Your arguments from authority have a certain flaw: Sachs is a respected academic, but only a tiny minority of foreign policy experts agree with him on this issue. — Jabberwock

Excellent. We're getting into the meat of it. I'll try not to disappoint. In what way is it a flaw? Your claim is that Sachs is biased, right? Presumably not randomly biased, but rather biased according to his cultural group ideology etc. So we've established that it is possible for academics to be biased and when they are it's likely to be ideological. So what have the three hundred academics done with their data that makes them more likely to be right, just because there are three hundred of them? Three hundred and one pairs of eyes have seen the raw data. Three hundred and one ideologically biased brains have processed it. And three hundred have come out one way, one the other. What how does their three-hundred-ness connect to the way the world really is such that they are more likely to right by virtue of being three hundred.

Surely they're more likely to be simply in a more popular ideology. Looked at the popular way, the facts seem like this, looked at the less popular way, the facts seem like that. Popularity of ideology doesn't seem to have any hook into reality to make the more popular theory more likely to be right.

If the 99% of cause of the overthrow is the popular rising and 1% is US scheming, then considering the 99% is irrelevant is not just a matter of opinion. — Jabberwock

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility.

presenting a minor factor and describing it as a cause while omitting a major factor which might also be a cause is biased. — Jabberwock

He's not even assessing the relative causes. He's demonstrating that foreign interference was one of them.

you have to admit that Arestovych is much better informed in the matters than Sachs, the economist, right? — Jabberwock

Not really, no. He'll have a very specific window. But that's not the point. He's a political advisor. He's going to be very, very biased. It's literally his job.

providing a quote that completely changes the meaning of what he said is something different. — Jabberwock

It doesn't change anything. Sachs provided it in support of the argument that people knew NATO involvement would lead to war, and it demonstrates that without any change in meaning. That is exactly what Arestovych meant by it. You seem to be having great trouble with the notion of providing support related the points being made in an argument. Have you ever written a thesis?

And what else do you imagine the 'takeover' to be — Jabberwock

Coups, election interference, propaganda, territorial grabs (such as Crimea), stoking insurrection. Arestovych pretty much lists them.

The fact that he provided the link does not change the fact that he selected a part of a quote so that it distorts its meaning to support his view which would not be supported by the whole quote. — Jabberwock

That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that he was "pretending he never said it". Providing the link in which he said it, is not pretending he never said it.

I try to get information from various, possibly opposing sources, which are likely to present different facts. — Jabberwock

Then why are you suggesting we dismiss Sachs?

I don't claim any expertise on the thread topic, but is there a reason to think that the 'wisdom of crowds' doesn't merit serious consideration here?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom_of_the_crowd

The wisdom of the crowd is the collective opinion of a diverse independent group of individuals rather than that of a single expert. This process, while not new to the Information Age, has been pushed into the mainstream spotlight by social information sites such as Quora, Reddit, Stack Exchange, Wikipedia, Yahoo! Answers, and other web resources which rely on collective human knowledge.[1] An explanation for this phenomenon is that there is idiosyncratic noise associated with each individual judgment, and taking the average over a large number of responses will go some way toward canceling the effect of this noise.[2]

Excellent. We're getting into the meat of it. ↪wonderer1
I'll try not to disappoint. In what way is it a flaw? Your claim is that Sachs is biased, right? Presumably not randomly biased, but rather biased according to his cultural group ideology etc. So we've established that it is possible for academics to be biased and when they are it's likely to be ideological. So what have the three hundred academics done with their data that makes them more likely to be right, just because there are three hundred of them? Three hundred and one pairs of eyes have seen the raw data. Three hundred and one ideologically biased brains have processed it. And three hundred have come out one way, one the other. What how does their three-hundred-ness connect to the way the world really is such that they are more likely to right by virtue of being three hundred. — Isaac

So we should assume that all those academics, including Sachs, are biased? OK, that is all that I have claimed.

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility. — Isaac

No, of course not, that is logically incorrect, which I have already pointed out. If there were two factors present (unrest and foreign intervention), ANY of those factors could be the sole cause (as well as their combination). It could be both, it could be just the intervention, it could be just the unrest (i.e. without the foreign intervention Russia might as well react). For his theory to work he would have to explain why he believes Russia would NOT intervene if it was just the unrest. But he has no such explanation, that is why he conveniently omits the other factor.

He's not even assessing the relative causes. He's demonstrating that foreign interference was one of them. — Isaac

No, he is not. All he does is he demonstrates that foreign interference might be one of them, as he has no way to conclude that Russians would not intervene without it, just as a reaction to the unrest. Foreign intervention might be a cause, but it did not have to be. Omitting the other factor allows him to argue the causal link, especially before a reader who does not know any better.

Not really, no. He'll have a very specific window. But that's not the point. He's a political advisor. He's going to be very, very biased. It's literally his job. — Isaac

A political advisor and an intelligence officer who spent most of his professional life on Ukrainian issues is worse informed on the issues of Ukrainian and Russian politics than Sachs, who occasionally dabbles in it? Now you are just being absurd.

It doesn't change anything. Sachs provided it in support of the argument that people knew NATO involvement would lead to war, and it demonstrates that without any change in meaning. That is exactly what Arestovych meant by it. You seem to be having great trouble with the notion of providing support related the points being made in an argument. Have you ever written a thesis? — Isaac

No, Sachs' argument is that NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war. If both NATO involvement and NATO non-involvement led to war, then his argument would be pretty meaningless. That is the point you are seemingly missing. Have you ever had a course in logic?

Coups, election interference, propaganda, territorial grabs (such as Crimea), stoking insurrection. Arestovych pretty much lists them. — Isaac

He lists them in the linked interview? At which point? And why think that Ukrainians would fall for any of that? The very point he is making is that the mistake of Crimea would not be repeated, which is exactly what happened.

That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that he was "pretending he never said it". Providing the link in which he said it, is not pretending he never said it. — Isaac

Ignoring it in his argumentation is 'pretending he never said it'.

Then why are you suggesting we dismiss Sachs? — Isaac

I am not. I was pointing out to Tzeentch that describing him as 'independent people' giving an account of negotiations (rather inaccurately, it turned out), is rather misleading, given his bias.

Amusingly, in his article from 2014, he naturally blames the Russian annexation of Crimea on the US and the West in general... However, the reasons cited are completely different: violations of international law in Serbia, Lybia, Syria and Afghanistan. Let that sink in: in 2014 Jeffrey Sachs did not even mention expansion of NATO as a cause for Russian annexation of Crimea. Coincidentally, Russians did not mention it at that time either, it became an issue some time later (when Ukraine actively sought the membership, according to the resolution of its parliament). But it must be just a coincident, a renown scholar would not be parroting Kreml's propaganda... would he?

Will be interesting to see, but I guess only time will tell:

Opinion: With their leader still missing, who will control Wagner forces in Africa?
^{— Joyce M Davis · CNN · Jul 18, 2023}

Wagner mercs have reportedly (AP, BBC) camped up in Belarus, maybe in the range of 600 so far.

Their forces in Africa can't quite become Russian army just like that, at least I don't think they can, yet the Kremlin likely wants to maintain that presence.

Either way, they'll be wanting a fat paycheck.

is there a reason to think that the 'wisdom of crowds' doesn't merit serious consideration here? — wonderer1

I've some sympathy with the idea, but here's my few issues with it;

Firstly, it assumes errors are the result of noise and I don't buy that in general. errors are the result, largely, of methodological failings which themselves are the result of foundational commitments, paradigms, which don't work. Usually, the stats simply churn out the answer, we don't exactly 'do the math' ourselves, so if the answer's wrong, it's the experimental design that's mistaken. In short, failings are usually ideological or paradigmatic.

Secondly, I think it assumes calculation is random - ie set 100 people calculating the answer and they'll all get it right bar the noise of error. But this isn't how expertise works. The reason we consult experts is that some people are better than others at some field of calculation (better informed, more insightful, whatever). So it's simply an outcome of this that the majority will be more likely minorly wrong. They sit in the middle of the Gaussian distribution. It's the minority who'll be either spectacularly wrong, or have it uniquely right (either being at the worst end - just about good enough to qualify) or the best end (genius in their field).

Thirdly, it ignores the countering effect of conformity bias. You'll be aware perhaps of Asch (and his detractors), who first demonstrated the effects of conformity on answer confidence. Whether it be social group pressures, or simple economic ones (job prospects), people are less likely to stick their necks out on a result which looks heterodox than they are to underplay radical differences in exchange for the safety in numbers of saying the same thing most others are.

So. To bring this back to topic (though the broader subject is way more interesting). Consider the responses here to pro-american posts. Pretty much universally accepted as the 'intelligent, balanced and steady' position to hold. Why? Because everyone else holds it. It's self-fulfilling in that sense. To hold an alternative is to be radical, naive (and other far less pleasant labels). So if you're an expert and you've had a good long think about all the data you have, and it comes out (as data usually does) somewhat on the fence, which way are you going to be more inclined to jump? Which way keeps you your job, the respect of your colleagues? All ambiguity is going to be resolved in favour of positions which conform and that adds up over time to a pretty much entrenched conformist and very popular position.

Add to that the effect of media and institutional bias, both of which are heavily influenced (if not completely controlled) by economic forces which have no particular interest in the 'right' answer, but do have a strong interest in the answer which best serves their interests. No one here has conducted a poll of all foreign policy experts. We gauge popular support by what we read and what we read is controlled by institutions who have a vested interest in a particular viewpoint seeming most popular.

So we should assume that all those academics, including Sachs, are biased? OK, that is all that I have claimed. — Jabberwock

I clearly isn't, and anyone can read the evidence to that effect. You've singled out Sachs as being biased because he doesn't support your preferred narrative and have not even mentioned the bias in any of the sources used in pro-american posts. Even at the end of this very post to which I'm responding you start some sarcastic diatribe about Sachs of which there's no equivalent for other academics. It is undeniable that you're claiming something of Sachs that you are not claiming of more pro-american academics

For his theory to work he would have to explain why he believes Russia would NOT intervene if it was just the unrest. But he has no such explanation — Jabberwock

Of course he does. He's talking about Russian security in international affairs. His whole argument is about how they have something to fear from NATO and the larger players. A little popular unrest in a neighbouring country is clearly not that. Again, you might disagree, but there's no need to disparage him. It smacks of a lack of confidence in your own ideas that you can't just disagree, you have to impute dishonesty into anyone with a different opinion.

All he does is he demonstrates that foreign interference might be one of them, as he has no way to conclude that Russians would not intervene without it, just as a reaction to the unrest. — Jabberwock

Of course not. Do your preferred authorities have more than 'might be'? These are theories of international politics. They're not amenable to that level of proof. Sachs is working on the very reasonable and well established principle that global powers are more concerned about the intervention of others massive global powers than they are about a bit of political unrest next door.

Does he prove that? No. Does anyone prove the opposite? Also no.

Omitting the other factor allows him to argue the causal link, especially before a reader who does not know any better. — Jabberwock

What do mean "a reader who does not know any better"? A reader who doesn't know that other possible causes exist? Is Sachs's article making an appearance in the country's playgroups? Who, above the age of five, is going to be reading that article thinking that no other possible causes could even exist?

And again, you're requiring a standard of these sources that you do not demand of the pro-american ones. You've not raised any issues throughout your involvement in this thread with any of the sources others have used to promote the American position, despite the fact that none of these sources spend any time pointing out all the potential counter-evidence to their positions either.

A political advisor and an intelligence officer who spent most of his professional life on Ukrainian issues is worse informed on the issues of Ukrainian and Russian politics than Sachs, who occasionally dabbles in it? Now you are just being absurd. — Jabberwock

Try reading what I wrote and then have another shot at responding.

Sachs' argument is that NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war. — Jabberwock

No it isn't.

Regarding the Ukraine War, the Biden administration has repeatedly and falsely claimed that the Ukraine War started with an unprovoked attack by Russia on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In fact, the war was provoked by the U.S. in ways that leading U.S. diplomats anticipated for decades in the lead-up to the war, meaning that the war could have been avoided and should now be stopped through negotiations.

Read more carefully before launching into ad hominem denunciation.

He lists them in the linked interview? At which point? And why think that Ukrainians would fall for any of that? The very point he is making is that the mistake of Crimea would not be repeated, which is exactly what happened. — Jabberwock

The interviewer asks him "So, on balance, which is better" (referring to the NATO-provoked war or Russian takeover - the "crossroads"), and he answers "of course, a big war with Russia".

On what grounds could that answer possibly make sense if both options were "a big war with Russia"? He treats " a big war with Russia " as only one of the options, the 'preferable' one.

Ignoring it in his argumentation is 'pretending he never said it'. — Jabberwock

Don't be daft. I don't pretend people never said all the things I don't directly quote them as saying. Your post contains selected quotes from mine. Are you pretending I never said all the rest?

in 2014 Jeffrey Sachs did not even mention expansion of NATO as a cause for Russian annexation of Crimea. — Jabberwock

So? What kind of bizarre argument is that. "If it's a reason in 2022 it has to have been one in 2014"? That doesn't make any sense. Sachs explains the rising importance of NATO enlargement.

In the immediate lead-up to Russia’s invasion, NATO enlargement was center stage. Putin’s draft US-Russia Treaty (December 17, 2021) called for a halt to NATO enlargement. Russia’s leaders put NATO enlargement as the cause of war in Russia’s National Security Council meeting on February 21, 2022.

I clearly isn't and anyone can read the evidence to that effect. You've singled out Sachs as being biased because he doesn't support your preferred narrative and have not even mentioned the bias in any of the sources used in pro-american posts. Even at the end of this very post to which I'm responding you start some sarcastic diatribe about Sachs of which there's no equivalent for other academics. It is undeniable that you're claiming something of Sachs that you are not claiming of more pro-american academics — Isaac

I have singled out Sachs because he was presented as supposedly 'independent' witness of the events. This is simply not true, given his visible bias towards blaming the US for everything, not only as far as Ukraine is concerned. And it turned out that I was right - his reporting was inaccurate, as Bennett did not say what he claimed he did.

Of course he does. He's talking about Russian security in international affairs. His whole argument is about how they have something to fear from NATO and the larger players. A little popular unrest in a neighbouring country is clearly not that. again, you might disagree, but there's no need to disparage him. It smacks of a lack of confidence in your own ideas that you can't just disagree, you have to impute dishonesty into anyone with a different opinion. — Isaac

I have already explained why I considered this to be dishonest: the US did not instigate the protests and had minimal influence on the course of the events. It is the disproportion of causes that makes the argument dishonest: had he described the actual scale of the protests, his argument would be extremely weak. And it is a bit peculiar to describe Euromaidan as a 'little unrest' - are you even familiar with the events?

What do mean "a reader who does not know any better"? A reader who doesn't know that other possible causes exist? Is Sachs's article making an appearance in the country's playgroups? Who, above the age of five, is going to be reading that article thinking that no other possible causes could even exist? — Isaac

A reader who is not familiar with the disproportion of the causes might get the impression that the US scheming was a major factor, therefore the cause of the Russian reaction. A reader familiar with the proportions of the causes would find the theory rather unlikely. That is why omitting the major factor and focusing on the minor one is intellectually dishonest, it presents a skewed perspective of the events.

And again, you're requiring a standard of these sources that you do not demand of the pro-american ones. You've not raised any issues throughout your involvement in this thread with any of the sources others have to to promote the American position, despite the fact that none of these sources spend any time pointing out all the potential counter-evidence to their positions either. — Isaac

No, I do not demand anything, in fact, I have already conceded that other sources might be equally biased. I was pointing out that Sachs is visibly biased so we should be cautious treating him as an 'independent' reporter of the negotiations. That is all that I wrote and I stand by that.

Try reading what I wrote and then have another shot at responding. — Isaac

You answered 'No' to my question whether Arestovych is better informed on the issues than Sachs. Is there more than one way to read that?

No it isn't. — Isaac

So explain how 'NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war' is different than 'NATO enlargement is at the center of this war' AND 'the war could have been avoided'.

The interview asks him "So, on balance, which is better" (referring to the NATO-provoked war or Russian takeover - the "crossroads"), and he answers "of course, a big war with Russia". — Isaac

But you wrote 'Arestovych pretty much lists them'. So, actually, he pretty much does not list them?

On what grounds would that answer possibly make sense if both options were "a big war with Russia"? — Isaac

Well, ACTUALLY he says: 'a big war with Russia and joining NATO after victory with Russia', so it makes perfect sense that the alternative he would not prefer would be a war with Russia and Russian takeover.

Don't be daft. I don't pretend people never said all the things I don't directly quote them as saying. — Isaac

Why not, if you are? The bottom line is that he did quote him out of context, even if he provided the link.

So? What kind of bizarre argument is that. If it's a reason in 2022 it has to have been one in 2014? That doesn't make any sense. Sachs explains the rising importance of NATO enlargement. — Isaac

No, it does not have to be, but it significantly weakens the argument. As you might remember, I wrote:

Russia has invaded Crimea unprovoked, breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and the Budapest Memorandum (which Sachs, conveniently, of course does not mention). It had also nothing to do with NATO.

to which you have responded:

Now you're getting ridiculous. 'Unprovoked' and 'nothing to do with' are the very questions at hand. As I've mentioned before bias doesn't mean 'disagrees with me'.

However, Sachs from 2014 partially agrees with me: the invasion of Crimea had nothing to do with NATO, he also stresses the importance of the Budapest Memorandum. He believes, of course, that it was 'provoked', but gives completely different reasons. That weakens his argument significantly. I must remind you that he wrote specifically:

The shooting war in Ukraine began with Yanukovych’s overthrow nine years ago, not in February 2022

So this war, which, by Sachs' own words, continues from 2014, was not provoked by NATO expansion, because Sachs' article from 2014 about the causes of Russian invasion does not even mention it. Correct?

I have singled out Sachs because he was presented as supposedly 'independent' witness of the events. — Jabberwock

He is independent. He represents neither Ukraine, nor Russia, nor America. 'Independent' doesn't mean 'not having an opinion one way or the other'.

his reporting was inaccurate, as Bennett did not say what he claimed he did. — Jabberwock

Yes he did. @Tzeentch has already corrected you on that.

had he described the actual scale of the protests, his argument would be extremely weak. — Jabberwock

His argument is that foreign agencies got involved. It would only be weakened if foreign agencies hadn't got involved. His argument is not about proportion.

A reader who is not familiar with the disproportion of the causes might get the impression that the US scheming was a major factor, therefore the cause of the Russian reaction. — Jabberwock

I don't think Sachs can be held accountable for the stupidity of some potential readers. The argument is not about proportion, never even mentions proportion and does not rely on it. If people are stupid enough to nonetheless think proportion has anything to do with it, I don't see why that's Sachs's problem.

I have already conceded that other sources might be equally biased. — Jabberwock

Yes. After you were pressed to. You volunteered Sachs's bias. That is, you are biased in which sources you voluntarily point out the bias of.

You answered 'No' to my question whether Arestovych is better informed on the issues than Sachs. Is there more than one way to read that? — Jabberwock

Yes. By continuing to read the rest of the paragraph. This from the person complaining about taking quotes out of context. Stop pretending I didn't say anything else!

So explain how 'NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war' is different than 'NATO enlargement is at the center of this war' AND 'the war could have been avoided'. — Jabberwock

I bolded the words, I'm not sure what more I can do. If you can't understand the difference between this war and any war, I think it'll take more than a forum post to help out.

Well, ACTUALLY he says: 'a big war with Russia and joining NATO after victory with Russia', so it makes perfect sense that the alternative he would not prefer would be a war with Russia and Russian takeover. — Jabberwock

Yeah, right. And in what way does that interpretation makes sense? What is the difference between the two scenarios in that sense?

Why not, if you are? — Jabberwock

So you can read minds now?

The bottom line is that he did quote him out of context — Jabberwock

...in your opinion. Sach's obviously thought the context was fine. It was to support the proposition that Ukrainian leaders knew NATO membership would provoke Russia into war and the quote supports that. What else he said is irrelevant to supporting that proposition. We don't, in adding quotes, typically list all the other things people said that might be of interest.

So this war, which, by Sachs' own words, continues from 2014, was not provoked by NATO expansion, because Sachs' article from 2014 about the causes of Russian invasion does not even mention it. Correct? — Jabberwock

No. 'This war', and 'the occupation of Crimea' are two different things. At best one is a stage within the other. Also Sach's 2014 article is not really about causes, but rather lamenting the breakdown of international law. In it he says...

Without diminishing the seriousness of Russia’s recent actions, we should note that they come in the context of repeated violations of international law by the US, the EU, and NATO.

...

The US and its allies have also launched a series of military interventions in recent years in contravention of the United Nations Charter and without the support of the UN Security Council. The USNled NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 lacked the sanction of international law, and occurred despite the strong objections of Russia, a Serbian ally. Kosovo’s subsequent declaration of independence from Serbia, recognized by the US and most EU members, is a precedent that Russia eagerly cites for its actions in Crimea

...

There have long been skeptics of international law – those who believe that it can never prevail over the national interests of major powers, and that maintaining a balance of power among competitors is all that really can be done to keep the peace. From this perspective, Russia’s actions in the Crimea are simply the actions of a great power asserting its prerogatives.

This is his only allusion to causes at all, and it clearly states that Russia acted because of a perceived need to keep in great powers in balance. It certainly doesn't contradict anything he says in the later article.

Can we rename this thread '@Isaac-@Jabberwock Crisis'?

Feel free to chime in. What is your analysis of Sach's argument in the article being discussed?

He is independent. He represents neither Ukraine, nor Russia, nor America. 'Independent' doesn't mean 'not having an opinion one way or the other'. — Isaac

Sure, he is independent and biased.

Yes he did. Tzeentch has already corrected you on that. — Isaac

Lol. No, he did not.

His argument is that foreign agencies got involved. It would only be weakened if foreign agencies hadn't got involved. His argument is not about proportion. — Isaac

Don't be daft. Of course the foreign interference would have to be significant to name it as the cause of Russian reaction. It was not.

I don't think Sachs can be held accountable for the stupidity of some potential readers. The argument is not about proportion, never even mentions proportion and does not rely on it. If people are stupid enough to nonetheless think proportion has anything to do with it, I don't see why that's Sachs's problem. — Isaac

The argument is about causality. The US involvement, while present, was negligible, so it is very unlikely to cause the Russian reaction. Readers who know no better (like those who are under impression that Euromaidan was a 'little unrest') would put much more weight to his argument due to that omission.

Yes. After you were pressed to. You volunteered Sachs's bias. That is you are biased in which sources you voluntarily point out the bias of. — Isaac

Yes, of course I am biased! Guilty as charged. Your desperate attemps at tu-quoqing the argument are quite amusing, I must say.

Yes. By continuing to read the rest of the paragraph. This from the person complaining about taking quotes out of context. Stop pretending I didn't say anything else! — Isaac

Sorry for that. Do we agree then that Arestovych is better informed on Ukrainian issues than Sachs?

I bolded the words, I'm not sure what more I can do. If you can't understand the difference between this war and any war, I think it'll take more than a forum post to help out. — Isaac

If you insist that Sachs' argument was that this war could be avoided by precipitating another one, so be it. I am not sure he would agree, though.

Yeah, right. And in what way does that interpretation makes sense? What is the difference between the two scenarios in that sense? — Isaac

Is that a serious question? Well, the described outcomes would be somewhat different.

...in your opinion. Sach's obviously thought the context was fine. It was to support the proposition that Ukrainian leaders knew NATO membership would provoke Russia into war and the quite supports that. What else he said is irrelevant to supporting that proposition. We don't, in adding quotes, typically list all the other things people said that might be of interest. — Isaac

Sure, if we accept your view that Sachs in his argument by saying 'preventing this war' means 'preventing this particular war, even if it leads to a different one'. I would say that view is peculiar, but it is my opinion.

No. 'This war', and 'the occupation of Crimea' are two different things. At best one is a stage within the other. — Isaac

That might be your opinion, but we are talking about Sachs' view. And he states it explicitly: THIS war started with the Yanukovych overthow, NOT in 2022, so the occupation of Crimea is part of the same conflict. The NATO expansion could not be the cause of the 2022 war, because the war DID NOT START THEN, according to Sachs. But it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. So which war was the expansion of NATO cause of, according to Sachs?

Yeah, sorry. I will try to wrap it up.

Sure, he is independent and biased. — Jabberwock

So @Tzeentch was not wrong to call him 'independent' then. And your labelling him as 'biased' was not an act of dispassionate information-sharing, but one of partisan rhetoric. Rather than addressing the arguments, you just smear the source.

Yes he did. Tzeentch has already corrected you on that. — Isaac


Lol. No, he did not. — Jabberwock

Here

He said that Bennet said that the US stopped it, which is not what Bennett said. — Jabberwock


It's exactly what he said:

Naftali Bennett: Everything I did was coordinated down to the last detail, with the US, Germany and France.

Interviewer: So they blocked it?

Naftali Bennett: Basically, yes. They blocked it, and I thought they were wrong. — Tzeentch

I've underlined the relevant words. "They blocked it (they including the US)", "Yes"

Of course the foreign interference would have to be significant to name it as the cause of Russian reaction. It was not. — Jabberwock

Now you're claiming 'significance' as fact. There is no fact of the matter as to how 'significant' the interference was. Expert opinion varies. Disagreeing with you is not bias.

The US involvement, while present, was negligible, so it is very unlikely to cause the Russian reaction. — Jabberwock

Again. Sachs disagrees. Disagreement is not bias.

of course I am biased! Guilty as charged. — Jabberwock

Right. so the more interesting question which we should have been discussing from the start is "why?". Given two competing narratives, why are you biased in favour of one? What is it that appeals to you about it?

And please don't start the whole charade again about it being the more accurate, or you having carried out some 4D-chess-level analysis of the data... You've read some articles and decided to trust one side. I'm genuinely interested in why.

Do we agree then that Arestovych is better informed on Ukrainian issues than Sachs? — Jabberwock

Yes, within that frame (not necessarily about Russia's intentions, for example, he has no more a read on Putin than Sachs does). My point was that what he knows and what he says are going to be two different things because it's his job to present the facts in a way that promotes Ukraine (particularity his political movement within it). He may know a lot, but what we have is the subset of all he knows which he chooses to say.

it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. — Jabberwock

I've just been through that. The article wasn't about the causes at all and where he does allude to them he talks about NATO's actions in Kosovo and Libya, how Russia cited them as reasons for it's actions in Crimea, and the talks about Russia's goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. All of that is completely consistent with the idea the NATO expansion (increase in it's power in the region) motivated Russian actions. Sachs may have changed his mind, it's possible, but if so, this article doesn't show it.

Also...

Jeffrey Sachs from the very beginning of the conflict blamed it on the US and claimed that the only reason for the war is the NATO expansion. — Jabberwock

it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. So which war was the expansion of NATO cause of, according to Sachs? — Jabberwock

Damned if he does, damned if he doesn't...

"Have a consistent theory throughout? Obvious sign of bias - proves he's wedded to one ideological position"

"Have an inconsistent position over time? Obvious sign of bias - proves he changes his views to suit his ideological position"

Is anything not a sign of bias for you?

So Tzeentch was not wrong to call him 'independent' then. And your labelling him as 'biased' was not an act of dispassionate information-sharing, but one of partisan rhetoric. Rather than addressing the arguments, you just smear the source. — Isaac

Again, I was pointing out that his reporting might be biased, and I was write.

I've underlined the relevant words. "They blocked it (they including the US)", "Yes" — Isaac

Lol. That is exactly biased reporting: Bennett says it is what a joint decision of the Western countries and Sachs reports it as 'The US did it'. It significantly changes the meaning of what he said.

Now you're claiming 'significance' as fact. There is no fact of the matter as to how 'significant' the interference was. Expert opinion varies. Disagreeing with you is not bias. — Isaac

Yes, there is a fact of the matter as to how significant the interference was, as anyone familiar with the events is aware of.

Right. so the more interesting question which we should have been discussing from the start is "why?". Given two competing narratives, why are you biased in favour of one? What is it that appeals to you about it?

And please don't start the whole charade again about it being the more accurate, or you having carried out some 4-d chess-level analysis of the data... You've read som articles and decided to trust one side. I'm genuinely interested in why. — Isaac

Because people are biased in general and the views they hold tend to sway their perception of other information they acquire. We tend to confirm our views rather than challenge them. It takes much more arguments to change one's view than to confirm it.

Yes, within that frame (not necessarily about Russia's intentions, for example, he has no more a read on Putin than Sachs does). My poitn was that whet he knows and what he says are going to be two different things because it's his job to present the facts in a way that promotes Ukraine (particularity his political movement within it). He may know a lot, but what we have is the subset of all he knows which he chooses to say. — Isaac

Of course, I do not question his partisanship. However, I would still put more weight on his expertise as opposed to Sachs.

I've just been through that. The article wasn't about the causes at all and where he does allude to them he talks about NATO's actions in Kosovo and Lybia, how Russia cited them as reasons for it's actions in Crimea, and the talks about Russia's goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. All of the is completely consistent with the idea the NATO expansion (increase in it's power in the region) motivated Russian actions. Sachs may have changed his mind, it's possible, but this article doesn't show it. — Isaac

The article lists many transgressions of the US which might have influenced Russia's decision of the invasion. It would be inexplicable to omit it, if Sachs thought then that NATO expansion was the central one of such transgressions.

As it seems this discussion goes on without a particular direction, I propose you respond and then we let others dicuss the actual topic of the thread.

I was pointing out that his reporting might be biased, and I was write. — Jabberwock

Whether you were right or not is the matter under discussion, it can't be brought in as evidence for the case.

Bennett says it is what a joint decision of the Western countries and Sachs reports it as 'The US did it'. It significantly changes the meaning of what he said. — Jabberwock

It does. It uses him as a source in an argument. I don't understand what you're finding so difficult about this concept of using what people say as support for arguments. I think you've got the whole concept confused. Quotes are not used in the vein of '...and so-and-so agrees with my thesis', they are used to provide support to particular aspects despite the possibility that the person cited might disagree with the final thesis. Sachs's thesis is that the US blocked the peace talks. Bennett's quote supports that thesis by naming the US as one of the parties he recognised as doing so. The whole thesis is not carried by that support, one needs to include also concepts about US influence over Europe, the particular relationships regarding this issue, the balance of leverage in those negotiations. But a clear witness that the party you accuse did indeed do what you claim is good support for your thesis. It's not bias to include it and it's not bias to omit other things that source might also believe.

there is a fact of the matter as to how significant the interference was, as anyone familiar with the events is aware of. — Jabberwock

Sachs is familiar with the events and doesn't think so. So that disproves your theory right of the box. A lot of your arguments purporting to show Sachs is biased rely on you already believing Sachs is biased. This one is a case in point.

"Sachs is biased, he overplays the significance of the US involvement in Euromaidan"
"How so"
"Well everyone knows the involvement was only minor"
"Sachs disagrees"
"Yes, but Sachs is biased"
> return to the start

people are biased in general and the views they hold tend to sway their perception of other information they acquire. We tend to confirm our views rather than challenge them. It takes much more arguments to change one's view than to confirm it. — Jabberwock

I was asking about why you made your choice. Why the pro-American side?

I do not question his partisanship. However, I would still put more weight on his expertise as opposed to Sachs. — Jabberwock

Why? You've just admitted he's partisan. Why would you put more weight on the words of someone you admit is partisan? You said...

having particularly strong views on the issue might influence his account, — Jabberwock

... does that not apply to Arestovych? Why not advocate the same degree of caution?

The article lists many transgressions of the US which might have influenced Russia's decision of the invasion. It would be inexplicable to omit it, if Sachs thought then that NATO expansion was the central one of such transgressions. — Jabberwock

He didn't omit it, but the article was about International Law. It's right there in the title "Ukraine and the Crisis of International Law". So why would he list transgressions that were not violations of international law in an article about violations of international law?

Also, also...

Why?

In your little story of Sachs the partisan, why is he doing this? He's a very intelligent man (I hope we can all at least agree on that, won several awards for his work in economics and international relations). So what's his game plan here? Write a few articles with such glaringly obvious mistakes that ordinary people on an internet forum can spot them (not to mention the three hundred academics), trash his career, lose his credibility, and have no-one believe him anyway because the mistakes were so obvious - all of which someone of his intelligence could easily have foreseen (he's written hundreds of theses and reports in this time). For what? To what end?

Which is most likely?

One of the world's foremost campaigners for democracy, international law and sustainable development suddenly decided one day to campaign for Russia (and to do so so badly that even layman could see the errors), giving up all he's worked on for the last few decades...

Or, you've misunderstood.

So this is something I don't quite understand. Has Russia always sort of been "hollowed out" as a kleptocracy? Is this the way their culture is normally? Or is this an aberration? — frank

Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was still in the process of emerging from the medieval organisation of society. The liberation of the serfs only began in 1861, and was not complete at the beginning of the revolution. So about 500 years of social change in Europe since around 1400 or so, has been compressed in Russia into a single century. They may have missed some of the nuances of the development of the social contract, the enlightenment, the reformation, the development of universal education, the industrial revolution etc, etc, in the rush to catch up.

Sorry, I missed that one...

Isn't Germany basically the leader? Excuse my ignorance. — frank

Germany is possibly the most powerful (depending on the metrics), but not to the extent it can dictate anything - it usually comes down to (informal) coalitions of EU countries with specific interests (some decisions can be easily vetoed, it is not just a majority). It also should be noted that its internal politics are somewhat complicated, to some (fully unknown) extent due to the Rusian influences, especially among Greens, but it pertains to most parties (Gerhard Schröder, former SPD Chancellor, was employed by Russians just after he resigned from the post). In general, in European politics the interaction between internal and external politics is so dynamic that it is quite unpredictable.

Why are they vengeful? — frank

In 2014 Russians took down over Donbas a Malaysian passenger plane with 283 passengers and 15 crew on board. Nobody was punished for that, Russia just produced a stream of various lies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17

So this is something I don't quite understand. Has Russia always sort of been "hollowed out" as a kleptocracy? Is this the way their culture is normally? Or is this an aberration? — frank

That is a long topic, gave a good introduction. I will just add that while the USRR was in some aspects discontinuation of the Tsarist Russia and the post-Soviet Russia is in some aspects discontinuation of the USSR, imperialism is not one of them. On the contrary, Russians tried to establish a strong dominance over the republics and countries of the Soviet bloc (with the exception of Yeltsin). If you want to read up on that, look up the term 'Near Abroad'.

Missile attack on Ukrainian grain. Flight to safety on the currency market. :grimace:

So about 500 years of social change in Europe since around 1400 or so, has been compressed in Russia into a single century. — unenlightened

That makes sense. Probably especially in times of stress, they would tend to go back to what's always worked?


Thanks! :up:

Speaking of history, I feel this thread is in need of a mention of the Holodomor, so here it is.

https://shron2.chtyvo.org.ua/Zbirnyk_statei/Canadian_American_Studies_Holodomor.pdf?PHPSESSID=p93mf86aasbafa5snpbs922m02

My father would have been a student in 1933, and if I were a Ukrainian and my father had whispered this story at all, I would not be very keen now, to negotiate away an inch of sovereignty.

The attack on Odessa's grain facility is a further reminder.

I also recommend viewing some fragments (or reading some quotes) from Russian Media Monitor. Note that those are fragments from official Russian channels, so it is pure propaganda - do not expect too much truth there and do not treat it as views of ordinary Russians, rather as what is force-fed to ordinary Russians. Still, fascinating stuff, sometimes enlightning, sometimes frightening.

Cool, thank you!

if I were a Ukrainian and my father had whispered this story at all, I would not be very keen now, to negotiate away an inch of sovereignty. — unenlightened

Which just about explains most of why we're here. Fucking xenophobic, racist claptrap like that. Everyone who carried out the Holodomor is dead. Russians haven't genetically inherited a likelihood to commit war crimes, they're not all warped by racial tendencies toward atrocity, there's no magic line from Rostov to Kursk east of which everyone is a monster.

It's material conditions which breed monsters and support for them, not flags.

So your hypothetical Ukrainian would be foolish to think his 'sovereignty' is going to do jack shit to prevent another Holodomor. Ukraine could be Russia in six months, as could we all. The colour of your flag doesn't stop it, your refusal to dehumanise your fellow man is what does it, refusal to buy the idea that one group are lesser than another and don't belong, denial of the pernicious idea that borders and countries and flags, and 'sovereignty' are more important than the people those ideas are supposed to serve.

Isaac is having a nervous breakdown because nobody wants to do land for peace. :smirk:

Russians openly call for genocide and subjugation of former republics (and other countries) on their official channels not because of their genetics, but because their current authorities specifically tout ideologies quite similar to those that caused Holodomor. And, notably, are actively engaged in Holodomor denial (and Katyn, and massive deportations, etc.). I have no doubt that Russians could be peaceful and well-meaning (I know quite a few of them who are), the problem is, those who rule Russia at this time are not.

And for some reason countries that have left the Russian sphere of influence (such as the Baltics) 'could be Russia', but curiously that has not happened yet, while those countries that remain in that sphere (like Belarus and Kazakhstan) could be like Switzerland, yet somehow are quite similar to Russia or are getting there instead. So I would say in this specific case sovereignty does play a role.

Russians haven't genetically inherited a likelihood to commit war crimes, they're not all warped by racial tendencies toward atrocity, there's no magic line from Rostov to Kursk east of which everyone is a monster. — Isaac

Of course they haven't. Of course there is no magic line. But there is a social inheritance that is expressed for example in nationalism, and ethnic identification, because people have memories and some have been known to hold grudges.

Fucking xenophobic, racist claptrap like that. — Isaac

Respect dude. But not much.

You are being unpleasant and silly, again. I expressed some sympathy for, and possible explanation of, the reluctance of Ukrainians to negotiate. I certainly think that mass killing is not unthinkable to the current Russian regime.

I read that the Russian military is building prisons to detain and torture Ukrainians. It's insane.

there is a social inheritance that is expressed for example in nationalism, and ethnic identification, because people have memories and some have been known to hold grudges. — unenlightened

Possibly, but one cannot have one's cake and eat it here. Ukrainians have a very strong history of right-wing nationalism with it's associated racism and criminality (still the region's main black market arms centre). But we really want to say that Ukraine have changed. We don't need to worry any more about right-wing nationalism, that was way back on 2008 - who remembers that? We don't need to worry about the massive human rights abuses, they were all the way back in the 90s. So where now is the idea that we need be wary of inherited national cultures? Abandoned when it's inconvenient to the narrative. When I said Ukraine could be Russia, it's as true of Ukraine as it is anywhere. There's no safety in sovereignty if we hold to the notion of historical cultural inheritance, the historical culture of Ukraine is nothing to feel good about.

I expressed some sympathy for, and possible explanation of, the reluctance of Ukrainians to negotiate. — unenlightened

Exactly. Negotiation is how we stop this God awful bloodbath. Sympathy for those who oppose it, especially by invoking xenophobic tropes, should be handled with reservation. Yours was your only post for pages. It's not as if, after pages of pushing for humanitarian-focused solution, you just happened to mention in passing that there's a history here.

Russians openly call for genocide and subjugation of former republics (and other countries) on their official channels not because of their genetics, but because their current authorities specifically tout ideologies quite similar to those that caused Holodomor. — Jabberwock

That's right. A single populist election is all it takes. Sovereignty is no defence against that. And driving a country into the ground economically is a sure fire way to push in the direction of making that more likely.

What possible defence against the sort of autocratic nightmare that Russia is in do you think an utterly destroyed, massively indebted, weapon-flooded and resentful Ukraine is going to be against populism just because it's got the right colour flag over the Duma?

For anyone wanting to educate themselves about what sovereignty really means, some words from Yuliya Yurchenko, researcher in political economy, on debt.

On how debt has been used by creditors to keep Ukraine dependent and poor...

There’s a theoretical component and, intimately intertwined with that, a practical one. Theoretically speaking, it is an instrument of external control and expropriation of national wealth, diluting the sovereignty of the state and its decision-making. As is well-documented in literature on international financial institutions, debts are structured so that they’re not easy to repay.

On EU integration...

it’s the latest stage and the extension of what we’ve just talked about. It involved more privatizations, a more market-based approach across all sectors, and the erosion of sovereignty of decision-making, economically but also on more ideological themes. You have quite a limited menu of what you can do as a politician in Ukraine.

But of course flag-waiving jingoists don't care about actual sovereignty.