Attempting to figure out China's stance towards Russia isn't the easiest. Various experts have various takes. (Shen Dingli goes as far as saying Russia will lose out in Ukraine by the way.) China's activities continue to suggest walking a cautious line that could go this or that way at a moment's notice.

Xi weighs up support for Putin after rebellion
^{— Amy Hawkins · The Guardian · Jun 26, 2023}
China unlikely to be worried by ‘weaker Putin’ post Wagner revolt
^{— Erin Hale · Al Jazeera · Jun 29, 2023}
Analysis-China's Ukraine peace talks gambit shows shifts amid hard realities
^{— Laurie Chen, Martin Quin Pollard, Greg Torode, William Mallard · Reuters · Aug 5, 2023}

Perceived common adversaries seem the main driver. After that, who knows. A Russian dependency on (or debt to) China could still be a factor. Pseudo-commitment?

What to expect from China these days in this respect?


Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis
^{— Madeline Fitzgerald, Elliott Davis Jr · US News · Jul 25, 2023}

I am not sure how to weigh all the different global strategic shakedowns but the recent escalation since the end of the grain deal has turned the Black Sea into goo. China is a major customer of that grain. It looks like a major divergence of interests has developed between partners sworn to never part.

China is a major customer of that grain. It looks like a major divergence of interests has developed between partners sworn to never part. — Paine

China isn't poor and there's still a functioning global grain market. Russia will be eager to compensate for any problems the war causes for China. Hence if China doesn't get grain from the Black Sea, then it gets it somewhere else.

The problem is for the poor countries which really suffer from higher prices. The Chinese won't have riots if grain prices are higher, but other countries (especially those who subsidize their grain prices, yet have difficulties in doing so) can be in a tight spot.

The ruble aiming high:

could you explain that graph please. A 150-word IELTS report, ideally

The exchange rate of ruble against all major currencies (USD, EUR, CNY) is climbing very fast. That means that all imports are more and more expensive for Russians. Whatever they bought for 75 RUB in December soon will cost 100. But that is even more devastating for Russian war effort, as they have to import lots of parts (e.g. electronics). Due to sanctions they had to pay much more for parts bought through intermediaries, now it will cost them even more. But even before the war due to 'easy' money from the natural resources (and rampant corruption) Russia's economy has been underdeveloped in many areas and relied on imports.

This could be balanced by exports, but recently Russia exports less and imports more. Also last year, to strengthen its currency against sanctions, Russia decided to renegotiate some of its export deals to be nominated in rubles. So a barrel of oil (sold for rubles) now buys two/thirds of goods it bought before (for yuans)...

The get-together apparently reflected the UN.

Ukraine calls Jeddah talks productive, Russia calls them doomed
^{— Pavel Polityuk, Hatem Maher, Angus McDowall, Barbara Lewis · Reuters · Aug 6, 2023}

We had very productive consultations on the key principles on which a just and lasting peace should be built. — Andriy Yermak

West’s efforts to make global South support Kiev's plan doomed to failure — diplomat
^{— TASS · Aug 6, 2023}

[The meeting in Jeddah is] a reflection of the West's attempt to continue futile, doomed to failure efforts to mobilize the international community, or more precisely, the global South, even if not entirely, to support the so-called Zelensky formula, which is doomed and unworkable from the outset. — Sergey Ryabkov

Kyiv doesn't want to talk with Putin (and repeats the UN). The Kremlin doesn't want to talk, just repeat demands. Doesn't look encouraging as far as talks are concerned.

Looks like Bayer agrees with boethius, sort of, in a way, partially... — jorndoe

Thanks for adding "sort of", but, yes, it is obvious even to staunch supporters of the war that Ukraine doesn't get "whatever it takes".

However, we are long past the moment where no-limits weapons supplies would make a major difference to the war.

Not that I would have supported such a policy when the war started or lament now the path not taken, as Russia could and likely would respond with nuclear weapons ... exactly why the policy has been to drip feed Ukraine weapons in a progressive and controlled manner that Russia can deal with without panicking (aka. win).

what leaves out from his commentary on the Rubble exchange rate is:

First, the energy contracts Russia insisted on Rubble payments was to "unfriendly countries"

Vladimir Putin has demanded payment in roubles for Russian gas sold to “unfriendly” countries, setting a deadline of 31 March. — The Guardian Explainer

This was not done to:

Also last year, to strengthen its currency against sanctions, Russia decided to renegotiate some of its export deals to be nominated in rubles. — Jabberwock

But was done mainly for political reasons of forcing Europe to make exceptions to sanctions and making countries who need the gas contradict their rhetoric; essentially playing the "push comes to shove game".

With the oil, the international market quickly adjusted to Western sanctions as long as Russia can sell somewhere, as oil is primarily transported by ships which can go pretty much anywhere in the world without significant extra costs. To make a long story short, international oil flows quickly adjust to changes in buyers and sellers.

International gas flows are far less flexible in any short period of time and so there are far bigger consequences to cut off supplies either by choice or by pipelines being blown up.

What @Jabberwock also leaves out is that even these contracts where the payment is in Rubbles, the price is not actually denominated in Rubbles but still in Euro or USD and what changed was the buyer needed to do the exchange into Rubbles rather than Gazprom or the Russian central bank. There is not really any economic difference in making the buyer make the exchange into Rubbles or the seller. The difference in this case was that insisting unconverted funds could potentially be stranded if payments were made to Gazprom subsidiaries who then, due to sanctions, could not move the money, but, in my opinion, the move was mostly symbolic of making countries "bend the knee" and buy Rubbles in contradiction to their public positions.

However, the price of the gas is not denominated in Rubbles so these countries will just be buying more rubbles.

Point is @Jabberwock has no clue what he's talking about, and even ignoring the gas, Russia has plenty of foreign reserves, gold and sells plenty of Oil in other currencies that the depreciation of the Rubble has zero relevance to Russia's ability to import electronics for arms manufacturing.

Rather, a low Rubble boosts Russian exports of manufactured goods.

For years, the West complained about China manipulating it's currency ... in which direction?

Lower!!

The accusation has been China keeps it's currency undervalued in order to boost it's exports.

Currency depreciation is only a major problem if you don't export anything.

As long as you're exporting, then you're getting foreign exchange that can be used to purchase whatever critical imports you need and your domestic currency can constantly inflate (which is basically a form of tax) and there's no issue (to the government and the wealthy who get the forex).

Case in point, Sri Lanka's economy unravelled because it's major export was tourism and then with Covid there was no more tourism, so Sri Lanka suddenly had no foreign exchange coming into the country but still has critical imports it needs to buy.

Things start to go bad when traders notice this and start to bet against the Sri Lankan economy in every way possible, further devaluing their domestic currency and forcing the central bank to spend foreign reserves to try to keep things from crashing altogether while a solution is hopefully found (such as an IMF loan to kick the can down the road or then tourism restarting in Sri Lanka's case), but then things crash completely when those foreign reserves run out and the central banks only option is to to to buy critically needed foreign cash in domestic currency, resulting in hyper inflation and the collapse of the government, as no one wants Sri Lankan money so you'd need to offer a ridiculous amount to buy any foreign money.

This doesn't happen as long as you can export.

If you're able to get into the country foreign exchange (which basically all goes to the central bank) through exports then you can by definition buy whatever critical imports you need with the foreign exchange you get through said exports.

You can then print as much as money as you want as a form of taxation and a form of national "sale" to foreign buyers of manufactured goods that are denominated in Rubbles. For example, if you're a Russian business and you sell farming equipment both in Russian and to foreign buyers and all your costs are in Rubbles, then there's not really an immediate affect of a change in the Rubble exchange rate ... in fact you're happy if the Rubble goes down as you're going to make more sales; you've basically been able to offer all your foreign buyers a discount without any of your cost structure or profits changing.

Normal poor people who mostly buy food (which Russia produces) and energy (which Russia produces) and maybe some fixed costs like rent, won't feel the effects of this currency depreciation either.

Who's affected is the middle class who don't own a business exporting anything and want to buy a phone or whatever on the foreign market or want to go on vacation somewhere, now it costs a lot more.

Which is why this form of inflation is in no way an economic problem for Russia and is just a massive tax on the Russian middle class.

The reason Russia manipulated it's currency to stay high until now (which the Russian central bank could easily keep doing if it wanted) is that there was propaganda value in doing that and keeping the currency stable to work out the effects of sanctions provided domestic "confidence" (so people stay in business and can work out alternative supply chains and so on).

However, the reasons for the central bank to support the Rubble are short term and once those reasons go away, any economist will recommend "price discovery" of what the fair value of the Rubble is on the international market.

Currencies depreciate on foreign exchanges or inflate (leading to the same thing) all the time without that being some problem.

It was a problem for Sri Lanka because the central bank ran out of foreign exchange, but in the case of Russia, the Russian central bank has plenty of foreign exchange reserves, plenty mineral reserves, can easily get more, and also basically doesn't have any loans equal to or exceeding its GDP with interest payment denominated in foreign currency (which is what fucks up small, fragile developing world economies).

Another way to put things in perspective is:

The inflation rate in India between 1958 and 2022 was 8,808.16%, which translates into a total increase of $8,808.16. This means that 100 rupees in 1958 are equivalent to 8,908.16 rupees in 2022. In other words, the purchasing power of $100 in 1958 equals $8,908.16 in 2022. The average annual inflation rate between these periods was 7.27%. — Rupee Inflation Calculator

And yet, India's economy has grown significantly and is considered a major international player.

Continuous inflation and artificially devaluing your currency on the international market on-top of inflation is a standard national economic strategy that the West continuously complains about as providing competitive advantage.

There is zero reason to assume this is not also true for Russia.

Of course, there are winners and losers in inflationary policy but neo-liberal economists can go on for quite some time on how everyone basically wins in the end, poverty vanquished etc.

So, at minimum, it's highly ironic and annoying that the Western press who employ neo-liberal economists to comment on everything else are suddenly pointing to currency devaluation as some sort of blow to Russia.

Here are two charts:



As can be seen, almost half of Russia's exports are made in rubles, but only one third of imports. What Russia sells for rubles is worth 13 bln USD, but it buys for rubles only what is worth 8 bln USD. Thus devaluation of ruble IS relevant to its foreign trade. This typically could be covered by the trade surplus (i.e. if what Russia sold for foreign currencies was still more than it bought for them), but this has been also shrinking rather dramatically and it is now headed toward deficit.

Chellaney opines impatience:

Biden’s Ukraine strategy is failing
^{— Brahma Chellaney · The Hill · Aug 8, 2023}

Organise or fight? Three years in exile, Belarus opposition divided about path
^{— Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Mike Collett-White, Peter Graff · Reuters · Aug 8, 2023}

Without foreign support, would Ukraine take a Belarusian turn? Apart from assimilation, that might be ideal for Putin. At the moment, it seems some ways off. But some steps roughly in that direction have been taken.

as Russia could and likely would respond with nuclear weapons ... exactly why the policy has been to drip feed Ukraine weapons in a progressive and controlled manner that Russia can deal with without panicking (aka. win) — boethius

Why likely would? It would seem rather spiteful, certainly not good for Russia(ns). Making it a nuclear war over a fifth of Ukraine (or however much would be left) suggests that the world (not just that area) has a markedly larger problem with the Kremlin, something in need of attention now (politically, tactically/strategically, militarily).

This typically could be covered by the trade surplus (i.e. if what Russia sold for foreign currencies was still more than it bought for them), but this has been also shrinking rather dramatically and it is now headed toward deficit. — Jabberwock

In other words, you agree with my analysis and the depreciation of the Rubble is not a problem, may even boost Russian exports and thus help that trade deficit problem ...

What is for certain is that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is not going to cause some imminent economic catastrophe.

Crash of the Rubble definitely could have been highly disruptive and caused such a economic and social unravelling at the start of the sanctions, but Russias central bank had plenty foreign currency reserves to support the Rubble.

For those wondering, the practical effect of the sanctions is massive supply chain disruption and so there's plenty of Russian businesses who have Rubbles in the bank and need to find alternative import substitutes for things that simply don't exist in Russia (ultimately exchanging Rubbles for whatever currency they need to buy whatever imports they require from somewhere else). Had the Rubble collapsed these businesses would have simply immediately failed causing further supply chain disruption and the entire economy could have unravelled.

By supporting the Rubble, the Russian central bank was basically underwriting (de facto subsidising) Russian business finding alternative supply chains and sorting things out.

Now that supply chains have been "reoriented" a fall in the Rubble actually boosts exports as now everything is cheaper for foreign buyers.

Generally speaking, all these macro economic moves have winners and losers and if it's good or bad and for who depends on a bunch of specifics. For example, if the government prints money to spend on social programs, that's basically just taxing the middle class to transfer wealth to the poor and invest in education and health and other things that ultimately benefit everything. If the governments prints money to "monetise" banker bets that went bad, that's taxing the middle and even lower classes to transfer wealth to the banks to further capture the political system.

Why likely would? It would seem rather spiteful, certainly not good for Russia(ns). Making it a nuclear war over a fifth of Ukraine (or however much would be left) suggests that the world (not just that area) has a markedly larger problem with the Kremlin, something in need of attention now (politically, tactically/strategically, militarily). — jorndoe

In terms of domestically and international politics, had NATO truly done "what it takes" and given Ukraine all manner of military equipment Ukraine could possibly want or need, started training on F16s and a thousand tanks and every sort of missile, and hell, why not F-35 and F-22's while we're "doing what it takes" and so on, then Russia could easily say they are fighting NATO, de facto attacked by NATO and so they're using nuclear weapons. So the optics would be "nuclear favourable".

Furthermore, if supplying all these advanced weapons to Ukraine resulted in major battlefield victories and Russia was losing, then the choice would essentially be between massive civil unrest and potential collapse of the economy and government or to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation.

Obviously there are costs to using nuclear weapons, but faced with total destruction (in this case of the Russian government or "regime" or whatever you want to call it) then any tool that avoids that is a preferable option.

Therefore, as long as Ukraine can be defeated with conventional means and, more importantly, has no chance of defeating Russia, then the costs of using nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits. Since NATO doesn't want Russia to use nuclear weapons as it has no response, hence NATO basically introduces one weapons system at a time so that Russia can easily adapt and overcome.

, losing out in Ukraine wouldn't destroy Russia, though it might be detrimental to Putin. Starting a nuclear war on the other hand...

In other words, you agree with my analysis and the depreciation of the Rubble is not a problem, may even boost Russian exports and thus help that trade deficit problem ... — boethius

No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices. Due to its huge official (and probably even bigger unofficial) deficit Russia no longer can provide such deep discounts on resources, so even with the better exchange rate (and, as I have shown, it helps only some, as half of the exports are in rubles) the opportunistic trade with India and China is slowing down - they now have enormous, cheaply bought reserves. Few countries are willng to break the price caps, Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts. Russia will not be able to boost its resource sales significantly. And beside resources there is not much to boost - the industrial base is undercut by the sanctions, Russian arms sales are the lowest since the USSR, obviously due to domestic demand. Add to this the greatest labor shortage since the 1990s...

Imports, on the other hand, steadily grow, which will drain Russia of its hard currencies.

↪boethius, losing out in Ukraine wouldn't destroy Russia, though it might be detrimental to Putin. Starting a nuclear war on the other hand... — jorndoe

That's why I literally say:

Obviously there are costs to using nuclear weapons, but faced with total destruction (in this case of the Russian government or "regime" or whatever you want to call it) then any tool that avoids that is a preferable option. — boethius

I say "in this case of the Russian government or "regime" or whatever you want to call it" as military defeat could spiral into civil unrest and unravelling of the economy (people in the streets rather than dealing with supply line disruption of the sanctions).

Likely, in such a scenario, the Russian decision makers (certainly Putin, maybe others as well) would conclude that using nukes on Ukraine to "stabilise" the situation is the pathway that leads to the least use of nuclear weapons. Better to nuke a few military formations and assets than the unravelling of the Russian government and nuclear armed warlords nuking whole cities. Whether that would happen or not, that would certainly be the argument of the pro-nuking debaters in such a meeting: that not-doing-the-thing leads to more of that very thing. I.e. by nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki we are in fact saving lives. Of course, can be debated both ways.

Now, how effective the full compliment of applicable NATO weapons would be in the battle space at the start of the war I'm not sure (maybe Russian anti-air missiles can shoot down F-16s on mass, Western tanks would not make much difference etc., and maybe Russia could even shoot down F-35 if that was possible to supply, train and support, or maybe they would not have been able to deal with advanced NATO weapons, or then maybe they could but the Russians run out of missiles etc.), so it's not a given that more weapons to Ukraine would have made a major difference. Advanced weapons take a long time to train on to become proficient and then more time to integrate those systems into a battle doctrine, unlike handheld missiles, so would have depended on what the limiting factors were for Ukraine at the start of the war. It's entirely possible that scrounging up and throwing in as much old soviet equipment as possible was the only effective strategy for NATO and tanks and planes are more symbols than potential game changers at any point in the conflict.

What is certain is that NATO decided very deliberately to not come close to testing that scenario because Russia could respond with nuclear weapons if it works. If it doesn't work then it's bad PR for Western military equipment (at this stage of the war there's plenty of excuses that the Ukrainians are tired, the Russians laid down all these mines and have air cover etc. -- excuses that would work less well at the start of the conflict): point being it's a lose-lose situation making an honest attempt to support Ukraine defeating Russia on the conventional battle field. What's a win for the US is subjugating Europe and sacrificing Ukrainians to do so.

No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices. Due to its huge official (and probably even bigger unofficial) deficit Russia no longer can provide such deep discounts on resources, so even with the better exchange rate (and, as I have shown, it helps only some, as half of the exports are in rubles) the opportunistic trade with India and China is slowing down - they now have enormous, cheaply bought reserves. — Jabberwock

You have a remarkable ability to have zero clue what you're talking about.

Russian resources are sold at international prices and if offered at a discount due to having limited buyers due to sanctions that has nothing to do with the Rubble exchange rate, but would just be 20% or whatever off the international price that's denominated in USD (even if the sale is made in other currencies, the price will be set relative the international price).

Where currency devaluation cheapens exports is in things that are not commodities but services or manufactured goods where the inputs are bought in Rubbles (i.e. labour and domestic resources and components -- if you need to import most of the inputs to your product then currency devaluation doesn't necessarily result in a lower price of the final product).

Devaluing your currency has an immediate effect of making your exports (dominated by domestic inputs) cheaper to international buyers while also making imports into your country more expensive thus encouraging buying domestic.

Of course, if your exports require all sorts of imports to produce (energy, material, services etc.), such as basically any small country that specialises in a few parts of the value chain, then currency devaluation can have the opposite effect, but that's not Russia's case.

You are literally grasping at straws trying to spin these changes in currency and trade balance winds as some sort of fatal blow to the Russian economy.

Russia is not in a recession and pretty much any economist on the planet will be able to inform you that supporting the price of the Rubble has only short term reasons for doing (subsidise import substitution to adapt to sanctions and provide stability and "confidence" generally speaking) but those reasons go away and long term it's wise to let the currency float (at least pretty close) to its market rate (supporting your currency is, fundamentally, subsidising capital flight out of the country).

Few countries are willng to break the price caps, Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts. Russia will not be able to boost its resource sales significantly. — Jabberwock

First, Russia doesn't sell to countries that have a price cap:

Russia bans oil sales to countries using price cap — BBC

And there are enough countries to purchase Russian output, in particular China and India as well as countries willing to man-in-the-middle Russian oil to Europe.

Whatever discounts Russia offered in 2022 or even 2023 to lower "friction" is relative higher prices due to anxiety caused by things like ... a big war.

And stating that "Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts" like that's against Russias interest or desires is just laughable.

Both Russia and Saudi Arabia always want output cuts as major oil exporters ... just "if everybody does it".

OPEC is a cartel who's entire purpose is to cut oil production and Saudi Arabia and Russia are in this cartel to always try to do that.

What matters is profits and if oil is 2% oversupplied or 2% undersupplied on the global market has a huge difference on profits, so if you can form a cartel to cut production and so fix prices high then you make far more profits than selling 10% more volume but at half or less the price.

So, if you can get enough exporting partners together you can all agree to cut production and sell less volume but at a higher price and make not only far more revenue but even more profits.

That's what OPEC is about, so Saudi Arabia "demanding" output cuts during this conflict is basically siding with Russia to make mad coin.

Saudi Arabia said it would extend its voluntary oil output cut of one million barrels per day (bpd) for another month to include August, adding that the cut could be extended beyond that month.

Shortly after the Saudi announcement, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said Moscow would cut its oil exports by 500,000 barrels per day in August. — Reuters - Saudi Arabia, Russia deepen oil cuts, sending prices higher

The oil cuts are literally good, not bad, for Russian oil export revenue.

Of course, the US exports oil too, so higher prices are a mixed bag to the US, in particular US elites who are the people that matter in the US system.

Europe on the other hand ...

You have a remarkable ability to have zero clue what you're talking about. — boethius

Let us see about that...

Russian resources are sold at international prices and if offered at a discount due to having limited buyers due to sanctions that has nothing to do with the Rubble exchange rate, but would just be 20% or whatever off the international price that's denominated in USD (even if the sale is made in other currencies, the price will be set relative the international price). — boethius

Yes, that is exactly what I wrote: 'No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices.' Russia had to provide significant discounts to find new customers for its resources, but it is no longer able to do that as it needs to make profit.

Where currency devaluation cheapens exports is in things that are not commodities but services or manufactured goods where the inputs are bought in Rubbles (i.e. labour and domestic resources and components -- if you need to import most of the inputs to your product then currency devaluation doesn't necessarily result in a lower price of the final product).

Devaluing your currency has an immediate effect of making your exports (dominated by domestic inputs) cheaper to international buyers while also making imports into your country more expensive thus encouraging buying domestic. — boethius

Most of Russia's exports are related to raw resources. We do not know what portion of it is denominated in rubles, what we do know is that Russia wanted to move away from USD and EUR in its trades. It could move solely to foreign currencies, such as CNY, but then it would put control of its trade into Chinese hands, which it might not be willing to do. We also do know (thanks to the chart given above) that a portion of the exports is pegged to RUB.

However, it does not matter much, because there will be no boom in the trade of resources, for reasons already given.

Of course, if your exports require all sorts of imports to produce (energy, material, services etc.), such as basically any small country that specialises in a few parts of the value chain, then currency devaluation can have the opposite effect, but that's not Russia's case. — boethius

That is exactly Russia's case for most exports beside resources, because its industry is underdeveloped and heavily relies (or did, when it worked) on imported inputs, most of those from Western countries. That is why its e.g. automoblie industry practically collapsed - Russians have no know-how, no domestic industrial machinery, etc. There will be no export boom for Russian cars, if the door handles come off or the car does not start.

Russia is not in a recession and pretty much any economist on the planet will be able to inform you that supporting the price of the Rubble has only short term reasons for doing (subsidise import substitution to adapt to sanctions and provide stability and "confidence" generally speaking) but those reasons go away and long term it's wise to let the currency float (at least pretty close) to its market rate (supporting your currency is, fundamentally, subsidising capital flight out of the country). — boethius

We do not know in what state Russian industry is, as we do not know what part is directed to the war effort. And while it might provide better employment and some short-term benefits, it does not lead to development in the long term.

First, Russia doesn't sell to countries that have a price cap — boethius

Yes, I know that. That was my argument, maybe it was too succint. There will be no boom in resource sales for Russia, because there will be no or very few new customers who will be willing to break the price cap (and going through intermediaries diminishes profits).

And there are enough countries to purchase Russian output, in particular China and India as well as countries willing to man-in-the-middle Russian oil to Europe. — boethius

No, as I have already mentioned. China and India were eager to buy at the discount, but it was not profitable enough for Russia. Besides they bought much more than they need already and they cannot store unlimited amounts, not to mention that China's economy is cooling off significantly. Russia will struggle to maintain the exports at the current levels, export boom is simply unrealistic.

And stating that "Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts" like that's against Russias interest or desires is just laughable.

Both Russia and Saudi Arabia always want output cuts as major oil exporters ... just "if everybody does it". — boethius

Again, while generally you are correct, you are wrong in this particular case. Russia does not want output cuts NOW, it needs to increase its exports to cover rapidly growing imports.

That's what OPEC is about, so Saudi Arabia "demanding" output cuts during this conflict is basically siding with Russia to make mad coin. — boethius

Nope. China and India will simply buy less if the price is raised (and they already buy from Russia below the OPEC price) as they have gotten enough cheap oil already, countries working with the West will not buy if the price cap is exceeded. All that is left is the illicit trade, but that will not be sufficient. Again, no boom in sight.

, turning it into a nuclear war wouldn't stabilize anything, it'd be like a defcon 2 or 1 escalation (sort of, to use old verbiage).
I'm assuming the Kremlin knows, but might be wrong I suppose.
Or, do you think Putin is that spiteful (and mad)?
He'd jeopardize lots more than himself, and has been told so by more than one party on more than one occasion.
(For that matter, there's a chance it could lead to unrest within Russia.)
At times, Putin comes through as meticulously calculating.
Incidentally, in this respect, I'd be more worried about Kim Jong Un.

Let us see about that... — Jabberwock

Yes, let's continue, why not?

Yes, that is exactly what I wrote: 'No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices.' Russia had to provide significant discounts to find new customers for its resources, but it is no longer able to do that as it needs to make profit. — Jabberwock

... You literally wrote:

No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices. Due to its huge official (and probably even bigger unofficial) deficit Russia no longer can provide such deep discounts on resources, so even with the better exchange rate — Jabberwock

Linking exchange rates to the commodity prices, somehow mitigating the already existing discounts that are too much of a discount and Russia's problem?

I didn't have time to unpack entirely how little sense that makes on each level. I leave it as an exercise to the reader.

I also didn't even have time to point out that Russia has large cash reserves and so can run a deficit.

We are all Keynesians now except for this guy.

Most of Russia's exports are related to raw resources. We do not know what portion of it is denominated in rubles, what we do know is that Russia wanted to move away from USD and EUR in its trades. — Jabberwock

None of it is denominated in Rubbles.

Countries who sell commodities do so relative the international spot price of those commodities.

You have literally zero clue how the international commodities market functions and you're insistence on providing analysis based on complete ignorance is, as I say, remarkable.

That is exactly Russia's case for most exports beside resources, because its industry is underdeveloped and heavily relies (or did, when it worked) on imported inputs, most of those from Western countries. That is why its e.g. automoblie industry practically collapsed - Russians have no know-how, no domestic industrial machinery, etc. There will be no export boom for Russian cars, if the door handles come off or the car does not start. — Jabberwock

In any major macro-economic shift (such as cutting off nearly all trade with the West) there are losers and winners (what matters is how many of each in the mystical agragate of the economist). Russian economy is growing, so pointing out sectors that were losers from recent events is not indicative of the whole.

However, it does not matter much, because there will be no boom in the trade of resources, for reasons already given. — Jabberwock

First, Russia makes regular revenue and foreign exchange off the sale of resources in completely normal market conditions and does not require a boom to continue to do so.

Second, commodity price increases are due to either shocks (which are by nature unpredictable) or then follow the international business cycle (recessions put downward pressure on commodity prices and growth puts upward pressure, in a cycle that is not really cyclical but a one way street to environmental collapse, but that is a larger time frame than the war at hand).

Third, I must admit I do not know the reasons given, feel free to provide them again.

We do not know in what state Russian industry is, as we do not know what part is directed to the war effort. — Jabberwock

... I thought you literally just told us because you know??

because its industry is underdeveloped and heavily relies (or did, when it worked) on imported inputs, most of those from Western countries. — Jabberwock

Which is just anti-Russian rhetoric, I'd say racist, based on nothing, but also self-contradictory.

Yes, I know that. That was my argument, maybe it was too succint. There will be no boom in resource sales for Russia, because there will be no or very few new customers who will be willing to break the price cap (and going through intermediaries diminishes profits). — Jabberwock

You're argument was:

Few countries are willng to break the price caps, Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts. Russia will not be able to boost its resource sales significantly. — Jabberwock

Which definitely implies Russia is selling under a price cap few are willing to "break" and so the only way to increase revenue is to sell more volume but the mean Saudi's are demanding Russia keep output cuts.

But if you're now saying your argument was too "succinct" to make any sense or have and meaning, yeah, sure.

No, as I have already mentioned. China and India were eager to buy at the discount, but it was not profitable enough for Russia. Besides they bought much more than they need already and they cannot store unlimited amounts, not to mention that China's economy is cooling off significantly. Russia will struggle to maintain the exports at the current levels, export boom is simply unrealistic. — Jabberwock

Again, zero understanding of commodity markets. Russia's primary concern when the war started was maintaining market share and ensuring it's oil flows somewhere. Storage is limited and stopping oil producing oil wells can be costly and do irreversible harm to the oil field for a bunch of complicated geological reasons (of course producing the oil efficiently will harm humanity more, but that's not Russia's main concern in 2022 or 2023 ... and possibly for the foreseeable future as they'll have a large amount of the world's arable land and can just watch world burn if they feel like, you know, we've been less than understanding).

Again, while generally you are correct, you are wrong in this particular case. Russia does not want output cuts NOW, it needs to increase its exports to cover rapidly growing imports. — Jabberwock

I literally explained several times that Russia (and Saudi Arabia and the other major oil exporters) want high prices and are perfectly happy to cut production if it means prices are higher. For example, obviously you'd be willing to sell 10% less if you are selling at 100% higher the price, but it's even more sensitive to price than that because what you actually care about is profits and the profits will increase even faster than revenue with price increases. It's basic math, I can break it down with additions and multiplications and subtractions if you want.

Now, what each oil exporter doesn't want to do is take it on themselves to cut production just to see another oil producer increase production and take their market share; if they did that then they'd be selling less at the same price and so simply making less money; if they then increased production to try to win back that market share then the price will decrease. The solution is to form a cartel and get enough of the market to coordinate production cuts to increase the price while no single cartel member looses market share relative the other members.

It's called friendship.

Nope. China and India will simply buy less if the price is raised (and they already buy from Russia below the OPEC price) as they have gotten enough cheap oil already, countries working with the West will not buy if the price cap is exceeded. All that is left is the illicit trade, but that will not be sufficient. Again, no boom in sight. — Jabberwock

Where do I argue some sort of commodities boom is coming? Generally speaking or even for Russia?

This literally comes from literally no where.

I've simply pointed out that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is quite usual and expected and not, in itself nor in this actual context, some harbringer of economic doom.

As long as Russia can sell a large quantity of commodities it will have foreign exchange and some sort of forex driven economic collapse (as certainly can happen as we've recently seen in Sri Lanka) is basically impossible in Russia's case.

Of course, some sectors of the Russian economy may do better may do worse, sanctions or central bank economic policies may or may not be the cause, but at the moment Russia's economy is growing so there's zero reason to believe there are some imminent economic problems that would affect the war effort, which is what we're discussing here.

Also, for people interested in actually understanding the situation rather than just swallow anti-Russia rhetoric, commodity producing nations don't go bust in one or two or several years. These are massive material and financial flows and have large amounts of momentum and what matters is a whole bunch of years. Even if Russia did sell at deep discounts in 2022 and 2023 (which we don't really have enough details of all the horse trading that goes on to really know much) this is just 2 years in decades and decades. 10 years would be a reasonable time frame to consider, such as Russia amassing a war chest over 10 years before invading Ukraine, and there is no evidence that Russian buyers of commodities have enough leverage to turn Russia into a vassal state that is unable to sell relative the international market rate.

↪boethius, turning it into a nuclear war wouldn't stabilize anything, it'd be like a defcon 2 or 1 escalation (sort of, to use old verbiage).
I'm assuming the Kremlin knows, but might be wrong I suppose.
Or, do you think Putin is that spiteful (and mad)?
He'd jeopardize lots more than himself, and has been told so by more than one party on more than one occasion.
(For that matter, there's a chance it could lead to unrest within Russia.)
At times, Putin comes through as meticulously calculating.
Incidentally, in this respect, I'd be more worried about Kim Jong Un. — jorndoe

If the Kremlin was faced with the unravelling of the Russian economy and state, from their perspective, nuking Ukraine would be stabilising.

Certainly that may not be true for the rest of the world, but we are considering the actions and decisions of the Russians in the scenario that NATO actually did provide "unlimited support" and "whatever it takes".

NATO would not nuke Russia in return and, at least in my opinion, nuking a bunch of key formations and infrastructure in Ukraine would arrest any offensive momentum. Some people disagree that nukes would be militarily effective ... but I find that hard to believe, and not just "because nukes" but because there are plenty of missile strikes on targets that survive and are repaired and attacked again (bridges, air-fields, logistics hubs) that a tactical nuclear weapon would not only dispatch in one go but permanently. The fact these targets are struck again and again simply to disrupt them indicates to me at least that they are of significant importance and simply nuking them off the map would be of comparable significant military advantage.

And yes, obviously would send the US to defcon 1 and things would be tense.

However, there's zero reason for the US to strike Russia with nuclear weapons and risk escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange so the US would likely do nothing.

Why would the US risk it's own cities in retaliating on Ukraine's behalf? Zero reason.

Now, the Neocons spent significant grey matter on trying to crack this impasse by brainstorming non-nuclear retaliation options that could potentially deter Russia from using nukes in Ukraine to therefore justify more and more advanced weapons systems being sent to Ukraine.

(Again, I don't think it's a given that there was a significantly better strategy than pouring in every piece of old soviet equipment NATO could find) but the neocons definitely wanted a "no limits" policy and that didn't happen because they never solved the nuclear retaliation (or lack thereof of an option) problem.

They'd say things like "oh, we'll strike Crimea with conventional missiles and sink the black sea fleet!!"

However, Russia could just eat that and not retaliate in turn as a "cost to doing business".

Of course, there would be significant costs to Russia and significant chaos down the line (including to Russia) due to the disruption to the international system using nukes would cause, which explains why they don't go around nuking people.

And, keep in mind, if Putin was hell bent on nuking Ukraine, or anyone, that would have happened already.

Putin is not an irrational actor, he has different goals that are at odds with Western goals but the West does not define rationality. The West goes around saying it defines rationality to justify imposing imperialistic policies on weaker parties since other forms of justification (the glory of the emperor or the will of God or straight up plunder) are incompatible with the Western advertised ethos.

Linking exchange rates to the commodity prices, somehow mitigating the already existing discounts that are too much of a discount and Russia's problem?

I didn't have time to unpack entirely how little sense that makes on each level. I leave it as an exercise to the reader.

I also didn't even have time to point out that Russia has large cash reserves and so can run a deficit.

We are all Keynesians now except for this guy. — boethius

Your argument was that depreciation of ruble was great for Russia, because it boosts exports. While in theory that is correct, in this particular case it will not boost Russian exports, for the numerous reasons I have already given.

In any major macro-economic shift (such as cutting off nearly all trade with the West) there are losers and winners (what matters is how many of each in the mystical agragate of the economist). Russian economy is growing, so pointing out sectors that were losers from recent events is not indicative of the whole. — boethius

Oh, so for balance point out which sectors are booming, beside the military ones.

Which is just anti-Russian rhetoric, I'd say racist, based on nothing, but also self-contradictory. — boethius

Lol, you are hilarious... You know who Dmitry Medvedev is? This is what he said seven years ago (Google translated):

The situation in some areas is still extremely difficult. Let me remind you that our share of imports in machine tool building is estimated at approximately 90% (90!), in heavy engineering - about 70%, in oil and gas equipment - 60%, in power equipment - about 50%, in agricultural engineering, depending on the category products - from 50 to 90%, too, and so on. Even in civil aircraft construction, imports, unfortunately, are still overwhelming - more than 80%. — Dmitry Medvedev

Are you saying he is an anti-Russian racist?

Which definitely implies Russia is selling under a price cap few are willing to "break" and so the only way to increase revenue is to sell more volume but the mean Saudi's are demanding Russia keep output cuts. — boethius

Russia was selling under the price cap practically till June and it was accused of lying about the cuts (as Daniel Yergin pointed out).

Again, zero understanding of commodity markets. Russia's primary concern when the war started was maintaining market share and ensuring it's oil flows somewhere. Storage is limited and stopping oil producing oil wells can be costly and do irreversible harm to the oil field for a bunch of complicated geological reasons (of course producing the oil efficiently will harm humanity more, but that's not Russia's main concern in 2022 or 2023 ... and possibly for the foreseeable future as they'll have a large amount of the world's arable land and can just watch world burn if they feel like, you know, we've been less than understanding). — boethius

Russia's primary concern was to maintain revenues, given that half of its budget is financed by resource exports. You are pretty confident China and India will buy same amounts for higher prices, but actually give no argument for that. And it does not align too well with the facts: China's July crude imports drop to lowest since January India's purchases peaked in April.

I literally explained several times that Russia (and Saudi Arabia and the other major oil exporters) want high prices and are perfectly happy to cut production if it means prices are higher. For example, obviously you'd be willing to sell 10% less if you are selling at 100% higher the price, but it's even more sensitive to price than that because what you actually care about is profits and the profits will increase even faster than revenue with price increases. It's basic math, I can break it down with additions and multiplications and subtractions if you want.

Now, what each oil exporter doesn't want to do is take it on themselves to cut production just to see another oil producer increase production and take their market share; if they did that then they'd be selling less at the same price and so simply making less money; if they then increased production to try to win back that market share then the price will decrease. The solution is to form a cartel and get enough of the market to coordinate production cuts to increase the price while no single cartel member looses market share relative the other members. — boethius

Again, what is true in principle does not necessarily apply to each and every situation. Sure, Russia would be happy to sell a somewhat smaller amount for a much higher price. The question is who will be happy to buy from Russia at those inflated prices. You assume that China and India will happily buy the same amounts of oil if it is much more expensive. That assumption is, to put it very mildly, unreasonable.

Where do I argue some sort of commodities boom is coming? Generally speaking or even for Russia?

This literally comes from literally no where.

I've simply pointed out that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is quite usual and expected and not, in itself nor in this actual context, some harbringer of economic doom.

As long as Russia can sell a large quantity of commodities it will have foreign exchange and some sort of forex driven economic collapse (as certainly can happen as we've recently seen in Sri Lanka) is basically impossible in Russia's case. — boethius

And I have pointed out why Russia's exports will stall while its imports soar. I did not write that I expect a collapse, I wrote that it will be more and more dififcult for Russia to pay for its imports.

_{(You know how in certain subcultures there are certain things that cannot be said suggested questioned?)}

Impressive, sinister, disgusting:

Russia’s latest effort to sway young minds: High-school textbooks praising the conflict in Ukraine
^{— Ivana Kottasová, Uliana Pavlova · CNN · Aug 9, 2023}

As per Sergey Kravtsov:

Of course, we will supplement the textbook as soon as we win. As I said, we are already winning the information war, but the special military operation will end, and end with our victory, and, of course, we will supplement the history textbook. — RIA Novosti · Jun 23, 2023

The textbook on the history of Russia for the 11th grade reflects the causes and course of the special military operation, the reunification of the Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia, as well as the entry of new regions into the Russian Federation. — TASS · Aug 7, 2023

There’s been an increase in school indoctrination efforts through textbooks, the content of the curriculum and extracurricular activities in Russia from 2014 onwards. — Katerina Tertytchnaya

The state has everything on its side, it has money, it has bodies, it has the stick of being able to jail parents who oppose what’s happening in schools, it has the stick of being able to keep teachers quiet – but these opposition groups have none of that and therefore everything they do is a drop in the water against this great behemoth of conspiracy theories and nationalism. — Ian Garner

Putin consolidated powers and put Russia on a non-peace trajectory. Goes hand-in-hand with the reenculturation efforts that have come up in the thread. I'm guessing it'll work, at least to an extent, perhaps depending on what others do.
_{"War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength."}

, no, it wouldn't be stabilizing, and Putin presumably knows. (Not sure why you keep writing that.)

Your argument was that depreciation of ruble was great for Russia, because it boosts exports. While in theory that is correct, in this particular case it will not boost Russian exports, for the numerous reasons I have already given. — Jabberwock

No where do I say the depreciation of the Ruble is "great for Russia", I explain why the Russian central bank supported the Ruble and how letting the Ruble float (or close to float) is wiser and in some ways inevitable central bank policy policy. I explain there's winners and losers in these sorts of macro economic shifts, exporters of manufactured goods that have foreign buyers with inputs purchased in Rubles being among the winners but there are of course both losers and plenty of other effects.

My point is this currency change is no unexpected nor dramatic nor, due to the particular circumstances of having reoriented supply chains, not a signal of high risk or imminent collapse or inability to prosecute the war (which is what we're discussing).

I explain the depreciation is also in essence a tax on the middle class who therefore are losers in this scenario, insofar as they don't ultimately benefit from increased exports of manufactured goods and services.

I also explain how depreciation of the Ruble has nothing to do with Russia's ability to get foreign exchange in selling commodities on international markets denominated in foreign currencies (and the fact Russia forced some countries to pay in Rubles is of little importance).

More to the point, none of these macro-economic variables mean much if they aren't the cause of or symptom of recession, which the Russian economy is not currently in and the depreciation of the Ruble against other currencies is unlikely to cause recession.

Balance of trade and capital flows and so on can go one way one year and another way the other year ... or, you know, consistently have a trade deficit for decades such as in the case of the United States.

Lol, you are hilarious... You know who Dmitry Medvedev is? This is what he said seven years ago (Google translated):

The situation in some areas is still extremely difficult. Let me remind you that our share of imports in machine tool building is estimated at approximately 90% (90!), in heavy engineering - about 70%, in oil and gas equipment - 60%, in power equipment - about 50%, in agricultural engineering, depending on the category products - from 50 to 90%, too, and so on. Even in civil aircraft construction, imports, unfortunately, are still overwhelming - more than 80%.
— Dmitry Medvedev

Are you saying he is an anti-Russian racist? — Jabberwock

He's saying the same thing as me:

In any major macro-economic shift (such as cutting off nearly all trade with the West) there are losers and winners (what matters is how many of each in the mystical agragate of the economist). Russian economy is growing, so pointing out sectors that were losers from recent events is not indicative of the whole. — boethius

Any economy will have sectors that rely heavily on imports, that is not indicative of the whole.

What is more indicative is recession or not. If the Russian economy is growing then maybe it's doing other things of value where it is more competitive.

Plenty of countries are not competitive in all those sectors you mentioned and a long list of other sectors.

Being competitive or then protecting / subsidising a domestic industry is important if the sector is strategic, but there is literally no country on the planet that is fully self sufficient.

If Russia is getting infrastructure built faster and cheaper by the Chinese then maybe that's building capacity that creates more overall value ... which is basically economics 101.

Japan imports a lot of oil, Saudi's import a lot of arms, America imports a lot of electronics and random stuff.

Pointing to an economy and then pointing to a sector that is heavily reliant on imports means absolutely nothing and you can do that with every country. What matters is if those dependence relations can be disrupted or manipulated. The West tried to disrupt those dependence relations prophesying doom and the Russian economy was able to adapt. Now the argument is the dependence relations are manipulated by China and India and so on and prophesying ... I'm not exactly sure, a few points off the international spot price for a few years?

Russia was selling under the price cap practically till June and it was accused of lying about the cuts (as Daniel Yergin pointed out). — Jabberwock

I have zero problem accepting massive discounts in 2022 and 2023, as I explain these are massive flows of material and finance over decades and centuries and what matters is the medium and long term and not any given year or two. I even explain why Russia needs to offload the oil at nearly any price as the oil wells can't easily be turned off and on. However, there is zero evidence Russia is somehow stuck with those discounts for any significant period of time.

You seem to just randomly assign points to me in total disconnect to anything I've written or the points you've made, and then argue against those points sometimes repeating my arguments I've made against your points that you've actually written.

It's tiresome.

Russia's primary concern was to maintain revenues, given that half of its budget is financed by resource exports. You are pretty confident China and India will buy same amounts for higher prices, but actually give no argument for that. And it does not align too well with the facts: China's July crude imports drop to lowest since January India's purchases peaked in April. — Jabberwock

Russia built up massive foreign currency reserves as well as gold and other precious metals reserves.

The priority in 2022 was not maintaining revenue (whole point of having a war chest) but to maintain market share, especially in fossil fuels.

The reason maintaining market share is important is that industrial projects and capacity can have long lead times and cost significant capital and may not be easy to just shut off and on again (in terms of the state of equipment, skills, supply lines, etc.), especially oil fields of which shutting off may damage the oil fields permanently.

So, Russia offered deep discounts to be sure to move it's stuff and maintain market share.

It would take many, many years for Russia to entirely deplete it's war chest and running a budget or trade deficit for a single year might be a warning sign or might be smart investment that will create larger growth and surpluses down the line, depends on what the money is spent on and what capacities imports help build.

Again, what is true in principle does not necessarily apply to each and every situation. Sure, Russia would be happy to sell a somewhat smaller amount for a much higher price. The question is who will be happy to buy from Russia at those inflated prices. You assume that China and India will happily buy the same amounts of oil if it is much more expensive. That assumption is, to put it very mildly, unreasonable. — Jabberwock

It's basic math.

Maybe I'll explain it tomorrow with the actual volume and price numbers of the recent oil market to show what price increases make the price cuts worth it in terms of revenue and the how much bigger an effect it has on profits (which is what matters).

And I have pointed out why Russia's exports will stall while its imports soar. I did not write that I expect a collapse, I wrote that it will be more and more dififcult for Russia to pay for its imports. — Jabberwock

Well, the main point of my analysis is that this isn't the case.

Insofar as Russia sells a lot of commodities denominated in foreign currencies (how the international commodities market works) there will be the forex available to buy whatever imports Russia needs.

Across the board subsidising all imports is a simplifying measure that's practical in the case of the disruption of the sanctions to ensure business have the purchasing power to find substitutes, but now that the Russian economy has adapted it is far more efficient to let the currency float and then target the sectors you want to support (that have some strategic value) since supporting the price of the currency is a massive subsidy covering everything (dildos to capital flight) and so covers what you want but also everything you don't want or don't care about. Targeting subsidies means bureaucratic overheads (that you can't implement and scale in an emergency) but is far more efficient over the long run (why countries are constantly accusing each other of unfairly subsidising strategic sectors).

As long as Russia has a large foreign currency revenue from selling commodities it is easy for the Russian government to subsidise any given sector it wants to protect / grow.

There is no structural problem that is currently happening in Russia.

Of course, managing an economy is difficult and simply because Russia has the foreign exchange to subsidise imports of whatever it wants doesn't mean it will do so wisely, but that would be mismanaging in the future and not some structural problem that you seem to be describing.

Also, for the record I don't expect Russia to grossly mismanage these sorts of economic questions; Russian economic policy has been pretty effective in recent years so presumably that will continue.

↪boethius, no, it wouldn't be stabilizing, and Putin presumably knows. (Not sure why you keep writing that.) — jorndoe

We're discussing the hypothetical situation where at the start of the war NATO provided Ukraine no limits support and Ukraine routing the Russians and Russian lines and military falling apart and civil unrest and the economy unravelling due to both losing the war and the disruptive effects of the sanctions and the collapse of the Russian government imminent.

In such a situation, dropping nukes on Ukraine would stabilise the military situation as Ukraine would have no way to nuclear retaliate. Stabilising from their perspective (the perspective of the people considering nuclear use in a unstable and deteriorating situation).

Hence, NATO did not provide "no limits" support to Ukraine, so, in the least, NATO agrees with me.

Newcomer here, so tell me if I'm repeating. Is there any other feasible outcome at this point than Russia keeping the Donbass, with all Ukrainians unhappy with that moving West.

It just doesn't seem like Ukraine can take it back...without getting destroyed in the process...and the Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas want to stay part of Russia

Newcomer here, so tell me if I'm repeating. Is there any other feasible outcome at this point than Russia keeping the Donbass, with all Ukrainians unhappy with that moving West. — Jack Rogozhin

It's quite possible that this war becomes a frozen conflict (as Russia just loves frozen conflicts!) and Russia keeps the Donbass. However Russia giving "unhappy Ukrainians" the option to leave is more remote when you take into account just what Russia has now done in the occupied territories with it's Russification programs and even kidnapping children.

It just doesn't seem like Ukraine can take it back...without getting destroyed in the process...and the Russian Ukrainians of the Donbas want to stay part of Russia — Jack Rogozhin

Wars do end some way or another in the end. And do note that Russia hasn't been able for a long time to conquer new territories and has entrenched itself in a very defensive posture, likely because of necessity.

In such a situation, dropping nukes on Ukraine would stabilise the military situation as Ukraine would have no way to nuclear retaliate. Stabilising from their perspective (the perspective of the people considering nuclear use in a unstable and deteriorating situation). — boethius

I'm not so sure that the US & NATO response of using force in the case of nuclear weapons being used was just a bluff. Or is a bluff.

The response was to be / would be limited: to Russian targets in Ukraine and the Black Sea and likely would have been for a brief period. The Russian Air Force and the Black Sea fleet would have a tough time facing NATO air power over Ukraine.

It's one thing of NATO giving aid to Ukraine, it's another thing for NATO to create that "no-fly zone" over Ukraine that Ukrainians wanted in the first place or use active force. And notice the limited response: not a nuclear response, not striking Russia everywhere in an all out fashion.

Putin's rhetoric just confuses which are the sides here as giving weapons and aid to a country that is fighting the other Superpower was totally normal during the Cold War.

Have these Russification programs and kidnapping of children been established? I know they said they moved chlldren orphaned by the post-Maidan and post-invation conflicts. That, could be true even without the asserted benign intent. Of course, Russia could have done those problems and kidnappings. I just haven't seen the evidence.

I know many disagree, but I believe the Donbass--which Russia certainly hasn't captured--was their territorial goal. I less have faith Russia could end this by actually capturing and holding it than I have little faith Ukraine could recapture it without losing an irrevocable amount of their people