If moral norms solve cooperation problems in groups, we can obviously understand that moral thinking goes further than a group of humans. What about other groups, what about other living beings, our World and the environment in general? — ssu

Regarding interactions between groups, it seems workable to apply the same definition of what is universally moral as within groups: “behaviors that solve cooperation problems and do not exploit others.” I cringe and feel anger when I hear political leaders talk about how each country, for example, should negotiate what is best for it regardless of the needs of other countries.

Can we apply the same criteria to other conscious beings and environments? Where might we find a good moral philosopher when we need one to sort out such issues?

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. We need moral philosophy to answer 1) the broader ethical questions you ask as well as the “How should I live?” kind of ought questions and 2) other complex ethical questions about applying such science.

If morality as cooperation becomes generally accepted, I expect the field of moral philosophy would be revitalized, not shut down. We do not face a binary choice in relying on science or moral philosophy for ethical guidance. Instead, we can rely on both disciplines' strengths and areas of expertise.

Yet if we just understand that "how the World is" and "how the World should be" are two totally different questions that aren't easy to answer and that the first question doesn't immediately give us an answer to the second question, that's a good start. — ssu

Right, my intent was that what I have written is consistent with this position.

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. — Mark S

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used.

I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.
...
I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.

No doubt the relationship of nature-culture is reflexive, even somewhat dialectical, yet culture supervenes on nature (though it defines or demarcates 'natural-artificial', etc). No, you're not "illogical", Mark; however, I find the major premise of your "Morality as Cooperation" to be non-natural (i.e. formalist/calculative/instrumental) and therefore scientistic or, at the very least, non-philosophical vis-à-vis ethics. — 180 Proof

I apologize for my delay in responding.

I understand you to propose, where => is read as “produces”

Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature => cultural moralities
And then,
Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature (as givens) + rational thought => 180 P’s moral naturalism

I propose:

Cooperation strategies innate to our universe + Biological and cultural evolutionary processes => Empathy and the rest of our moral sense + cultural moralities
And,
Cooperation strategies innate to our universe (as givens and the stance independent natural facts) => M’s moral naturalism

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe. By taking that higher level of causation as given, I avoid potential misinterpretations of the semi-random collection of parts of cooperation strategies that make up our moral sense.

The relevant game theory strategies are innate to our universe and, therefore, fundamentally natural. To be unnatural requires thought and the imagining of unnatural things such as gods and, in my opinion, imperative moral oughts.

Of course, whether one ought to advocate and conform to science's moral naturalism is a philosophical question. I hold that doing so is a matter of preference, and I think I have good reasons for it being my preference.

Am I correct that your moral naturalism goes beyond givens about interactions between people (Morality as Cooperation’s domain in our moral sense) to more fully answer the question “How should I live?”

AmadeusD
1.4k
The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
— Mark S

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used. — AmadeusD

From the OP,
"... the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups. Human morality appears to have been biologically and culturally selected for by the benefits of the cooperation it enabled."

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense.

You are correct that we can only explain the cultural moral norms we know about and what we know about our moral sense. But we know a lot of diverse, contradictory, and strange cultural moral norms and a lot about our moral sense and its judgments (which also are diverse, contradictory, and strange). If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth.

Again from the OP:
"The diversity, contradictions, and, to outsiders, strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms are largely due to 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups or in disfavored or even exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in ingroups and outgroups. "

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. "Number crunching" is not an issue here. The number crunching needed to reveal cooperation strategies has already mostly been done (but is still going on) as part of game theory. The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident.

Of course, the data set to be explained as part of sociology. So what?

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe. — Mark S

This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals.

Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality — Philosophim

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts (which I was not intending to be a part of this thread, but here we are).

Those two parts are:
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems within an ingroup but may exploit others. (“Homosexuality is evil!” and “Women must be submissive to men!”)
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting others (“Do to others as you would have them do to you”) Such norms are universal to all descriptively moral behaviors because cooperating in an ingroup without exploiting others is necessary to enforce moral norms that exploit outgroups.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.— Mark S

Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent? — Philosophim

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case.

Remember that the science of morality describes what the function of human morality (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) 'is', not some intellectual construct that claims to handle edge cases.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”.— Mark S

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality. — Philosophim

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that. — Philosophim

I expect most people will prefer to advocate and conform to what is universally moral, not what is merely descriptively moral.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).— Mark S

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here. — Philosophim

Do you think that past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense are NOT explained as parts of cooperation strategies? Interesting. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation. — Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.

Nice, thank you.

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense. — Mark S

Unfortunately, nothing here (or behind it in the comment) responds to my position. I understand your position. I'm wanting to explanation as to how it affects the world in the ways claimed. It seems it doesn't? I can't see its explanatory power prima facie. I can see it's claim to it, but not any reason to take it seriously. More further on..

If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth. — Mark S

But the claim isn't of that kind. THe claim is one where its apex would be an efficient and predicatable statistical analysis of moral norms over time, in various cultures based on lets say 1000 variables "number crunched" for "intimative" power to ascertain the most likely moral position of future states/generations/peoples. That seems to just be a really focussed sociology. So, I'm wondering whence comes some kind of verifiability in the present? Maybe interesting as to how we 'got to" any particular moral situation (but again, so various even across the present moment that I think attending to the "chaos" would presuppose something you've not shown - coherence).

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. — Mark S

But this assumes the success of hte claim, without even beginning the project of showing that success. I'm unsure this has gotten off the ground. The underpinnings still seem fairly wide of a workable hypothesis beyond internal monologues.

The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident. — Mark S

They certainly don't appear that way to most people, from what I can tell. I'm failing to see anything in your defenses that would establish this claim. And if this claim were established, I'd think you're well on your way to a workable hypothesis. But as above, without showing some coherence across those disparate data points I think its very hard to get interested in the hypothesis.

So what? — Mark S

A purely observational, statistically analytical historical "hypothesis" is not one which has the power to explain anything more than what "was" (and, maybe, under certain constraints, what is... but we already have various disciplines making sense of that data, to the degree it can be made sense of)

Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals. — 180 Proof

:up:

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well:

Abstract
Static networks have been shown to foster cooperation for specific cost–benefit ratios and numbers of connections across a series of interactions. At the same time, psychopathic traits have been discovered to predict defective behaviours in game theory scenarios. This experiment combines these two aspects to investigate how group cooperation can emerge when changing group compositions based on psychopathic traits. We implemented a modified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game which has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically to sustain a constant level of cooperation over rounds. A sample of 190 undergraduate students played in small groups where the percentage of psychopathic traits in each group was manipulated. Groups entirely composed of low psychopathic individuals were compared with communities with 50% high and 50% low psychopathic players, to observe the behavioural differences at the group level. Results showed a significant divergence of the mean cooperation of the two conditions, regardless of the small range of participants’ psychopathy scores. Groups with a large density of high psychopathic subjects cooperated significantly less than groups entirely composed of low psychopathic players, confirming our hypothesis that psychopathic traits affect not only individuals’ decisions but also the group behaviour. This experiment highlights how differences in group composition with respect to psychopathic traits can have a significant impact on group dynamics, and it emphasizes the importance of individual characteristics when investigating group behaviours.

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe.
— Mark S
This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals. — 180 Proof

Cooperation strategies, such as direct and indirect reciprocity, are species-independent and innate to our universe because the simple mathematics they are based on are species-independent and innate to our universe.

That these cooperation strategies are encoded into our biology is evident when we consider the emotional responses triggered by our moral sense: empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, guilt, and shame.

These are not just a hodgepodge of emotions.

Empathy, loyalty, and gratitude motivate helping behaviors that initiate or motivate continuing direct and indirect reciprocity.

Righteous indignation (anger triggered by moral norm violations) motivates punishment of others who violate the group’s moral norms. Guilt and shame are direct punishments of ourselves when we violate moral norms.

This combination of motivation to help others and punishment of moral norm violations are the two necessary components of all reciprocity strategies. These emotional heuristics for parts of reciprocity strategies are what began us on the path to being the incredibly successful social species we are.

Are these emotions innate in all people? Psychopaths have diminished to no ability to experience empathy or conscience (shame and guilt) and an inability to learn how to do so. An old term for psychopaths is moral idiots. In them, these heuristic emotions for reciprocity are greatly reduced or even absent.

"Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim.

↪Mark S "Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

Of course, empathy and other emotions are not cooperation strategies.

Empathy and the other emotions I mentioned motivate behaviors that are heuristics for the two necessary parts of reciprocity strategies.

I've tried posting links to the literature, but I could never tell that anyone read the links.

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms.

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well: — wonderer1

Nice study. Thanks for posting.
We could summarize the results as "moral idiots" are bad at cooperation.
That is the point.

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts — Mark S

Yes, its a hypothesis, not a confirmed scientific fact. I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins. — Mark S

How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral? For example, there is a culture in which a caste system exists and those on the lower end of the caste are said to deserve their lot. What if, as many have, find it immoral? Might of culture or law is often times not the same as morality, and yet you claim it is. You're only taking some people's viewpoint of the prescriptive morality in the culture, and not considering the other viewpoints of descriptive morality over the same rules and traditions in that culture. Descriptive morality is subjective to the people you select, but when you speak about universality, you need to address any and all discrepancies.

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case. — Mark S

This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.

1. I showed you quite a few contradictions and rational inconsistencies in your proposal that Morality is Cooperation.
2. Irrational application of science, is faulty science. Its not, "It could be faulty science." Demonstrate what is faulty or irrational.
3. Edge cases are NOT to be dismissed in science. Science constantly challenges its own conclusions, and if there is ANY discrepancy, that is swarmed over like flies until it is resolved.

Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument. A hypothesis that cannot answer discrepancies and offer concreate logical consistencies is a faulty hypothesis.

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others. — Mark S

Many cultural norms or laws are exploitive or about co-option. How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it? How is giving 10% of my money away to the church when I'm poor and need help cooperation? Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?

Thus your thesis that cooperation is universal conclusion we can take from all descriptive morality has a lot to answer before it can be claimed to be universal. Also, I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. I'm curious at this point where you're getting this hypothesis from.

I appreciate you staying engaged with this and trying to answer the issues.

:up: :up:

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms. — Mark S

From what I can tell, sir, that so-called "relationship" is pretty weak. While interdisciplinary disciplines like moral psychology, evolutionary ethics & sociobiology are empirically interesting (re: 'cultural norms' as eu-social constraints/biases), in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct. I stand by my earlier assessment:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/885373

in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct. — 180 Proof

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct?

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture—descriptively moral behaviors.

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

Further, the science of morality identifies what “motivates/facilitates either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct” as part of cooperation strategies.

Here are two examples of the science of morality’s relevance to moral naturalism:

1) The fact that our moral intuitions regarding interactions with other people are part of cooperation strategies reveals much about the natural conditions relevant to moral naturalism. This knowledge should be helpful in defining moral naturalism.

2) Indirect reciprocity is a much more powerful cooperation strategy than direct reciprocity. (In indirect reciprocity, the reciprocated help will generally not be returned to the person who initially helped another as required for direct reciprocity.) The non-reciprocal part in your moral naturalism’s "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" implies cooperation to reduce harm by indirect reciprocity. If so, the science of morality directly supports "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" as the goal of the most natural of moral naturalisms.

Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

A thread about the state of the science of morality might be well worthwhile. I’ll give that some more thought.

"Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" — 180 Proof

Neither is Morality, but here you are - a moral Naturalist ;)

"Neither is Morality" what?

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct? — Mark S

No. Why do you ask?

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

No. The sciences I'd mentioned in my previous post, more or less, do just that.

Morality — AmadeusD

is not

innate to the universe" — 180 Proof

Yet here you are, a moral Naturalist. And apparently a grumpy one. :)

You're mistaken. I have not claimed or implied "morality is innate to the universe".

Perhaps, but I'm also joking.

In anycase, I understand moral naturalism to entail that it is empirically discoverable, as an aspect of the universe. I can't understand how that wouldn't entail an 'innate to the universe' conception of morality. If that is the case, even if your view is sui generis, would be very much interested to know what the source is, if it's not innate. I don't realy know any naturalists

In anycase, I understand moral naturalism to entail that it is empirically discoverable, as an aspect of the universe. — AmadeusD

What "it" are you referring to?

morality. I'm not a dentist...

I'm not a "dentist" either and you're completely mistaken about moral naturalism as I've used the term in this thread. "Morality" is certainly not "innate" or "furniture of the world" any more than ecology or medicine are, and yet the latter are, at minimum, bound (i.e. enabled-constrained) by the laws of nature.

"Morality" is certainly not "innate" or "furniture if the world" any more than ecology or medicine are, and yet the latter are bound (i.e. enabled-constrained) by the laws of nature. — 180 Proof

Ah, ok, interesting. And is it hte case that you apply that similar boundedness to Morality, but perhaps with different parameters?
Again, I don't really know any moral naturalists so my understanding is purely academic. Just enquiring, mind to mind :)

And is it hte case that you apply that similar boundedness to Morality, but perhaps with different parameters? — AmadeusD

Yes.

Here's a recent post from another thread that might make clearer and more precise what I mean by moral naturalism ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857773

Thanks very much, that's very helpful - It seems to be counter to a general conception of moral naturalism, so that's really cool to me.

Not at all compelling, though, for various reasons.

Do tell – "not compelling ... various reasons"? (I can use all the help I can get. :smirk:)

(3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e.obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; — 180 Proof

Fair enough! The thing that shook me off the track was that the underlined appears to be the unpinning of the system (otherwise, I see no connection with anything moral in the description - set me right if i'm wrong). If this is the case, this seems an arbitrary assertion for which nothing in the wider post acts as support. It seems, this is your emotivist crux, hiding under a cloak of objective reason.