I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.
— Mark S

Very much unluckily for you, I didn't do that and expressly addressed the fact that you're system is not scientific, or derived from science. — AmadeusD

It seems an appropriate time to write a post describing the different perspectives in the present state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. I'll do that in my next thread. I apologize for misreading your comment as implying the science I described was necessarily flawed because it was deriving ought from is.

I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. — AmadeusD

... literary phil seems quite dead outside the existentialist frame. Where are the poetic epics looking at the philosophical implications of quantum foundations or extended evolutionary synthesis!?
— Count Timothy von Icarus
:up: :up: Actually, there are quite a few speculative fiction authors on the margins ... — 180 Proof

Do you know of any speculative fiction by authors knowledgeable about moral philosophy regarding the philosophical implications of the evolutionary synthesis? What a moral philosopher (or a knowledgeable non-professional) was willing to speculate about could be revealing.

Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?
— Mark S

↪Mark S Sure would, Mark! Where are we starting from? — Kizzy

I have started composing a thread on the state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. Give me a week or so to post it, and then you can let me know what you think.

,

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman.
— Mark S

Then your entire premise is false and I am happy to leave it here for you to play with :) — AmadeusD

The topic of this thread is the science of morality which studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.

“Moral science” implies a ‘science’ of bindingness, which does not exist as far as I know, but has been a common basis for strawman arguments against the science of morality. I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.

It occured to me that the science of morality is just about useless for Boethius as he sits in his prison cell awaiting his torture and execution for not not allowing corruption. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where science is probably most helpful is in knowing what to do and how to do it, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Science would be extremely helpful to Boethius while he is still Consul and dealing with the intricacies of public policy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Point being, science, and techne in general, is only useful once one is already self-determining to some degree. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Excellent.

You aptly describe my perspective also, including Stoicism being the best philosophical therapy for those who are suffering. I hope you didn’t think I would disagree. Thanks for commenting.

Science can’t tell us what our values and goals imperatively ought to be, but once we choose values and goals, science can often tell us what we ought (instrumental means) to do to be most likely to achieve them.

The science of morality can tell us (or Boethius) how we ought (instrumental) to refine cultural moral norms to best support moral values and achieve moral goals using means defined by the moral principles that underly our moral sense and cultural moral norms. Because of their origins, we will find these moral means more harmonious with our moral sense and more motivating than any other possible set of means for achieving moral goals.

I am glad you find them interesting. The references include several different perspectives on the science. What I have presented in this forum is my synthesis of those perspectives.
Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?

I'm asking what literature you're using, and what ideas you're basing this off of. When you reference something by science, put a quote so we can see where you're coming from and what research you're basing it off of. — Philosophim

The references are representative of the literature I am using. What I propose here is a synthesis of this literature and, in that sense, a personal perspective. I am thinking of going into that more in a separate thread.

Ok, but that's not cooperation. I can do many things for my gene's advantage that do not involve cooperation. How is me, under threat of jail or duress, getting drafted in a war to die for my country cooperation? — Philosophim

Much of cooperation has nothing to do with morality. I have not claimed all cooperation is relevant to morality.

The two most powerful means of promoting cooperation in the modern world are money economies and the rule of law. Both can increase cooperation in amoral ways. Prior to their invention, cooperation relied on morality with a little help from the inefficient strategy of barter. Remember Protagoras's myth about the function of morality enabling cooperation (in Plato's dialog of the same name)? At one time, morality as cooperation would have been the common view, and I expect I would not have had as much pushback as I am getting here. Money economies and the rule of law are fantastic at increasing cooperation, but really muddied the waters about the function of morality.

There are cultural norms connected with both money economies and the rule of law. whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. These are moral norms which solve cooperation problems.

Why do you think the law that threatens jail or duress if you refuse to get drafted for war is a moral norm? Obeying laws in general is a moral norm. Helping defend the group is a moral norm. A specific law is not necessarily a moral norm.

Many ideas of morality and laws in culture are not about cooperation or willingness, but forced obeyance under threat of punishment or death. — Philosophim

Laws that force cooperation are not recognized as moral norms for good reasons. And moral norms that exploit others to increase the benefits of cooperation for ingroups are only descriptively moral. So what?

If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality?
— Mark S

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity.
— Mark S

Indirect reciprocity? Look, I'm not thinking they're going to pay it forward. For all I know the guy's a psychopath. I also lost 20$. I do it because I think if I have spare resources, it should go towards helping another life live well. This is not cooperation. This is sacrifice. Altruism. — Philosophim

I agree; you are not necessarily thinking they will pay it forward, thereby continuing indirect reciprocity; you are just acting on your altruistic impulse.

I was explaining why the impulse exists. The biology underlying your altruistic impulse and when it is triggered was selected for in our ancestors because, on average, increase in reproductive fitness. You act altruistically because of the impulse, not because of any knowledge about cooperation strategies.

You're really going to try to claim that if I stomp on a bug, it could be considered immoral because it means I'm not good to cooperate with? How does that have anything to do with whether I can work with other people towards a common goal? — Philosophim

Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism forbid harming any living thing. This can be a high-cost moral norm for farmers or anyone bothered by bedbugs or mosquitoes. The best explanation I know of for why such a high-cost moral norm has persisted in cultures with billions of people is that it is marker of being a good person in that culture. Do you have a better explanation?

Threat of punishment for not following a culture or society is not cooperation. Its also not 'reciprocity'. Its servileness. Slavery. Personal sacrifice for obedience to others. — Philosophim

Direct and indirect reciprocity are cooperation strategies. Punishment of violators (such as people who exploit others) is a necessary (not an optional) part of those strategies in order for them to be stable in a society. Punishment can be as simple as social disapproval or refusal to cooperate with the exploiter in the future. Punishment of moral norm violations also have included death.

Cultural norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment are moral norms. Punishment, like altruism, is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.

This needs work. A lot of work Mark S. — Philosophim

That is why I post here.

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.
— Mark S

No it isn't. — AmadeusD

You are incorrect. Can you say why you think it is not?

Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
— Mark S

This is a shotgun to the foot. This is an emotive position. — AmadeusD

How is someone's preference for the moral principle that is most harmonious with people's moral sense a "shotgun to the foot"? Please explain. Are you saying they should not prefer it?

It is an instrumental ought
— Mark S

Then I have no issues. I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. It appears, patently, your assertion carried forth into a logical framework where you get the desired result of a self-consistent system. This is just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim. Nothing wrong with that, but it certainly falls short of anythign we could consider a scientific position or train of thought. — AmadeusD

I am glad to hear you have no issues.

Of course, science, including the science of morality (which studies why moral norms and our moral sense exist), only provides instrumental oughts. Beyond exploring how this instrumental ought knowledge could be culturally useful, I have no plans to comment on any possible imperative oughts..

No, it is not "just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim". Morality as cooperation is silent regarding ultimate moral goals (utilitarianism's focus). Morality as cooperation only deals with moral means as defined by our moral sense and cultural moral norms, not moral ends.

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman. As I have described, there is a science that studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms extst. Perhaps you think the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist is off-limits for science? If so, why?

Yes, scientism (or pseudo-science) is, at best, bad philosophy (i.e. sophistry). — 180 Proof

Sophistry implies clever arguments that make the worse argument appear to be the better. I don't believe I am clever enough for sophistry.

Wikipedia says that "Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality." This thread is dedicated to explaining what science can tell us about why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist. That science, supported by evolutionary game theory, now reveals why they exist and their underlying universal core cooperation strategy. That is not scientism.

If someone decides they prefer that underlying principle as the basis for their society's moral norms, I still don't see that as scientism. But perhaps you do?

No, you don't. Look Mark, proposing cultural values are moral values is ethics 101. Its highly debated. Your 'no contradiction with known facts' is dogmatic at this point with the examples I've given you. I still see no posted scientific papers that agree with you. You haven't addressed the specific examples I've given you like "Dying for your country". I'm not feeling like you're engaging with questioning, but dogmatically harping that your theory is right because 'science'. — Philosophim

Some of the peer-reviewed literature:

You can connect with it by googling morality as cooperation on google scholar. But rather than dump you off into that ocean, which contains many perspectives on morality as cooperation, I suggest the following list compiled by Oliver Curry with quotes by their authors:

‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices,
identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that
work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life
possible.” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). ‘‘[M]orality functions to facilitate the generation
and maintenance of long-term social-cooperative relationships” (Rai & Fiske, 2011).
‘‘Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating
with others” (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). ‘‘[T]he core function of morality is to promote
and sustain cooperation” (Greene, 2015). ‘‘[M]oral facts are facts about cooperation,
and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it” (Sterelny & Fraser,
2016). (Compiled in a paper by Oliver Curry)

Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019). Is it good to cooperate? Testing the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies. Current Anthropology, 60(1).

Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. Fiske, G. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 797–832). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review,
118(1), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021867.

Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality. Annual Review of Psychology, 64(1), 231–255. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev- psych-113011-143812.

Greene, J. D. (2015). The rise of moral cognition. Cognition, 135, 39–42. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.018.

Sterelny, K., & Fraser, B. (2016). Evolution and moral realism. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 68(4), 981–1006.


Important note: “Moral systems”, “Morality”, “Human morality, and “Moral facts” from the quoted authors refer to behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms, and not necessarily to philosophical meanings.


Regarding your proposed counter-examples, I thought I had explained them, including how dying for your country is part of a reciprocity strategy. The short answer is the motivation for loyalty only works to your gene's advantage on average.

I have said:

“Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the death of the giver.
That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the life of the individual.”

“So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.— Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.”


“Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.”

Proposed counterexamples are still welcome.

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark S

Why would this be an Ought?
— AmadeusD

That's what I keep coming back to. It seems there is an assumption that cooperation strategies are good and therefore ought to be obligatory or foundational to any moral system. Sam Harris did the same thing when he proposed that 'wellbeing' is good therefore it ought to be obligatory as the foundation for moral decision making. — Tom Storm

Tom, see my reply about its bindingness to Amadeus https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/15230/mark-s.

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark

Why would this be an Ought? — AmadeusD

Amadeus, this question merits a careful answer. I’ll describe:
1) What makes it “universally moral”
2) What kind of ought that origin implies.
3) What kind of ought it is not.

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.

Answering your question: It is an instrumental ought regarding which moral principles to advocate and follow in a society given any and all of these goals:
1) Increase the benefits of cooperation within and between societies
2) Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
3) Define a moral code based on a principle that is not just cross-culturally, but cross-species universal

However, its origins in science entail no imperative bindingness – what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences. Any arguments for its imperative bindingness would be philosophical arguments, not scientific ones.

...I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.
...How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral?
...This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.
..Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument.
...How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it?
...Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?
..., I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. . — Philosophim

Responding in order to your above comments:

I propose a highly robust hypothesis based on its remarkable explanatory power for the huge, superficially chaotic data set of our moral sense and cultural moral codes, no contradiction with known facts, no remotely competitive hypotheses, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science.

Such robust hypotheses are excellent candidates for scientific truth.

I personally see it as true in the normal provisional scientific sense. Not all investigators accept that, so I sometimes refer to it as a hypothesis despite my opinion.
...
What people believe is moral is a function of their cultural moral norms. Not everyone necessarily agrees with, advocates, follows, and enforces their culture's norms. Everyone in a culture is not required to agree on what is moral.
...
What criteria are you proposing that make my hypothesis unscientific?
.....
What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others – is a universal part of descriptively moral behaviors since to exploit others requires cooperation in the ingroup that exploits the outgroup.
...
The science of morality studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. That limited area of study necessarily limits its usefulness for resolving edge cases in ethics that have little to nothing to do with solving cooperation problems - why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is no “Science of ethics” that I am aware of. that would be relevant to all ethical disputes. No handwaving involved.
...
Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.
...
I have started thinking about a “Recent perspectives within the science of morality” thread and how it could be helpful. There is essentially universal agreement that human morality exists because it enabled our ancestors to cooperate in groups. However, there are different perspectives (hypotheses) about how science best expresses that.

Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

A thread about the state of the science of morality might be well worthwhile. I’ll give that some more thought.

in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct. — 180 Proof

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct?

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture—descriptively moral behaviors.

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

Further, the science of morality identifies what “motivates/facilitates either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct” as part of cooperation strategies.

Here are two examples of the science of morality’s relevance to moral naturalism:

1) The fact that our moral intuitions regarding interactions with other people are part of cooperation strategies reveals much about the natural conditions relevant to moral naturalism. This knowledge should be helpful in defining moral naturalism.

2) Indirect reciprocity is a much more powerful cooperation strategy than direct reciprocity. (In indirect reciprocity, the reciprocated help will generally not be returned to the person who initially helped another as required for direct reciprocity.) The non-reciprocal part in your moral naturalism’s "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" implies cooperation to reduce harm by indirect reciprocity. If so, the science of morality directly supports "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" as the goal of the most natural of moral naturalisms.

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well: — wonderer1

Nice study. Thanks for posting.
We could summarize the results as "moral idiots" are bad at cooperation.
That is the point.

↪Mark S "Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

Of course, empathy and other emotions are not cooperation strategies.

Empathy and the other emotions I mentioned motivate behaviors that are heuristics for the two necessary parts of reciprocity strategies.

I've tried posting links to the literature, but I could never tell that anyone read the links.

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms.

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe.
— Mark S
This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals. — 180 Proof

Cooperation strategies, such as direct and indirect reciprocity, are species-independent and innate to our universe because the simple mathematics they are based on are species-independent and innate to our universe.

That these cooperation strategies are encoded into our biology is evident when we consider the emotional responses triggered by our moral sense: empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, guilt, and shame.

These are not just a hodgepodge of emotions.

Empathy, loyalty, and gratitude motivate helping behaviors that initiate or motivate continuing direct and indirect reciprocity.

Righteous indignation (anger triggered by moral norm violations) motivates punishment of others who violate the group’s moral norms. Guilt and shame are direct punishments of ourselves when we violate moral norms.

This combination of motivation to help others and punishment of moral norm violations are the two necessary components of all reciprocity strategies. These emotional heuristics for parts of reciprocity strategies are what began us on the path to being the incredibly successful social species we are.

Are these emotions innate in all people? Psychopaths have diminished to no ability to experience empathy or conscience (shame and guilt) and an inability to learn how to do so. An old term for psychopaths is moral idiots. In them, these heuristic emotions for reciprocity are greatly reduced or even absent.

Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality — Philosophim

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts (which I was not intending to be a part of this thread, but here we are).

Those two parts are:
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems within an ingroup but may exploit others. (“Homosexuality is evil!” and “Women must be submissive to men!”)
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting others (“Do to others as you would have them do to you”) Such norms are universal to all descriptively moral behaviors because cooperating in an ingroup without exploiting others is necessary to enforce moral norms that exploit outgroups.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.— Mark S

Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent? — Philosophim

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case.

Remember that the science of morality describes what the function of human morality (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) 'is', not some intellectual construct that claims to handle edge cases.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”.— Mark S

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality. — Philosophim

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that. — Philosophim

I expect most people will prefer to advocate and conform to what is universally moral, not what is merely descriptively moral.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).— Mark S

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here. — Philosophim

Do you think that past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense are NOT explained as parts of cooperation strategies? Interesting. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation. — Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.

AmadeusD
1.4k
The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
— Mark S

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used. — AmadeusD

From the OP,
"... the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups. Human morality appears to have been biologically and culturally selected for by the benefits of the cooperation it enabled."

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense.

You are correct that we can only explain the cultural moral norms we know about and what we know about our moral sense. But we know a lot of diverse, contradictory, and strange cultural moral norms and a lot about our moral sense and its judgments (which also are diverse, contradictory, and strange). If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth.

Again from the OP:
"The diversity, contradictions, and, to outsiders, strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms are largely due to 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups or in disfavored or even exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in ingroups and outgroups. "

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. "Number crunching" is not an issue here. The number crunching needed to reveal cooperation strategies has already mostly been done (but is still going on) as part of game theory. The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident.

Of course, the data set to be explained as part of sociology. So what?

I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.
...
I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.

No doubt the relationship of nature-culture is reflexive, even somewhat dialectical, yet culture supervenes on nature (though it defines or demarcates 'natural-artificial', etc). No, you're not "illogical", Mark; however, I find the major premise of your "Morality as Cooperation" to be non-natural (i.e. formalist/calculative/instrumental) and therefore scientistic or, at the very least, non-philosophical vis-à-vis ethics. — 180 Proof

I apologize for my delay in responding.

I understand you to propose, where => is read as “produces”

Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature => cultural moralities
And then,
Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature (as givens) + rational thought => 180 P’s moral naturalism

I propose:

Cooperation strategies innate to our universe + Biological and cultural evolutionary processes => Empathy and the rest of our moral sense + cultural moralities
And,
Cooperation strategies innate to our universe (as givens and the stance independent natural facts) => M’s moral naturalism

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe. By taking that higher level of causation as given, I avoid potential misinterpretations of the semi-random collection of parts of cooperation strategies that make up our moral sense.

The relevant game theory strategies are innate to our universe and, therefore, fundamentally natural. To be unnatural requires thought and the imagining of unnatural things such as gods and, in my opinion, imperative moral oughts.

Of course, whether one ought to advocate and conform to science's moral naturalism is a philosophical question. I hold that doing so is a matter of preference, and I think I have good reasons for it being my preference.

Am I correct that your moral naturalism goes beyond givens about interactions between people (Morality as Cooperation’s domain in our moral sense) to more fully answer the question “How should I live?”

Yet if we just understand that "how the World is" and "how the World should be" are two totally different questions that aren't easy to answer and that the first question doesn't immediately give us an answer to the second question, that's a good start. — ssu

Right, my intent was that what I have written is consistent with this position.

If moral norms solve cooperation problems in groups, we can obviously understand that moral thinking goes further than a group of humans. What about other groups, what about other living beings, our World and the environment in general? — ssu

Regarding interactions between groups, it seems workable to apply the same definition of what is universally moral as within groups: “behaviors that solve cooperation problems and do not exploit others.” I cringe and feel anger when I hear political leaders talk about how each country, for example, should negotiate what is best for it regardless of the needs of other countries.

Can we apply the same criteria to other conscious beings and environments? Where might we find a good moral philosopher when we need one to sort out such issues?

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. We need moral philosophy to answer 1) the broader ethical questions you ask as well as the “How should I live?” kind of ought questions and 2) other complex ethical questions about applying such science.

If morality as cooperation becomes generally accepted, I expect the field of moral philosophy would be revitalized, not shut down. We do not face a binary choice in relying on science or moral philosophy for ethical guidance. Instead, we can rely on both disciplines' strengths and areas of expertise.

“Morality” here can be interpreted as [...] a category of strange thing I am not sure exists. — Mark S

My perspective is that 'morality' as "what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences" does not exist.
But 'morality' as "a set of cooperation strategies innate to our universe and necessary to form and maintain civilizations" is as real as the mathematics underlying it.

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense.
— Mark S

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science. — Philosophim

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”. That tag is that people feel violators deserve punishment. This tag exists because punishment of violators is required for cooperation strategies to be sustainable. This tag is also the source of morality’s feeling of mysterious bindingness for everyone that has so pre-occupied much of moral philosophy.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others.
— Mark S

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no. — Philosophim

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.
— Mark S

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?" — Philosophim

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others.

My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.
— Mark S

Who is your intended audience? If it's the average person, me, for instance, I struggle to see why it should matter to me. — Tom Storm

Hi Tom,

Though here I address people with backgrounds or at least interest in moral philosophy, my ultimate goal is to make Morality as Cooperation useful to the average person. As you may be referring to, the average person will correctly think “Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems can do not exploit others” useless, on its own, as moral guidance in normal life.

It is the insights from Morality as Cooperation about standard cultural moral norms that I am hoping can be useful for average people. For example,

1) Food and sex taboos are commonly semi-arbitrary markers of being a good person. If they are found to harm people, they should be abandoned.

2) Versions of the Golden Rule are commonly said to summarize morality because they are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for initiating a powerful cooperation strategy. Following them would be immoral in cases (such as when tastes differ) when the result would predictably be less cooperation, not more.

3) Shame and guilt over immoral behaviors exists because these emotions, on average, increased cooperation for our ancestors. Shame and guilt to the point one stops doing good things (and thus creates a cooperation problem) is immoral.

4) Punishment, of at least social disapproval, of moral norm violators is necessary for cooperation norms to be sustainable in a culture. The goal of moral punishment is solving cooperation problems.

My understanding of morality is that it's a code of conduct (an agglomeration of historical cultural mores) enforced through a legal system. Morality provides stability and predictability, which helps societies to thrive (within certain parameters, given that the powerful can manipulate most moral systems to suit their interests).

How different is your view to this? — Tom Storm

My view is similar. Legal systems are powerful means of solving cooperation problems and increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society. Punishment of norm violations such as theft, murder, and lying under oath by the group as a whole is much more effective than punishment by individuals at maintaining cooperative societies.

The inherent rightness or wrongness of certain actions (e.g., murder or stealing) is a separate matter, I take it? — Tom Storm

No. Murder and stealing are violations of moral norms that solve cooperation problems. The cooperation problem is “How can I avoid being murdered of stolen from in cases when other people really want to murder or steal from me?”. The solution is moral norms and laws that imply or specify punishment for violators. They are, in effect, reciprocity rules, I won’t murder or steal from anyone else and they will not murder or steal from me, even when they really want to.

as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds — 180 Proof

I was an aeronautical engineer in my working career. I expect a bird who was able to understand aerodynamics would find it quite useful to learn how to take off with more weight and to fly with less energy.

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.
— Mark S
Given that morality is an aspect of philosophy (i.e. ethics), a scientific "understanding of morality" seems, IMO, as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds. — 180 Proof

To your point that you find the science of morality, at least in its Morality as Cooperation form, useless:

I can see it would be useless if your philosophical position is that a morality exists that is what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences – that imperative moral oughts exist. If someone already knows what is imperative, then what is merely instrumental could be of no interest.

But I remembered you were supportive of a kind of moral naturalism. This is what the science of morality is all about.

Regardless of your personal position, would you argue that a moral naturalist would find the science of morality useless?

Here is how this science is useful to me given my philosophical position:

I do not believe imperative moral oughts exist. My preferred answer to “How should I live?” is simple stoic wisdom except for interactions with other people. I prefer morality for interactions with other people defined by a kind of rule consequentialism with the moral consequence being a version of happiness or flourishing and the moral rule being Morality as Cooperation.

So the science of morality is not just helpful, it is critical to my moral philosophy. Would you claim I am being illogical?

What is hateful [harmful] to you, do not do to anyone. — Hillel the Elder, 1st century BCE

Right. And the New Testament describes the positive form as summarizing morality.

Why? Science can explain that. Forms of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Further, as usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb, this same science can identify when it would be immoral to follow them – when doing so will predicably create cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Are science’s explanations of why versions of the Golden Rule exist, are found in all well-functioning cultures, and are commonly described as summarizing morality of no interest to you?

— a[n] exercise entirely in the domain of science.
— Mark S
So then why do you think this "exercise" has any relevance to moral philosophy? — 180 Proof

As I said in the OP,

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms shape our moral intuitions. Therefore, our moral intuitions are also virtually all parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. To the extent that a moral philosopher relies on guidance from their moral intuitions, this might be an additional helpful insight. — Mark S

There are many perspectives in moral philosophy. Some philosophers may find these results from the science of morality helpful to their area of study, others certainly will not. That is OK with me.

My interest is how to make the science of morality culturally useful. My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.

You are pretending to use these words in non-normative ways, but it seems clear to me that you are not being consistent in this.

The simpler claim here is, "Cooperation explains morality, says Science." — Leontiskos

To claim "Cooperation explains morality” is a philosophical leap I would not make and science definitely can’t. “Morality” here can be interpreted as “what everyone ought to do” a category of strange thing I am not sure exists.

Cooperation explains our moral sense and cultural moral norms. That is a scientific claim, so yes, “says Science”.

The word “morality” in the theory Morality as Cooperation refers to past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. Cultural moral norms are norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Our moral sense is our biology-based facility for making near-instantaneous judgments about right and wrong.

Of course, cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgements are “what everyone ought to do” in that culture or in that individual’s opinion.

But I expect you don’t confuse “cultural moral norms” and our “moral sense” with what a philosopher would describe as “moral” when answering questions such as “How should I live?”, “What are my obligations?”, and “What is good?”.

So why the difficulty with understanding what “Morality as Cooperation” refers to as an explanation of why our cultural moral norms and moral sense exist?

Hello 180 Proof!
Thanks for commenting.

I think the attempt to reduce habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction (i.e. morals) to "strategies for solving cooperation problems" (e.g. game theory, cybernetics) is incoherent and misguided. — 180 Proof

I agree that trying to reduce the philosophical understanding of morality (such as habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction) as what people ought to do to strategies for solving cooperation problems is incoherent. This is not my argument.

I am reducing past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to morality as cooperation – a exercise entirely in the domain of science.

This proposal is incoherent due to the category mistake of reframing non-reciprocity (altruism) in terms of reciprocity (mutualism), or vice versa. — 180 Proof

Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the giver's death.

That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the individual's life.

For example, the so-called "moral sense" in human toddlers and many nonhuman animals is expressed as strong preferences for fairness and empathy towards individuals both of their own species and cross-species ... prior to / independent of formulating or following any "cooperation strategies". — 180 Proof

And of course, people, including babies and myself for most of my life, are utterly oblivious that their moral sense motivates and cultural moral norms advocate parts of cooperation strategies. Biological and cultural evolution stumbled across them by chance and they were selected for by the benefits of cooperation they produced. We just experience the motivation to follow our moral sense and, sometimes, cultural moral norms.

When people are motivated by empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, shame, and guilt or “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, cooperation problems are solved. No intellectual understanding of what is going on is required. How helpful an intellectual understanding might be in daily life is still to be seen.

But what does that have to do with morality? — Leontiskos

What it has to do with "morality" is that morality as cooperation is the underlying principle that explains why past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

I expect you are thinking of "morality" as what everyone imperatively ought to do - a topic in moral philosophy. Morality as cooperation is in a different domain of knowledge - what 'is', which I hope we agree may or may not be what we ought to do.

— Leontiskos

to say that morality is for cooperation is a teleological claim — Leontiskos

I did not say morality is for cooperation. Given a standard philosophical understanding of “morality” as what everyone ought to do, I see no justification for such a claim. I said the existence of cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explainable as parts of cooperation strategies.

A moral norm involves valuation, and therefore any field which prescinds from matters of value cannot appraise moral norms, except insofar as it explains them away. But to predicate cooperation of morality is to explain one value term with another value term, and "science," as you have described it, cannot do this. The account is therefore not even logically coherent. — Leontiskos

Consider three cultural moral norms:
Eating pigs is an abomination
Homosexuality is evil
Do to others as you would have them do to you.

All are parts of known cooperation strategies explored in game theory.
The first two are marker strategies as described in the OP.
The Golden Rule is a heuristic for initiating indirect reciprocity, arguably the most powerful known cooperation strategy.
Similarly, virtually all cultural moral norms I am aware of can be explained as parts of known cooperation strategies.

And somehow in your mind this is logically incoherent? How?

Perhaps you are leaping to philosophical conclusions that I have not made and that are incoherent.

— Philosophim

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.
— Mark S

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality? — Philosophim

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once.

In outline:

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. However, solving these cooperation problems has been done for what we see as morally reprehensible goals such as mass murder.

Might there be a part of all these descriptively behaviors that is universally moral – meaning universal to all descriptively moral behaviors?

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others. But exploiting or harming others (in outgroups) creates a cooperation problem, which we know is immoral by morality as cooperation.

So all descriptively moral behaviors have a universal ingroup cooperation component and a potentially immoral interaction with exploited or harmed outgroups.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.

That our moral sense and cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is a robust hypothesis that 1) explains virtually all past and present cultural moral norms (suggested counterexamples would be gratefully received) and 2) everything we know about our moral sense. It is a simple explanation of a huge, superficially chaotic data set. It is a good candidate for the normal, provisional kind of scientific truth.

It also is not new. Protagoras proposed it to Socrates in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Socrates rejected it, perhaps because it was too close to what the common people thought about morality at the time and therefore not intellectually challenging. Protagoras proposed it by reciting a Greek myth about why Zeus gave people a moral sense. If you replace Zeus with evolutionary processes, you get a remarkably coherent story of the evolutionary process.

Finally, your criticism that morality as cooperation redefines morality as expedience is a philosophical claim irrelevant to science.

So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. Descriptively moral behaviors have included a lot of things we would consider despicable – no surprise there.

You seem to be thinking about what is universally moral. It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others. So, no, the mass murders cooperation does not count as universally moral by morality as cooperation.

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral.

I expected my examples of “Don’t eat pigs” and “Homosexuality is evil” would have made it clear that the science of morality explains both what is descriptively moral and what is universally moral.

If I had proposed "It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others." in my OP, I would have been moving over into making a philosophical claim which I was trying to avoid.

I get to the conclusion of obligation by the fact that the processes to create life in the first place exists at all. The opposite of life and existence is death and nothingness. Life doens't have to happen. But the mere fact it does leads me to believe that to proactively force the opposite is a violation. — Kaplan

Living is what life does. Living is not an obligation of life because life has no moral obligation to live regardless of needs and preferences.

I don’t understand your explanation of how you go from the fact that:

“…living is the first 'thing' an organism does and is what makes it an organism” to

“Living is an obligation for life. Therefore one ought to live, as being a being implies this by default.”

Even if you explained how you made that leap, who ought to live? The smallpox virus? (Did we do evil when we exterminated it?) Some individual organism, the individual’s species? Just conscious species? All species?

Also, “Obligation” and “ought” imply doing something regardless of needs and preferences. Coherently using these words here would require you to describe the domain of when and why “one ought to live” would be in conflict with your needs and preferences.

"Objective knowledge" cannot be interpreted as a (physical) object whose attributes are thereby equally applicable to all co-existent minds in impartial manners. Hence, I so far can only interpret it as "impartial knowledge" regarding our shared intuition of about the good. — javra

Objective knowledge from science about our moral intuitions is “impartial” and even mind-independent. Obtaining mind-independent knowledge is the standard goal in science.

For example, is guilt triggered by our moral sense good? Guilt is not physical, but science can objectively tell us why it exists. Guilt exists because it is a punishment strategy – internal self-punishment to motivate not repeating immoral behavior.

Science can tell us the function of guilt is to motivate moral behavior in terms of cooperation with others. That is all.

In sum, it so far seems to me that science and philosophy can only happily, satisfactorily, converge on the issue of morality only if both agree on what the meaning of "good" (regardless of the language in which it is expressed) can and does signify, and what it applies to in all its conceivably instantiations. — javra

Remember that:

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” — Mark S

Science does not address the broad question of the meaning of good, so agreement with moral philosophy on “the meaning of good” is impossible. And I have yet to hear that moral philosophers have agreed on the meaning of good.

But science can provide culturally and philosophically useful information about a subset of what is good. “Good behaviors” regarding interactions with others are science’s playground of objective knowledge. Objective knowledge about what is good (even this limited subcategory of good) could be useful in moral philosophy in broader discussions about what is good.

I’ve talked about objective knowledge in the form of Morality as Cooperation Strategies. But the same approach can also be applied to answering the broader question, “Why do our intuitions about what is good exist?”

Objective knowledge about why our shared intuitions about good are what they are could be similarly useful.

As I've repeated already, I believe there is no reciprocity implied by the Golden Rule, and I think that this represents a gross misinterpretation on your part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you that the Golden Rule advocates behavior independent of conditions or consequences such as the expectation of reciprocity.

However, following the Golden Rule INITIATES indirect reciprocity, regardless of any lack of awareness of that being the case. People acting in accordance with the Golden Rule without consideration of consequences is the main mechanism for initiating indirect reciprocity in societies, the main strategy for maintaining a well-functioning society.

People can and do act consistently with cooperation strategies (act morally) without awareness that their behavior has anything to do with cooperation (with forms of reciprocity).