quote="James Riley;568708"]5
I would also add that it represented the most refined and ‘verified’ thinking among the intellectuals
— Joshs
How much of that was just establishment conservatives justifying the maintenance of the status quo?
But the way it is worded, it almost comes across as saying "even the damn ivory tower intellectual elite liberals" were on board back then. That wasn't true then and it's not true now.[/quote]
“I It is by now well known that some of the greatest modern philosophers held racist views. John Locke (1632-1704), David Hume (1711-76), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), G W F Hegel (1770-1831) and many others believed that Black and Indigenous peoples the world over were savage, inferior and in need of correction by European enlightenment.” ( You could add Hannah Arendt to that list).
“Michael Zeuske, a Bonn-based historian and specialist for the history of slavery, on Deutschlandfunk (a German public radio station) on June 13, 2020: “If one seriously intends to enlighten people about racism and the toppling of monuments,” to paraphrase Zeuske, “one must also take such great minds as the philosopher Immanuel Kant […] into account.” Why? Well, because, as Zeuske puts it, Kant’s “anthropological writings helped to establish European racism.”
What George Kelly could ad is that: Man, in his open conspiracy to pursue his self-interest, always claims to be doing it "for the children"; and some of those children in future generations will look back and excuse him for "not knowing any better. — James Riley
Kelly, like the phenomenologists , Heidegger and embodied cognitive theorists , rejects the quaint enlightenment notion of self-interest, which implies an atomized , autonomous subject split off from a world. By the way, your view of self-interest would probably be considered racist by critical race theory adherents.
“ A parable called "The Tragedy of the Commons" haunts social research on ethical concerns. The parable describes a situation in which a number of herdsmen graze their herds on a common pasturage. Each herdsman knows that it is in his self-interest to increase the size of his herd because, whereas each additional animal brings profit to him, the cost of grazing the animal and the damage done to the pasturage is shared by all the herdsmen. As a result, each of the herdsmen rationally increases his herd size until the commons is destroyed and, with it, all of the herds that grazed on it. The concern of the social scientist is how one can get a group of rationally self-interested herdsmen to cooperate in maintaining the vanishing commons.
This disarmingly disingenuous metaphor for our world situation embodies a long tradition of modern thought about the self and its relation to others, which may be called the economic view of the mind. The goal of the self is assumed to be profit-getting the most at least cost. The unconstrained economic man, such as Hobbes's despot,continues his acquisitions until there is nothing left for anyone else. Therefore, constraints are needed: overt social force, internalized socialization, subtle psychological mechanisms. A general theory called social exchange theory, widely used in social psychology, decision theory, sociology, economics, and political science, views all of human activity, individually and in groups, in terms of input and output calculations, paying and receiving. We believe that this implicit vision of motivation underlies not only social science but many contemporary people's views of their own action. Even altruism is defined in terms of an individual obtaining (psychological) utility from benefiting another.
Is such a view experientially validated? We believe that the view of the self as an economic man, which is the view the social sciences hold, is quite consonant with the unexamined view of our own motivation that we hold as ordinary, nonmindful people. Let us state that view clearly. The self is seen as a territory with boundaries. The goal of the self is to bring inside the boundaries all of the good things while paying out as few goods as possible and conversely to remove to the outside of the boundaries all of the bad things while letting in as little bad as possible. Since goods are scarce, each autonomous self is in competition with other selves to get them. Since cooperation between individuals and whole societies may be needed to get more goods, uneasy and unstable alliances are formed between autonomous selves. Some selves (altruists) and many selves in some roles (parents, teachers) may get (immaterial) goods by helping other selves, but they will become disappointed (even disillusioned) if those other selves do not reciprocate by being properly helped.
What does the mindfulness/awareness tradition or enactive cognitive science have to contribute to this portrait of self-interest? The mindful, open-ended approach to experience reveals that moment by moment this so-called self occurs only in relation to the other. If I want praise, love, fame, or power, there has to be another (even if only a mental one) to praise, love, know about, or submit to me. If I want to obtain things, they have to be things that I don't already have. Even with respect to the desire for pleasure, the pleasure is something to which I am in a relation. Because self is always codependent with other (even at the gross level we are now discussing), the force of self-interest is always other-directed in the very same respect with which it is self-directed. What, then, are people doing who appear so self-interested as opposed to other-interested? Mindfulness/awareness meditators suggest that those people are struggling, in a confused way, to maintain the sense of a separate self by engaging in self-referential relationships with the other. Whether I gain or lose, there can be a sense of I; if there is nothing to be gained or lost, I am groundless. If Hobbes's despot were actually to succeed in obtaining everything in the universe, he would have to find some other preoccupation quickly, or he would be in a woeful state: he would be unable to maintain his sense of himself. Of course, as we have seen with nihilism, one can always turn that groundlessness into a ground; then one can maintain oneself in relation to it by feeling despair.“
( Francisco Varela, The Embodied Mind)