people must be prepared for what is likely to happen and take appropriate action.

Third time lucky... Authoritarian rule is an indicator, not a factor affecting indicators. The HFI attempts to include in its measure degrees of authoritarianism, it is therefore already included in any comparison. Things like the actions of predatory monopolies like Black Rock (or Halliburton in Iraq), are not measures already included in the HFI, so we have to speculate on the effect they might have had. If you still don't get it this time, it's probably best we just drop this. — Isaac

No, what Putin does to his people is not an indicator, it is a factor affecting the indicator. You are just confused.

Yes. The same applies to Sachs, but it didn't stop you attempting to downplay the relevance of his statements with this accusation of bias.

And since when ha making predictions divorced from reality hampered the career of retired military advisor. Have you looked at the track record of the current crop of ex-military advisors? accuracy isn't an issue. Cushy jobs consulting for arms dealers and government agencies are far more important and those are not gained by accuracy, they're gained by loyalty. — Isaac

I did not down play the relevance of Sachs' statements, I just pointed out he is not an impartial witness to the negotiations, which was implied.

You have accused me of making things up, i.e. the specific operation plan, because it was not from an expert, so you claimed we are both in the same boat. I gave you the plan from the expert, so you are in the boat of unspecificed operating plans alone.

Well then we've reached the limit of our disagreement. I think it is inhumanely monstrous to simply 'choose' war as if it were an equal option to peace dependant only on the chances of success. — Isaac

As I wrote long time ago, I understand that you feel that way, however, most people do not. You also seem to believe that it is an imperative that everyone felt like you, but again, it is just you.

None. That is a moral claim and as such requires no expertise to back it up. It is intended to appeal to your moral sense. It clearly failed. — Isaac

If your moral sense is different than that of most people, then all I can do is to empathize with you. Your insistence that the majority abandons their moral view (which, as you say, does not need backing up), is a bit unrealistic, though.

So you claim, but without evidence. You've yet to supply anything with relative amounts. Sure, if the West cuts aid in half it will still be enough. But are they going to cut aid in half? or third? or quarter? There's significant calls in America to cut it to zero, likewise Germany. — Isaac

The military American aid to Ukraine amounts to 42 bln USD. It is harder to find data on help from other countries, but estimates put it at about the same figure. This year the whole military budget of Russia is about 80 bln USD. However, not all of it or possibly even most of it is not directed to the war effort - Russia has military personel and bases all over the country, fleets etc., which still must be maintained. But this constitutes one fourth of the annual budget, as the Economist pointed out, Russia will not be able to keep it at this level, especially that not all costs of war are directly related to the military.

And yes, the aid may be cut to zero and the Russian economy may collapse overnight. Both options are possible, but unlikely.

I don't propose lasting peace with Putin. I've asked you time and again for a very simple and very reasonable request that you cite what I have claimed in your post rather than make up what you think I've claimed. It's really the bare minimum of decent honest debate that you argue against the claims I've made. I simply will not answer again to claims I've not made. there is a quote function, it's not hard to use. — Isaac

I am very sorry then, what do you propose? Because it is extremely hard to extract that small bit of information out of you. Repeating 'negotiations' is not very helpful, for the reasons given by Fortna.

Recently you have quoted Charap, so it seemed like you endorse his plan. Do you? Do you advocate solid support for the Ukrainian offensive along starting the negotiations? Do you believe that coercion should be as strong as diplomacy? I was under impression that you do not, but I do not want to misinterpret you again.

It's a regional conflict over disputed territory because of separatism, the same kind of separatism which elsewhere has lead to independence, and a general siding with the separatists in the liberal West. — Isaac

Are you saying Sachs was writing nonsense? Putin had nothing to do with this at all? It was never about NATO? 'Free and prosperous' Ukraine is not a threat to Putin, as you have claimed? If separatists got their independence, Putin would just look happily as Ukraine joins NATO and EU? Really...

I'm comparing Ukraine and Russia in similar global economic and political circumstances (both ten years ago and both now). You're comparing completely different circumstances (the collapse of communism and rise of Europe). The world has changed fundamentally since then, the rise of globalism, the take over of the financial industry, the move from national government control to multinational companies... We're in a different world. And figures from 30 years ago are not necessary. We have modern day examples. — Isaac

You have given no examples how those factors affect HFI. As we have seen, there are factors which barely change the indicator (like rising authoritarian rule in Russia), so we cannot predict whether what you write will do. The fact is that the very countries that had very similar problems that you mention now have stellar HFIs.

You mean the Ben Hodges who held the chair at CEPA, funded by the arms industry? The guy who has, throughout his advisory career advocated a stronger NATO and has politically endorsed Joe Biden? That Ben Hodges?

Funny how when Sachs was mentioned you spent several pages on how unreliable he was as a source because of his political leanings and history of advocacy for a particular policy...

But sure, he'll do. — Isaac

You mean he is biased? Of course he is. Does that mean that he makes wild speculations? Rather unlikely, it would be rather damaging to his reputation if he made military predictions completely divorced from reality.

So where does he say that negative assessments of Ukraine's chances are all nonsense? Because, as seems to be stubbornly difficult to get across, we hate war. We choose war as a last resort, when all.other options are spent. So to support war you have to show all other options are spent. Your experts need to show, not just the.possibility that Ukraine might win, but the near impossibility that they would lose. They need to show, not just the possibility that Ukraine could outgun Russia in the long run, but the near impossibility that they would not...

You're not accepting, not even addressing, the asymmetry here. We don't want war. It's horrific. It needs a very strong argument in favour of it. — Isaac

No, we choose war when other options are unlikely to bring lasting peace and bear negative consequences. You yourself called Minsk accords 'crap'. But that was the exact option you advocate for: bad, but supposedly meant to bring peace. That was the best non-war option all could come up with. Was it a good one? Did it have positive consequences? Did bring lasting peace?

Also, which of your experts you mentioned said that all options must be spent, no matter how likely or with what consequences? Charap writes about the US policy at the beginning of the war:

This approach made sense in the initial months of the conflict. The trajectory of the war was far from clear at that point. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was still talking about his readiness to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the West had yet to supply Kyiv with sophisticated ground-based rocket systems, let alone tanks and long-range missiles as it does today. Plus, it will always be difficult for the United States to speak about its view on the objective of a war that its forces are not fighting. The Ukrainians are the ones dying for their country, so they ultimately get to decide when to stop—regardless of what Washington might want.

so definitely he does not advise the approach of 'no war no matter the cost'. He also, as I have already mentioned, advises to maintain the military pressure on Russia to make it more likely to enter negotiations, which includes the counteroffensive, even it is not absolutely certain it will succeed (on the contrary, he admits that the result is pretty much unpredictable, yet he still supports it, unlike you).

Fortna specifically writes that negotations are very unlikely to bring about the expected results, so she is not for 'spending all the options' either.

Russia. But Russia will spend as much of it's income as it possibly can on the military first and has a single objective - Ukraine. The West has a million other objectives, and political opponents opposed to spending anything at all on Ukraine. So it will take a collapse for Russia to stop spending, a mere dip into deeper recession will be enough to cause the West to question its commitment.

Comparing the economies alone is ridiculous. As if spending were merely an accounting issue and not a political one. — Isaac

For Russia it will not take collapse to limit the spending, as has been already pointed out in your own source (a dramatic false alternative again). In the West it is very likely that the spending will be limited as well, as I have already acknowledged. Comparing the economies is important to show the scale - even if the West cuts its assistance by half, it will still be a significant burden on Russia which it will be unlikely to meet. Spending as much of its income as it possibly can will still not be enough. And politics in Russia should not be disregarded either, given that it already had a coup attempt. It is not that Putin can completely ignore domestic dissent.

He's attacked Ukraine once so far. Not much to go on. — Isaac

He took Crimea in 2014, the forces he supported broke the Minsk accords in 2015, he started a full-scale hostilities in 2022. Are you considering this as a single attack?

She doesn't. She's pessimistic about the chances, but that's only relevant to this discussion if she were more optimistic about the chances of a long war bringing about peace and she isn't.

To use Fortna to support your argument you'd have to select out her opinion on negotiations and ignore her opinion on war. — Isaac

She writes that achieving lasting peace with Putin through negotiations is very unlikely, which is the very thing you propose. How is it irrelevant to the discussion?

Exactly. But we can agree on the low chances of negotiation succeeding. Where we disagree is that war has a higher chance (and enough higher to justify the massive costs). Fortna is equally pessimistic on that matter. — Isaac

Ukrainians want to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Russia (and Putin in particular) are willing to use force to stop them. That is the underlying conflict here. For that reason negotiations will not bring lasting peace, because Putin will never agree to that. The only way to resolve the conflict is to facilitate that transition the best that we can. It is regrettable that it must be done in the conditions of war, but as Fortna points out, Putin would not have it any other way.

And? Is Ukraine going to store up all the weapons it gets and not use them then? — Isaac

No, it will use them, but their depletion rate is lower than the acquisition rate at this point. Of course, the deliveries will eventually stop, as the West does not have unlimited supply of surplus hardware, but most of it has not even been delivered (e.g. Ukraine got about 20% of promised tanks).

You're reaching. If your argument hangs on the use of 'eventually' you're really clutching at straws. What matters is not the terminology, it's the conclusion. Charap concludes that winning a long war is not likely enough to justify the cost, so whatever he meant, it must lead to that conclusion. If what he meant was that the West would run into problems way down the line, but Russia would do so first, then it wouldn't lead to the conclusion he reached would it? So that cannot be what he meant. It's really the bare minimum of charitable interpretation to assume the reasons back the conclusion. — Isaac

Charap concludes that a decisive victory is not likely and that the conflict will last for a long time. We have also discussed that the conflict will lose its intensity (the West will be willing to dial down the assistance, Russia will be forced to limit its spending), so there will be a long, low-intensity conflict. That is what all cited experts agree on.

No, that's not what Charap is suggesting. He's suggesting such talks right now. Not 'once Russia is weakened enough. His argument is the exact opposite, that waiting for Russia to be more weakened is not worth the cost. — Isaac

Yes, he suggests that the diplomatic channel should be opened now. But he is saying that it should be done in parallel with supplementing the counteroffensive, which is the opposite of what you suggest:

In the short term, that means both continuing to help Kyiv with the counteroffensive and beginning parallel discussions with allies and Ukraine about the endgame. In principle, opening a negotiation track with Russia should complement, not contradict, the push on the battlefield. If Ukraine’s gains make the Kremlin more willing to compromise, the only way to know that would be through a functioning diplomatic channel. Setting up such a channel should not cause either Ukraine or its Western partners to let up the pressure on Russia. An effective strategy will require both coercion and diplomacy. One cannot come at the expense of the other.

He clearly advocates helping Kyiv with the counteroffensive and the 'push on the battlefield'. That would mean that we should supply Kyiv with as much military hardware, ammunition and other resources as we can to improve its negotiating position, right?

Poland busts another Russian spy network, this time around unveiling plans to attack Ukraine-bound trains. Lukashenko + Putin "mention" that Wagner would like to hit Poland (on more than one occasion). Wagner mercs train close to Polish border; Poland + Baltics nervous. Poland enacts controversial law to deal with Russian influence. Belarusian choppers enter Poland airspace. Russia posts about Poland taking over Western Ukraine. EU ready to close Belarus borders. — jorndoe

Today Belarussian choppers violated Polish airspace.

Sorry, messed up the reply, see above.

They're not any more. They may be a prime example of how it worked in the late 90s, but they're not an example of how it works now. They're also, more to the point of the argument, not an example of the sort of 'club' Ukraine is looking to join became unlike Ukraine, they did not have such crippling debts, predatory monopolies like Black Rock, destroyed infrastructure, and huge globally important assets, nor were they entering into a fractured Europe in recession. — Isaac

'Crippling' is rather subjective, but they did have debts, most of which were cancelled by the economic oppressors. Why think with Ukraine it would be different, given its strategic importance for the US? The infrastructure was not 'destroyed' as such, just completely obsolete (if I remember correctly, at some time in the 90s Poland had the most modern telephone infrastructure, as it was completely new - the old one was simply torn down and replaced). Western companies bought post-communist industries in bulk for spare change ('robbery privatization' was the term used). So while the situation was not similar, but certainly analogous. I am surprised you object, given you considered Russia's and Ukraine's situation ten years ago to be very similar, so your standards of similarity seem very broad. Now they have high HFIs, then so will Ukraine, as your argument went.

I wasn't questioning your ability to make stuff up. I was questioning the extent to which any of it can be demonstrated to be a viable solution.

You've not cited a single expert source, just come up with a load of wild speculation. You might as well have said "Ukraine will perform an incantation to summon demons who will fight off the Russians". A load of military acronyms doesn't stand in place of an argument here, which, in this context would be in the form "so-and-so states that...", preferably followed by a citation. Absent of that, we're in the same boat since all we have of specifics with actual expert basis, are the conclusions. — Isaac

How about Ben Hodges, ex-commanding general of the US forces in Europe? Is he expert enough for you or Is he also making wild speculations?

https://www.newsweek.com/how-ukraine-retake-crimea-us-general-ben-hodges-russia-counteroffensive-1796264

Does that mean I am alone in the boat now?

Neither article addresses the issues Charap raises, they both just give targets, not the means by which those targets will be met given political opposition. Nor do either of those sources give relative figures showing that the resultant production mentioned will be higher than Russia's. — Isaac

You have asked a very specific question:

What artillery supply deals will be struck? — Isaac

And you got very specific answer: now you are complaining it does not answer your other unasked questions? How sad.

Well then. If they fail, how will the West sustain the expenditure reliant on them? — Isaac

It will not. Which economies are more likely to fail: those of the West, which carry a relatively small economic burden and are not hindered by dozens of sanctions or the Russian one?

...So who is it claiming Charap's conclusion here is nonsense?

Again, if it's not nonsense, if it's just one of the options, then we try peace, because war is horrible, we try it only if we absolutely have to, not on a preponderance of evidence. — Isaac

How many times Putin has to attack Ukraine for you to consider that his promises of peace are not actually worth much? Fortna, the fucking expert on negotiations and agreements writes: 'No leader in the world can believe a promise by Russia to stop fighting'.

Indeed you have. As I said, I've no interest in having the absurd discussion you're thinking of. The idea that us throwing our 'data' at each other results in anything other than the exact same positions we both started with is naive beyond reckoning. I'm asking here for something different. I'm asking for expert support for the notion that, for example, Charap's position is actually non-viable. Because if you can't show that, then you have no argument. If a peaceful solution is viable, then we ought try it. — Isaac

I have already given you one: Fortna says achieving lasting peace with Putin is non-viable.

Nowhere does she say anything even approaching your points. She doesn't argue that Ukraine can win territory back, she doesn't argue that wearing Russia down will solve the problem in the long run, she doesn't argue that Russia are unlikely to improve their measures of freedom. — Isaac

I did not say ALL of my points. I just meant those where I have pointed out that negotiating agreement with Putin is unlikely to bring lasting peace.

Yes. Clearly we can. Did you think Charap was joking? Had he temporarily lost his mind? Maybe had too much to drink? Obviously, if an expert in foreign relations thinks it is possible then it is clearly possible. You don't have to agree with him, but you (an unqualified layman) sneering at him (a qualified, experienced and respected strategist) just makes you look stupid. — Isaac

Charap thinks it is possible, he just has no idea now:

Devising measures to make the cease-fire stick will be a thorny but critical task, and Washington should ensure that it is ready to assist Kyiv in that effort. Serious work should begin now on how to avoid what Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, describe derisively as “Minsk 3,” a reference to the two failed cease-fire deals that were brokered with Russia in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015, after its earlier invasions. These agreements failed to durably end the violence and included no effective mechanisms for ensuring the parties’ compliance.

He then suggests mechanisms mentioned by Fortna. The only issue is that Fortna herself gives a very specific argument why those measures will not work in this case. Charap does not address any of the issues she mentions at all.

No, my claim is that it cannot increase faster than Russia's — Isaac

Your own source (the Economist) claims that Russia's military will decrease.

Well then it must be the 'modest effort' that is proving hard to sustain mustn't it? Otherwise why would Charap (a fucking expert in these exact questions) say otherwise? It's patently absurd for you to think you can in any way dismiss his conclusion by just guessing how difficult it might be. — Isaac

Your fucking expert writes:

Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West, which will eventually cause budgetary challenges for Western countries and readiness problems for their militaries.

Note 'eventually'. On the other hand Russia is facing 'budgetary challenges' right now.

Basically, it comes down to this - several experts consider talks, ceasefires, and an end to military offensives is not only a viable, but a necessary strategy. Since that strategy kills fewer people (and results in far less collateral damage) - again, in the view of these same experts, it is a strategy we ought to follow in favour of more destructive ones. To argue against this, you have to show that these experts are not right. You personal opinion doesn't do that. — Isaac

So far you mentioned one expert, Charap, who proposes opening diplomatic channels for future negotiations, while maintaining fighting and other means of pressure on Russia (he specifically mentions that diplomacy cannot come at the expense of coercion). So yes, possibly once Russia is weakened enough such talks might be started. The issue is that it would undermine Putin's regime, so he is unlikely to enter such agreements. The other issue, mentioned both by Charap and Fortna, is that the means to assure his compliance are very limited.

Quite familiar, but I'm no historian. Perhaps rather than relying on vague attempts at condescending dismissal, you'd actually say what issue you think I've missed. — Isaac

The issue you missed is that if we are to talk about the IMF and US economic capitalistic oppression, then the transformation of the former EE countries is the prime example of that, so their HFIs must reflect it.

Fine, let's have an equal playing filed then. You claim that continued fighting could release some more territory from occupation and deplete Russian stocks of artillery faster than Ukraine's; which military operations exactly? What formations do you think will be successful and why (and don't give me any formations that have been tried before and ever failed because we know those don't work). What artillery supply deals will be struck? How will places like Germany fend off the rise of the far right whilst maintaining weapons supply? What budgetary mechanisms will the US and Europe put in place to avoid recession (and again, don't give me any that have failed in the past)? What policies will Ukraine put in place to maintain conscription? What economic policies will maintain the next decade of economic stability without any air access or port use?

From the strategic level the most reasonable way is to cut off the land bridge to Crimea by splitting the Russian forces somewhere between Melitopol and Mariupol. That operation is underway, conducted by the Operational Command South, which was quite successful in liberating Kherson. The question about 'formations' is rather odd, frankly speaking, because operations are not typically conducted all the time with the same formations, as in order to mantain their battle readiness they must be rotated on a regular basis. The operation met with stronger resistance than expected, therefore Ukrainians (who are more conservative about their troop losses due to the accepted tactics) switched to attrition, which is more successful. The materiel losses of both sides are reported by Oryx, which is considered to be rather objective, as he was widely quoted even by Russians. The reports show that Russians are losing substantial amount of hardware, especially artillery, proportionally more that Ukrainians, which is atypical given that it is Ukraine that is on the offensive. The main reason for that is that Russians cannot have proper rear, given the terrain they have taken is only 100 km wide and completely in range of Ukrainian HIMARS and SCALPs. The problems with Russian supplies in Zaporozhia are widely reported by Russians: dismissed Popov, milbloggers Rybar, WarGonzo or Romanov. Partricular attention should be given to the blog of Andrej 'Murz' Morozov, who is a seasoned veteran of the war since 2014 and who (unlike e.g. Girkin) was not a doomsayer at all, even when he criticized the higher command. Recently he is very pessimistic about the fate of Russian forces in the South, particularly citing supply problems. This indicates that the situation may develop simiarly as in the Kherson oblast, where Russians were unable to support its troops. However, progress made this way is rather slow, so without significant breaks the land bridge is unlikely to be taken this year. However, if the operation is successful, it will enable Ukrainians to control all the land supply routes to Crimea (if they get to the Azov Sea the Kerch Bridge will not be defensible from medium range missiles). This will make Crimean forces quite difficult to maintain, which might prompt another withdrawal.

The details about funding the artillery production in the coming years can be found e.g. here and here.

I do not know what budgetary mechanisms will be applied, I think it is quite likely that they will fail. Politicians are not very good at stopping recession.

The problem with Ukrainian troops is not that it run out of men, but rather that, due its tactics, it must maintain a high quality of troops, not necessarily as numerous. They are not running meat attacks with mobiks, like Russia, so they have lower losses, but each soldier is more precious (as he is better trained and equipped). So it is not so much about conscription numbers but about training and equipping the force, which the West helps with a lot.

Air access in Ukraine is negligible for transportation of goods. Sea transportation will have to be replaced by land transport (mostly railway), which has about half of capacity. The railway network will have to be expanded (it has already gained 470 km of new and renewed tracks last year, despite the war). Poland has pledged significant expansion of its eastern network, which will be connected to its central communication hub. There are talks with Romania, which would strengthen its infrastructure to allow export of Ukrainian goods from its ports. Still, the throughput will be lower than the sea transportation, reaching at best two thirds of its volume (this figure might be incorrect, as I cannot recall the source for it, I will keep looking).

and to be clear, in answering all of those questions don't ever supply a battle manoeuvre, policy, strategy or approach that's ever failed before because that means it will fail again. When you've provided all that data, backed up by expert testimony that it will work... then you're in a position to accuse the move to ceasefire lacking in detail. — Isaac

Not really. Throughout the thread I have already provided much more facts and details to support my arguments than you did. The playing field was never even, but not the way you suggest.

The fact remains that you have failed to provide a proposal of a solution that would likely bring lasting peace, which, by your words, you are required to do. The ceasefire proposition does not do that.

No. And Fortna does not go on to say that another few decades of war will eventually prevent Russia from doing this gain either. She's pretty pessimistic about any solution at all. Again, as I said above, if both solutions look bleak, we don't pick war because war is horrible. — Isaac

Fortna pretty much argues that the war was inevitable in the long run. And it is not because she suddenly turned a blood-thirsty militarist, on the contrary, she still believes that negotiations and peace accords are the best way to achieve lasting peace. She just argues, in great detail, why at this particular point it is very unlikely. But many of those issues apply equally well to the situation before the war - the points she makes concerning Putin's situation pretty much align with what I was saying even before I found that article. Your chosen expert seems to to agree with my points, as painful as it might be for you.

He does... — Isaac

An armistice without a settlement? So hostilities cease, Ukraine seeks Swedish-style informal cooperation with NATO with close integration of forces and of course arms itself to the teeth with the help of its newfound informal allies. It also seeks to join EU, with the democratic and economic improvements that entails. All this means that Ukraine practically and actively leaves the Russian sphere of influence. Can we at least take a guess how willing Putin would be to maintain ceasefire in such case? While doing that, we have to consider arguments of some people that claim that the very prospect of Ukraine in NATO practically pushed Putin to war AND the argument that Putin sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a grave danger.

I already have given the relevant quote. You've asked this already and I supplied the Charap's conclusions that the benefits of depleting Russia's capabilities do not outweigh the costs. — Isaac

Your claim was that Ukraine's military potential does not increase, so that quote does not support it.

It's not just about economics, it's about the political ability to keep pouring money into Ukraine at the expense of other calls on that money during an economic recession. Of course if all the countries of the West put all their effort into arming Ukraine, their combined resources would be bigger than Russia's, that goes without saying. The point is that Russia is directly involved in this war and is a ruthless autocracy, so it can pretty much spend as much as it likes on military until it reaches a point of open revolt in the streets. The west are in no such position. the arms lobby are very powerful, but other lobbies are powerful too and they want a slice of the pie, plus they have to keep an electorate happy and whilst a good media campaign can do that, people are fickle and have short attention spans, the 'Glorious War' will get boring soon and need replacing with another distraction. We've no skin in the game so haven't got the same capability to maintain investment. The troubles Germany are having right now are a good example of this. — Isaac

You seem to be fond of dramatic false alternatives. Maintaining the current level of support costs the US less than one percent of its annual budget and Russia already cannot keep up. So the West does not have to put 'all their effort', in fact, it is enough that it puts a rather modest effort, like it does right now. Most of the hardware that the West has given to Ukraine was either decommissoned or on its way to be replaced, so it is not that the West is losing some previous assets. And no, Russia cannot spend as much as it likes, it can only spend as much as it has, which is not much compared to the West, given its economy is twenty times smaller. When the West dials down the aid, which is to be expected, it will still outspend Russia rather easily.

Degree of indebtedness is an external factor, as is predatory contracting by monopolies. Those are not already measured by the HFI, but rather are theorised to be potential causes of those measures. — Isaac

It seems you are still not familiar with how EE economies were restructured ('given away to the West', as some said) after the communism.

Is there anything not clear enough there? — Isaac

Everything is perfectly clear: in your quote Charap does not propose any solution, he just says it is needed. Can you see the difference? Fortna and co. specifically write:

But absent a major battlefield loss for Russia, or major domestic upheaval, in the near future an enduring negotiated settlement is unlikely. Instead, the war could drag on for years, with tens of thousands of casualties.

It takes more to end a war than a few sessions at the negotiation table — the challenge is reaching agreement about the likely eventual military outcome and terms of settlement that both sides will want to honor, as well as reaching an outcome that leaves leaders without fear of domestic political punishment.

Fortna specifically writes why any accord negotiated at this time would likely not bring enduring peace, so in effect any solution negotiated now would be Minsk 3 (while you agree that Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 were 'crap'). Nothing in your Charap's quote contradicts that.

Look up the difference between 'armistice' and 'peace deal'. Fortna is giving reasons why an actual peace deal will be difficult. Charap agrees, but is talking about an armistice.

Either way, "carry on with the war until Russia runs out of bombs" is not on either experts wish list. — Isaac

If Charap does not propose a solution that would end the war and Fortna argues that an enduring peace is not likely, then you still do not 'show there's a reasonable chance'.

It doesn't. As Charap points out. And even NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s admits that “the war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles. The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain. — Isaac

It does, it was already discussed that Ukraine has more military hardware (and much better) than it had in the beginning of the war. Soon it will have more modern planes, while Russia is losing them much faster than it can produce them. Does Charap deny that? Can you give the relevant quote?

And yes, Ukraine is using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than the West can produce it, but of course Russia is also using up artillery ammo quite quickly, quicker than Russia (and Iran and North Korea) can produce it. The difference is that the West, due to its much greater economic potential, can ramp up production much more than Russia and its allies. It is happening already, it just takes time. Not to mention that when Stoltenberg made that comment, the decision on the DPICM stocks (about 3 mln pieces) was not yet made.

No. It wasn't. Please, if you're going to continue to try thus "you argued that..." line of discussion (which frankly I'd rather you didn't), at least use the quote function to dispute what I've actually said, not what you'd like me to have said.

If you don't understand an aspect of my argument, then ask. Ask sarcastically if you must, but simply asserting I said something and then arguing against it isn't a discussion, I might as well not be here you can just do both parts. — Isaac

That was your claim:

The simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years. — Isaac

Additionally, you have flatly refused to consider aspects of the current Russian situation that would counter that claim, arguing that they are irrelevant, because HFI includes everything. Is that correct?

It's not going to 'join them'. The 'them' you're referring to are 'countries recently freed from Soviet restrictions on trade and governance, entering a buoyant European economy with functioning, if underinvested infrastructure and a few billion in debts'. That is not the group Ukraine are proposing to join. — Isaac

You have claimed that Ukraine was like Russia, because they had similar HFI, specifically refusing to consider their obvious differences, different paths they have taken and their history in general. You have specifically claimed that all you need for your prediction are HFI shifts. In that case, I can ignore the differences between the EE countries and current Ukraine and make the exact same prediction based on the exact same support: the simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where the EE countries are now in the space of sixteen years.

That a qualified expert in the field thinks peaceful solutions are possible is an argument in favour of peaceful solutions. It is, in fact, just about the strongest argument possible here, and not one I should even be engaged in among the relatively well informed.

You've stretched out to like ten pages of posts what should have taken half a paragraph. "Yes, its possible that peaceful negotiations might work because clearly some experts consider that be the case... Here's why I think we shouldn't pursue that option nonetheless..." That's the discussion we should have been having. Not this truly bizarre exchange where you half pretend there's no expert disagreement, then half pretend there is, but your spectacular mental kung fu can work out who's right, if only some complete layman could summarise the argument for you. — Isaac

Which qualified expert and what exact solution he proposes? It would not take ten pages if each request for support of your claim (which you admit now you need) was not met by 'I do not have to give you anything but HFI' and 'I know, but I will not tell'.

This despite me citing those sources...? — Isaac

Your source from 2005 does not contain proposals concerning the situation in 2022 or 2023. I have already agreed that ceasefire based on strong foundations is a great idea. The fact that it is theoretically possible says nothing about how it is applicable to the situation at hand.

But imagine your luck! I did find what Fortna (and other notable experts) think about the current situation! So there you have it, your own source, the renowned expert, on the current situation in Ukraine in the article titled 'The prospects for a negotiated peace in Ukraine are bleak'. So even assuming she still thinks negotiations work, she has many reasons to believe (and she lists them in detail, it is worth a read) why they do not apply to this particular situation.

None. That criteria is unlikely to be met. Fortna is not suggesting that every single criteria need be met. Status quo ante bellum solutions are usually cited as plausible in cases of mutually disputed territory, so as Fortna puts it "neither side loses". This is clearly not an option here, but as is clear from the thesis, it's not that all factors need be present. — Isaac

Sure, but it seems to be pretty important in this case. Most of the other criteria were part of the Minsk accords, which you considered 'crap'. The Fortna's article given above points out exactly the very issues I have mentioned.

But again, this paper is cited, by Anatol Lieven at Quincy, if I recall correctly. If you think its inappropriate, then take it up with him. I'm just letting you know what the arguments are, since you asked. If you think you have the grasp and experience in this field to take them down, then you crack on but I'm not the man you need to be going after. — Isaac

The only source I found is this article in which he opposes demilitarization of Crimea and Donbas, saying that it would worsen the situation. But demilitarization is the second of conditions of lasting peace given by Fortna. So it would seem (to a layman) that another strong foundation for a lasting peace would be taken out.

Note also that Lleven here does not give a proposal for a peaceful solution, only warns which solutions should be avoided. The search continues.

Because your argument is about how Russia's economy will be damaged more than the West's such that it will be unable to keep up the artillery supply that the West could. If you're now saying that Russia's economy will survive a low intensity simmering war, then you have no grounds for your argument that...

...as that argument was based on deteriorating Russia's military capability which in turn was based on collapsing it's economy. This is all quite clearly detailed in the thread if you read back a few posts...

If, as you now agree, the war is likely to simmer for a long time, and, as you now agree, the Russian economy can quite easily sustain such a war, then on what grounds are you now supporting an argument that continued war will deplete Russia's military capabilities quicker than Ukraine's? — Isaac

Because being capable only of lower intensity effort means that you are not capable of sustaining the current intensity effort? I am not sure how to put it in simpler terms... If Russia will be unable to sustain the current level, then its military capability WILL deteriorate, right? I said nothing about 'collapsing', I said that Russia is in a worse state economically (i.e spends proportionally on the war much more than the West), so it cannot keep up with the current level of spending, with which the Economist agrees.

Given that Ukraine's potential now increases (at the current level of support) and Russia's potential decreases, the gap will widen. It will do so even if the support for the war from the West decreases, as long as it is still higher than what Russia will be able to spend, which is exactly what I wrote.

They are not external. They are in the HFI measurements. — Isaac

Your argument was that HFI can move significantly and positively without consideration of any particular factors (as they could be offset by other factors), therefore we are unable to predict whether it will not bounce when Ukraine is occupied by Russia. Do you retract that argument?

All you have is the sum total, it doesn't tell you which factors pushed in which direction, only what the end result of those factors put together was.

Given that the US cannot even achieve a high HFI itself, it's unlikely that US influence was a positive factor.

Given, further, what we know about US's predatory trade, privatisation, and monopolising practices, it's most likely to have be a negative factor, simply overcome by more positive ones (such as the very profitable new trading opportunities opened up by no longer being in the soviet bloc). — Isaac

The bottom line, however, is that the countries in the US sphere of influence are much less oppressed, according to the HFI, therefore we should expect that Ukraine will also be much less oppressed, when it joints them. There is no point citing debts, trade etc., because they are already included in the HFI. All the negative factors will be overcome by the greater positive factors, also included in the HFI.

Exactly. If you seriously think there's no alternative then I can't help you. You can't expect to conduct a conversation on a topic like this one so woefully ill-informed. So read a little around the topic first. Having done that you will have become aware of the alternative opinions. Once aware of them, there's no need for me to point them out, simply say why you don't find their position convincing. Don't let's go through this rhetorical charade first.

If you know what the alternative opinions are, then address them directly. If you don't then I suggest you read more widely before engaging in such a complex topic as this with such strong views as you espouse. — Isaac

I think you have pushed the expectations on conducting the conversation on this topic woefully ill-informed quite significantly.

I must remind you that you wrote that 'to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance'. You did not, on the contrary, you specifically refuse to do so. Saying 'look it up on the Internet' is not 'showing the alternative' under any reasonable interpretation. And given your tendency to drag in any googled random piece of information to support your claims, it would be somewhat odd if you knew the alternative and refused to share it for mysterious reasons. Thus the quite reasonable conclusion is that you do not know any such alternative, which is additionally supported by the fact you have entered this discussion claiming that you do not have to provide it. At least I have managed to change your mind on that, success, yay.

It's quite clear on the matter. But I'm not going to be drawn into this make-believe notion that this is about weighing the evidence, I already regret the five minutes it took me to find and format those quotes from the PDF, as if evidence was going to have any effect. — Isaac

But I agree with your source! Yes, those are quite strong factors to achieve peace. The issue I see is that you have not given any explanation how those factors could be applied in this particular case (and failed to provide sources that do). For example, the first point mentioned is withdrawal beyond the status quo ante. Which of your experts says Russia is likely to peacefully withdraw beyond pre-2014 borders, leaving Crimea, Donbas and all other annexed oblasts which are supposedly now part of Russia according to its constitution?

As it is with both the US and Europe. This is a comparative exercise. But again, if you don't think it's a reasonable conclusion take it up with the experts who conclude it, don't argue with me about it, I didn't work this stuff out myself by pouring over source economic data, why the hell would I when there are experts who are much better informed than I am who do that for me? — Isaac

My experts say that the US is spending 0.50% of its annual budget on military help for Ukraine (0.25% for other help). That exact same amount constitutes 15% of the Russian annual budget. My experts say that it is a greater burden for Russia. Do your experts disagree?

It's the opposite of what you are saying. You said... — Isaac

The Economist says Russia will be able to maintain a conflict of much lower intensity and I said that it will be able to maintain a simmering conflict. How is that opposlte?

We agreed that history tells us that wars of this nature are likely to persists for decades (a 'long' war), the kind of war the article says "Russia's economy can withstand". That's why I cited the article. — Isaac

Yes, and I have already argued that low-intensity (i.e. simmering) conflict will not allow Russia to prevent Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence.

Again, I'm not the best person to learn this from, there are far better resources online, unless you seriously think there isn't even an argument in that respect, then a few online resources aren't going to help. — Isaac

I begin to see a pattern.

Quite serious yes. The former were historical figures, the net result of which were already included in the summary data, the latter are predictions about future effects, they obviously require consideration of factors.

If you want to bring in estimates for Russian occupied Donbas over the next 10 years, you'll have to explain why you're rejecting the data from Russian occupied Crimea, which provides what would seem to be an almost perfect data set for that prediction. — Isaac

No. You have made an argument that it is perfectly possible, if not likely, that occupied Ukraine will be able to increase HFI and you have repeatedly claimed that the HFI variations are absolutely sufficient to make that argument and that any external factors (such as the political situation in Russia) may be promptly dismissed.

Now you are making an argument that post-war Ukraine will NOT be able to increase its HFI, completely disregarding your previous argument and basing that prediction solely on the external factors.

Tu sum up: using just HFI is good, when it supports your argument, but should be disregarded, when it does not. On the other hand, external factors are irrelevant when they do not support your argument and essential when they do. Pretty interesting way of argumentation.

You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing?

I though this thread had reached a peak of US bootlicking sycophancy, but turns out there's whole new levels I hadn't expected. — Isaac

No, I am just pointing out that the US influence does not seem to limit other countries' freedom. On the other hand, those who buy the theory of the U.S. oppression, must admit that Americans' oppression seems to make those countries less oppressed than Americans are themselves. Curious.

I assume the experts considering the situation have probably taken that into account. But if you think not... I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at Samuel_Charapatranddotorg, I suggest you drop him a line and let him know he's missed something. I'm sure he'll be very grateful. — Isaac

No, i think experts considering the situation have taken different factors into account, that is why they have different opinions on the subject. I also assume that the Ukrainian command has taken into consideration even more factors, possibly even those not known to experts, when they started their counteroffensive. They could be wrong in their predictions, of course, but I doubt they were less informed than Charap.

Of course I refuse to do it. I also refuse to argue in favour of the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. I refuse to argue for my own pet theory of economics, or some idea I had about how the digestive system of the bat might work... I'm not qualified to do so. I do, however, have preferred experts I turn to, and I'm more than happy to talk about and defend my choices there (something we're all experts on), I'm happy to talk about the ideology that guides those choices, even the epistemological commitments which frame that choice. What I'm not prepared to do is pretend that me pitting what my sources say against you paraphrasing what your sources say is going to actually yield anything other than two shoddy summaries of writing which is freely available in full, unadulterated form online. — Isaac

You have no qualms whatsoever criticizing one particular course of action, often describing it as inhumane and gladly taking a position of moral superiority, but when asked about the supposed existing reasonable alternative, you clam up. You are happy to talk about the ideology that guides choices, but only of others. You want to talk about epistemological commitments, but not yours.

I've linked the article on the factors which lead to strong armistices. That you didn't read it is not something I'm equipped to help with. — Isaac

I am not fond of creating an account to download a single article, besides the article from 2005 can apply to the current situation only in rather general terms. With those I have already agreed - yes, ceasefires can and do sometimes work. I still do not see what possible terms could be proposed to overcome this particular conflict, and you and your secret experts did nothing to help me.

And? The 5yr graph shows a small drop to 2018 levels after what was an unprecedented high. The drop id less than that experienced by the US for example late 2020. So where's this economic collapse you're suggesting? — Isaac

The trend is downward and all the factors that precipitated it are still in force, so it is reasonable to expect it will maintain that direction.

As above. They're no lower than 2018 - it's on the chart. You know people can see these charts, right? — Isaac

Yes, and the spending is much higher, by 40%.

Gods! Why the fuck would I explain, I'm not an economist. You may consider yourself to be some kind of genius polymath able to wrangle with the greatest in economics, international relations, history, military strategy, and foreign affairs, but I'm afraid you've picked the wrong interlocutor for your Walter Mitty moment — Isaac

No, I am no genius and my levels of understanding of economics, international relations, history, military strategy and foreign affairs are much lower than those of the greatest. However, I am not discussing with them, but with you, and here the proportions seem to be a bit different. And yes, it does seem that your way of shaping beliefs is just googling and running away with the first source you agree with, I just am not sure it is advisable methodology. Especially when the source you did google (i.e. the Economist) says such things about Russian economy:

The country's long-term prospects are dim, exacerbated further by unfavourable demographics.

which you do not seem to agree with. I cannot read the whole article you linked, as it is behind a paywall, but the very title says:

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one
Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far

which is about what I was saying... Have you just read half of the title? Maybe google another one?

Yes, we already agree that being less Russia-like yields an improvement on the HFI, I'm not sure why you're going down this path at all. No one is confused as to why Ukraine wants to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence.

The discussion is about the price it is worth paying relative to the likely degree of success in that venture. Ukraine will unlikely get as far as the Baltic states because it will have crippling debts which are themselves authoritarian, far more in debt than the Baltic states ever were, they have mega-companies like Black Rock involved now which was simply not an issue in the late 20th century, the power of these multinationals to control policy is exponentially higher than it was then, they're entering a fractured Europe in runaway recession cycles desperate for cheap labour and manufacturing facilities, and they're starting from a position of being a lot more Russia-like in the first place. Add to that a strong right-wing nationalist sentiment, the region's biggest black market in illegal arms recently flooded with untraceable weapons, virtually zero intact infrastructure, and some of the most important exports in the world up for grabs for whoever controls that economy... — Isaac

Poland had a substantial debt to the Western countries and then to IMF which was to large extent cancelled and restructured and yet it has much higher HFI than Russia. But if you belive that IMF cripples freddom, could you provide specific data how the IMF impacts the HFI?

Also, your whole thesis was that HFI can turn around just like that in a few years and we do not have to look at the internal factors at all, as shifts in the single chart are sufficient to support that thesis. So your claim was that Ukraine under Russian oppresion could easily increase its HFI in a relatively short period of time. When I have pointed out the internal factors in Russia, such as political oppression, which might prevent that, you simply dismissed them. And now you are saying Ukraine cannot improve its HFI, citing economic oppression AND internal factors, which are suddenly important.

Are you even serious?

Oh, and most of those Baltic states rank higher on the HFI than the US. So we should keep Ukraine out of the US's sphere of influence too, yes? — Isaac

So the countries in the US sphere of influence are perfectly capable of reaching HFIs so high that they outperform even the US... How does constitute an argument that Ukraine should not join them? I think you need to work on that argument a bit.

'Might' and 'Likely' are doing all the work there. some area's might be de-occupied, or more areas might be occupied. It might result in the whole of Ukraine being occupied, but might not. all you're expressing is that there's uncertainty. It doesn't support your argument. — Isaac

My support is that for the last year Russia has made very minor gains, while Ukraine had major gains. Ukraine has liberated half of the territory that Russia grabbed since 2022.

As I've said before, these arguments are asymmetric because no one wants war. therefore to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance, to argue for war you have to show there's no reasonable alternative. they don't have an equal burden of proof because war is utterly horrific and we avoid it at all costs, anyone advocating it needs to show that those other options are ruled out. I don't need to show that war wouldn't work to advocate peaceful resolution, because it's what we'd prefer anyway. — Isaac

I completely agree. To argue for peace you have to show there is a reasonable chance for an alternative. The very issue is that you refuse to do so.

So never again? That's it for negotiations the world over now? It's just war? Funny how "we tried negotiations" get trotted out in defence of warmongering, but "we tried war" never does.

I've already provided you with the historical assessment. War has not worked. It has not yielded victory in the timescale which is usually decisive. — Isaac

No, just crap negotiations are over, which you yourself acknowledge Minsk 1 and 2 were. As you said, we would have to do better. I do not how we are supposed to do that. You know, but will not tell.

I believe that there exist a wide range of indicators of economic strength, some of which I've cited. there's a reason why sites like tradingeconomics offer those metrics. Russian exports are picking up. that's indicative of a recovery. It was you who mentioned trade deficit. I've cited the figures we actually have that are closest to the measure you said were indicative of Russia's economic state, that's why they're directly underneath quotes from you. those are the measures you picked. If you now want to back track because you don't like the results, then pick some others. — Isaac

On the chart you have provided Russian exports are 'picking up' month to month, which means that they might have a good sale or two in one month (especially if the previous one was rather poor), but it is not indicator of recovery for the longer run. If you look at the 1Y, 5Y or 10Y graph, it always has smaller ups and downs (for every country), which is not indicative of the long-term trend. Yes, I might sound like a teacher now, but it is REALLY basic stuff. So I do like the results, that is why I gave them - they confirm what I wrote. I did not realize someone might have a problem with reading them though.

The fact is that Russian exports are overall lower than before the war and last year. This (and the trade deficit) is very impactful for the country which had 50% of its budget income financed directly from the said exports AND the country which had budget expenses increased by 40% since last year. Comparing that to the US is comparing apples and oranges. But sure, I might be wrong, if you can explain how the country that has apparently income at least 25% lower and expenses 40% higher year to year (or in any reasonable longer period) is doing great, I am all ears. You can also explain how a country that depends on the imports for a significant portion of its war effort can finance increased military spending when its currency is tumbling down. You might also tell me why Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, if it is doing well.

Yes. That's just saying the same thing I said. Communism isn't good for the HFI score. How does that relate to a comparison of modern Russia (not communist) and modern Ukraine (not a Baltic State). And why are we speculating on these unavailable data sources when we have available ones with which to make the comparison? — Isaac

Because we know current score for Russia, Ukraine and, say, Belarus, and we know current scores for countries which are no longer in Russian sphere of influence. The difference in HFI is rather significant, which might motivate Ukrainians to leave it.

So it's 'leave them there' in both scenarios then. All that talk of sovereignty and freedom was a waste, you're expecting ten more years of occupation anyway. — Isaac

The difference is that at least some of the area might be deoccupied (and some already were), while your 'leaving them' would likely end in occupation of the whole Ukraine (and we have no idea when it might end).

So the debate is around how best to neutralise the Russian threat. Political instability and isolation, negotiations, agreements... Or use up all their bombs by cunningly giving them Ukrainian hospitals to fire at until they run out... — Isaac

The issue is that non-violent means, negotiations and agreement were already tried and they did not work.

Again, I can't think why you'd be asking me. If you think the people concerned about the risk of nuclear escalation are wrong then I suggest you take it up with them. If you don't, then why on earth are you asking me as if there wasn't a good set of reasons?

This notion that a bunch of laymen can somehow 'thrash out' the data and come up with answers that have defied the people whose job it is to do exactly that is absolutely dumbfounding. — Isaac

I am asking you, because it is you who mentioned that possibility. And, for the third time, if you do not want to discuss the topic, then I am not sure why you do.

You're not asking me to support it, if you wanted support you would have read the relevant expert opinion already.

You're using mock astonishment as a rhetorical device to imply that there isn't any support, despite knowing full well there is. I'm not playing that game. — Isaac

Yes, I am asking you support your claims, which is quite reasonable to do. What is astonishing is that you do have that special expert opinion and you refuse to share it. And 'look it up yourself' is exactly the game, as old as the Internet itself.

...are certainly all other measures of economic stability. Now...where did I put that article about cherry-picking... — Isaac

So you believe trade deficit is equally hurtful for major exporters and minor exporters? You believe month to month is a better indicator of export rise than year to year or 5Y to 5Y? Or are you just embarrased you read the exchange rate chart backwards?

Yes, that's right. Russian HFI is low, so not being like Russia raise the HFI. I don't think that's in dispute. You've not provided the data you were using for your claims that their HFI soared. — Isaac

When they were communist states, they were more like Russia, so when they stopped, their HFI would increase (if it was assessed then).

Right. But how? You've not provided a mechanism. How does Ukraine get Russia to a point where is will give up all the territory it has gained, but somehow not run into exactly the same supply problems Russia faces? And all this without racking up so massive a debt that it will never get it's sovereignty back? And at no point provoking Russia into using nuclear weapons? And all this somehow without Russia realising that capability (otherwise Russia would have good reason to negotiate now)? — Isaac

I think it is quite possible that Russia will not give up all the territories it has gained and Ukraine will not be able to get them back. As I said, the main point is depleting Russia's potential to the point when it is no longer capable of threatening Ukraine.

And why would Putin use nuclear weapons? Free Ukraine might be a mortal threat in the future, using nukes would end his regime definitely and rather quickly.

What reasons? Do you think all armistices only came on the back of serious of amazingly successful previous agreements? Minsk agreements were crap, so we do better. It's not a difficult concept to get your head around. There's loads of expert opinion online about why the Mins agreements failed, if you're interested. As there is on why negotiations might succeed. It's really daft to try and learn this stuff from me. Look it up, you have the internet. — Isaac

Well, obviously the concept is difficult enough to get your head around that so far you have given no indication HOW are we supposed to 'do better'. And you are making the claim, so I am asking you to support it. 'Read the Internet' is a rather poor way of discussing things. Again, if you are not interested in the discussion, why maintain it?

Russia's balance of trade
US balance of trade

Russia trade to GDP ratio for 2021 - 52.17%
US trade to GDP ratio - 23.12%

Russia exports (rising)
US exports (falling)

Lol. Month to month, yes. Click year to year, or compare 2021 with the first half of 2023.

Russia current account
US current account

Again, the U.S. does not depend as heavily on trade

The Ruble
The Dollar — Isaac

Yes, dollar has somewhat weakened, while ruble weakened much more compared to the dollar. That is, ruble has weakened even more than shown on the chart.

...and the equivalent rate for the US/Europe would be...? Of course, you don't have one because the aim is simply to give an alarming rate fo Russia and leave it there. — Isaac

There are several PPP indices for Europe and US (e.g. OECD), they use somewhat different methodology, so the results are scattered. OECD does not do Russia, however, as it stopped revealing its data. Maybe it was doing so well that it did not want to embarass other countries.

It did. It just did so less than the relief from communist dictatorship improved it. — Isaac

So in fact their freedom increased?

What dataset are you using, the HFI started in 2013 with data going back from their previous methodology to 2008. The countries you're mentioning were last under communist rule in the late 20th century? — Isaac

And now their HFI is quite high, much higher than Russia's. Thus is it reasonable to assume that if Ukraine stopped being 'just like Russia', as you claim it is now, and was more like them, HFI of its citizens would significantly improve.

Not to any meaningful extent. what matters is their ability to replenish, and as the historical data I've presented shows, that ability is usually sufficient to maintain war for decades. That Russia will be the exception for some reason is wishful thinking. — Isaac

It would be sufficient to maintain a simmering conflict, as you wrote, not for a full-scale war effort which it is taking now.

It's not wild and unsubstantiated. I've provided you with the evidence of armistices working. — Isaac

Armistice is cessation of hostilities. In itself it does nothing to resolve any conflict. It is usually a precondition to a peaceful conflict resolution, but it is not a conflict resolution in itself.

Notwithstanding that, your two suggestions here make no sense together. If Russia are going to run out of artillery first, then they must know that. If they know that, then they know they're going to lose, therefore they have good reason to accept terms.

You can't have it both ways. Ukraine can't have an excellent chance of winning a war, depleting Russia's armoury to almost redundancy, and threatening Putin's grip on power... and also claim Russia has no reason at all to accept terms. Either continued war is an existential risk for Russia or it isn't. — Isaac

That is why I did not write that Russia is 'going to lose' and I also did not write that 'Ukraine has an excellent chance of winning the war', as I have ackhowledged that the hostilities might simmer for a long time. The conflict would be resolved by getting Russia to a point when Ukraine will be able to integrate with the West without Russia preventing it.

It's not wild and unsubstantiated. I've provided you with the evidence of armistices working. — Isaac

Without addressing all the particular reasons for why this is not likely in this particular case, it is still wild and unsubstantiated. We had Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, so there are no reasons to think Minsk 3 (or whatever you call it) would fare any better.

It doesn't. — Isaac

You do realize that Russia is an authoritarian country, therefore its statistics might not be completely truthful, to put it mildly? You know that Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, so it is not entirely transparent, right? That is why its official inflation figure might not be completely trustworthy and it might be reasonable to turn e.g. to basket-based indices, such as Romir. Hanke from Hopkins gives an even higher rate, but it is clearly an outlier, so it should be treated as such. There are several such indicators, I think they average at about 25%, I will gather some more. Interestingly, even CBR reports that the perceived inflation is ten points higher than the official one.

The point is that the actual inflation rate in Russia is rather difficult to estimate. It certainly is not reasonable to treat the official indicator as a sufficient single indicator of Russia's economy (why am I feeling deja vu?).

Still, there are a few indicators that Russia cannot hide or fake, like trade deficit, or exports income, because they need to mirror the data of other countries. For example, before the war half of Russia's budgetary income was premium from the exports of natural resources. Now Russia's resource exports value fell by over one third, so Russia's budget deficit achieved the projected yearly value in three months - it will be rather difficult make up for that... Russia's official current account dropped drastically, even if we assume it has not been 'prettified'. Also the ruble exchange rate defense is not going too well, Nabullina pretty much said that it cannot continue forever.

In general, getting even an approximate view of Russian economy is not easy. However, if you take many indicators into consideration (I can provide more), it does not look too well.

Ceasefires are conflict resolution. Read the paper. — Isaac

No, they are not. They might be a precondition to a conflict resolution, but they in themselves do not resolve anything.

I'm not the one suggesting your opinion is nonsense, remember? I think your opinion is perfectly valid. I'm defending the claim that mine isn't. — Isaac

I do not suggest that your opinion is nonsense, only that it is unsupported. You have not provided any support for the view that it is ilkely that Putin would refrain from hostilities. Citing assumed unknown factors is not support. I did provide support for the view that it is unlikely.

Serious consideration isn't a priority, nor would I expect it on the basis of argument (been there). — Isaac

OK, so we have no reason to think that the conflict resolution in Ukraine by peaceful methods would be likely.

You wrote specifically:

the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom — Isaac

After the communism Eastern European countries were in a rather poor state, with rather poor infrastructures, inefficient, seriously outdated industry, etc. Then they were in significant debt from the IMF (with significant part of it relieved) and they had 'imposed' pecuniary free market restrictions. It did not limit their freedom, their freedom (i.e. HFI) soared.

Right. So if no peace deal is reached, history tells us the war will drag on for decades. So remind me again how that helps the people of Ukraine? Remind me how decades of war gets them any more freedom, any more 'sovereignty'. Just your wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will run out of artillery first? — Isaac

Well, at least we see Russia is running out of artillery, although slowly. What you propose is wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will leave Ukraine alone if we give them more and more, even though it has no reason to do so.

On what basis? The economy is already tanking https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-drags-europes-economy-succumbs-crisis-2022-08-23/ . What grounds do you have for believing this level of militarisation can be sustained for another ten years? — Isaac

It needs to be sustained at the level higher than Russia, which hurts economically much more.

Again, on what grounds? This is just pie in the sky wishful thinking at the moment. How is the west going to sustain this level of militarisation for decades when it can't even keep out of recession after just two years? — Isaac

It does not, as noted above.

Yes. Again, history shows that strong ceasefire negotiations work — Isaac

Sure, I have already said that strong ceasefire negotiations work. What is required for that, however, is some sort of conflict resolution. That is why I have asked how exactly negotiations at this point would resolve the conflict. You cannot answer that question.

What exactly? — Isaac

You cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would prevent Putin from starting the war. If that is so, I can cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would push Putin to war.

Because I'm darkly fascinated by this new trend for absolute certainty in the mainstream opinion. Ukraine, Covid, ... both shared this odd feature that even though solidly qualified experts in the respective fields disagreed, the lay populace were utterly convinced that only one side were right and the other were little short of murderers. I'm exploring that. — Isaac

Good luck. Just do not expect that an argument that you are unwilling to support will get any serious consideration.

The longer Ukraine continue their attempt to regain the lost territories, the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom and is directed by a central power. It's definitionally authoritarianism. So if Ukraine are avoiding Russian authoritarianism, it's extremely relevant that their method could lead to an equal authoritarianism from a different source. — Isaac

Let us check then the one sufficient indicator of human freedom there is: the Human Freedom Index. How those poor Eastern European countries opressed by the IMF (which practically financed their transition) and the free market practices of the EU are faring? Hmm, strange: Poland 7.66 (with the top 8.30), Estonia 8.73, Lithuania 8.34, Czech Republic 8.33. You will not believe it, but the HFI says they are much less authoritanian than Russia!

Nor will it if the war is long...

A study from the CSIS, using data from 1946 to 2021 found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”

Your notion that there might now be a short decisive war is... what's your term... ahistorical.

But no doubt history now suddenly loses it's relevance. No doubt this war becomes the special case. — Isaac

I did not say it will be short and decisive.

From where are you getting this idea that Ukraine could somehow wipe out Russia's military capability? — Isaac

I did not say 'wipe out', I said: lower to disable its potential to attack Ukraine. Rocket attacks on the cities are nasty, but they have little to no military significance. They might hinder formal acceptance into NATO, but they will not be able to stop Ukraine's militarization and informal integration.

What makes you think Ukraine will be allowed into NATO with the war still simmering? If NATO countries were willing to go to war with Russia, why not now? — Isaac

While the war is simmering, it will not be formally accepted, it will just be armed and informally integrated, like Sweden. There will be no security guarantees, just military assistance. The point is that Russia must be too weak to stop it.

It's highly relevant, as I've explained dozens of times now. War is devastating, it needs to win very high gains to be worth it. Measuring the likely gains is absolutely crucial. It's practically psychopathic to suggest that war is a good option regardless of the gains. — Isaac

The gain is over 2.00 HFI increase on the average for the future Ukraine in NATO and EU. That should trump all, right?

It resolves a lot for the people currently being shot at and shelled which will no longer be. It literally stops the war, Ukraine are currently on the offensive. It might not, of course, resolve the conflict, but it will, right now, stop the war. — Isaac

That is not 'just leaving them there', that already assumes successful negotiation of ceasefire with Putin on unknown terms. And not resolving the conflict at this point leaves him with enough potential to start trouble again soon.

You're seriously assuming that there are no other factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action other than whether Ukraine is free and democratic? If not, then why are you asking me for them? Explain why you've discarded them, your argument is incomplete otherwise. — Isaac

No, I assume that there are exactly as many factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action that would prevent it as there are factors that would convince him to do it. You are not discarding JUST the latter, are you? So, as the ungiven factors even themselves out, we are left with the given factors, which say he would likely attack.

I'm not interested in discussing the details of this. The suggestions I've made are those that have been made by experts in the field with far more knowledge and experience than I have, or you. Unlike a truly remarkable number of people here, I don't see myself as qualified to make these kinds of judgements because I don't have sufficient expertise in the area. I choose those theories which seem to best fit my world-view. What I'm interested in here is why you are so certain of your beliefs here that you're so casually willing to assume all other theories are nonsense, to be laughed off. It just makes you look stupid, I can't think why so many seem to think it a good play. — Isaac

I am not assuming your theory is nonsense, I am just pointing out it is unsupported by you. If you are not interested in discussing support for your theory, why are you interested in discussing it at all?

Lol! That's it! How's that gonna work? Ukraine gonna take all of Russia's nuclear warheads! Ha! What a stupid idea! Rotfl! — Isaac

Yes, of course, exactly like Latvia did, when it joined NATO. Why ask?

I'm not defining it any differently. Read the quotes I provided earlier, they explain how the "strong central power" your Wikipedia article names need not be a government. The World Bank, the IMF, Black Rock... these all act as "strong central powers" which is why economic freedom is equally important when considering freedom for authoritarianism. — Isaac

This redefinition has even less to do with the conflict in Ukraine.

Yes. You can be defeated in a land war na d still attack your neighbours. Being able to attack neighbours is not a factor which differentiates our two approaches. — Isaac

Sure, if the war is short and indecisive. Then the conflict will still not be resolved.

Pushing Russia back does not end war, it changes the location of the front line. — Isaac

Destroying Russian's potential to wage war prevents it from further attacks for a longer time. If Russia is too weak to attack again, then Ukraine may join NATO which will prevent Russia's attack for much longer. The conflict is still unresolved, but Russia is unable to resolve it militarily.

I disagree. As above, if one is merely moving a front line then it is of crucial importance to the advisability of that strategy that one can be sure of making improvements to the lives of those on your side of that line which are commensurate with the cost to them of that action. — Isaac

However, this is not about moving a front line, but joining by Ukraine the economic and military community which will put it outside of Russia's reach for a long time. This, incidentally, would also bring about significant increase in its HFI.

Russia is staging ground for future wars. In this current war, forces entered from Russia and Belarus. They did not need Crimea. — Isaac

That is absurdly false. Taking the southern coast would not be possible, if Ukrainians held Crimea and Donbas.

Notwithstanding that, the whole argument I'm making is that ceding territories is not that much of a disadvantage. Ukraine was no picnic before the war, especially in Donbas. Ukrainian national pride might be damaged by ceding territory, but I don't give a fuck about Ukrainian national pride. — Isaac

But this is still irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict.

No, I'm saying wars don't avoid war.

Are you saying negotiations don't resolve conflicts? — Isaac

You do not understand the difference between 'conflict' and 'war'? Because it is pretty crucial to thte discussion.

And no, I am not saying negotiations do not resolve conflicts, they do. However, they do not seem to work that well in this particular conflict.

...? Yes. I'd say either leave them there or don't leave them there pretty much exhausts the options. — Isaac

Yes, if you omit part of your own quote, then that exhausts the options. The issue is that just 'leaving them there', unlike 'leaving them there and causing a regime change', does not resolve anything, and in particular, it does not stop the war.

Again, you keep dialing back from 'most likely', or 'likely' to just 'any indication' (the Motte-and-bailey fallacy - for your collection). Yes, Putin's past decisions give us information about his future ones. No, citing a single past decision is not sufficient to support an argument that a future one is likely. Not without acknowledging and ruling out competing factors. — Isaac

It was not a single decision even in my quote, in reality there were even more such decisions. So yes, unless the competing factors are given, it should be treated as likely. So I am waiting for the competing factors. What are they?

Personally I think negotiations over independence for Donbas and an unallied Ukraine might have done it last year. — Isaac

That is it? Your personal opinion in lieu of any real argument? Let me think, how the argument might go: 'Putin promised he will not hurt Ukraine, but then he did. Ukraine (and the West) gave him what he wanted, then he promised again he will not hurt Ukraine. But then he did again. And then he threatened Ukraine again... But if he is given all the new things he NOW wants, then he will leave Ukraine in peace'. Is that your reasoning? I must remind you that you believe that free and prosperous Ukraine is seen by Putin as a mortal threat, which giving him Donbas and NATO promise would not alleviate in any way. That is, Putin would have Donbas and Ukraine's (promised) neutrality and one of the sources of the conflict, i.e. the mortal threat, would still be there. Why exactly Putin would stop at this particular point? Let us see the factors.

Now I think the best we can hope for is an armistice based on the current front line, some assurances of Ukraine's security (perhaps from Europe), maybe reparation payments from Russia, lifting of sanctions, perhaps trade deals to assist Ukraine in lost output from Russian occupied territory... — Isaac

Lol. Assurances of Ukraine's security from Europe? How about that: Western countries agree to defend Ukraine if it is attacked and call it 'Article 5'? That would not be a threat at all, unlike NATO? As Bennett said, such 'guarantees' are not worth much. Not to mention that free and prosperous Ukraine would still be a problem for Putin? Why would he not seek to resolve it militarily?

What's yours? — Isaac

I have described it above: decreasing Russia's military potential to the degree where it is no longer capable of preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO and EU, which is the only 'assurance' it can get. Hopefully this results in Ukraine getting back its lands, but it is far from certain.

And I've explained that how it isn't always the case, which is how we have a discussion because you're not the fucking teacher, and though this will blow your mind, it is actually possible that you're wrong. — Isaac

You have literally went from:

So. The argument you were supposed to be countering was about how far Ukraine might be from Russian-style authoritarianism. The answer is, not far. The question wasn't about recent direction of travel. — Isaac

to:

tyranny in lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity

Because that is how you have decided to define authoritarianism/tyranny based on the HFI index. The problem is that authoritarianism as it is usually meant:

Authoritarianism is a political system characterized by the rejection of political plurality, the use of strong central power to preserve the political status quo, and reductions in the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic voting. — Wikipedia

is at the center of the issue here - the political system in Russia both fuels the Russian imperialism and depends on it. Thus, free Ukraine is a dangerous threat to it which is one of the causes of the conflict.

On the other hand, 'authoritarianism' as you define it now, i.e. the range of specific HFI values, has very little to do with that issue, as you can have a nice HFI in Crimea and still attack your neighbors, because your regime is authoritarian in the first sense. So yes, if you frame the argument in terms of general freedom indices, you might not be cherry-picking, however, your argument stops being relevant to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine.

My argument is that Ukraine moved, in the last eight years, in terms of tyranny (as defined by the dictionary definition I gave before), the same distance as it would take to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now. — Isaac

The obvious issue is that your current interpretation of 'tyranny' has very little to do with the causes and resolutions of the actual conflict in Ukraine. So sure, Russia could improve HFI by a few points in a few years, the issue is that it might still be very eager to attack Ukraine because of its authoritarian regime. How can we know it? Because Russia actually did improve a few points in HFI before it attacked Ukraine. So yes, I completely concede the argument that Russia can improve its HFI index in a few years, the issue is that it might have no bearing whatsoever on the war in Ukraine, its causes and ways to stop it.

Then provide me with the quotes where I have made such claims. I'm not going to argue for claims you'd like me to have made. I will defend claims I've actually made. — Isaac

You give the quote yourself down below.

Nonsense. Just because a strategy doesn't address the mechanism by which conflict is ended it doesn't mean it leads to war. And besides, we're comparing it to your strategy which actually is war, so what does it not ending war have to do with any meaningful comparison. your strategy doesn't end war, nor prevent future wars either. — Isaac

So on my strategy war is certain, on yours likely. Mine has the advantage of accepting the war on more advantageous terms, yours does not (because it involves ceding territories, which can be used as a staging ground for future wars, exactly as Crimea and Donbas were used).

Neither does "keep chucking arms at it". — Isaac

Are you saying that wars do not resolve conflicts? Do you want a list again?

I've bolded the relevant context to assist your reading comprehension. — Isaac

Yes, with the context there are still two options listed. Do you believe those are the only two possible or the two most possible options?

That's not a reason, it's throwing a loose and undefined general comment at it in lieu of any real argument. — Isaac

So the fact that Putin has already attacked Ukraine and annexed its territory, then threatened it with a war and started it does not give us any indication to what his possible decisions might be? Do you believe human behavior is completely unpredictable?

Except that you skipped over the words 'negotiaion, and...' to create a ridiculous straw man. — Isaac

OK, so your argument is 'negotiate and cede Donbas and then the conflict might end'. I am afraid you must be a bit more specific before the chances of that happening might be assessed.

So, again, what is your proposed peaceful solution to the conflict in Ukraine?

You said it was cherry-picking and fleeced a quote from Wikipedia. That's not 'describing specifically'. — Isaac

No, I have explained for many posts before that relying on a single datapoint out of many is incorrect. I have talked about it over and over. You did not reject it, but were seemingly unaware what the problem is. I brought in the Wikipedia article as it explains in detail what the problem exactly is about. Have you read it?

You haven't 'included' several indices any more than I have. You've decided that you agree with the weightings in one and disagree with those in another. — Isaac

Yes, I did:

The Economist Democracy Index in 2008 for Russia was 4.48, while compared to 6.94 for Ukraine, with full democracies starting at about 8. RSF Freedom of Press - Ukraine 19.25, Russia - 47 (the lower score, the greater freedom). Human Freedom index for 2008 - Ukraine 76, Russia 111 (less is better). Freedom in the World 2013 (no earlier issues) - Ukraine 4, Russia 6 (1 - best, 7 - worst). Polity IV State Fragility 2009 - Ukraine 6, Russia 8. They only indices they were comparable in was corruption. So what you wrote is simply false. — Jabberwock

They all show that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not nearly as comparable as HFI would have us believe. Note that I further discussed them in the context of your proposed peaceful regime change (which you seemingly no longer advocate for), not your later, different argument about 'freedoms in Donbas'.

It isn't, and repeatedly saying it is is an argument from assertion (seeing as you're so keen on your fallacies). There are only two indices in the world which make a claim to cover human freedom as a whole (rather than specific elements like economy, press, or democracy). Those are Freedom House and Cato. That does not make Cato's an 'outlier'. — Isaac

The whole issue with the argument seems to be that you switched from 'we have two options, peaceful regime change in the WHOLE OF RUSSIA and war' to 'freedom in Donbass can improve'. I do not contest tthe latter, I just point out that it has little to do with the causes of war, which your proposed course of action was supposed to avoid.

Do you still believe these (i.e. peaceful regime change in Russia and war) are the two alternatives we have? Do you believe they are exclusive and exhaustive? Because now you are arguing something different.

And I've asked you what 'engaging' would constitute in, but since you refuse to answer I can't see how I can defend that particular accusation. — Isaac

I have already responded: it would require to discuss it and reexamine your argument in view of it, just like i did with your evidence.

I mean... Just read that again and if it still makes any kind of sense on a second read, I don't know if I can help...

"If a strategy I advocate doesn't prevent the conflict, then that proves the only thing that will is war"? Seriously? — Isaac

No, it does not prove it, it just means that the strategy you advocate likely does not prevent the war, just delays it. That is, the strategy you advocate likely leads to war, just sometime later and with several negative consequences. What good is it then?

Negotiations. Compromise. — Isaac

That is a method toward solution, not a solution. It tells me nothing about how the conflict would be resolved.

So? What has that bizarre invented counterfactual have to do with your claim that I claimed any course of action was a requirement? — Isaac

If you write 'there are two options', you typically mean that the options are reasonably exhaustive and exclusive. If there are more options to avoid the war, why not mention them?

Yes, in part. As I've said, your incredulity isn't an argument. — Isaac

And your credulity is not an argument either, as we still have no reason to think that this course of events is likely. On the other hand, we have a strong reason - i.e. previous Putin's conduct - to believe it is unlikely. That means that your proposed solution is not likely to resolve the conflict, i.e. it would likely just delay the war and not prevent it, while still bringing about negative consequences (i.e. oppression of Ukrainians, strenghening Putin's positions, etc.).

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"? — Isaac

You wrote specifically:

The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). — Isaac

So that is what I go by. If your proposed solution to end the conflict involves other factors, it would be better to include them in the means of ending the conflict.

So, again, what is your proposed solution to resolve the conflict?

No, I don't disagree. There's a difference between a negative effect and a sufficient negative effect. Political oppression is not the only factor to consider. To dispute the case (that Ukraine-like levels of freedom are possible to achieve in eight years), you need to show why you believe that these negative factors are sufficient to make that unlikely, not merely that they work in that direction. — Isaac

Sorry, I missed this one: again this evidence was used to argue that a peaceful regime change in Russia is likely, which was your argument (once), not to dispute that it is possible to improve HFI a few decimal points.

That you think it acceptable practice to just throw out accusations without any basis given and then expect them to stand unless sufficiently rebutted is not something I'd be particularly advertising, if I were in your shoes, but... — Isaac

I have described very specifically why your support is inappropriate and have quoted the Wikipedia article only after you have shown that you simply do not understand what the issue is about. So 'the basis' was given several times and in detail.

My use of the HFI is not cherry-picking because, as I have pointed out, the decision about which factors to include and which to weigh is a political one, not a scientific one. There's no 'right' answer, there's no rational calculation we can apply to determine which are the 'right' data points to pick and which ought to have what weight. We make a political choice as to what kind of thing we think constitutes human freedom. Cherry-picking does not apply to making political choices about value judgements, it applies to the selection of a subset of data from a wider pool of data of the same type. It applies to picking a subset from a wider set which ought to be included, not from a wider set for which there are reasons for exclusion. — Isaac

There is nothing political about including several indices as opposed to one. Especially given the single one given is an outlier.

If I were to pick temperature records (as your article uses) from a wider pool of temperature records, that would be cherry-picking seeing as my decision to correlate temperature already implies that any measure of temperature ought be included. If I, on the other hand, decide to use income-equality as a measure of development rather than GDP, that is not cherry-picking, it is making a value judgement as to what best indicates 'development'. — Isaac

It is cherry picking because you have selected an outlier indicator that does not reflect too well the actual issue relevant to the discussion. You have switch talk about changing regime (which is specifically required for the improvement of the situation, as you have yourself admitted) to talk about nebulous freedoms and insisted that improvement in the latter somehow impact the probability of the former.

The point of all this is that your application of rational deductive practices to these historical, political and social facts is inappropriate, they are not data points on a graph to which we can apply some statistical analyses. Trust me, I've spent 20 years in research in social science, it can't be done. — Isaac

But it is you who reduced in the discussion complex political and social processes to a single HFI index and argued that it is sufficient to support your very specific argument about probability of peaceful regime change in Russia. The conclusions you draw from the possibility (not probability) of HFI do not impact that probability.

That wasn't the accusation though was it? It's not about 'willingness' You accused me of not engaging with the counter-evidence on the basis that I hadn't spoken about it. Have you spoken about the counter-evidence to all your theories here? No. So your accusation is unfounded. We do not typically present all the counter-evidence for our theories, we support them, and expect others to counter them. — Isaac

No, i have accussed you of not engaging with counterevidence I have spoken about.

I've supported my theory about Russian-occupied Donbas's ability to achieve Ukraine-like levels of freedom within eight years, using an index which I believe shows that.

You've countered by presenting other indices which use other measures of freedom and place different weightings on those which crossover. — Isaac

People in Crimea reaching higher HFI did not stop Putin from starting the other war, therefore it is not unreasonable to conclude that leaving people in Donbas to reach higher HFI will not stop Putin from starting another war for Kharkiv, Odessa or Kiev itself. Thus proposing a solution that somewhat possibly (NOT LIKELY, POSSIBLY) improves freedoms in Donbas has absolutely no impact on the resolution of the conflict itself. If you are content with a solution that does absolutely nothing to resolve the conflict, so be it, but then it means (given your alternative) that the only other option to actually end the conflict is war, as you have failed to propose a peaceful path for resolving the conflict.

I am. Which is very much not the same as declaring it to be a requirement. Thinking that we ought to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner is not the same as declaring it to be a requirement that we go to the Italian restaurant for dinner. — Isaac

If we have two choices: to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner or starve, and we reject starving, then there is no other option but to go to the Italian restaurant.

Who said it would? Again, you're 're-framing' the argument. The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). The counter to that is usually that it would cause more harm than good. I countered that by pointing to the relative harms in occupied Crimea and the possibilities of reaching Ukraine-like levels of freedom in Russia-occupied Donbas over that period by means other than invading it. I didn't think it was that complicated an argument, but it's clearly been caught up in the "every argument that's not 'MORE WAR!' must be wrong" trope that seems to apply to the Ukraine situation. — Isaac

So your solution is to cede territory and hope that the conflict MIGHT end. Putin was peacefully given Crimea and it did not stop the conflict, on the contrary, he made new demands. Why think ceding Donbas would be different?

Odd then that none of your other arguments have simply been conducted by vague reference to Wikipedia articles. I gave you 15 articles about the fallacies and bias you committed. Was that sufficient for you to be persuaded? Or did you feel there was some room for me to have been wrong about the application of any of those to your case? — Isaac

Yes, that is why I took a lot of time to point them out - I carefully examined each charge of fallacy and explained why it might and why it might not apply to my arguments (to which you implied I should not do that because it was supposed to be a joke). You have just asserted that your cherry picking does not constitute fallacy, without explaining why it would not. That is the difference.

Many are, yes. that's why I ask for clarity. Is that odd behaviour to you? To ask for clarity when faced with ambiguous terms. — Isaac

No, you do not ask for clarity, you dismiss terms based on their supposed lack of clarity. You argue about tyranny and then refuse to argue about tyranny, shifting the goalposts several more times in the process.

I really don't see how. Did you talk about all the evidence opposing your theories? If I look back over the thread, will I find all the theories you've proposed about the war accompanied by a short statement about all the counter-evidence that there is on the matter and how you rejected it? — Isaac

I have talked extensively about the only piece of evidence presented by you and I am ready to talk about any other you would be willing to present (but you are not willing). You refuse to talk about evidence presented by me. That is the difference.

...? The first gives two choices, the second asserts that there's only one. — Isaac

Given that you explicitly reject the second choice (i.e. continuing the war), then you are committed to the first one, which is, I remind you:

leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny — Isaac

Later you added that the preferred method should be peaceful protests.

That is NOT the same as: 'leave them there and allow their HFI to improve a bit'. The latter does not entail the former and does not increase its probability. Therefore the argument 'freeing the whole of Russia by peaceful protests is likely, because it is possible to improve country's HFI several decimal points in ten years' fails, because there is no direct causal link between the two, which I have demonstrated by showing that Russia's HFI increased exactly as the conflict in Ukraine deepened. Improving the HFI (even if likely, which your evidence does not show, because it can move both ways) does nothing to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. Yet we had to spend a week discussing it.

So your measure of intelligence is the degree to which people agree with you? Sling a load of facts together which seem to you to reach a particular conclusion and then if other people see it, they must be intelligent too. If they don't, then the only option is that they must not be very intelligent. After all, it couldn't possibly be because you're wrong, could it now? It couldn't possibly be that the way things seem to you to be is not necessarily the way things actually are? — Isaac

No, if I was wrong, it would be pointed out to me that the facts have no relation to my argument, just like I did with the HFI above. But sure, if you want it spelled out point by point, we can do that. It will take some time though.

I believe that having a tight state control over protests, social gathering and social organization in general has a negative effect on probability of regime overthrow by peaceful protests, because all budding protests are dispersed immediately, often brutally, and their leaders are quickly taken out by the unfair judicial process, so the protests cannot gain momentum. Do you disagree?

What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy. Throwing a Wikipedia article at it isn't an argument. How has my data selection process lead to my conclusion being less sound in a way that yours isn't? You've not given me any mechanism connecting these data selection processes with the truth. — Isaac

I have given your four articles about the fallacy you commit. You either understand them or not. If not, then nothing can be done about it, as they are pretty clear.

'Challenging' it? 'Reflecting' on it? These are just amorphous terms that don't have any distinct meaning. What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it? — Isaac

Yes, it seems all terms are amorphous to you.

You have no reason at all to believe I've not looked at any other evidence, and in fact the most cursory glance back through this very thread would have shown that assumption to be wrong, but it's not your interest to actually get that assessment right, is it? — Isaac

Well, even if you had a glance, you have refused to talk about it, which is about the same.

And I made such a ridiculous claim where, exactly? — Isaac

Here you go:

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

Have you ever written an argument? Have any of your teachers ever given you high grades for your 'list of facts' with the conclusion 'put them together however you want, that's up to you'? I presume you've at least had education past the level at which you're taught how to construct arguments. If you want to present an argument that your facts lead to a high probability, you must make that case (and do so persuasively). It's not 'list the facts and then roll your eyes if others don't reach the same conclusion you did' That's what persuasive arguments are for - to get others to see what you see connecting the facts to the conclusion. — Isaac

That is hilarious coming from you.

I counted on your intelligence, did not expect that I have to spell it all out for you.

Was there something there you didn't understand? — Isaac

I understand it quite well, but my accusation is not that 'there's no evidence for X', but that the evidence is cherry-picked. So joyously acknowledging that yes, your data is cherry-picked, does not address the fallacy in any way.

Is it? How? — Isaac

I have already wrote that: by challenging your view by reflecting on it from a different point of view.

The hardest thing about defeating confirmation bias is that it requires someone to challenge their own logic, which is easier said than done. The simplest way to avoid confirmation bias is to look at a belief you hold, and search out ways in which you’re wrong, rather than the ways in which you’re right. It’s of paramount importance to listen to all sides and carefully consider them before coming to a conclusion. And, having reached a conclusion, we need to continue reassessing whether our conclusion is correct as new information becomes available. You don’t need to compromise your values and beliefs to open your mind to other ideas. Entertaining another idea doesn’t mean accepting it. Just try to look at the alternative to a belief you hold and see the viewpoint of the other side. It’s here that you can begin the fight against confirmation bias. — What is Confirmation Bias and How to Reduce it?

You can overcome confirmation bias by getting out of your echo chamber to challenge your preexisting beliefs.

Here are some quick tips for getting started.
Search for accurate information, not easy-access information

Before making up your mind, spend a little more time seeking out evidence that disproves your point.
[...]
"Question your sources. Make sure you're getting your information from reliable sources and that you're not just seeking out information that confirms your existing beliefs," Dragomir says. — How to spot confirmation bias and keep it from fueling snap judgments and limiting your worldview

5 Ways to Overcome Confirmation Bias

For a start we've looked only at two indices in detail, that's not 'as many as possible', not even close, but putting that aside, the anchoring is implied in what you expect to see. You already have Russia as descending into something, your frame of reference, so the quality of any assessment in anchored to that metric, things either deviate from it (and so require justification), or they do not (and therefore require no justification). Likewise your 'framing' of human freedom means that deviations are what require justification, but adherences do not. — Isaac

You have flatly refused to look at other evidence. Could that be the reason for why we were looking just at one? Anchoring cannot be 'implied', if we are looking at several indices without rejecting any of them beforehand. 'Let us look at all the indices and average them' is not 'anchoring'. And 'human freedom' is too broad, as many ways in which human freedom is increased does nothing to resolve the actual conflict (which is caused by very specific violations of human freedom). If someone objects to slavery and someone proposes to significantly increase religious freedom of the slaves then yes, it would be a nice improvement of their index, but it would still not address the problem, i.e. slavery.

So 'framing' this as a misuse of 'tranny' (notwithstanding the fact that I only mentioned tyranny a few times), is a straw man. There are two definitions given by the dictionary, you have chosen the one which provides you with a means to an easy counter argument rather than use the one that was intended. It's literally the definition of straw-manning. — Isaac

Your claim that the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny requires a rather specific understanding of the term, which you have then tried to water down. The tyranny (i.e. the authoritarian regime) in Russia must be abolished, because it has specific properties that are the source of the conflict (like the fear that successful neighbors might instigate movements dangerous to the regime), so improving the plight of Russians in other areas has little to do with the resolution of the conflict. The question is not 'Can we make Russians happier?' but 'Can we make Russians stop subjugating other countries?' The HFI says that the first is possible (not even likely), but it says nothing about the second question.

Firstly, blame is about mens rea, not actus reus, so predictability isn't important. But I'm quite content with probabilism. You've not given any probabilities, you've just slung together a load of facts and said "see, these make it more probable". I don't see. I'm unconvinced that those facts lead to the probabilities you suggest and you've not presented anything at all to argue that they do. Their mere existence as facts is not sufficient. — Isaac

I have given you the facts, how you assess their influence on the probability is up to you. If you do not see how tight control of any form of protests might influence the probability of peaceful protests, so be it. If you do not see how the lack of grass-root activity traditions might influence people self-organization, what can I say. If you do not see how brutal suppression of opposition obstructs rising of figures around which the popular protests could concentrate around, there is nothing more I can do. I cannot do the thinking for you.

Great, so you finally did some reading.

So: is using a single outlier to support your argument is a fallacy or not?

The problem here is that your priming bias makes the argument you have seen seem more strong than the arguments you read here. So confirmation bias leads you to see the supporting evidence for that as leading more strongly to that conclusion. — Isaac

Of course, I have already acknowledged that:

Like everyone else, I surely apply some bias, based on my previous opinions — Jabberwock

But as I have pointed out, it is easier to overcome one's confirmation bias by seeking many sources, both confirming and countering his thesis.

As your anchoring bias sets you up to see your preferred indices as centre points from which to measure deviation, you use framing to shore up the evidence in favour of your preferred theories. — Isaac

That is the exact opposite of what I was doing. I have proposed to review as many indices as possible, including yours, with no particular weights attached to any of them, so there would be no anchoring and no preferential treatment whatsoever. You object to that because you realize that putting them all together would indicate your source is an outlier. How exactly is that framing?

Treating 'tyranny' and 'democracy' as if they were non-scalar terms is a suppressed correlative, something is not removed from either camp simply by relative position, and repeatedly arguing against that tighter definition you now have rather than those I'm using is a straw man. — Isaac

I have explicitly demonstrated that the HFI might be a positive correlative to 'tyranny': for Russia the HFI increased together with its tyranny. However, your argument requires that the correlation be negative. Having realized that, you try to redefine 'tyranny' as 'lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity', but that is not what is generally meant by the term. And surely it was not your meaning when you have initially used the term, which is rather clear when we substitute 'tyranny' in your original argument with that meaning:

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity [substitution underlined], or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity in it's regions. — Isaac

How does that work? It does not - if people in Russia are more free economically and have more personal opportunities AND there is still an authoritarian regime that is likely to impose its rule mlilitarily on its neighbors, that does not resolve the Ukrainian conflict in any way.

Your assumption that historical conditions must, simply by existing cause the current states is an historical fallacy, and reliance on it results in retrospective determinism, and as a result the majority of your assessment of Russia's current state from it's historical roots is just post hoc ergo propter hoc. — Isaac

No, it is not my assumption that it must happen, my argument is that it is more likely to happen than not. I am not arguing for historical determinism, but for historical probabilism. If you reject historical probabilism, then you cannot argue that the US provoked the war: if history is wholly undetermined and future inscrutable, then nobody could predict any course of events, therefore they are blameless.

Your repeated insistence that I 'enagage with' only one source despite having no information on how many sources I have read is an attempt at proof by assertion, not to mention the Bulverism. — Isaac

Maybe you have read many sources, but you engage with only one.

Finally, using Wikipedia to make your arguments for you is an appeal to authority. — Isaac

Yes, of course it is. Not all appeals to authority are fallacious. After all, citing HFI is also an appeal to authority.

So, still no. A small point for the effort, maybe.

Of course it does. If the accusation is "there's no evidence for X" then cherry-picked evidence disproves that claim. There has to exist evidence for X in order that I can cherry pick it, it therefore disproves the claim that there is no evidence in favour of X. — Isaac

Oh my, you still have not read the article, which clearly explains why this approach is incorrect. Errare humanum est, in errore perservare stultum.

It isn't. Just because some Wikipedia article says so, doesn't render it fact. There are multiple competing theories of epistemology. Googling a fallacy doesn't prove anything. If think you have a case, make it. — Isaac

I have been warned, now I realize why.

https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Cherry-Picking
https://listoffallacies.com/cherry-picking/
http://ds-wordpress.haverford.edu/psych2015/projects/chapter/cherry-picking-data/
https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/11526726

Good. You go ahead and believe that then. That you believe something to be the case is not an argument that it is, in fact, the case. — Isaac

I believe something based on as many facts as I have been able to gather, you believe something based on a single fact that you have picked because you believed that before you picked that fact. If you believe both views are equally valid, good for you.

What would constitute 'engaging' with them? You keep throwing in this term, but it's so nebulous. If I read them, decide they're not meaningful, is that 'engagement'? What do want as a sign of engagement (short of just agreeing)? I don't believe those factors make it sufficiently unlikely - I am unconvinced. What more is there to say? — Isaac

Yes, I truly believe you do not know what it means to engage with counterevidence.

I believe only the evidence that supports my claim (is sufficiently weighty). But that's obvious. It's why I believe my claim. The same is true of you. All the evidence that supports your claim you believe is weighty enough, all the evidence which opposes it you don't. That's why you believe your claim.

You seem to think that there's some kind of number-crunching or mental kung-fu that can be done with all this competing theory, that you've carried out and I haven't, yet you can't actually describe what it is. You can list things that we agree are the case all day long, but nothing in that listing is going to magically spew out a theory that we're all then compelled to believe. The facts underdetermine the theory - a point that seems stubbornly impossible to drive home here for some reason. — Isaac

You believe a single piece of evidence against all other evidence that says otherwise, i.e. an outlier (you still do not know what that is), because you have picked it out based on your beliefs. You actively and persistently avoid learning any facts that might challenge your view, and you do not examine your belief in view of the counterevidence.

It does. The HFI is as good a measure of 'tyranny' as any. Short of you getting out your tyranny-o-meter, what could you possibly bring to bear to dispute that. I get that you don't like it, that for you tyranny is mostly about voting and political opposition, but for others, there's tyranny in lack of economic freedom, lack of opportunity... I agree with the weighting the HFI has applied. You don't. There isn't an answer to that, there isn't some way we can stare more at the data and the right opinion pops out. — Isaac

Sure, if you take 'tyranny' to mean whatever else than is usually meant by that, then anything can be a measure of tyranny. For example, if you take 'tyranny' to be the amount of rainfall, then all you need to measure it are weather charts. Because there are different theories of epistemology.

What do you think you've provided evidence for? That Russia might not overthrow tyranny in eight years? Sure. But that's not the claim, the claim was that it will not. Or your later claim that it is more likely to not. Nothing you've provided has any probability assigned to it. It all simply might be the case. — Isaac

If past facts are irrelevant for probabilities, then anything really might come up. Why should we avoid war then? Past wars cannot inform us if there will be victims, simply that it might be the case. That is your reasoning, right?

Facts underdetermine theories. If you're having trouble with the notion, I'm sure I can dig out a Wikipedia article for your edification. — Isaac

But you do not have facts. If all the evidence I have provided is just 'some other people think otherwise', as you say, then your evidence is also just 'some other people think otherwise', which, as you say, cannot support or counter any claim. So neither theory has sufficient support, we have no reason to believe any of them is true.

I need no other support. I'm defending against your accusation that the position has no support. One set of support disproves that claim. — Isaac

No, cherry-picked support does not disprove anything, which you would know if you read that article. An argument based on a single cherry-picked point of support is fallacious and that is how it should be and will be treated.

There's no 'vastness' to the counter evidence other than in your mind. Some people disagree. I'd fully expect they do. My claim was not 'Russia can escape it's current state within eight years and nobody disagrees' — Isaac

I have described many factors from the history of both Ukraine and Russia that make me believe what you propose is unlikely. Unlike me, you have not engaged with any of them. This is simply confirmation bias. You engage ONLY with the evidence that supports your claim.

The simple fact is that, by some measures of freedom, it is perfectly possible for a nation to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years. It is also a fact that Russian occupation results in orders of magnitude fewer deaths and constraints than war. — Isaac

The simple fact is that capability of some countries to move on the HFI by a certain amount has nothing to do with the likelihood of freeing of the whole of Russia from tyranny, which was your argument. Ironically, I have demonstrated that Russia was able to improve its index while succumbing to the said tyranny.

Your absurd descent into truly execrable epistemology and speculation about my reading history, has failed to cover the fact that you've not provided a shred of evidence contradicting that claim.

And no "some other people think otherwise" does not contradict that claim, not even if your Delphic wisdom determines they're the ones telling The Truth™. — Isaac

I would say I gave you more than a shred, for example:

I gave you two facts, but I can give quite a few more. For some of them one has to go back to the times of tzars, when, at the time where Western civic societies were being established, Russians were still under absolutistic rule. The period of relative freedoms after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the Ditcatorship of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's verchushka. After that were fifty years of the authoritarian party's rule, with a very short period of relative relaxation under Yeltsin; then Putin came and strengthened the rule again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of democracy and very little of grass-root civil activity. This is aggravated by the rampant corruption, which necessarily weakens all the state institutions. It should also be noted that the geographical setup also plays a role – many remote regions are unsustainable without external help, so they were and are heavily dependent on the center. For example, independent Yakutia (Sakha) might sound nice to some, but is rather unrealistic - in spite of vast resources it would be unable to develop without significant external support. That forces heavily centralized structure of the government. This makes the greatest difference between Russia and current regions/republics and some former republics – for Baltics, for example, the oppression was clearly foreign - they did not need Moscow for anything, they could perfectly manage on their own (which they did). For remote regions it is quite different. This is somewhat related to another fact that hinders a popular uprising - significant differences in the standards of living. Those whose voice would be better heard and influential, Muscovites, have it much better than the rest of the country and they are quite aware of that - they have a lot to lose. On the other hand protests in remote areas would be simply unheard. Popular uprising needs unity, which would be difficult to reach.

This does not mean that Russians are unable to reach democracy, I sincerely hope that they do, but that process would be rather long and necessarily full of upheavals. It cannot be seriously considered as a solution for a conflict that is happening right now.
[...]
Sure, it is possible! If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.

But Russia does not have any of that. On the other hand, it has strict control of information (last somewhat independent press outlets were closed last year, it has massive blocking of Internet sites, Roskomnadzor, etc.), tight control of any social activities (organizations, foundations, etc.), stiff penalties for any form of protest, politically controlled judicial system. Could all those differences (beside those already mentioned by me before) affect the expected outcome? I say they would. Your argument just ignores all those differences and claims that we should expect a similar outcome, because they had a similar SINGLE metrics eight years ago (even if many other were different). And you demand to be treated seriously.

So you are simply not telling the truth when you say that I have not provided a shred of evidence. You simply dismissed it by saying that your cherry-picked evidence trumps all that I wrote. That much is clear: you do not engage with evidence. And saying that I do not provide it is a lie, pure and simple.

I was ready to provide more, I still am, but why should I, if you refuse to engage with it?

And tell me, you do not believe that the HFI contradicts my claim that the peaceful fall of regime in Russia is unlikely. How can it then support the opposite thesis?

Your whole argument was first based on clearly ahistorical claims, when that did not pan out, on cherry-picked data (or opinion in your view) AND by shifting the goalposts from 'oligarchy to democracy in a few years' to more and more watered down idea of 'freedom'. You have no other support to make the claim that a peaceful rebellion in Russia is likely in a reasonable time and flatly refuse to consider the vast evidence that says something else. You have acknowledged that Ukrainian independence might be a cause of war and now you are backtracking out of the claim by quibbling, when I have pointed it undermines your whole view. Yes, we are really done with this one - I gave it much, much more than it deserved.

I accept the capitulation.

I think these are different issues. For a libertarian, the difference between a human and a computer lies precisely in the fact that humans do possess infinite recursion. We can reflect and bend back on our own thought in a way that is not limited. The second quote here isn't as interesting, and I doubt it is even true, though this depends on definitions. A computer could be programmed to switch its output to "output = !output" as a response to an input command. But strictly speaking, counterfactuals do not exist for computers. — Leontiskos

We can modify the description of the experiment to remove the recurrence: the printout is not read by Ned, but by his colleague, Ted. Ted reads that Ned will go for walk and Ned does not. Does it disprove determinism? No, it just assumes libertarianism, there is no paradox at all.

I get it now. When I look at sources and conclude that one or more seem better than the others, I'm cherry picking opinions to match my theory. When you look at sources you're carrying out some next level rational analysis that for some reason the experts at each of the agencies concerned aren't even capable of, and the fact that the ones you choose just happen to support the theory you've been promoting all along is complete coincidence. — Isaac

Except you did not do what you now say you do. You have given one source (cherry-picked after your ahistorical claim that Ukraine turned around in a decade turned out indefensibie). You have also not mentioned that you consider this source better than others and why, you have flatly refused to look at other sources. I look at all sources - in case you did not notice, for the last two days we are talking about YOUR evidence. I assess the counterevidence and discuss what is its relevance to the argument presented and how methods used might affect the conclusions. In other words, I engage with the counterevidence. You claim that you do not even have to look a the counterevidence. See the difference?

Does it explain that in your Wikipedia article? — Isaac

Maybe you should read it? Who knows, maybe it would even help you to avoid your fallacies?

...? Most likely? Where are you getting your probabilities from? All we've established is that it might well be one of his motivating factors. You've not even mentioned any others, let alone assigned any probabilities to them. — Isaac

Are you saying that we have no reason to believe Putin threatening a war due to his perceived threat is likely to do that? If that is so, then he was not provoked into war by promises of Ukraine in NATO? Then nobody provoked the war, because nobody could know it was likely.

I don't think you understand how probability works. If I have a 2% chance of invading if it's sunny and a 3% chance of invading if it's a Wednesday, it doesn't mean I'm definitely going to invade on a sunny Wednesday just because those are the only two motivating factors we have. Putin might well be inclined to invade if Ukraine is free and prosperous. He may well be inclined to threaten invasion if he's already got some territory from the last threat. But since we've no data at all on how strong either of those motivating forces are, we've equally no data at all on how likely such an action becomes when both are present. — Isaac

So 'willing to go to war', with which you have agreed, is now 2% chance? Quite impressive backtracking.

But if it is so, then nobody could predict that Putin would invade Ukraine because of NATO. He was willing to, but given that it was just 2% chance, everyone can be excused for thinking he would not.

But we do have a right to demand the Yemeni's make their sacrifice? — Isaac

We do not, so we do not.

Then what do you do with it? How has it affected your theory, what did you change about your belief in the light of it, and why? — Isaac

I have considered it in view of your argument that peaceful regime change in Russia is likely. It does not show it - at best it shows that some indices of freedom are prone to quicker changes than others, but in both directions. It does not say which change is more likely than the other. Also, as I have pointed out, it seems to have significant shortcomings, as portraying Russia, with its anti-gay laws, as exactly as great in the same-sex relaltionships as the Netherlands, which have same-sex unions and robust anti-discrimination laws or not indicating the introduction of authoritarian rule during Putin.

On the other hand, many other sources that I have also considered in my assessment (unlike you) do influence my view on the probability of popular uprising in Russia, based on those many sources I conclude that it is unlikely.

Yes. So you said. I'm asking how. What is this 'taking together' you think you're doing? Half way between the two? Biggest wins? What are you actually doing when you're 'taking together'? — Isaac

I consider all the facts known to me and draw conclusions from them. Like everyone else, I surely apply some bias, based on my previous opinions, but at least I try to challenge them. You consider only one fact, sorry, an opinion, that suits your conclusion and, not unexpectedly, confirms that your conclusion was right.

No. That's not the situation here (nor your other examples). None of the indices are data. They are conclusions based on data. All groups had access to the same data. They disagree about the relative importance, value and meaning.

Importance, value and meaning are not facts to include in data harvesting, they're opinions one either is persuaded by or not. — Isaac

So cherry-picking an opinion is somehow better than cherry-picking data? I really do not think so.

How? Explain what you think happens. Cato make mistakes. Freedom House make mistakes. You put them together, then what? The mistakes magically pop out? What happens to the mistakes when you look at both reports? You see the differences. How do you know which ones are mistakes/biases? Majority rules? Magic bias detector? — Isaac

You have not read the article on your fallacy, have you?

It's not unaccounted for. Cato have come up with a unified score. The fact that you don't like their methodology because it doesn't come up with the score you think it ought to is not a point against it. — Isaac

If the indicator does not reflect the introduction of an oppressive regime and is supposed to be your evidence for the likelihood to overthrow an oppresive regime, then yes, it is unaccounted for. The indicator (or should I say, the opinion) does not show what you say it does.

If I'm willing to shoot deer that enter my garden, and a deer enters my garden, does that mean I'm going to shoot it, or meraly that I'm willing to shoot it? — Isaac

It means that you are likely to shoot the deer: there are two factors that make it more likely than not, unless we know other facts.

Possibly. I'm not sure what that's got to do with my mention of "strong unified global community committed to international law which Ukraine could be a part of". — Isaac

Because the distinction makes no difference: it will still put Ukraine outside of Putin's sphere of influence, so most likely he would react by waging a war.

If he was some kind of robot with only a single factor to take into account in any decision, perhaps. But he isn't, he's an oligarch balancing several dozen objectives of which eliminating a free and prosperous Ukraine is only one.

People rarely act in accordance with a single objective. — Isaac

Yes, human mind is inscrutable, however, often we have to make predictions concerning other people's behavior. Unless you have good reasons why he would not, those two premises (with which you agree with) tell us that he would likely do that.

Yes. Indeed it would. Still trying to make an argument by looking only at one side I see? — Isaac

Well, all the other side has is a fallacious argument based on cherry-picked data, sorry, a cherry-picked opinion, that does not even support the conclusion, because it makes improvement of freedoms as likely as their worsening.

If the other side comes up with an proper argument with proper evidence, I will be happy to consider it.

They might. But since neither you nor I are, I'm not sure what difference that makes to this discussions. I'm sure someone in Yemen looking at their desperately hungry child might have a difference of opinion too. — Isaac

The difference is that we have no right to demand they make that sacrifice from the comfort of our homes.

... where you dismiss the entire, well-respected, Human Freedom Index because it doesn't show the descent of Russia that you think it ought to? — Isaac

As I wrote I do not dismiss it, I just point out the possible shortcomings (like you did with Freedom Hourse) and point out that it should be considered together with other sources and not in isolation.

As I asked before, if not dismiss them, what do you want me to do with them? Average them? Believe the exact centre? Add up all the experts they each used and divide by the total? Subtract the number I first thought of? What exactly do you think one should do with this other conflicting data? — Isaac

First of all, I want you to think. If one source confirms your conclusions and many others do not, maybe that is not a correct conclusion after all? You want to process only preselected data that support your conclusion and ignore all others. That is a classic example of confirmation bias or more generally, cherry picking:

Cherry picking, suppressing evidence, or the fallacy of incomplete evidence, is the act of pointing to individual cases or data that seem to confirm a particular position while ignoring a significant portion of related and similar cases or data that may contradict that position. Cherry picking may be committed intentionally or unintentionally. — Wikipedia

That is exactly what you do. Intentionally.

And please tell me, how your vaunted index is arrived at? Experts at Cato gather all individual indices and then... average them? THE HORROR! Don't they know that averaging does not bring you the truth?!

People disagree. Experts disagree. I don't know what it is about you people that makes you think you alone can carry out some kind super-level of meta-analysis but the very experts you're citing for some reason didn't bother. — Isaac

I am just pointing out that using that one source preselected to confirm your view might not be the best methodology and therefore not the best support for your argument.

Yes. That's right. Unless you can give me a compelling (or any) mechanism whereby that occurs. — Isaac

If I argue that the global temperatures do not rise from year to year and carefully select data for only those places where it does not and ignore all others, are my conclusions as valid as the conclusion from the study where all data are considered and the results are just the opposite?

If I have a theory that the local population is dissatisfied with the city government and select those five opinions from the poll that confirm my theory and ignore 95 people who are satisfied, is my view equally supported as those who consider all opinions and conclude just the opposite?

If I claim that each plane travel is a terrible risk and include in my statistics only the crashes, ignoring all the safe travels, am I telling the truth?

If I read a single book on history (or just a single index on history), are my conclusions equally as valid as the person's who has read a bit more than that?

I am astonished that i even have to explain this.

The truth is the way the world is. The experts at Cato have had their best shot at modelling the truth using their Human Freedom Index. The experts at Freedom House have taken their best shot using their own index.

Now. How do I make a better shot by putting the two together? Why is the average of the two more accurate a model than either one. And if it is, why didn't either team of experts just do that? What mechanism links the averaging process to the way the world is? — Isaac

People at Cato have their preferences, biases and make their own mistakes. Experts at Freedom House have their preferences, biases and make their own mistakes. Many other experts do as well. So yes, getting all their opinions together does equal out those issues and provides better general view than cherry-picking the data.

I do recommend you read the whole article on that fallacy of yours. Actually, at this point, I believe reading any source on the issues you discuss would be beneficial for you.

Yes, if that's what the index shows (though 0.83 is quite a bit bigger than 0.59 and I prefer rankings for the reasons I've given). Your incredulity doesn't constitute an argument. You're implying doing exactly what you accuse me of doing, picking your index to match your theory. You already decided (theory) that Russia's descent into draconian tyranny must impact human freedom more than Ukraine's economic and judicial corruption, so you're now only prepared to believe evidence which agrees with that theory. Your implication that Cato's measure is suspicious is based entirely on the fact that it doesn't match your theory. — Isaac

And your theory is that economic and judicial corruption has an equal or greater impact? The issue with that theory is that you did not even bother to check your single source. Ukraine's indicators for the rule of law and for economy just about level out for the whole period from 2000 to 2018 (Ukrainians have a bit more judicial freedom and Russians a bit more economic one). So no, Ukrainians in general were not more opressed economically and judicially according to your single source and the descent into draconian tyranny is still unaccounted for.

You were writing about 'democracy', when that did not work you wrote about 'authoritarianism', when that collapsed you moved to 'general freedom', when even that did not work, we are at 'economic and judicial corruption', where you are wrong about the latter part. So now your argument is reduced to 'Putin's regime is likely to fall due to popular uprising, because Cato's experts have shown that during some period Russian's economic freedom has improved, even though it descended into draconian tyranny'. For some reason, I do not find that argument convicing, maybe others do.

That's not what you asked. You said "threaten". Opposing nations threaten war, that's how the balance of power is maintained. The key is to threaten back an equal measure. As I said before, if there was a strong unified global community committed to international law which Ukraine could be a part of, then this situation would never have happened. We're here because there's no such community and rather than being protected Ukraine was dangled like bait on a line. — Isaac

You said 'yep' when I wrote that Putin is willing to go to war to defend against perceived threats and you agree that he sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a threat. The conclusion must be that he would go to war for that reason. Not to mention that you are willing to make concessions based on threats alone, not to 'threaten back'.

And it happens so that there is a strong unified global community committed to protection of its members which Ukraine could be a part of. You do not want it to be there, because Putin objects. Why think Putin would not object to the community you describe?

I've nowhere proposed we do that. You asked a hypothetical. It's not the decision we have before us. But for the sake of your hypothetical situation... — Isaac

Yes, in our hypothetical situation you would give Putin the whole Ukraine. Given your view that he sees free and prosperous Ukraine as a threat, it is very likely that he would ask for it. So the course of action you proposed (give in to Putin's demands if he threatens war) is very likely to bring about the effect I am writing about: subjugation of the whole Ukraine with no prospect of it being free and prosperous.

Yes, that's right. If, in your hypothetical, we had to relinquish all of Ukraine to Russia, the number of free and prosperous neighbours would be less and so their effect less. — Isaac

But given that this hypothetical is quite likely on your proposed course of action, it seems this course of action would make the peaceful rebellion against Putin less likely.

It's always about balance. Hundreds of thousands of lives, millions more at risk, for the sake of a few decimal place improvements on the human freedom measure is not balance, it's insanity. — Isaac

Well, for you people being jailed, beaten up, poisoned, shot and deprived of basic democratic freedoms is a few decimal places on your precious index. People actually involved might have a bit different opinion on that.

There's nothing to 'engage' with. Yes. There are other metrics which show things in a different light. What exactly is it you want me to do about that? Carry out some phoney 'rational synthesis' which somehow determines the Truth of the matter (despite experts in the field being unable to decide), and no doubt suspiciously resembles the position I held in the first place? I'm about 25 years past that kind of naivety. — Isaac

I certainly did not expect you to ignore all the data that contradict your thesis.

Oh. Turns out yes.

Why did Freedom House not do that then? They have the staff, they have the expertise. Why are they leaving it to us laymen? If The Economist has data that needs accounting, then what's stopping Freedom House from including it?

The reason these sources differ is because they differ in opinion as to what's relevant, how important each issue is, and what it all means put together. There's no resolving those differences. Finding some kind of 'mean average' doesn't get you closer to the truth, it's not dome by vote and it's neither does splitting the difference. — Isaac

Assessing more data does not get you closer to truth than carefully selecting just the one that confirms your thesis? Because that is how you have selected it in the first place, right? You base your whole theory on an outlier (you do know what an outlier is, don't you?) and try to convince me it is valid methodology? I wonder why all those people are wasting time doing metaanalyses, if you can just pick out the result of this one study that you like best!

You already know it isn't because I've already explained three times how to interpret my use of the term, since you refuse to listen, I can't see the value in doing so a fourth time. — Isaac

OK, so let us stick just to relative terms, exactly as you want. Considering that Russia's score in 2000 was 5.57 and it moved to 6.16 in 2008, i.e. (improvement of 0.59), and Ukraine made the progress of 0.83 from 2000 to 2008, which was the period you mentioned, then we have to conclude that both made about the same progress in those respective periods?

Yep. — Isaac

If yep, then Putin would still attack Ukraine if it had prospects for being free and prosperous, no matter whether it was in NATO or not. Conceding NATO membership would not stop the war, if Ukraine was to be free and prosperous, it would still be attacked.

Pretty much, yes. But as boethius has pointed out, that option is not the one we're considering right now. — Isaac

So if we conceded the whole Ukraine to Putin, as you propose, we could not 'expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door', as there would be no free and prospering Ukraine next door. It pretty much would diminish the likelihood of the successful Russian revolt, would it not?

I think that course of action protects the most people's well-being. I've asked if you disagree and your answer was pretty much that you don't really care about the well-being of non-Ukrainians because you don't know any, so I don't see much we can discuss further. — Isaac

And you seem to care about well being of non-Ukrainians only if Ukraine can be blamed for its decrease, otherwise you are content with 'balance', as you wrote. If you sold your Fairphone and donated the whole amount to charity, you would protect well-being of even more people, most likely save a few lives. But you do not do that, you do not choose the course of action that protects most people's well-being, you prefer the course of action that protects some people's well-being AND lets you keep your Fairphone. You keep your Fairphone even if it means that more people would die, but object that Ukrainians want to keep their freedom, if it means more people would die.

Now, if free and prosperous Ukraine still had elections, maybe you could plausibly say the policies are what "Ukrainians" want.

Likewise, if men were allowed to leave the country and weren't forced into fighting, maybe you could say they "want" to fight, because they aren't leaving.

But, please explain the simple answers to these issues, as it's all uncomplicated to you. — boethius

Yes, of course, not all of them. When we use the collective nouns, we rarely mean every one of thing represented. Still, the support for the defensive war seems to be high, around 70-80%, of course it is higher in those places less affected by the war, so yes, I would say that in the general sense in which we typically use such phrases, they want to fight. Everyone reporting on the war, including Russians, acknowledge high morale of Ukrainian troops, desertions seem to be rare, so it does not seem that most of them are forced to fight.

Likewise, let's assume you are correct and "Ukraine wants to fight", and lets say we (the arms suppliers) know Ukraine will lose the war at immense cost, death and suffering.

Should we still send arms even if we knew Ukraine is very likely to lose anyways?

Because you also say in your uncomplicated world view that you don't need a theory of victory, so is Ukraine losing at the cost of a million Ukrainian lives worthwhile? — boethius

The issue I think I have already mentioned in this thread, possibly even in discussion with you, is that many people are somehow hang up on the issue of 'winning' or 'losing'. That is rather unrealistic and makes the discussion rather difficult, as everything depends then on the 'theory of winning', as you say, which is necessarily rather vague. I do not expect neither Ukraine nor Russia to 'win' the war in any reasonable sense. I believe it rather unlikely that Ukraine will get back all the territories and I believe Russia will not succeed in subjugating the whole of Ukraine, which I would say were the main goals for both sides.

Thus it is difficult to answer your question in principle, without defining what would be considered 'losing'. I would say that if we knew beforehand that they would very likely not gain anything and lose many Ukrainians, then we should refrain from it. I do not know though why they would do so, if they knew they were certain to lose?

You sweet summer child, like a leaf blown along the winds of hope without a care in the world.

Honestly seems nice to be that naive, but let us continue for the sake of argument. — boethius

That is hilarious from someone who believes in a solution negotiated with Putin.

Ok, well, if this "woeful" state of Western politics results in Ukraine losing the war at a massive cost of lives and suffering, are you saying the "woeful" support was justified nonetheless, or are you actually against the current policy, preferring sending no arms rather than insufficient support (which may not be achievable at all with only arms shipments but may require sending actual soldiers)? — boethius

No, I am against the current policy, preferring much stronger support. And I am not sure what you mean by 'unachievable'. Was the current level of support insufficient for taking back Kherson? Because I am pretty certain that it still did happen. Did Ukraine win back 10% of its territory or not? So it seems the support was sufficient for that, was it not? I would say quite a lot has been achieved, but of course with greater support Ukraine could achieve much more.

We've gone through the alternative many, many times with previous interlocutors. I haven't read all the posts since my haitus here so I'm going to assume Isaac did in fact answer you sufficiently, or then just dealing with your continuous deflection, but I can summarise the alternative:

First, not-helping Ukraine at all other than humanitarian aid the West can arguably be said to provide universally (or then makes an honest attempt, such as Médecins Sans Frontières) isn't a moral catastrophe. There's plenty of wars all over the place, not to mention those in which the West is the aggressor, in which we do not "help".

So not helping Ukraine would be the less hypocritical, and therefore more honest and more moral position.

Nevertheless, the alternative to arms shipments is diplomacy based on the honest position that we're not willing to die for this cause and there's zero evidence sending arms to Ukraine will result in a better outcome for Ukraine or anyone else (that the only hopium-light reason to do so is a cynical expenditure of Ukrainian bodies, "fight to the last Ukrainian", for debatable, and arguably counter-productive, geopolitical ambitions), but we (the West, and in particular Europe) may have things both Russia and Ukraine want that can help end the conflict.

Of course negotiating a resolution to the conflict requires both compromise and risk.

So, if you're opposed to either compromise or any risk (obviously only diplomatically and the risk of warfare) on principle then we should debate that first.

You seem to take it for granted that Ukrainians continuing to fight "to victory" (while also not requiring a theory of victory of how that happens) is the only reasonable option.

Are you against a negotiated resolution? — boethius

You have written a lot of words, but I do not see described any of the actual consequences, beside that you would feel morally superior.

I am not taking it for granted, as I wrote, I doubt Ukraine will 'win' the war in the sense you insist on, but I do believe that it is capable of achieving some more goals before the conflict ceases.

And I am not against a negotiated resolution, in fact I fully expect that this particular war will end with one, as surely none of the sides is able to force the other to complete capitulation. I just do not believe that a negotiated resolution before the war or during the war before we started helping Ukrainians would provide any benefit beside postponing the conflict a bit, because it would certainly not resolve it. But sure, please describe what solution you have in mind and why you think it would fare any better than Khasavyurt, Minsk 1 or Minsk 2.

If we don't want to fight, why do we want to send arms? What's this moral theory about sending arms regardless of the consequences sending arms has is the moral thing to do? Feel free to explain. — boethius

We care about Ukrainian sovereignty, but not enough to die for it. Sending weapons has the advantage of us not dying. Ukrainians, on the other hand, do want to die for Ukrainian sovereignty, possibly because it is their own sovereignty. I would say it is rather uncomplicated.

There's this delicate balance right in the middle of sending the "just right" bowl of arms that seems to aim for maximising Ukrainian dead, but at the same time it's presented as some obvious idea and anyone who's critical is "helping the enemy" who we're not actually at war with. — boethius

I would say the amount of arms sent is not a result of deliberate anything (I would rather say too little deliberation is involved), but it is the woeful result of the state of Western politics, which is ruled strictly by popularity, therefore politicians instead of making up their minds try to please everyone, so that we have the exact situation of 'helping the effort, but not too much'. If the support for the effort was greater in the West (like it is e.g. in the Baltics, former Eastern Bloc countries and Finland), then the war would be long over with.

Absolutely nothing is obvious about this idea and every time the consequences are brought up, instead of accepting the consequences as a consequence of this idea suddenly the West isn't moral agents at all and it's Ukrainians doing all the fighting and choosing and it's their choice and we aren't to question that choice no matter how irrational it seems, but somehow sending arms isn't our choice but just obvious thing to do. — boethius

OK, let us bring up the expected consequences of not helping Ukrainians at all. I tried to bring it up with Isaac, but to no avail.