Neither Isaac nor the whole of the UK where he lives, or me and the country where I live, or NATO or the whole of the EU, has a choice in front of us of "giving away further parts of Ukraine". — boethius

He was advocating refusing military help to Ukraine which would most likely result in Ukraine's loss of further lands and quite likely its independence. I think it is pretty much 'giving away further parts of Ukraine'.

Is it morally justifiable to send them on a fools errand that results in them dying in huge numbers based on a series of false promises (i.e. lies and manipulation) that we're going to "do whatever it takes" and "provide whatever they need"?

If that's not morally justifiable, then you need some theory of victory that actually leads to your free and prosperous Ukraine (that also takes into account that elections have been cancelled). — boethius

I do not need a theory, because it has already happened: Ukraine already IS more free than it would be if it was subjugated by Russia, which would likely happen if the help was denied. And I am not sure why you are treating Ukrainians as fools who do not know better. Why would they be 'manipulated' about the Western help, if the West in the beginning of the war flatly refused to supply them with tanks, planes and long-range artillery? They have made the choice to defend their independence (i.e. to risk death) BEFORE any Western help was promised, in fact, the West was quite resigned that they will lose the war quickly. Americans offered evacuation of Zelensky's government in the first days of the war, which might have precipitated the general capitulation, how is that consistent with the claim that they somehow 'made' Ukrainians to fight? We decided that we do not want to fight, Ukrainians have decided that they do - all they ask for is help.

Yes, but the main problem is that the machine cannot predict an outcome that depends on that prediction. 'Pick an option opposite to what you would have picked' is unrealizable both for humans and for determinate machines: the output needs to be routed to the input, creating an infinite recursive loop.

Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.

The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion? — Isaac

The point is, as I have repeated for a long time now, that you base your whole argument on a single metrics, which you admit is quite prone to variation due to subjective weights assigned to particular indicators. In other words, you believe that the single indicator precisely describes the state of affairs in the region. I have provided you with four other indicators, you have never engaged with them.

Sure. That measure clearly doesn't show anything like the achievable movement I'm advocating. Freedom House have had some criticism of their methodology, and the list of countries scoring low reads suspiciously identical to the list of oil-rich countries that the US would like some political excuse to interfere with... but I'm sure Cato has it's critics too.

The point is, so what? As I said. I'm not the one suggesting your theory is nonsense, so I don't need to trash your source. You're the one suggesting my theory is nonsense, so presenting a different source has no weight in that argument. Why are they a better source? Why, in fact, are they so much better that to believe any other source is nothing short of ideological delusion? — Isaac

Presenting a source that contradicts your argument has no weight on that argument? Are you serious?

No, no single datapoint is 'the best', that is the point... No single source of evidence, especially indices which have subjective weights, is sufficient to support an argument. It does not mean that we can just pick and choose the data as we want and say that this argument is as good as any other. We ahve to compound ALL the data, your source, Freedom House, The Economist, Polity etc. and any other source available. We also need to consider facts both from the history and from the current state of affairs that could influence our assessment. You flatly refuse to do that, claiming that your single metrics 'includes everything'. No, it does not, as quite a few other sources indicate something else.

It does indicate changes caused by draconian oppression. That it doesn't come up with the results you want isn't a flaw. I don't know if you're familiar with the way evidence works, but you're supposed to look to the evidence to check your theory. You're not supposed to use your theory to check the evidence. — Isaac

This is their chart for Russia: it has moved from 5.57 in 2000 to 6.16 in 2018. By your claims, it means that Russia has moved from an authoritarian rule under Yeltsin to a 'less-authoritarianism' under Putin. That is, under Putin the Russian government became less authoritarian. is that correct?

I'm aware of what your point is. I'm trying to move the conversation to a place where you actually begin to support it with anything like an argument. — Isaac

No need to move anywhere, just ask: by your own words free and prosperous Ukraine is a grave threat to his regime. We know that he is willing to go to war to defend against threats, so it is reasonable that he would keep threatening war until there was no chance of free and prosperous Ukraine. As you are claiming that avoiding the war is better than letting people get under oppression, you would advocate letting him subjugate the whole of Ukraine if it meant war could be avoided. We also know that he is interested in Ukrainian territories and is willing to risk war to get them, therefore we can assume that he might want more Ukrainian territories. Again, you would rather give away Ukrainian territories to avoid war, therefore you would advocate giving away further parts of Ukraine, until it run out of parts.

Suppose that we want to program a computer (a machine that is known to be deterministic) that would make a robotic arm to pick out a ball: red or blue. However, there is a catch: we program the machine in such a way that it examines all the states it is in, calculates the determined outcome and then does exactly the opposite. Can this be done? No, as it would require an infinite recurrence. Does it prove that computers are non-determinate? No, just that supertasks of this kind are not possible.

Another neighbor, Finland, doesn't seem to have had much impact against Putin, though. Why is that? — jorndoe

Because only the nearest abroad counts. Russians do not see Finns (or the Baltics) as 'people like them', so they do not care much whether they are free and how. Free and prosperous Ukraine, on the other hand, especially in the EU, would show Russians (and other former republics) that yes, positive change is possible for them. Successful Ukraine in EU would be a mortal threat for Putin's regime, that is why he is determined to stop it by any means, including war. All the other causes are secondary.

Yes, but you quibbled over the meaning of 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' so I went for just the actual index scores to create what I thought would be a more objectively measurable claim. It's less subjective to say that Ukraine went from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. What we call 'Russia-now' and 'Ukraine-now' is not relevant - I went for 'oligarchy' and 'democracy'. I could have gone for 'authoritarian' and 'less-authoritarian' It doesn't matter because the point was relative (Russia to Ukraine) not absolute (one category or another). If the territory is ceded to Russia, it will become Russia-like. If it is won back, it will become Ukraine-like, We're comparing those two, so the metric is how long it takes to go from Russia-like to Ukraine-like. — Isaac

The issue I am pointing out is that first you make very specific claims and support it with a rather unspecific indicator of freedom, which is actually comprised of many indicators. You believe that it is general measure of 'authoritarianism', but it is clearly not - the changes between 2000-2008 and 2012-2014 even though similar numerically, concerned different areas. The change from 2012-2014 concerned mostly one specific area, yet it significantly affected Ukrainian score. If the HFI is the single metrics of authoritarianism, then we must conclude that from 2012-2014 Ukraine underwent sudden change from 'less-authoritarianism' to 'authoritarianism'. But that is false, so the HFI is not the universal metrics of authoritarianism, contrary to your claims.

Then I suggest you actually look at the data I've provided to support my argument rather than this pointless distraction that the data you're looking at doesn't. If my data is at fault, find fault with it. "some other data says something else" is not a fault unless your data is somehow more authoritative than mine. — Isaac

Data that do not fit your claims are 'pointless distraction'? We should only look at your data when examining your claim and disregard data that say something else? Why?

Provide the Freedom house figures then. I'm happy to look at both. What progress does Freedom House have Ukraine making in their best eight year period, and where does it put Russia in it's latest score?

As to why my datapoint should carry more weight than yours... You're the one arguing my position is completely wrong. I'm not arguing yours is, I just disagree with it. I've no reason to claim my datapoint is more authoritative than your. My claim is merely that it is a legitimate source. — Isaac

Here you are: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/All_data_FIW_2013-2023.xlsx

And none were introduced from 2006 to 2020? The point is not whether they are draconian, but whether they are draconian enough to significantly alter the score. For that they'd have to be something outside the range of anything introduced in all of the recorded history of Russia in this index. — Isaac

If the tool you have provided does not indicate changes caused by draconian oppression, then it is not a good indicator of oppression, right? Why do you want it then to use it for that purpose?

And, as I've said, wartime measures can't count otherwise we'd have to make the same adjustments for Ukraine (seeing as this is a comparative exercise). Ukraine have also instigated some very draconian laws in the midst of war. My argument is only about getting from Russia-as-it-is-now to Ukraine-as-it-is-now, so if we include wartime measures, then Russia-as-it-is-now gets worse, but so does Ukraine-as-it-is-now so the distance between them is not only affected by Russia's move. — Isaac

OK, so we skip the wartime data.

Sure, Ukraine's 2015-2023 progress has definitely been in large part bought by throwing off some of the shackles of Russia, but if Putin's fears are even half justified, we can expect a likewise positive effect on pressure for change in Russia (including any stolen territories) from a free and prospering Ukraine next door. — Isaac

The point is there would not be a free and prospering Ukraine next door, because you would have given it away to Putin.

I didn't have the relevant data in a single table, I had the CSV from 2018 anyway but had to look up the 2022 report. I can't think why the numbers are different, but it doesn't matter because even the figures you've used show the same. Ukraine went from 119 (where Russia is now). So the argument - that in eight years Ukraine has come from where Russia is now - is unaffected. This whole thing has been a massive diversion to avoid that argument. — Isaac

Your claim was that it went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years. Do you still support that claim?

Yes. If the other ten countries fell behind because of global reasons (like economic recessions), and yet Ukraine didn't, then it clearly had some compensatory improvements. That's why they show rankings. It's not perfect, but pretending it doesn't show anything is just ridiculous. Besides, I used scores, not rankings, from 2000-2008 and you won't accept that result either, so this whole 'ranking' issue has just been yet another deflection to avoid the argument. Whatever I use, you're going to fish out some hurriedly made-up reason to dismiss it. First it's there being another table, then it's the particular year (2015), then it's using rankings not scores, then it's the definition of 'autocracy'... you're clearly clutching at straws. — Isaac

I just ask how the evidence that you have provided supports your original claim (that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in ten years). Obviously you cannot do that, therefore we are reduced to arguing about decimal differences in a single datapoint in a single source. If that change in points was indicative of your claims, then we would have to assume that from 2013 to 2014 Ukraine went from democracy to oligarchy, which of course it did not. One specific indicator has changed (through no fault of Ukrainian authorities) that has badly affected the overall score. That is the peril of using a single datapoint for your argument.

Same source because I'm referring (as you know full well I have been since the very fist time I mentioned it) to the 2018 document for Ukraine's 2015 score. In it, it breaks down the scores. I compared the relevant one to Russia's 2020 (latest). Not all categories are in both sets, but most are. The ones I've listed are the ones for which Ukraine scored lower than Russia (the reasons for it's lower ranking). Disappearances and homicides weren't even that big an effect. The corrupt judiciary caused as much of an effect on the score - but I suppose you'll claim that was the Russian's too. — Isaac

Well, I am using the 2022 table and it shows that the biggest change from 2012 to 2014 was in the category I have named. The other one was religion. In other words, Ukraine went from 7.04 in 2012 to 6.50 in 2014 mostly due to a single indicator. Yet you insist that the single score is the sufficient indicator of political oppression in the country.

Then either Ukraine is not a democracy (at 6.68) or Russia is not an oligarchy (at 6.01), because that is the scale of improvement Ukraine made in that timescale. The names are irrelevant (as you already know - another deflection). The point is about freedom. — Isaac

Of course it is not, I have already wrote about it two days ago, it is considered a hybrid regime. It had a good start, but it still has quite a long way to go.

I haven't ignored them. They're in the Human Freedom Index. The end result is a net improvement of some 0.6-0.8 points (you know that thing you're claiming you do about taking into account all the factors). It's you who wants to ignore some of those and focus only on the one which Russia caused. — Isaac

Yes, you still are ignoring them, if you consider the single indicator from a single source as sufficient evidence for your claims. According to the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' index, Russia went ten points down since 2015, but so did Ukraine. Does it mean that they both went from democracy to oligarchy? No, it does not, it means that some particular indicators which were given arbitrary weights went one way or another. Why should your single datapoint carry more weight than mine?

No, only the ones instigated after 2020, the period you claim Russia has deteriorated so much as to render the 6.01 score no longer relevant. Any laws before then will show their effects in previous scores, so are irrelevant to that claim. — Isaac

All the measures I have described were introduced after 2020.

It might. The blacklist was instigated in 2012, the circumvention ban in 2017. Both will also have severely restricted freedoms, but in grand total, had minimal effect on the overall score. You're arguing that post 2020 such draconian laws were put in place as to render the 6.01 score completely redundant. — Isaac

No, I have argued that the score might be affected which would throw off your maths. And yes, draconian laws were introducted after 2020.

Ah! When the evidence doesn't support your theory, the evidence must be wrong. I thought we'd pretty much reached the bottom of the barrel, but... — Isaac

No, I am just pointing out that arguing from a single datapoint is not a good way for argumentation. I have just given you a single datapoint that totally negates your argument. Are you convinced by that?

That's not the link I provided for the data in question, and it's completely dishonest to present it as such. — Isaac

So we are supposed to ignore it and pretend it that the other data are not there?

... so just speculate instead, eh? Then assume your speculation is enough to accuse those who disagree with you of dishonesty in the same post as you blatantly lie about the source I provided. — Isaac

Well, using data from two different sources if you have the relevant data in a single table in a document you have linked does look a bit suspicious, wouldn't you say? Especially if it is just the single outlier that is supposed to confirm your conclusions. But OK, I will give you the benefit of the doubt.

No. Rankings are there exactly so we can compare because, for example, the global economic situation affects all countries' scores, as will things like Covid restrictions and the global security situation with regards to terrorist threat and instability. Rankings avoids this. It also avoid weighting on scores because the scores are measured out of ten regardless. — Isaac

You do not even understand the issue. If Ukraine had the exact same score, but in the period of six years ten countries would fall behind it because people there lost their freedom, then Ukraine would automatically improve in the ranking. Is that evidence of its improvement? No.

Ukraine's low score was the result of...

Taxation; payroll, government payments
Legal freedom; courts, enforcement, judiciary, police, protection
Economic freedom; growth, inflation control, regulatory compliance
Political freedom; party composition
Identity; overall
Rule of Law; criminal, disappearances, homicide

Apart from the disappearances and homicide (which the Amnesty International report from the time makes clear have been about equal on both sides), how are the others caused by Russia? — Isaac

Are you using a different source again? I cannot even find such categories in the 2022 document.

The fact is that the sudden drop in Ukraine's score between 2012 and 2014 is mostly caused by the drop in the single indicator, i.e. disapperances, conflicts and terrorism. If you have any other interpretation of the facts that explains that, please do.

Fine, we can use a different time period if you don't like 2015-2023. How about 2000-2008? Ukraine went from (using your own table seeing as you have some technical troubles opening links) 6.25 to 7.08 an increase of 0.83. The same increase would get Russia from its current 6.01 to 6.84, roughly where Ukraine is now (6.68).

Are you now going to say that that time period also had a whole load of special factors which we have to dismiss? Are you own tables now flawed? — Isaac

No, in 2000-2008 Ukraine also did not went from 'corrupt oligarchy' to 'free democracy', as was your claim. The data shows a constant process of improvement that has lasted at least two decades, but that is only because there are no data from before 2000. That is, nothing about the data supports your claim that Ukraine went from oligarchy to democracy in a decade.

And no, we do not have to dismiss factors, only you do. I say we have to take all the factors into consideration, which you consistently refuse to do, by focusing on a single indicator from a single source. I have already explained what factors were, in my opinion, instrumental in the fact that the progress of the two countries was different. You have just ignored them. You are free to engage them at any time, just scroll a few posts back.

Since 2020? What laws have been put in place then and how are you measuring their likely impact on the Human Freedom Index? Were all the changes you mention put in place after 2020 (6.01) but no similar changes made before 2006 (the last time Russia were near 6.01)? Did Putin have a break from oppressive policy instigation between 2006 and 2020? Was he on holiday? — Isaac

I have already listed the laws, do you want every single act listed? I am not 'measuring' them, I present my opinion that e.g. strict tightening of censorship laws that put you in jail for 16 years MIGHT have some impact on the freedoms of those involved. If you believe that it would not affect the score, maybe it is a problem with the scoring system.

The sum total of Putin's oppressive policies from 2006 have had virtually no impact on the score. Are you wanting to argue the the policies since 2020, are so awful, even compared to those in the entire period from 2006, that they'll push the score significantly lower to render all comparison with 2020 useless. — Isaac

So you say that your source does not actually reflect the increasing oppressiveness of the Russian regime? I might agree with that. For example, Russia keeps scoring a full 10.0 in the relationship category, when from 2013 it has been introducing increasingly suppressive legislation against LGBT communities. So yes, your single source does not seem particularly good in describing the level of opression in Russia, thanks for pointing that out. Maybe we should use more facts than just a single indicator then? Maybe supporting your whole argument with a single fact is not the best possible methodology? What do you think?

It's quite simple (though you seem to be having trouble with (4))

1. Open the CSV linked.
2. Go to line 316 - 2015 Ukraine.
3. Read off column G hf-rank.
4. Avoid then picking your own data from somewhere other than the link provided to show something different. — Isaac

In the link you have provided: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf

there is no data for 2015, but there are data for 2014 and for 2016: Ukraine has the score 6.50 and 6.69:



It is not unreasonable to conclude that the data for the year in between would be somewhere between that. And other publications on the site confirm exactly that: the link from 2021 shows Ukraine's score as 6.34, as shown above. Why the same site gives different scores for the same country for the same year? I do not know, it could be that they have changed the methodology in the meantime and rescored all the raw data accordingly to reflect that or maybe they just have no idea how to handle data and they just randomly put any number they want in various places. I do not know and I do not care - either way the .csv from 2018 cannot be compared to the publications from 2021 and 2022, if the concern the same results. I have mercifully not mentioned that before, but even if there was no such discrepancy, comparing rankings from different years is simply wrong - rankings are relative, so they heavily depend on the movements of other countries.

Your desperate attempt at distraction does not change the fact that the very source you have provided gives recent data and past data IN THE SAME TABLE. Claiming that the table does not say what it says because there is also another table is beyond silly, at best it discredits the very source you provide (but rather shows that you have zero understanding of their methodology).

I'll repeat for clarity. In eight years (the time over which Russia occupied Crimea), Ukraine has gone from where Russia is now on the Human Freedom Index, to it's current state. Therefore Russia is capable, over the same time period, of the same improvement.

That is the claim. Nothing else you might want to make up about autocracy, or press freedom, or the state of affairs in 1991... — Isaac

It is the claim now, but it was not before. Maybe I will repeat your claim, for clarity:

Ukraine turned from a path of corrupted oligarchy and right-wing nationalism to one of more freedom and European integration within just over a decade. So it is clear that Russian-occupied territories (even the whole of Russia) can turn from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies within a decade. — Isaac

That is simply false: the Ukraine did not turn from corrupted oligarchy to a free democracy within a decade, so not it is not clear at all that Russia can do that, no matter how much you try to water down that claim.

Your claim was also that:

Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan — Isaac

But it is false as well. It was not worse then and it was not worse then as compared to today's Russia. Whenever you try to rely on facts, it turns out that what you write is false, because you do not know the facts.

But let us deal with your current, drastically watered down claim:

So Russia can move from the state it is now to the state where Ukraine had a temporary decrease caused by an armed rebellion instigated by Russia, with thousands of dead, dispossed, with elections blocked by the rebels etc. That is you propose that Russia move from the oppression it is under now... to the state caused by the oppression it also caused? How does that make even sense?

Before the rebellion Ukraine had scores above 7.0, that is in the middle between the current Russia and the current Spain - it was much better than Russia was then and much better than Russia is now. Before Russia has started troubles, Ukrainians were not nearly as oppressed as Russians are now, as your own source shows. So no, Ukraine did not go 'from where Russia is now', because it was never there (since 1991). It mostly improved a single indicator because it the effects of the armed rebellion caused by its neighbor were less pronounced. It had nothing to do with popular movement and it had nothing to do with fighting opression. The changes in Ukraine have nothing to do with anything what you propose.

Again, try to restrict yourself to claims I've actually made. The extent to which the move was 'remarkable' is not a part of the argument. What is relevant is the difference between Ukraine and Russia (the two options available). — Isaac

Well, your argument was that it is clear that countries can go from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies in a decade. Is it still so clear?

Ukraine was much better in all indices from Russia since 2000, with the temporary drop due to the rebellion. Given that Russia did not have an armed rebellion caused by its neighbor, it is rather unlikely it will improve in the simillar way. So how the improvement of Ukraine in a single metric - security - is an indictator of what might have happen in Russia?

Odd, seeing as your own data you've provided above shows a steady overall increase in the index score until 2018 whereafter the drop is not even matched by the world ranking.

But do please provide 'the facts' which show conclusively that the last two years instigated policies which interrupted 20 years of minimal change in overall score. — Isaac

Sure: censorship laws, freedom of movement laws, laws on companies, laws on gay 'propaganda'. These are just formal measures, as important are changes which are nor formally sanctioned, like treatment of protesters, activities of Roskomnadzor, closing publications under false pretences, etc. Here, more facts you can ignore.

Yes, I know those bits in blue, those are the exact links I have used to get the data I have so nicely presented. Those data say things completely different from what you said. Ukraine was not worse than Russia since 1991, its civic freedoms, while still quite imperfect, were on the higher level than Russia's at least since 2000, so were its freedoms of information, gathering, etc.

And now, visibly embarassed, you try to save the argument saying that .33 is irrelevant to the argument... If that is so, then so would be the difference of .38 between Ukraine in 2015 and now - but the whole point of using that datapoint was to show 'evidence' for the remarkable growth that Ukraine has made in a few years? Time and again, your own evidence disproves what you claim.

Not to mention that the score from 2020 for Russia is not that relevant either, given the changes that have occurred since. I could give you a long list of those, but I will not. Do you know why? Because you are not interested in facts. I have given you plenty of facts from the history of both countries and from the currect situation. Sure, I suppose it could be done better, I am not a historian. But I should not even bother, because you do not engage with facts. You ridicule them, because you have no facts on your side. You have based your whole argument on a handpicked data point and it turned out you are not even that good with handpicking data. That is exactly the level of Moon landing discussion, and yet you are indignant that it is not treated as a legitimate alternative view. It simply is not. You try to discuss things you have no idea about.

Given that your whole argument based on a single datapoint has crumbled, we are back to what I wrote - we have no reason to believe that the peaceful rebellion you propose in Russia will likely occur. I fully expect you to pull out another single random fact and just run with it, like you did above, with complete ignorance of the actual, quite complex situation in the region. I think nobody will blame me if I choose not to bother, I believe I have already contributed to this discussion quite enough.

Eight years ago from now is 2015. I assume you can keep up with the basic maths.

So I'm comparing Ukraine in 2015 to Russia now. — Isaac

Ukraine score in 2015: 6.34



Russia now: 6.01



Can YOU keep up with the basic math? Or do you prefer to keep digging?

Of course it is, if your only other choice has zero chance of success, then you take the one that has slightly above zero. Your plan has zero chance of achieving the 'desired effect'. — Isaac

Not if the expected likely consequences are worse than if you did not take that action.

They would if the alternative had 0% chance of success and 100% chance that the world would be plunged into tyranny. Again, if you want to talk about probabilities, then you're comparing options and their consequences. — Isaac

But if the alternative did not strive for global peace, but also did not likely plunge the world into tyranny, they would not. Yes, I completely agree - we should compare options and their consequences. The issue is that you refuse to compare the consequences, e.g. you refuse to consider the consequences of making concessions toward force.

I've cited the data. It ranked lower than Russia in the Human Freedom Index. It now ranks higher. It made progress from lower to higher in eight years. That's all that's needed to show Russia can do the same. — Isaac

No, it did not.

Nor have you. In fact your proposed course of action 100% guarantees war. So neither of our options are distinguished by a guarantee to avoid war. I'm suggesting war could be avoided by not resisting (militarily) when tyrants attempt to occupy territory but instead focus on removing the tyrant from power so that it doesn't matter much which country owns what. You're suggesting we use war to contain tyrants in the country they're in and by losing said war, weaken their rule. As far as 'avoiding war', your strategy literally cites it as a tool, so it will 100% not avoid war. My strategy might avoid war. In that one simple metric 'avoiding war', it's clear that even if my strategy had only 0.000001% chance of working it's better than yours which has 0% chance of avoiding war seeing as it involves war.

This is, of course, a good reason not to use stupidly simplistic metrics like 'avoid war' or 'secure voting rights', but rather take a more holistic approach which tries to maximise human well-being throughout the reach of our consequences. — Isaac

Yes, I completely agree! We should abandon the discussion of consequences based on a single metric, like the body count, and consider the overall consequences.

Oppression only works because most people prefer it to death. If most people preferred death to oppression then they would all resist it until dead and the oppressor would have no population left to oppress. If an oppressor puts a gun to your head and says "jump", you jump, because you prefer that to just saying "no" and getting shot. It's an absolute fact of human nature that we marginally prefer oppression to death because there's a chance of getting out of oppression. Crimea has been under Russian oppression for eight years. Why has the entire population not simply killed themselves to escape the oppression? Because they'd prefer to live, and hope. — Isaac

Sure, that is why Ukrainian would not choose to fight, if it meant that they would all die. On the other hand, there are quite a few examples from history where people preferred the risk of death (i.e. that some of them die), if it meant that it would remove the oppression. On the other hand, if people believed that oppression is better than risk of death, like you do, then there would be no armed rebellions at all. As you are unable to delineate the boundaries of concessions, we can assume that in all provided cases of liberation wars and revolutions you would argue for leaving the oppression as the better option (because your only metrics is the death count). As I wrote, I understand it, but you would be at odds with all those people who decided themselves they prefer to fight.

Of course, if I mischaracterise your views, please correct me - tell me when the armed fight with oppression would be preferable. Just do not hide behind 'This is not my view, but I will not tell you what it is'.

It's not as if the Ukrainians have these two stark choices. Ukraine outside of Russia is hardly a bed of roses and with crippling debt and a destroyed economy, it'll be much worse. The human rights record of Ukrainian-occupied Donbas is practically identical to that of Russian-occupied Crimea. You might have bought into the propagandist fantasy that Ukraine was some beacon of democratic light before the invasion, but the evidence shows otherwise.

The choice faced (in the frame you've used above) is thousands more dead vs slightly worse levels of freedom). — Isaac

Ukraine outside of Russia is not a bed of roses, but it is better than Russia. I have already discussed some prominent differences. And your evidence does not show what you say it shows.

And now again we come to the part when you refuse to consider the consequences of your proposed actions, which makes the discussion difficult. You propose one concession and happily pronounce that it would avoid war. However, the obvious consequence of that would be that quite shortly we would be in the exact same situation, with the exact same choices. If you want to discuss the consequences, let us do that.

... as do most indices. Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan. The factors you cite are already taken account of. Ukraine came from a situation where it was worse than Russia in all of those measures put together, to one where it was better than Russia, in eight years. — Isaac

Was it? Let us examine the evidence, the single source you so cherish?

2013 (BEFORE Maidan): Ukraine: total score 7.06, Russia: total score: 6.35. Oh, so just one year before Maidan Ukraine WAS NOT WORSE by the single metrics you provided as evidence. And it was not worse for all the years up to 2008, the first scored year. As it seems to be a habit in our discussion, the evidence actually proves that you are wrong.

But let us examine the source you respect so much. What so terrible happened in 2014 that Ukraine somehow slipped into being an authoritarian regime? Let us examine the data for 2014:

Rule of law: Ukraine scores better
Movement: Ukraine scores better
Religion: Ukraine scores better
Association, assembly, civil society: Ukraine scores better (by a wide margin)
Expression and information: Ukraine scores much better
Relationships: the same (both countries have top score)

And that leaves us with a single point where Ukraine does score worse:
Security and safety

This comprises of two subitems:
Homicide: Ukraine scores better by a wide margin
Disappearances, conflicts, terrorism: yes, here Ukraine scores much worse than Russia and much worse than the year before

So what has happened? Two things: Maidan happened and a rebellion organized by Russia happened. Yes, that might affect the perception of security in the country, could it not?

So now it is quite clear: you have hand-picked a SINGLE DATA POINT in a SINGLE YEAR, where Ukraine has trailed in the metrics behind Russia and which is Russia's fault as evidence that Ukraine was worse as far as freedom was concerned a few years ago. But according to the same source it is completely false: in the years before and after according to your own source Ukraine has been in all aspects of freedom since 2008, i.e. the first year the source gives the data for.

But wait a minute... You wrote: 'An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119'. But the very source you have provided says something else: Ukraine 114 (score 6.57), Russia 123 (score 6.24).

Did you really think I would not look at the data?

in your place I would take this as an opportunity to admit that you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about and bow out of the discussion. But of course, we can have a few more.

(119 is smaller than 134, that's not an opinion) — Isaac

It was neither 119 nor 134. That's not an opinion.

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac

No, 'greater than zero' is not enough, you have to provide argument that your proposed course of action is likely to succeed. If you had a plan that would provide us with global peace without any violence, but the chance of success was 1%, and the 99% was that the world would be plunged into tyranny, then nobody would pursue that course of action, even though the goal was so lofty.

We're not. We're talking about freedom. Freedom is a lot more than just democracy. — Isaac

in this case it is a distinction without a difference. Neither Ukraine was authoritarian a few years ago, nor did it undergo any fast processes over the last few years.

What goal? 'Avoid war'? Are you seriously arguing that 'continue war' is more likely to avoid war than 'stop war'? — Isaac

No, I am arguing that you have failed to provide an argument that your proposed course of action would likely bring the result of avoiding war. If that goal is unlikely to be achieved, we should pursue other goals - those which we are likely to achieve.

So ignoring completely all collateral damage? I suppose the Iraq war was OK by you too then? — Isaac

No, because it failed to provide any positive results and was not likely to provide them from the start.

Ah! The Generally Accepted View™. Owned by the same company as The Facts™ if I recall correctly.

Is there a citation you could share for The Generally Accepted View™, it would sure resolve decades of disagreement between Marxist historians and Western scholars. — Isaac

If you enjoy the company of Moon-landing denialists, it is your choice, but do not demand that your views be treated as a reasonable alternative.

Who said quick? Measuring against the current death rate in the war and the Russian occupation of Crimea, they've got decades and would still come out on top. Are you arguing that not a single expert in the world thinks Russia could improve a few points (all Ukraine has done) in the next decade or so? — Isaac

Oh, so the alternative is now thousands of deaths or decades of oppression. Think of the children, you said? If so, then it is even more understandable why Ukrainians would prefer the former. And again you are saying what is possible, not what is likely.

Done so already, but again...

According to the Human Freedom Index, Ukraine, just before the Maidan Revolution ranked 134. Russia, at last measure ranked 119.

It is therefore possible for a country to (through non-military action) bring itself to the level of freedom Ukraine now enjoys from the level of freedom Russia now suffers in the space of eight years.

Eight years is also the time over which Russia has occupied Crimea with some few hundred deaths and similar restrictions of freedom currently active in Ukraine (and imposed by Ukraine in Donbas before this latest invasion)

Therefore it is plausible to believe that a country can get from Russia-now to Ukraine-now (in terms of freedom) in the space of eight years, suffering only the death and humanitarian toll seen in Russian-occupied Crimea. — Isaac

Sure, it is possible! If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.

But Russia does not have any of that. On the other hand, it has strict control of information (last somewhat independent press outlets were closed last year, it has massive blocking of Internet sites, Roskomnadzor, etc.), tight control of any social activities (organizations, foundations, etc.), stiff penalties for any form of protest, politically controlled judicial system. Could all those differences (beside those already mentioned by me before) affect the expected outcome? I say they would. Your argument just ignores all those differences and claims that we should expect a similar outcome, because they had a similar SINGLE metrics eight years ago (even if many other were different). And you demand to be treated seriously.

These are all historical facts (the human freedom measures, the deaths and humanitarian situation in occupied Crimea). They can be used to support a narrative - one of popular struggle against oppression, anti-war. — Isaac

No, they are not, you have specifically excluded 'human freedom measures' from 'facts' - 'measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective'. You cannot have it both ways.

I was referring to your potted history of the USSR. The number of 'instances' you divide this into was not the relvan6part of that paragraph. The relevant part was that it is interpreted. — Isaac

I was referring to the facts concerning overthrowing various regimes and how it affects the likelihood of assessment of success in this case.

Are you seriously claiming that there exists not a single case of tyranny being overthrown by non-military? Because if not, then my case is already made. If we both agree that such cases exist then that is my argument. It is possible, therefore we ought strive for it. That case is undermined only by two counterarguments; a) it is not even possible, or b) we ought not strive for it. You've argued neither. — Isaac

No, your case is not already made, because you are supposed to argue that what the course of action you propose is likely to provide the desired effects. Arguing that it is merely possible is not enough.

I proposed no such thing. I proposed "measures of human development", please respond to what I've written, not what you'd like me to have written.

An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119. — Isaac

If we are tracking transition from autocracy to democracy, then we should consider indices that do just that.

O will do so if you claim that there are no instances at all in history, or that it is impossible. Otherwise we already agree on the facts of my case. We disagree about the conclusion. — Isaac

Sure, I agree that is possible, I just argue that we have no reason to believe it is likely. If you are happy with that conclusion, the discussion is settled.

I presume we'd all rather avoid war. Therefore I only have to argue that it is possible to do so. — Isaac

No, you have to argue that your proposed course of action is likely to achieve that goal. I think all would agree that it would be great if we could summon aliens by singing hippie songs so that they brought us global peace with no victims at all. It is impossible to argue that this effect is NOT possible. Yet this idea is useless as the proposed course of action.

If I wanted to kill Putin, dropping 10 nuclear bombs on Moscow would be sure to do it. So is all I need to do to prove that increased likelihood of achieving the outcome? Of course not. We want to kill Putin, but we want to do so in the least harmful way (in terms of collateral damage). If you prefer we could set the outcome to be 'freedom for the people of Ukraine with minimum loss of freedom to others'. But under that metric, war has a high(ish) chance of securing freedom, but with massive losses, supporting revolution has a lower chance of securing freedom, but with minimal losses. So which wins? — Isaac

The former, because the chance of achieving the latter is low due to the circumstances I have described.

Probability of success is not a sufficient metric, unless your 'preferred results' is wide enough to include avoiding undesirable collateral effects, in which case, you haven't made your case because you've only included 'freedom for Ukraine' as your result. I sincerely hope my government have more concerns than the freedom of Ukrainians.

It is not the only metric, but it is the most important one. Great effects could be achieved by taking very risky actions, but we do not do them precisely for the reason that they would most likely fail. Yes, the predicted outcomes offset the probabilities, but only to a small degree.

No, they don't. Look, I'll try and give an example from your post above...

"... at the time where Western decadent societies were being established, Russians were still under equally despotic rule (monarchs and bourgeois factory owners are identical). The period of relative chaos after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the paternal care of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's dedicated verchushka. After that were fifty years of the steady party's rule, with a very short period of descent into capitalism under Yeltsin; then Putin came and fortunately strengthened the rule for the people again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of decadence and are one of the few countries to overthrow the rule of bourgeois oligarchs, so they can do it again."

... I've not changed any of the facts at all. Just written it from a different perspective. You've not 'explained' anything. You've just told me what your preferred frame is. — Isaac

It is not hard to notice that this interpretation is as coherent as the perspective that the Moon landing is fake. I understand that you are desperate to show that all perspectives are equal, but the simple truth is they are not.

You've not given a single reason why my story is invalid. Presenting an alternative one isn't an argument that mine is invalid. You have to show that I can't think what I think (and remain coherent), not merely that there's an alternative which is also coherent. — Isaac

Your story is invalid because it does not cohere with the generally accepted view of historical processes. Sure, you might argue that those in turn are invalid, but that requires in turn even more arguments.

No, it doesn't because I can show how it is virtually impossible to believe the moon landings were fake and remain coherent - the number of people who would need to be involved is inconsistent with the number of people who have been shown to be involved with any other conspiracy. It's not complicated. As I've shown above, you giving your preferred account of Russian history is not the same category of fact at all. It's really, really simple - do experts actually think the moon landings were faked? No. Do experts actually think war will be worse for Ukraine than occupation? Yes. That's literally all you need to do to determine which positions are off the 'crazy' end and which are to be taken seriously. — Isaac

But that is not the argument you are making. Do experts believe that quick and peaceful revolution in Russia leading to its democractization is likely? If you know them, just present their arguments. Because so far you have claimed you are exempt from making the argument at all.

It's not that simple if one course of action is going to lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, we don't simple compare on likelihood of success, unless success includes the minimisation of collateral effects, in which case you haven't made your argument at all since you've not included that metric. — Isaac

But so far we have nothing to compare, because you have failed to present the argument (I mercifully refrain to consider the 'decadence frame' as one).

You've presented a series of facts which, alone, do not demonstrate anything but your interpretation of what actually happened in one instance. What actually happened in one instance is neither a delimiter nor predictive of what will/could happen in another instance. It would be like me claiming that tall people are likely to hit you on the grounds that a tall person once hit me. — Isaac

No, I did not present my views based on one instance. I have quoted many events from the history that support the view I propose. Unlike you.

Measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective. When Ukraine (or Russia) started being an autocracy and when it stopped are not raw historical facts (which would be things like election methods, political arrest rates, etc). You've already interpreted historical facts in line with your preferred narrative and are attempting to pass off the interpretation as fact. — Isaac

It was you yourself that proposed democracy indices as a measure of democracy. I understand your dismay that you did so without actually checking them and it turned out they actually do not support your view, but it is silly now to discredit them.

But sure, it is one interpretation of events, be free to present those events that support your interpretation. Till now you have flatly refused to do that.

We're not dealing with facts, we're dealing with your preferred story, based on facts. I can't argue against it because it's a perfectly valid story. — Isaac

And I am not asking for it, I am asking you to argue for your preferred story, based on facts. I suspect, based on the discussion so far, that the reason you refuse to do so is that you do not know any.

Nor have I any need to to support my argument.

Yes, you do. You demand from your government that it takes a specific course of action instead of the course of action it is taking. To argue for that you have to present an argument that the specific course of action you propose is more likely to have the preferred result than the course taken by them. It is not enough to claim that it is just possible that the preferred result might occur.

You, however, to support an argument that war is necessary, have to show that alternatives are impossible (or highly improbable). That can't be shown by simply pointing to one plausible interpretation of events. An argument that war is necessary has to show that other interpretations are all implausible. You have to show that it is impossible to be of the opinion that Ukraine turned from a state similar to Russia's current one, to their current one in a few years. You haven't shown that, you've shown that it is possible to interpreted events in such a way as to suggest not. But no one is arguing that is is not possible to do that. I'm arguing it is not necessary to do that. Do you understand the difference? — Isaac

No, all I have to do is support an argument that war is more likely to produce the preferred results than other courses of action and I did just that. We have to act based on what we consider to be likely, not possible. Until you actually present an argument (based on facts) that peaceful revolt in Russia is likely, then that is the only assessment of likelihood we have.

Nothing you've presented even addresses the argument that it is possible to interpret historical events in such a way as to support the notion that alternatives to ground war can bring about freedom. You've shown it's plausible to think the opposite, not that it's implausible to think anything else. — Isaac

I have already explained which historical events support my argument that peaceful revolution in Russia at this time is unlikely. Sure, it is possible to interpret historical events otherwise, but it is possible to interpret historical events in ANY way. It is possible to interpret historical events in such a way that supports the notion that the Moon landing did not happen. Would you demand that this position was treated equally as the one that says that it did? There are people arguing on the Internet that the ancient Rome did not exist. Does that position deserve the exact same merit as the opposite one?

I argue against your view, because it is not a perfectly valid story. I argue against it, because it is an invalid one, for which I gave my reasons. Saying 'Oh, I can argue that Ukraine's transition was fast and recent, because I can interpret the facts that way!' has the exact same weight as 'Oh, I can argue that the Moon landing did not happen because I can interpret the facts that way!' Actually, it has less weight, because the Moon landing conspiracists at least share their interpretations of the facts that led them to that conclusion, which you refuse to do.

The bottom line is that we have a reason to believe that the taken course of action is likely to produce the effects we expect (as you wrote yourself, it is a perfectly valid story). On the other hand, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that the course of action you propose is likely to produce the desired effects, beside your claim that your interpretation of events (which you refuse to share) tells you so.

I would let the readers decide how that should inform our demands concerning the course of action.

Those arguing for continued war are not arguing "Yeah, war! Let's have more of that!" They are arguing that we unfortunately, reluctantly must have war, it's our only option. They'd love nothing better than a world without war, but their hands are tied and reality is such that it cannot be avoided.

Those arguing for non-war options are not arguing the opposite (that they'd love to have a war, but unfortunately our hands are tied and we just cannot). They are arguing that there is a way, that we can resolve conflicts without war, that we can oppose tyranny without having to first move it about the globe by way of border wars.

So the evidence required for each of these positions is different.

The first argument needs to show that war cannot be avoided, in other words, it needs to prove a negative - that no other way works.

The second argument has no such burden, we don't need to prove that war cannot work because no one wants war anyway. War is what we reluctantly accept when all other options are closed. so we don't have to prove a negative, we only have to disprove the opposition's attempts to do so. We only have to show that they've not sufficiently made their case that war is the only option. — Isaac

No, that is not true, it is as ahistorical as most of your other claims. The simplest example is the one I have already given you: the liberation wars. People do not start liberation wars when 'all other options are closed' - obviously there is always the option to remain under the oppression - but when the war is considered to be a better alternative. Nobody finds that blameworthy - few beside the most staunch pacifists claim that they should choose the oppresion over the war. Your position seems to be to avoid war at all cost, including oppression. I understand it, but you are a in a tiny minority of people who support this. Thus it is simply incorrect to assume that all who discuss the subject here share that position, which you do above.

But even if that was true, which it is not, the conlusion is still false. For both sides the burden of proof is exactly the same – to show that the expected results of the proposed course of action are more likely than not. Without that it does not matter at all whether the solution would be preferred by both sides, because if it is not likely to happen, it makes no difference.

If an idealist proposes that we reach global disarmament by destroying all our weapons and waiting as all others do exactly the same, it is not the realist's burden to show that it is not possible in principle (because it is) or that it is not the preferred course of action, but only that such a course of action is very unlikely to produce the expected result and quite likely to produce other quite adverse effects (like being attacked by those who held onto their weapons).

So no, 'the slighest chance' of good results is not sufficient to propose a course of action, if there is a quite big chance that the results might not be that good.

Supporting that position requires the stronger argument made above, and the facts very clearly do not support that stronger argument, only the weaker one. — Isaac

Oh, so we can discuss facts after all. So please, do present the facts that show that the peaceful deposition of Putin by way of popular protest is likely. That is all I ask. Because so far your track record is somewhat unimpressive: you have argued for an alternative between 'peaceful protests and military invasion', but that alternative is false and ahistorical. On the other hand, examining whether more regimes fell down by violence or by peaceful opposition shows that the first is definitely more likely. You had no answer to that.

You also have claimed that Ukraine in recent years went from autocracy to democracy quickly and by way of popular protests - that is also an ahistorical claim, which shows a rather significant lack of knowledge of the history of the country we are here discussing. You have given as a support democracy metrics, which, it turned out, were quite different than what you have claimed.

I gave you two facts, but I can give quite a few more. For some of them one has to go back to the times of tzars, when, at the time where Western civic societies were being established, Russians were still under absolutistic rule. The period of relative freedoms after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the Ditcatorship of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's verchushka. After that were fifty years of the authoritarian party's rule, with a very short period of relative relaxation under Yeltsin; then Putin came and strengthened the rule again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of democracy and very little of grass-root civil activity. This is aggravated by the rampant corruption, which necessarily weakens all the state institutions. It should also be noted that the geographical setup also plays a role – many remote regions are unsustainable without external help, so they were and are heavily dependent on the center. For example, independent Yakutia (Sakha) might sound nice to some, but is rather unrealistic - in spite of vast resources it would be unable to develop without significant external support. That forces heavily centralized structure of the government. This makes the greatest difference between Russia and current regions/republics and some former republics – for Baltics, for example, the oppression was clearly foreign - they did not need Moscow for anything, they could perfectly manage on their own (which they did). For remote regions it is quite different. This is somewhat related to another fact that hinders a popular uprising - significant differences in the standards of living. Those whose voice would be better heard and influential, Muscovites, have it much better than the rest of the country and they are quite aware of that - they have a lot to lose. On the other hand protests in remote areas would be simply unheard. Popular uprising needs unity, which would be difficult to reach.

This does not mean that Russians are unable to reach democracy, I sincerely hope that they do, but that process would be rather long and necessarily full of upheavals. It cannot be seriously considered as a solution for a conflict that is happening right now.

This is just a sample of facts, I can give you quite a few more. However, the issue I see is that you tend not to engage with facts, you simply ignore them. You do not seem to be even interested in the history of the region. You somehow believe that it is sufficient to claim 'But it could happen!'. That is not a position based on factually supported assessment of likely course of events, that is wishful thinking. Yet you demand that such position, in which you specifically reject the burden of proof, be given exactly the same merit as other views.

So yes, please, do present your detailed account of your assessment based on facts from the situation and history of the region, particularly Russia, that peaceful deposition of the regime leading to democratic changes that would prevent Russia from encroaching on Ukrainian freedom is likely in relatively short term. I will treat that position with the respect it deserves.

Ah well, if I'd known The Facts™ were involved, I'd have stayed schtum. — Isaac

I have given you two specific facts:
1. Putin's rule has been practically unchallenged by peaceful protests for twenty years.
2. The events of the Ukrainian war have weakened Putin's regime.

Which do you believe is false and why?

How convenient. The one thing that can end these otherwise impossible to shift tyrannies just so happens to be the one thing that is the solution you prefer anyway because of your personal allegiances.

What an entirely unbiased and rational pure coincidence! — Isaac

You expect me to apologize that facts confirm my arguments and not yours?

No, it is not a coincidence, it is a process well known from history. The facts are that Putin's rule for over 20 years has been practically unchallenged by any peaceful protests (the only bigger one was the Bolotnaya Square, which was dealt with rather swiftly) and after a year and a half of unsuccessful, bloody war he already had to bargain away from an armed coup. Yes, that is very unfortunate that regimes tend to weaken much more through blood and violence than by peaceful processes, but the history teaches us that is the way it is. We can accept it and act accordingly (like the West does now) or we can ignore history, concede everything to regimes and just hope that they somehow stumble and fall down on their own.

Funny how the solidity of Putin's grip on power seems to change depending on the purposes the argument is being put to. — Isaac

Yes, tyrannies have a tendency to last quite long, unless significant impulses affect it. I would say that a bloody, unsuccessful war, with more than 100k dead and collapsing economy COULD be that impulse, don't you think? Especially that we know from history (those who know it) that such lost wars do tend to influence rulers quite negatively. What you you proposed, on the other hand, that is handing Putin Ukraine and giving him concessions would mean that he won the war. I would say that would be a regime-strengthening factor, don't you think?

And if you expect that Putin's rule will end with Russians gathering, holding hands in a circle and establishing a democracy in a week (which is your preferred method of getting rid of regimes, even though it did not happen that often in history), then you are even more naive and oblivious to the reality of Russian politics than your previous posts have shown.

Putin's end will not be peaceful and it will definitely not be pretty, in case you did not notice, Prigozhin was bringing to Moscow not a draft of a new democractic constitution, but tanks. I do not expect that Putin's end will be succeeded by a democracy, definitely not in a short term. I do not even think that Russian society is capable of a violent revolution at this time (which in regimes happens more often) - they have been trained to be politically apathetic for decades.

I rather expect that after Putin the next regime will be equally autocratic - only much weaker, which would make it uncapable of maintaining the war effort.

Igor Girkin (Strelkov), the main instigator of the Donbass war and a man main responsible for killing three hundred people in a passenger plane over Donbass has been arrested in Russia. Not for his war crimes, of course, but for insulting Putin.

Interestingly, he did not say recently anything different from what he was saying for the last year and a half. Putin's grip on power seems to be slipping if he starts to see bloggers as a threat.

All I really wanted to know. — Isaac

Should have asked, would save us some time.

Again, that metric is not the issue. The method is. — Isaac

Your alternative was 'popular protest movements vs how many had to rely on military invasions'. I did not expect you to take it so literal, if you do, then the alternative is obviously false - most commonly opressive regimes were overthrown neither by popular protests nor by military invasions (which Ukrainian defense, by the way, still is not), but by wars and revolutions. You wrote 'just look at the history of the overthrow of oppressive regimes' and I did exactly that - most of them were overthrown through death and violence, not by peaceful protests.

No you haven't. You said it's because the regime would oppose it. All autocratic regimes oppose resistance. Why are Russians uniquely unable to win out against that? — Isaac

Yes, all autocratic regimes oppose resistance and they often last quite long, so there would be nothing unique about that. Do I have to list all the lengths of autocratic rules to make that point?

As late as 2008, Ukraine was in roughly the same position as Russia on indices of freedom, corruption and human development. Whatever progress it's made relative to Russia, it has done in the last few years. I get your nationalist tendency to think the colour of the flag is the marker of independence, but most of the world have moved on from colonialism and consider more complex measures of human freedom than whether they like the flag. — Isaac

Let us check that out... The Economist Democracy Index in 2008 for Russia was 4.48, while compared to 6.94 for Ukraine, with full democracies starting at about 8. RSF Freedom of Press - Ukraine 19.25, Russia - 47 (the lower score, the greater freedom). Human Freedom index for 2008 - Ukraine 76, Russia 111 (less is better). Freedom in the World 2013 (no earlier issues) - Ukraine 4, Russia 6 (1 - best, 7 - worst). Polity IV State Fragility 2009 - Ukraine 6, Russia 8. They only indices they were comparable in was corruption. So what you wrote is simply false. Ukraine has began to improve democratically from the moment it has thrown the Kremlin yoke off. Yes, it went slower than in some other republics, yes, there were some regresses, but that is precisely because Russian influences were there much stronger than in the Baltics. The flag has nothing to do with it, it is a matter of Russian dominance.

I know the world's media would have us believe Ukraine are the world's most noble beaten down underdogs, but they're not. Until recently they were a hotbed of far-right nationalism, corruption, human rights abuses and black market arms trading. The people revolted against that. They did so over only a few years. There is no reason at all why Russians cannot do the same, they are coming from almost exactly the same position on indices of freedom. — Isaac

No. It seems you simply do not know the history of Ukraine. People revolted in 2004, not 'a few years' back. And they did not revolt against autocratic regime (Kuchma did not even run in the elections), but against rampant corruption and electoral fraud. That was four years before 2008, when you believe Ukraine was still authoritarian. Not to mention that your objection undermines your own argument: if Ukraine was autocratic from 1931 till 'a few years back', then it would be even longer, so it cannot be an example of fast rejection of authoritarian rule, can it?

See above, this is just wrong. The move from corruption to freedom is recent. Your obsession with the USSR being the cause of all oppression is not reflected in the data I'm afraid. The Ukrainian government did a perfectly good job of oppressing its own people up until very recently — Isaac

No, it was not, as I have pointed out above. It was slow, gradual, with many regresses, but it is certainly not recent. Moreover, most deficiencies in the democratic processes in Ukraine were related to bitter infighting between the different fractions and corruption, not to autocracy. In general from 2000 Ukraine has been described as a 'hybrid regime', i.e. one with some deficiencies and abuses (like rigged elections), but different from authoritarian rule, like Russia. They are not comparable.

Yes, because you've given me no options. The offers and possibilities are real here. Occupation, neutrality, NATO membership... these are real negotiation points. You're asking me to measure hypothetical ones. I don't have the data on hypothetical demands. If you give me a real demand you think Putin might make, I'll do my best to find some figures to use. — Isaac

Yes, I have given you a list of specific options, you just evaded it. Let us assume that we give Putin all the territories he has now, Ukraine renounces NATO, peace is reached and in three years Putin comes back with the army and asks for the rest of the lands which are now officially annexed to Russia as enshrined in the constitution. Should Ukraine concede or not?

This argument doesn't make any sense at all. I'm asking you why you choose to support the Ukrainians. Why do you choose to support your government spending billions on their war and not on protecting the Yemeni. It has nothing to do with what I'm asking Ukrainians, I'm not talking to a Ukrainian, I'm talking to you. Why do you choose to support Ukrainian freedom over and above Yemeni food supply?

Your government has a limited pot of money, why are you happy for them to spend it securing Ukrainian freedom at the expense of Yemeni food security. — Isaac

I choose to support Ukrainians, because they were attacked by Russians as they were striving for freedom. But I also believe that conceding to Putin's demands will only encourage him, making the whole Europe less secure.

I'm not forcing anything? Are you forcing people to starve because you're not actively helping them? Are you forcing people to live without shelter because you're not providing a home? Are you currently forcing Afghan women to live under the oppressive Taliban regime?

No. I'm responding to the situation Russia has put them in, in the context of all the other crises the world is facing. — Isaac

Fair enough. You are not forcing them. Let me rephrase that, then: you would prefer to deny them military help, so they fall under the Russian regime, and then help them somehow. Is that correct?

I have a Fairphone, but that's not the point. The point is that we face a choice as to which crisis we ask our governments to prioritise. I want a balance, you want Ukrainian freedom above all else. I'm asking why. — Isaac

Oh, so we no longer strive for THE MOST HUMANITARIAN OPTION, but a balance. Last year's number of dead Yemeni (when the grain deal was in force) was acceptable, but with the deliveries stopped it would be too much.

Yes, I would rather help Ukrainians, possibly because I know more Ukrainians than Yemeni. But also because I believe Putin must be stopped.

Yes. I know what you're advocating, I'm asking why. If giving Ukraine that option is bought at the expense of Yemeni food security, Ukrainian children's future, dead Russian conscripts, risk of nuclear war... Why are you advocating it? What is it about giving Ukrainians the options they want that trumps those other concerns for you? — Isaac

I do not think it is at the expense of Ukrainian's children future, on the contrary. It is specifically for their future, so they do not have to do 'peaceful protests' in a police state. As I said, I am closer to Ukrainians than Yemeni, the risk of nuclear war is rather small. As for Russian conscripts, you have just argued that they can peacefully revolt any time they want, so why that should be a problem?

And I notice that again you decided to skip the question about the terrorists: well, that is my concern, too - if you concede to a bully, sooner or later you have to concede again, unless you reach a boundary. Unfortunately, due to your evasions, I still do not know how much you are willing to concede under a threat of force. You get indignant when I suggest you would concede everything, but I am not sure why - you postulate the most humanitarian option and giving everything up to avoid violence IS the most humanitarian option.

Because they are planning to invade Russian held territory. The legal paperwork doesn't change how many people die, nor how successful/necessary the operation is likely to be. — Isaac

Then Washington invaded British-held Boston. There you go, military invasion overthrows the regime! Should I look up all the others? The bottom line still is, people have risked their lives for freedom throughout the history. Coming up with made-up criteria will not change it.

No I'm comparing the two options. I haven't declared either to be trivial, nor have I ignored either. It is the act of ignoring one to only look at the other that I'm disputing. — Isaac

And I have explained why I think that option is very unlikely.

Simple. Ukraine did it. So did several other states (as you only recently pointed out). If Ukraine can do it, why not Russia? — Isaac

Ukraine lost its independence in 1921 and gained it again in 1991. How is this an example of 'simple' or 'faster'?

Nonsense. I don't have the data to make such a decision. I do have the data to show the current options are heavily in favour of occupation. Other potential demands would have to be weighed on their merits, but since there are no other demands right now, I can't see the point. — Isaac

You had no problems of presenting demands and likelihood of their fulfillment when you have described the hypothetical peace negotiations, but now you have no data. You can assess that the current options are heavily in favour of partial occupation, but somehow are unable to assess the options in favour (or not) of complete occupation. Curious.

So was Ukraine. The people threw that shackle off. — Isaac

The people threw that shackle off after 50 years when the USSR was economically collapsing and could not intervene, like it did in 1968 in Czechoslovakia or almost did in 1980 in Poland. So yes, the people did it, but the situation was quite favorable.

I've donated to several famine funds. But you do demand that Yemenis give up their lives to promote freedom in Ukraine, right? Where is this line of argument supposed to go? — Isaac

I see, you donated. But if you sold all your possessions, leaving just the bare minimum, you would save even more Yemenis. That would be THE MOST HUMANITARIAN OPTION, would it be not? Yemenis give up their lives so that we can have smartphones, computers, and watch Netflix, that does not bother you that much? Somehow you do not feel obliged to relinquish all your comforts and do not demand that from all the people you know? Only Ukrainians should give up their freedom?

Where have I said that I don't think we ought help Ukraine? The argument is about which methods we should be willing to support, not about whether we offer any support at all. — Isaac

You would prefer to force Ukrainians to go under Russian occupation and then somehow help them in other ways. Does that misrepresent your views in any way?

OK, so in what way are we consulting the people in Yemen whose lives are put at risk by disruption to grain exports? You're not advocating a 'most effected, most choice' option, you're advocating a 'do everything the Ukrainians ask' option. Given the enormous death toll, I'd say ordinary Russian conscripts were pretty much the most affected (they seem to be being killed in higher numbers), so where are we considering them? — Isaac

As long as you have a smartphone, leave the Yemeni out of this. Until we give up our comforts for them, we should not not expect Ukrainians to give up their freedom.

I am advocating that Ukrainians be able to decide in matters most related to them, exactly as I wrote. I would be extremely happy if Russian conscripts could decide for themselves, however, the West has little means to enable that choice. In the case of Ukrainians, we can.

And i still feel the need to ask: do you believe we should always meet the demands of terrorists, if it is the most humanitarian option?

So can you (or anyone) explain to me why they consider the most humanitarian option to be pursuing war to avoid occupation? — Isaac

The simple answer is: it is not the most humanitarian option. The American Revolution was not the most humanitarian option: most likely Brits would have directly killed less Americans than died in the Revolution. This possibly concerns many if not most fights and wars for freedom. What you fail to understand is that there are some things that people are willing to risk their lives for or even knowingly die for.

I didn't mention anything about non-violence. I said military action. Action by the military. How many oppressive regimes were overthrown by one countries military invading territory held by another? Compare that to those overthrown by the actual population within that region (violently or not). Especially true if you set that as the motive (we had no intention, for example, of regime change in Nazi Germany, the intention was defence). — Isaac

There is no reason to limit the examples to invasion of one country by another, given that Ukraine does not and never planned to invade Russia. Why bring it up then? And Ukrainians have no intention to change the regime either, their intention is defence against the regime. If Russia did not try to subdue them and meddle in their affairs, they would not care what regime they have. So yes, I believe all the examples where people defended themselves against a regime still apply, wether those people were formally organized into military units or not.

Seriously? Have you seen the images from the war? What in those does not seem to you like brutal force? You act as if the option of removing the Russians by land war was some kind of trivial paperwork exercise. Both options face brutal resistance. We're talking about historically which option has had the least. If you want to make the case that open war generally is met with less brutal force than popular uprising then be my guest, I'm all ears. — Isaac

It is you who suggests that overthrowing Russian regime by peaceful methods would be somewhat trivial if we let Russia to install that regime in the first place. That is simply absurd and ahistorical, as I have pointed out. I am making a case that defending against the regime BEFORE it is installed has more chance of success than afterwards, before the region is turned into a police state, as those are not that easy to overthrow as you believe them to be.

What a stupid thing to say. You're basically saying that Russia is screwed, condemned to be forever under tyranny. That's ridiculous, of course it isn't. — Isaac

Forever, no, for a very long time, yes. At least as long as in Belarus, possibly as long as in the USSR. Why think it would be faster?

How successful have Ukraine been at removing Russia militarily? Not very I'd say? If you only look at one side of an equation it's going to be impossible to draw an relative conclusions. We're comparing two options here, It's no good just dismissing one because it's unlikely. What matters is whether it's more likely than the other. — Isaac

How successful was Ukraine in not submitting the whole country under the Russian regime? I would say very. Putin wanted to take over the country and he did not, Ukrainians stopped him militarily. I would count it as a success. So yes, Ukraine was much more successful in opposing a regime militarily then the peaceful opposition in Belarus.

Don't tell me what I really propose. If you want to discuss ideas with some imaginary opponent go start a fucking blog. This is a discussion forum, for people to discuss ideas with other real people, not to make up what they think. — Isaac

When I have asked you specifically what concessions you would not make in the face of war, you wrote a whole paragraph to avoid that question. Unless you answer straight which Russian demands would need to be rejected, even under the threat of force, I am justified to assume that you would give up the whole Ukraine. If that misrepresents your view, give a straight answer: where is the limit.

Funny that, because we hear over and over in this very thread how it is wrong to bring up Ukraine's right-wing nationalism of the early 2000s because "things are so different now". You've cited Ukraine's path to freedom yourself (despite it being on a par with Russia only a few years ago). Now, all of a sudden it's somehow impossible for any Russian-controlled regions to follow the same path? — Isaac

Have you missed all that I wrote? Russia is actively thwarting all attempts of democratizing of former republics, if it can, and it is quite open about it to discourage others. What is so hard about it to understand?

But let's say we do. Again, you're only comparing one side. What do the next decades hold for Ukrainians after another year of destructive war? A rosy utopia of freedom and prosperity? Their infrastructure is destroyed, they are entirely beholden to Western corporations and they have lost millions of citizens. What alternative future are you comparing this decades of tyranny to? — Isaac

I am comparing the Baltics and Belarus. Sure, a lot depends on how much Ukraine will be helped on its road to democracy, but I have no reason to believe that with the right support it cannot be like a bigger, more resourceful Lithuania. I would say the other option is Belarus in the best case, but I am afraid it could be much worse, given how often 'deukrainization' is mentioned by the propaganda.

What kind of a counter argument is that? Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world campaign for freedom. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Yemenis give up their lives to support it, right? — Isaac

I have donated to several Ukrainian funds. But you do demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate the hunger crisis, right?

I've just given my reasons. The war affects more than just Ukrainians and my governments are taking actions one way or the other and it's my duty as a citizen to hold them to account. That means that I must judge their actions based on the outcomes I think are right. Hiding behind someone else's decision won't cut it. — Isaac

Your governments are taking actions that enable Ukrainians to make the choice whether their freedom is worth fighting for militarily or not. I believe they should have that possibility, because the issue concerns mostly them - they will feel the consequences. You believe that it is better to create a situation where they cannot make that choice. In other words, you want to make that choice for them.

Who said the Ukrainians had no right? We are all part of humanity and we're all responsible for each other in our part. When did that get wrong. I must have missed the memo were we all turned into nationalists. — Isaac

Ukrainians can choose their future only if they have outside help. Without that help, their future is decided by Russia. You want to deprive them of that help, so yes, I think you want to deprive them of that right.

Whether "it is right to let them choose the path they want to take"? I don't see any argument from you why holding a Ukrainian passport makes one magically the only entity whose interests need to be considered by our governments when deciding how to respond to this crisis. — Isaac

If you don't see it, then you did not read my three last posts. People who are most affected by the consequences of certain actions should have the most say about choices concerning those actions. That is usually how it works.

That depends entirely on the likely consequences. If the aim isn't to protect human well-being, then what the hell is it? If concessions cause less damage to human well-being than war, then we ought choose concessions. If they cause more, we ought choose war. What other consideration would you have us include? — Isaac

That depends entirely on the likely consequences. If the aim isn't to protect human well-being, then what the hell is it? If concessions cause less damage to human well-being than war, then we ought choose concessions. If they cause more, we ought choose war. What other consideration would you have us include? — Isaac

That is a lot of words written to completely avoid the question. I have asked you a series of very specific options, consider the likely consequences and then answer.

I understand your views, but you must also understand they are not shared by most people. Americans thought that it is worth risking their lives in exchange for freedom, so did Haitans, Greeks, the Irish, Algerians, Afghans, Russians, Poles, the French... I would say the list is rather long. Of course, it is better to throw off the yoke of tyranny by peaceful methods, but history teaches us that such opportunities are somewhat rare. Usually it involves death, violence and destruction. Yet people think it is worth it. I understand you disagree, but maybe let those directly involved decide.

Not to mention that given your reasoning, we should give in to all terrorists: after all, they always threat with more damage than would happen if their demands are not met. Do you have any idea why we are not doing that?

So because some negotiations fail the whole concept is thrown out? — Isaac

No, the concept works very well in the right conditions. However, the situation did not change sufficiently for them to occur.

Where have I proposed that? — Isaac

You insist that we make concessions, while refusing to specify where concessions must stop. Unless you do that, it is most reasonable to assume that you are willing to accept all concessions.

So? Can we not fight that? Why are we suddenly disarmed of any means of resistance other than full-scale land war? Just look at the history of the overthrow of oppressive regimes and tell me how many were achieved through popular protest movements vs how many had to rely on military invasions. In fact, I'll save you the trouble - it's virtually all of them vs virtually none of them. — Isaac

None of the oppressive regimes were overthrown by military action? Hmm, let me think: the American Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the Greek War, the Irish War, the Indonesian War, the Algerian War, the Russian Civil War, the Afghanistan War. Funny how many of them have 'war' in the name? And remind me, was the Hitler's regime overthrown by a popular protest? Because I do vaguely remember some foreign soldiers were involved... Mussolini? Rings a bell? Did Saddam Hussein resign after peaceful protests? Gaddafi? Sorry, I do not have all day.

The idea that the only way to promote the freedom of the people of Donbas is to fight a bloody and destructive war to keep them under Ukrainian rule is ridiculous and ahistorical. Extraction from the yoke of tyranny has almost universally been won by the people, not governments invading each other. — Isaac

Unless you noticed, Ukrainians are also people. And they are doing exactly that: defending themselves from getting under the yoke of tyranny. Your idea that it is somehow best to get under the yoke of tyranny and then just peacefully overthrow it is ahistorical: tyrannies have a strange habits of being quite resistant to change. It could be due to their tendencies to crush any opposition with brutal force, I guess.

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions.

Option one will undeniably cause less bloodshed and has a better overall outcome for humanity. On the downside, it might not work.

Option two will definitely cause masses more bloodshed, may trigger a wider conflict, even a possible nuclear one, and has two possible routes to failure (Ukraine simply cannot shift Russia, or the toll of the war stymies Ukraine's progress away from tyranny).

So what is it about option two that's so attractive for you? — Isaac

This is a false alternative. Did the Baltics have to free all of the USSR to get independence? No, they did not - they seized the opportunity when Russia was unable to intervene (well, it did, but it was too weak to do it effectively).

The first option - 'fighting to free all Russia' is so unlikely that it is absurd - overthrow of the Communism took 50 years and happened mostly due to economic failure of the Soviet system. Tell me, how successful is the West in overthrowing the regime in Belarus? Not very, I would say? Why think that in Russia the result would be different? Giving up the whole Ukraine (because that is the option you really propose) would most likely mean condemning them to the yoke of tyranny for many decades to come.

The second option is not needed: the point is to weaken Putin militarily, economically and politically to the point where he will no longer be able to oppose integration of Ukraine into democractic structures and alliances. Possibly, it might not even require freeing the whole occupied territory.

Yes. Your incredulity is not an argument. 50 million face starvation if grain and fertiliser exports continue to be disrupted, the total death toll in Ukraine stands at about 100,000. And I also talked about the children of the Ukrainians currently supporting war, did anyone ask them what future they want? — Isaac

Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world hunger crisis. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate it, right?

And I also talked about the children of the Ukrainians currently supporting war, did anyone ask them what future they want? — Isaac

Oh, so Ukrainians have no right to decide the future of their children, but you have the right to decide the future of Ukrainians. Right.

Did I mention me? — Isaac

Well, you feel you have the right to decide the fate of Ukrainians, because of the war, and disagreed that it is their decision to make, even though they are most affected by it. Why?

That's the matter in question. Begging the question seems to be an occupational hazard for you. — Isaac

What is the matter in question? You do want to decide for Ukrainians in matters that mostly concern Ukrainians. Where exactly I am begging the question?

Russia are asking for elements which involve us, that's the point (matters such as membership of NATO, trade deals, political involvement, military collaboration...) — Isaac

You seem to have a naive conviction that giving in to demands of a bully at the slightest show of his force will stop him exactly where he is. That is ahistorical as well. 'I bring you peace', said Chamberlain. Guess what? He did not.

You would renounce Ukraine's NATO membership, if Russia demanded it under the threat of war, is that correct? Well, what if Russia demanded all the occupied territories, under the threat of war? You would give it that to them as well (or force Ukrainians to do it). What if they demanded Odessa, historically Russian city, under the threat of war? Sure, why not. Corridor to Transnistria, vital for Russian interests? Of course. The question is: what in Ukraine you would NOT give under the threat of war?

Do you seriously have that bad an understanding of what a negotiation is? Thank God you're not a diplomat. — Isaac

Oh, I have a quite good idea what negotiations are. Negotiations were involved in the Budapest Memorandum, quite a lot of them. Oops. And what about Minsk 1? Oh, how they negotiated, the guarantees they gave! Ouch. Wait, there was also Minsk 2! They negotiated there as well, so all the resolutions must have been final and dutifully observed by both sides, right? Right?

The issue is that you propose to give Russia anything to avoid war. Is that a strong negotiating position, in your opinion?

War does not equal sovereignty. War equals massive indebtedness, economic collapse, and often an accompanying risk of increases in extremist politics, particularly nationalism. You read my quotes from Yuliya Yurchenko? If you're concerned about sovereignty and steering away from authoritarianism, the best route is one which promotes economic independence, equality, and respect for everyone in your community. War is just about the worst course of action. — Isaac

Well, when the Ukrainians tried that (by driving toward closer integration with the EU) their president for some reason made a 180-turn and opted for closer integration with authoritarian Russia, which does not support those ideals, against public support. And we all know how it ended. And which countries in Russia's sphere of influence are democratic and economically independent? Those who are somewhat driving towards democracy (like Moldova and Armenia, earlier Georgia) just happen to have the same problems with Russian-inspired destabilization as Ukraine. Do you think that is a coincidence? Belarussians wanted democracy, how exactly that ended? With Wagner involved in presidential elections, isn't that right? With FSB allegedly preventing a 'coup'? We have every reason to think that Russia would thwart every effort to establish a full democracy in a country of its influence.

Nonsense. We're all just people. There are rich Ukrainians who'll not suffer a scratch from war and there are poor Yemenis who'll more likely suffer painfully slow deaths from hunger the longer it continues. There's powerful arms manufacturers and their investors who'll benefit from a protracted war, there's the Russian conscripts and their families. There's the children and grandchildren of the current Ukrainians who were never asked if they wanted their future sold out to Black Rock. and there's the rest of the world who might take umbrage at the prospect of being wiped of the face of the earth by the ensuing nuclear war.

I realise it's like rule one in your playbook (when cornered say it's up to the Ukrainians), but it's just isn't. — Isaac

Are you seriously suggesting that Yemenis are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? Are you seriously suggesting YOU are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? Please, do describe how. And as for Ukrainians, they massively support their defensive war, rich or not.

Notwithstanding that, the question is about whether we continue to supply weapons, whether we write off debt, whether we push for negotiations (or block them), whether we offer Russia elements it wants (elements to do with us, not Ukraine). These are all decisions for Western powers (and so presumably Western electorates) to make. Why are we obliged to simply follow the Ukrainians on any of those decisions? — Isaac

Because it is right to let them choose the path they want to take. And when we do not support them, then we are exactly 'offering Russia elements' that have very much to do with Ukraine, not with us. We let Russia decide Ukraine's fate, just because it is stronger.

So. The argument you were supposed to be countering was about how far Ukraine might be from Russian-style authoritarianism. The answer is, not far. The question wasn't about recent direction of travel — Isaac

No, as I have already explained. Sovereignty for Ukraine is a way to steer away from Russian-style authoritarianism.

Then why were you presenting an argument at all? It's a bit disingenuous to present an argument and then when your reasoning is challenged claim its not your decision anyway. — Isaac

I was explaining why Ukrainians fight for sovereignty - to get away from Russkiy mir. Nobody else but them is able to decide whether it is worth the war and destruction, because they will suffer through it. It is a value judgement they had to make, because it concerns themselves. Apparently, you would rather deprive them of that choice, as you know better what is good for them.

What difference doesn't make to the argument that the Ukrainians have decided? If the Ukrainians decided to kill everyone of Russian descent would you have nothing to say on the matter because "it is what Ukrainians have decided"? — Isaac

The difference is that they decided about themselves, so your example is silly.

Ukraine is not a well established democracy and Russia is not a full-blown autocracy. There are several independent measures of human development, in every single one Ukraine is not far from Russia. — Isaac

I do not believe that the distinction between a full-blown autocracy and a full-blown kleptocracy is that important in case of Russia. The point is that Ukraine wants to be less like Russia.

Is there some reason you're treating years of bloody war and destruction as if it were a minor additional consideration to weigh in? — Isaac

It is not my consideration to make, it is what Ukrainians have decided.

OK, what? — Isaac

As far as I know there have been no cases of well established democracies turning into full-blown autocracies in half a year. But I might be wrong here, can you give some such examples?

I don't see what any of that has to do with a war over sovereignty. As if war was the only way to decide on leaders... — Isaac

Sovereignty gives Ukrainians a chance to be not-Russia. Sure, they might have squander that chance, especially if the West abandons them, they can turn into an awful copy of Russia. Still, they would have that chance. On the other hand, at this time, giving up sovereignty to Russia practically deprives them of a chance to be a democratic, well-governed, prosperous country. Sovereignty for Ukrainians is a way to better their lives, not an end in itself.

That's right. A single populist election is all it takes. Sovereignty is no defence against that. And driving a country into the ground economically is a sure fire way to push in the direction of making that more likely. — Isaac

No, it is not, it takes a bit more than that.

And seemingly you missed the whole point of my post: at this particular time those under Russian influence have it worse than those without it, even if they are under the terrible boot of the EU. That is why Ukrainians are trying to get out. Possibly, EU might change into Russia in half a year and the other way round and that would turn out to be a mistake, but that does not seem to concern them that much. Maybe because the probability of that happening seems to be rather low.

Russians openly call for genocide and subjugation of former republics (and other countries) on their official channels not because of their genetics, but because their current authorities specifically tout ideologies quite similar to those that caused Holodomor. And, notably, are actively engaged in Holodomor denial (and Katyn, and massive deportations, etc.). I have no doubt that Russians could be peaceful and well-meaning (I know quite a few of them who are), the problem is, those who rule Russia at this time are not.

And for some reason countries that have left the Russian sphere of influence (such as the Baltics) 'could be Russia', but curiously that has not happened yet, while those countries that remain in that sphere (like Belarus and Kazakhstan) could be like Switzerland, yet somehow are quite similar to Russia or are getting there instead. So I would say in this specific case sovereignty does play a role.

I also recommend viewing some fragments (or reading some quotes) from Russian Media Monitor. Note that those are fragments from official Russian channels, so it is pure propaganda - do not expect too much truth there and do not treat it as views of ordinary Russians, rather as what is force-fed to ordinary Russians. Still, fascinating stuff, sometimes enlightning, sometimes frightening.

Sorry, I missed that one...

Isn't Germany basically the leader? Excuse my ignorance. — frank

Germany is possibly the most powerful (depending on the metrics), but not to the extent it can dictate anything - it usually comes down to (informal) coalitions of EU countries with specific interests (some decisions can be easily vetoed, it is not just a majority). It also should be noted that its internal politics are somewhat complicated, to some (fully unknown) extent due to the Rusian influences, especially among Greens, but it pertains to most parties (Gerhard Schröder, former SPD Chancellor, was employed by Russians just after he resigned from the post). In general, in European politics the interaction between internal and external politics is so dynamic that it is quite unpredictable.

Why are they vengeful? — frank

In 2014 Russians took down over Donbas a Malaysian passenger plane with 283 passengers and 15 crew on board. Nobody was punished for that, Russia just produced a stream of various lies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17

So this is something I don't quite understand. Has Russia always sort of been "hollowed out" as a kleptocracy? Is this the way their culture is normally? Or is this an aberration? — frank

That is a long topic, gave a good introduction. I will just add that while the USRR was in some aspects discontinuation of the Tsarist Russia and the post-Soviet Russia is in some aspects discontinuation of the USSR, imperialism is not one of them. On the contrary, Russians tried to establish a strong dominance over the republics and countries of the Soviet bloc (with the exception of Yeltsin). If you want to read up on that, look up the term 'Near Abroad'.

So Tzeentch was not wrong to call him 'independent' then. And your labelling him as 'biased' was not an act of dispassionate information-sharing, but one of partisan rhetoric. Rather than addressing the arguments, you just smear the source. — Isaac

Again, I was pointing out that his reporting might be biased, and I was write.

I've underlined the relevant words. "They blocked it (they including the US)", "Yes" — Isaac

Lol. That is exactly biased reporting: Bennett says it is what a joint decision of the Western countries and Sachs reports it as 'The US did it'. It significantly changes the meaning of what he said.

Now you're claiming 'significance' as fact. There is no fact of the matter as to how 'significant' the interference was. Expert opinion varies. Disagreeing with you is not bias. — Isaac

Yes, there is a fact of the matter as to how significant the interference was, as anyone familiar with the events is aware of.

Right. so the more interesting question which we should have been discussing from the start is "why?". Given two competing narratives, why are you biased in favour of one? What is it that appeals to you about it?

And please don't start the whole charade again about it being the more accurate, or you having carried out some 4-d chess-level analysis of the data... You've read som articles and decided to trust one side. I'm genuinely interested in why. — Isaac

Because people are biased in general and the views they hold tend to sway their perception of other information they acquire. We tend to confirm our views rather than challenge them. It takes much more arguments to change one's view than to confirm it.

Yes, within that frame (not necessarily about Russia's intentions, for example, he has no more a read on Putin than Sachs does). My poitn was that whet he knows and what he says are going to be two different things because it's his job to present the facts in a way that promotes Ukraine (particularity his political movement within it). He may know a lot, but what we have is the subset of all he knows which he chooses to say. — Isaac

Of course, I do not question his partisanship. However, I would still put more weight on his expertise as opposed to Sachs.

I've just been through that. The article wasn't about the causes at all and where he does allude to them he talks about NATO's actions in Kosovo and Lybia, how Russia cited them as reasons for it's actions in Crimea, and the talks about Russia's goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. All of the is completely consistent with the idea the NATO expansion (increase in it's power in the region) motivated Russian actions. Sachs may have changed his mind, it's possible, but this article doesn't show it. — Isaac

The article lists many transgressions of the US which might have influenced Russia's decision of the invasion. It would be inexplicable to omit it, if Sachs thought then that NATO expansion was the central one of such transgressions.

As it seems this discussion goes on without a particular direction, I propose you respond and then we let others dicuss the actual topic of the thread.

Yeah, sorry. I will try to wrap it up.

He is independent. He represents neither Ukraine, nor Russia, nor America. 'Independent' doesn't mean 'not having an opinion one way or the other'. — Isaac

Sure, he is independent and biased.

Yes he did. Tzeentch has already corrected you on that. — Isaac

Lol. No, he did not.

His argument is that foreign agencies got involved. It would only be weakened if foreign agencies hadn't got involved. His argument is not about proportion. — Isaac

Don't be daft. Of course the foreign interference would have to be significant to name it as the cause of Russian reaction. It was not.

I don't think Sachs can be held accountable for the stupidity of some potential readers. The argument is not about proportion, never even mentions proportion and does not rely on it. If people are stupid enough to nonetheless think proportion has anything to do with it, I don't see why that's Sachs's problem. — Isaac

The argument is about causality. The US involvement, while present, was negligible, so it is very unlikely to cause the Russian reaction. Readers who know no better (like those who are under impression that Euromaidan was a 'little unrest') would put much more weight to his argument due to that omission.

Yes. After you were pressed to. You volunteered Sachs's bias. That is you are biased in which sources you voluntarily point out the bias of. — Isaac

Yes, of course I am biased! Guilty as charged. Your desperate attemps at tu-quoqing the argument are quite amusing, I must say.

Yes. By continuing to read the rest of the paragraph. This from the person complaining about taking quotes out of context. Stop pretending I didn't say anything else! — Isaac

Sorry for that. Do we agree then that Arestovych is better informed on Ukrainian issues than Sachs?

I bolded the words, I'm not sure what more I can do. If you can't understand the difference between this war and any war, I think it'll take more than a forum post to help out. — Isaac

If you insist that Sachs' argument was that this war could be avoided by precipitating another one, so be it. I am not sure he would agree, though.

Yeah, right. And in what way does that interpretation makes sense? What is the difference between the two scenarios in that sense? — Isaac

Is that a serious question? Well, the described outcomes would be somewhat different.

...in your opinion. Sach's obviously thought the context was fine. It was to support the proposition that Ukrainian leaders knew NATO membership would provoke Russia into war and the quite supports that. What else he said is irrelevant to supporting that proposition. We don't, in adding quotes, typically list all the other things people said that might be of interest. — Isaac

Sure, if we accept your view that Sachs in his argument by saying 'preventing this war' means 'preventing this particular war, even if it leads to a different one'. I would say that view is peculiar, but it is my opinion.

No. 'This war', and 'the occupation of Crimea' are two different things. At best one is a stage within the other. — Isaac

That might be your opinion, but we are talking about Sachs' view. And he states it explicitly: THIS war started with the Yanukovych overthow, NOT in 2022, so the occupation of Crimea is part of the same conflict. The NATO expansion could not be the cause of the 2022 war, because the war DID NOT START THEN, according to Sachs. But it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. So which war was the expansion of NATO cause of, according to Sachs?

I clearly isn't and anyone can read the evidence to that effect. You've singled out Sachs as being biased because he doesn't support your preferred narrative and have not even mentioned the bias in any of the sources used in pro-american posts. Even at the end of this very post to which I'm responding you start some sarcastic diatribe about Sachs of which there's no equivalent for other academics. It is undeniable that you're claiming something of Sachs that you are not claiming of more pro-american academics — Isaac

I have singled out Sachs because he was presented as supposedly 'independent' witness of the events. This is simply not true, given his visible bias towards blaming the US for everything, not only as far as Ukraine is concerned. And it turned out that I was right - his reporting was inaccurate, as Bennett did not say what he claimed he did.

Of course he does. He's talking about Russian security in international affairs. His whole argument is about how they have something to fear from NATO and the larger players. A little popular unrest in a neighbouring country is clearly not that. again, you might disagree, but there's no need to disparage him. It smacks of a lack of confidence in your own ideas that you can't just disagree, you have to impute dishonesty into anyone with a different opinion. — Isaac

I have already explained why I considered this to be dishonest: the US did not instigate the protests and had minimal influence on the course of the events. It is the disproportion of causes that makes the argument dishonest: had he described the actual scale of the protests, his argument would be extremely weak. And it is a bit peculiar to describe Euromaidan as a 'little unrest' - are you even familiar with the events?

What do mean "a reader who does not know any better"? A reader who doesn't know that other possible causes exist? Is Sachs's article making an appearance in the country's playgroups? Who, above the age of five, is going to be reading that article thinking that no other possible causes could even exist? — Isaac

A reader who is not familiar with the disproportion of the causes might get the impression that the US scheming was a major factor, therefore the cause of the Russian reaction. A reader familiar with the proportions of the causes would find the theory rather unlikely. That is why omitting the major factor and focusing on the minor one is intellectually dishonest, it presents a skewed perspective of the events.

And again, you're requiring a standard of these sources that you do not demand of the pro-american ones. You've not raised any issues throughout your involvement in this thread with any of the sources others have to to promote the American position, despite the fact that none of these sources spend any time pointing out all the potential counter-evidence to their positions either. — Isaac

No, I do not demand anything, in fact, I have already conceded that other sources might be equally biased. I was pointing out that Sachs is visibly biased so we should be cautious treating him as an 'independent' reporter of the negotiations. That is all that I wrote and I stand by that.

Try reading what I wrote and then have another shot at responding. — Isaac

You answered 'No' to my question whether Arestovych is better informed on the issues than Sachs. Is there more than one way to read that?

No it isn't. — Isaac

So explain how 'NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war' is different than 'NATO enlargement is at the center of this war' AND 'the war could have been avoided'.

The interview asks him "So, on balance, which is better" (referring to the NATO-provoked war or Russian takeover - the "crossroads"), and he answers "of course, a big war with Russia". — Isaac

But you wrote 'Arestovych pretty much lists them'. So, actually, he pretty much does not list them?

On what grounds would that answer possibly make sense if both options were "a big war with Russia"? — Isaac

Well, ACTUALLY he says: 'a big war with Russia and joining NATO after victory with Russia', so it makes perfect sense that the alternative he would not prefer would be a war with Russia and Russian takeover.

Don't be daft. I don't pretend people never said all the things I don't directly quote them as saying. — Isaac

Why not, if you are? The bottom line is that he did quote him out of context, even if he provided the link.

So? What kind of bizarre argument is that. If it's a reason in 2022 it has to have been one in 2014? That doesn't make any sense. Sachs explains the rising importance of NATO enlargement. — Isaac

No, it does not have to be, but it significantly weakens the argument. As you might remember, I wrote:

Russia has invaded Crimea unprovoked, breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and the Budapest Memorandum (which Sachs, conveniently, of course does not mention). It had also nothing to do with NATO.

to which you have responded:

Now you're getting ridiculous. 'Unprovoked' and 'nothing to do with' are the very questions at hand. As I've mentioned before bias doesn't mean 'disagrees with me'.

However, Sachs from 2014 partially agrees with me: the invasion of Crimea had nothing to do with NATO, he also stresses the importance of the Budapest Memorandum. He believes, of course, that it was 'provoked', but gives completely different reasons. That weakens his argument significantly. I must remind you that he wrote specifically:

The shooting war in Ukraine began with Yanukovych’s overthrow nine years ago, not in February 2022

So this war, which, by Sachs' own words, continues from 2014, was not provoked by NATO expansion, because Sachs' article from 2014 about the causes of Russian invasion does not even mention it. Correct?

I would agree that an 'object' is a mental construct. I believe that mereological universalism is too vulnerable to a host of problems (Theseus/persistency/sorites/identity etc.) to be held reasonably. What we pick out are regularities in the underlying physical substrate by way of their sufficient differences from other regularities.

Excellent. We're getting into the meat of it. ↪wonderer1
I'll try not to disappoint. In what way is it a flaw? Your claim is that Sachs is biased, right? Presumably not randomly biased, but rather biased according to his cultural group ideology etc. So we've established that it is possible for academics to be biased and when they are it's likely to be ideological. So what have the three hundred academics done with their data that makes them more likely to be right, just because there are three hundred of them? Three hundred and one pairs of eyes have seen the raw data. Three hundred and one ideologically biased brains have processed it. And three hundred have come out one way, one the other. What how does their three-hundred-ness connect to the way the world really is such that they are more likely to right by virtue of being three hundred. — Isaac

So we should assume that all those academics, including Sachs, are biased? OK, that is all that I have claimed.

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility. — Isaac

No, of course not, that is logically incorrect, which I have already pointed out. If there were two factors present (unrest and foreign intervention), ANY of those factors could be the sole cause (as well as their combination). It could be both, it could be just the intervention, it could be just the unrest (i.e. without the foreign intervention Russia might as well react). For his theory to work he would have to explain why he believes Russia would NOT intervene if it was just the unrest. But he has no such explanation, that is why he conveniently omits the other factor.

He's not even assessing the relative causes. He's demonstrating that foreign interference was one of them. — Isaac

No, he is not. All he does is he demonstrates that foreign interference might be one of them, as he has no way to conclude that Russians would not intervene without it, just as a reaction to the unrest. Foreign intervention might be a cause, but it did not have to be. Omitting the other factor allows him to argue the causal link, especially before a reader who does not know any better.

Not really, no. He'll have a very specific window. But that's not the point. He's a political advisor. He's going to be very, very biased. It's literally his job. — Isaac

A political advisor and an intelligence officer who spent most of his professional life on Ukrainian issues is worse informed on the issues of Ukrainian and Russian politics than Sachs, who occasionally dabbles in it? Now you are just being absurd.

It doesn't change anything. Sachs provided it in support of the argument that people knew NATO involvement would lead to war, and it demonstrates that without any change in meaning. That is exactly what Arestovych meant by it. You seem to be having great trouble with the notion of providing support related the points being made in an argument. Have you ever written a thesis? — Isaac

No, Sachs' argument is that NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war. If both NATO involvement and NATO non-involvement led to war, then his argument would be pretty meaningless. That is the point you are seemingly missing. Have you ever had a course in logic?

Coups, election interference, propaganda, territorial grabs (such as Crimea), stoking insurrection. Arestovych pretty much lists them. — Isaac

He lists them in the linked interview? At which point? And why think that Ukrainians would fall for any of that? The very point he is making is that the mistake of Crimea would not be repeated, which is exactly what happened.

That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that he was "pretending he never said it". Providing the link in which he said it, is not pretending he never said it. — Isaac

Ignoring it in his argumentation is 'pretending he never said it'.

Then why are you suggesting we dismiss Sachs? — Isaac

I am not. I was pointing out to Tzeentch that describing him as 'independent people' giving an account of negotiations (rather inaccurately, it turned out), is rather misleading, given his bias.

Amusingly, in his article from 2014, he naturally blames the Russian annexation of Crimea on the US and the West in general... However, the reasons cited are completely different: violations of international law in Serbia, Lybia, Syria and Afghanistan. Let that sink in: in 2014 Jeffrey Sachs did not even mention expansion of NATO as a cause for Russian annexation of Crimea. Coincidentally, Russians did not mention it at that time either, it became an issue some time later (when Ukraine actively sought the membership, according to the resolution of its parliament). But it must be just a coincident, a renown scholar would not be parroting Kreml's propaganda... would he?