"Self" is nothing but an idea reiterated moment to moment like frames in a movie reel (continuity) projecting an illusion of "self-identity" that is almost always reified by reflex (bias) into "ego". Various techniques, such as meditation, are used to suspend ego-attachment, etc in order to relieve(?) anxiety / neuroses due to threats? limitations? inadequacies? of – felt by – the "ego". Psychoactives are also another way of experiencing the idea of "self" as merely an idea, thereby loosening the duality-grip of "ego".

So what remains when the illusion (of "self-identity") is made explicit as such? The body – continuity of memories, feelings, awareness via embodiment. As Witty says "The human body is the best picture of the human soul." Foot & Dennett, Lakoff & Flanagan, Parfit & Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche Hume & Spinoza, other thinkers all the way back to ... Epicurus & the Buddha (seem to) concur.

My thinking on the matter stems originally from first-hand experience, many times growing up I would have seizures and blackout upon awakening for a brief period of time I would have no memory. I did not know who anyone was including myself. I was battered and bruised but otherwise felt incredibly good, all there was, was my sense of being alive which felt fantastic. Then one memory would come to me and the rest would come flooding back. Spinoza said the body is the mind's object, it is through the body that the mind knows the world and that was my experience, there was nothing else, it just felt great to be alive. I believe the sense of self lives in the memory but to know it, is to know it has no identity it is process. People identify the I as their storyline, the history of their experiences remembered is then the self. The experiences of that given constitution is a like process all across the board as a given constitution in process of building a history of experiences.

But, it does show that the self is not always in charge, and many forms of breakdown do show aspects of ego consciousness and the fragility of the self for some individuals. — Jack Cummins

However, even a "fragile" self is and therefore is still a self.

The self is grounded in the experience of being. The pure experience of being is always there.

The core of the self, the experience of being, is changeless and indestructible, and not "fragile" at all.

What changes is the stuff that is other than the experience of being, and that one identifies with like an actor identifying with the characters he impersonates in different plays.

The fragile bit is that part of us that is capable of change, in the same way the physical body may suffer an illness or even the loss of a limb without however this in any way affecting the core of who we are.

So, it is all a question of who or what one identifies with. I think this is what Jung meant when he was talking about mandalas as a device for refocusing or re-centering your psychological system and reintegrating it with that inner awareness of being as the core of your self. And, presumably, some forms of meditation work in a similar way.

The self is grounded in the experience of being. The pure experience of being is always there. — Apollodorus

I'm assuming this pure experience isn't necessarily available to the people who have it. The experience is mediated. Many people have a false sense of self and their experiences are rarely grounded or pure and are influenced and editorialized by a flawed personality or by a mental illness or simply through enculturation and socialization.

I think the real, authentic self, is that part of the experience of the self that is impossible to express. I mean: I have a certain perception of me as "I", but I realize that it is absolutely impossible to me to know if other people perceive their being "I" somewhat similarly to me: it is impossible to me to make a journey inside your "I" and see how you feel, how you experience your being "I"; the same applies to you towards me. This is the true self. When we, instead, talk about it as a result of other mechanisms, such as cells, brain, neurons, we are talking about what we might having in common, this way completely forgetting the exclusiveness and the non-comunicability of the experience of the self that each of us has. If, one day, we explain the mechanisms that make us perceive as "I", we won't have explained anything, because we will stll totally miss the exclusive experience of each of us that is impossible to communicate.

You may have a point there, depending on how mediated or distorted the experience is, which is probably hard to tell in cases of severe psychological disorder. But my guess is that so long as an individual is conscious there must be a basic awareness of existing on the background of which all other experiences take place. And that basic awareness may help us find an answer to the question as to how we understand the self.

If, one day, we explain the mechanisms that make us perceive as "I", we won't have explained anything, because we will stll totally miss the exclusive experience of each of us that is impossible to communicate. — Angelo

But the fact that it is impossible to communicate does not necessarily mean that there is no common element in that experience that all conscious beings share.

I'd say the sense of self (in the sense of identity) is dependent on memory, and may be lost due to amnesia. There also seems to be a sense of individuality based on felt embodiment, which obviously is not lost in amnesia, and is common to animals as well as humans.

So what remains when the illusion (of "self-identity") is made explicit as such? The body – continuity of memories, feelings, awareness via embodiment. — 180 Proof

I see you are making a similar point. :up:

Nietzsche repeats Pindar's urging to:

Become who you are.

And Jaspers makes a whole philosophy out of that.

I like to think of my self as that within my body (whatever the self is, it is inside my body, I think) which is aware of (1) my physical limits/boundaries (my body) AND (2) the change detected by my senses.

Thus, my self knows what I am NOT (i.e., it is capable of differentiating between my body and what is not my body - or between itself and what is NOT itself, even if it is unable to exactly define itself); in addition, my self is also able to relate a sense-experience (a perception) to past forms of such sense-experience (it is aware of change).

Sometimes, I try to approach the problem of the self by asking myself what it is that I am aware of. So far, I have been able to conclude that the most basic things (or least complex things) I am aware of are my body and the change in the environment perceived by my sensory organs; in a way, I think of these (my body and change) as the basis of awareness (I don't think one would be able to be aware if one could not tell itself apart from the environment, and if one could not perceive change in the environment). In regard to the perception of change, I do not think that the act of perceiving (in addition to being able to tell what one is not) would be enough to give rise to the self - one would need to be able to detect change. Thus, at its most "basic" level*, I think, the self is that which is able to be aware of change in its environment (sensory organs detect/react to change in the environment but are not aware of it; the self does not detect change in the environment but is aware of it - but to be aware of such change, the self must be aware of what it is not, first).

So, what is it that you are NOT? What is it you are aware of (in its most basic form)?

* Well, in its most basic form, the self is that which is aware (but again, to be aware, I think one must be able to know/understand what one is not - and by one I mean an organism/a particular entity).

I think that your idea of self as being an aspect of self organization does make a lot of sense to me — Jack Cummins

But, it think that we do develop systems of information, as evident in memories and this is inherent in our sense of identity and self. — Jack Cummins

When I think about my own development of self and identity, it is bound up with significant memories — Jack Cummins

In systems and complexity theory, a naturally occurring thing is a "self" organizing system. A system organizes on it's own, and thus through this process creates a self. A system can be composed of various things in different ways, that through interrelation, self organize to some sort of singular thing ( a collective consciousness ). The multiplicity of things that they are and what they do, can be captured by the term "information". Information composes their structure, and how they act is information. It follows "a self is information about how information has organized itself " - this captures all systems, including humanity.

Normally what we are is the result of our experience ( memories ). Strictly speaking what we are is the result of DNA data, experience, and point in space ( relativity ) ( perspective ). These are all information about us. So, in the end, information put together in a particular way, in our unique way, is what we are, what we become, and this continues evolving in an ongoing process.

Things, and people, assemble themselves into themselves is the observation. Why should things assemble themselves into themselves is the question?

Generally, I am trying to think about the idea of self as a philosophical rather than psychological problem — Jack Cummins

Could it be the case that Philosophy asks and seeks - what is it? how can we know about it?, while Psychology asks, and explains how it affects us, and what it does for us?

del

I think that the idea of considering what the self is NOT is important. It probably begins when the child first realises separation from mother and other people. But, of course, how we see other minds is important because most people don't end up coming up as taking a soliptist view. We think about oneself in relation to other selves.

But, I think that when we think about what the self is or isn't, apart from the role of embodiment, it involves being aware of invisible aspects of existence. In this, while we step back and are aware of being in the world, connected to others, there are certain aspects of self, which incorporate will, imagination and conscience. So, the idea of self is a whole spectrum of identity, rather than a single aspect, and is almost a universe within.

I think that your distinction between philosophy asking, 'What it is?'and how we can know and psychology focusing upon how this 'affects us' is useful. Psychology and philosophy are separate as disciplines now, but they still overlap so much, and I have been trying to ask about the nature of the self as a philosophy question. But, it is hard to distinguish the psychology and philosophy can this entirely, but I do believe that the philosophy is about the basic explanations, but, of course, we are selves, or minds, asking the questions.

One can even ask to what extent is the idea of self and mind different. That could involve viewing the self as being embodied. However, we are left with another question: what is mind exactly? Most philosophers don't view mind as a category of disembodied 'mind' in an idealist way. But, I think that philosophy is more about the thinking about the concepts, such as how self is figured out, in relation to other ideas, such as mind and body.

I think that the question of why particular things and selves assemble themselves in the particular unique way is one which can become overlooked. Generally, I think that it probably involves a complex mixture of nature vs nurture, but I do believe that as selves we have more of conscious choice in choosing how and what to select in the assembling of our lives.

I am sure that language plays a clear role in this and the whole nature of self-consciousness entails language. It gives us the framework for conceptualizing, constructing identity and the framework of our specific consciousness, which leads to the specifically human engagement with other beings and the environment.

I think that your point in one of your pictures, 'We can't see awareness be we are it' is interesting. It may be the universal blindspot. I wonder how this relates to looking in the mirror, because we are able to look at ourselves, from the perspective and others, although the mirror itself gives a reverse image. But, to see our mirror image or photograph, or even hear a recording of our own voice is a perspective of self from the outside, which is an alternative addition to the perspective of awareness from the subjective viewpoint alone.

Nietzsche repeats Pindar's urging to:

Become who you are. — Fooloso4

But who are ‘we’ according to Nietzsche?

“What gives me the right to speak about an I, and, for that matter, about an I as cause, and, finally, about an I as the cause of thoughts?””

“…a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I” – well that is just an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty.” In fact, there is already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself.“

“On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and motion that generally start right after the act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about this duality by means of the synthetic concept of the “I.” “

If you have not already done so, it would be helpful to identify the source of the quotes. They are from Beyond Good and Evil 16-17.
ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).(BGE 17)

He is not denying that we think: “ONE thinks”. What he rejects is an “interpretation of the process” by which “the ‘one’” “does not belong to the process itself”.

This is easier to understand if we look an earlier section:

Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! (BGE, 12)

But if we stop there we will not understand him. He continues:

Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new. (BGE 12)

He is not critical of Descartes' “I think” but of the notion of a thinking substance, which Descartes identifies with his immortal soul. The soul is not something we have. In his refinement of the soul-hypothesis Nietzsche posits a “soul of subjective multiplicity”. This solves the problem of the seeming mystery of a thought that comes when it wishes rather than when I wish. It is not that the thought has some kind of independent existence and comes to me from elsewhere, but simply that there is not something within me, an “I” or “ego” or “little ‘one’” that is the agent of my thoughts. This is not a denial of agency, it is a denial of something within me, some substance or soul-atom that is the agent.

This solves the problem of the seeming mystery of a thought that comes when it wishes rather than when I wish. It is not that the thought has some kind of independent existence and comes to me from elsewhere, but simply that there is not something within me, an “I” or “ego” or “little ‘one’” that is the agent of my thoughts. This is not a denial of agency, it is a denial of something within me, some substance or soul-atom that is the agent. — Fooloso4

There would have to be agency for Nietzsche in the sense of a subjectivity, since Will to power is grounded in subjectivity. The question for me is what sort of agency or subjectivity is this? How does it differ from Kant’s , for instance? You say thoughts don’t have independent existence for Nietzsche. What do you mean by independent? In what way are they dependent on my subjectivity? If we follow the postmodern readings of Nietzsche ( Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault , Deleuze) , subjectivity for Nietzsche is a difference of forces. This means that subjectivity is always outside of itself. Not outside in the sense of being ‘caused’ by empirical objects in the world , but outside in the postmodern sense of a subjectivity whose very essence is in that it is produced by an outside.

How does it differ from Kant’s , for instance? — Joshs

Kant's concept is unitary. The 'I' is for Nietzsche a multiplicity.

I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Toward the Ubermensch)

What do you mean by independent? In what way are they dependent on my subjectivity? — Joshs

"ONE thinks"

If we follow the postmodern readings of Nietzsche — Joshs

In my opinion, this multiplies that problem because we must now provide an interpretation of interpretations.

What do you mean by independent? In what way are they dependent on my subjectivity?
— Joshs

"ONE thinks" — Fooloso4

ONE what? Where is the unity in order to talk about a singularity? In what sense is a subjective multiplicity a unity? Didnt you just quote Nietzsche saying we need to get beyond the ‘one’?

perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).(BGE 17) — Fooloso4

Didnt you just quote Nietzsche saying we need to get beyond the ‘one’? — Joshs

No. The distinction is between 'one' as in what someone might think or say or do (see how often he says "one must" in the passages above) and 'one' or 'I' as a substance or "soul atomism" as:

something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon

to get along without the little "one" — Fooloso4

The little one is that:

to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself

Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science.

He distinguishes between an old refinement and a new one.

soul of subjective multiplicity,

But this isnt a functional unity, and it isnt an inside as opposed to an outside. In sum, it is very different from Sarte’s notion of subjectivity and agency.

But this isnt a functional unity — Joshs

Sometimes we are conflicted and at odds with oneself. Plato points to this with the story of Leontius in the Republic.

Sometimes we are conflicted and at odds with oneself. Pl — Fooloso4

Being conflicted and at odds with oneself is another way of describing the idea that experience is becoming. Conventional ways of thinking about agency, subjectivity and the self make change derivative of self-present entities and objects.An object appears to a thinking, experiencing subject whose ‘self’ can be differentiated from what it experiences. Nietzsche spearheaded a revolution in thinking that places difference, change and becoming as prior to presence. This is the essence of Will to Power. Being at odds with oneself simply IS what the self is.

what is 'self' exactly... how do we make sense of this at all in a way which is useful and meaningful for us in life?

Personally, I've always enjoyed Kierkegaard's idea of the self, as a verb or an act of continual movement (being that the self is continually created and re-created throughout a lifetime).

Here, this idea of the self essentially posits it as a relation, that relates itself to a finite and an infinite aspect.

The finite aspect is the necessary, the relation to the concrete here and now, to the reality of living as a definite something in the world.

The infinite aspect is all about possibility, to create new thoughts, new ideas, to bring into existence new creations, to change oneself into becoming something new by choosing from an infinite number of possibilities.

A balanced self then, is a relation between these two aspects, to choose from infinite possibility, and then to make this choice concrete by actualizing it in the finite. This balance is a continual movement, as the self changes over a lifetime of experience. This idea of self also requires overcoming anxiety into a "leap of faith", that is, to have the courage, passion, and conviction to make a choice from infinite possibility and committing to it in our finite reality.

The loss of self then, Kierkegaard would say, arises from an imbalance in the relation to the finite / infinite - i.e. to be trapped in the current finite self relation, unable to actualize and to change, or trapped in infinite possibility, a dreamer, with no hope of making those dreams "real."

So, the self then - a verb, an act, a continual movement - an unfolding project of taking what we find ourselves with as beings in the world, and through a passionate commitment, or "leap of faith", relating to something outside ourselves to bestow our lives with meaning. One could say, a subjective meaning, or subjective truth - "to become what one is" - this choice / meaning, is all up to you.

I do believe that as selves we have more of conscious choice in choosing how and what to select in the assembling of our lives. — Jack Cummins

In my understanding a body of information ( a self ) integrates more information onto itself, in every moment of consciousness. The information cannot fit any old way. The established body of information has its own momentum, so is biased in how it integrates new information along its path. This suggests a determinism, but there is also a slight element of randomness in regard to how well new information can be integrated with the old. This inability to integrate new and old information causes novel information integration, and so a slight shift in what constitutes a self.

I am sure that language plays a clear role in this and the whole nature of self-consciousness entails language. It gives us the framework for conceptualizing, constructing identity and the framework of our specific consciousness, — Jack Cummins

Yes, I agree. Words are symbols (of information), and language is a pattern of symbols. Language express our unique patterns of information entanglement ( integration ), so expresses aspects of our peculiar consciousness.

However, we are left with another question: what is mind exactly? Most philosophers don't view mind as a category of disembodied 'mind' in an idealist way. But, I think that philosophy is more about the thinking about the concepts, such as how self is figured out, in relation to other ideas, such as mind and body. — Jack Cummins

I do realise the importance of the concepts and definitions in philosophy, - clarifying and reflecting analysing, and inventing the new (if needed). I was reading about Jung last night, and it said "Ultimately Jung claims, the Self is fully realised in death." I thought it is a kind of mystic way of description, rather than scientific, which sounds subjective and impossible to prove or falsify with scientific methods.