He's just saying that consciousness of my own existence requires something to compare and contrast with me. The use of dialectics runs through the CPR. This is a case of that. — frank

And?

Per Kant, we don't learn about space and time a posteriori.
— frank

That is a more of an argument toward accepting an "ontological" limit than saying: — Paine

I don't know what an ontological limit is. That we know about space and time a priori is the outcome of a series of arguments.

The Refutation of Idealism section previously linked to argues against the "any difference will do" idea. — Paine

I don't know what "any difference will do" refers to. It has nothing to do with anything I said.

On the surface, your description does not account for the emphasis upon intuition of space and time. — Paine

Per Kant, we don't learn about space and time a posteriori. As for a reference, I don't think we can do better than Kant himself. Have you read the Transcendental Aesthetic?

Or it could be incorrect which also would require more work reading the text. — Paine

He's just saying that consciousness of my own existence requires something to compare and contrast with me. The use of dialectics runs through the CPR. This is a case of that.

I don't think Kant's point is really all that complicated. Can you not encapsulate it?

Excellent. Why don't you flesh out Kant's argument for us?

Yes, I would say connected. Everything arises from social practices and contingent factors; the possibilities of our experiencing anything, perception, our bodies, and the way we experience the world are all shaped by these conditions — Tom Storm

Sure. It pains me to agree with Leontiskos, but he's right that this theory about human life suggests a fixed, transcendent vantage point. That's just how the mind works. If you call something transient, you're situating yourself at a point that being identified as stationary.

Rationality is also a narrative. — Pantagruel

It's a bunch of different narratives, in a way. There's rationality that's basically just fashion, there's rationality that's logical, etc. Do you agree?

. For me, truth isn’t something we reach from a perfect, universal viewpoint; it’s something we work out from where we stand. So when I say truth claims are context-dependent, I’m also saying this one is too. — Tom Storm

Isn't it that the meaning of a sentence is context dependent? And both the sentence structure and its meaning emerge from social practices. It's confusing to say the truth claim is context dependent, because that suggests that the meaning of the sentence remains fixed, but it's truth varies depending on context.

Rather, make the meaning variable, depending on context, and truth is a property of propositions or statements, however inflated or deflated you take truth, that's a connected, but separate issue, right?

:up:

Are you familiar with Kripke's argument that meaning can't arise from rule following?

Who knows how my isolated super brain might work. — T Clark

Surely some part of you knows how it works? Your personal Lord of Illusion?

That same image came to me once: of God with finger puppets, doing a puppet show for herself. Bloody puppet show. :scream:

So your answer is that everything is you, but parts of you are not available to consciousness right now?

I'm a keen student sociology, especially symbolic interactionism. For me, Habermas' communicative rationality seems a logical development of that. Instrumental rationality is a core theme for me. I also like to read him as counterpart and contrast to Rawls' theories of distributive justice. His writing is dense but it is concise, and his knowledge encyclopedic. Also is a monumental work. — Pantagruel

Cool. My interest is in how a community recovers from a catastrophe related to nationalism. Apparently the narrative was that Germany has a tendency to embrace irrational themes, and the ideology of Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger fed into this. I think the real root of it goes much deeper than Hegel, though. I think it's in Christianity as well.

Searle's tongue was in his cheek: whoever "disproves everybody else's solipsism" presupposes that s/he is not a solipsist. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Does it? How so?

Let’s take a shot at it. — T Clark

Ok thanks! Shot number 1:

Doesn't your solipsistic view conflict with your everyday behavior? For instance, you talk to me without knowing what I'm going to say next. How could that behavior fit with solipsism?

Solipsism as usually understood is not something that can be verified or falsified empirically. It’s metaphysics. It’s something you can pretend to believe because it makes figuring things out easier. — T Clark

If you're up for it, I'd like to try to persuade you that solipsism is wrong. I just need for you to play devil's advocate and defend it. Ok?

Anglo-American philosophy has been stranded for some time in an attempted pivot away from Cartesian dualism. The OP is pestering the issue anew.

You could probably find a forum focused on welding if the OP question seems like a waste of your time. :grin:

I agree that there's a good side and bad side to downvotes. It's helpful for identifying trolls.

So why allow it in the form of trivial, faceless "down votes" devoid of any reason or explanation? — Outlander

It works. I have a couple of subreddits which I've never had to moderate. Downvotes do all the work.

:up: What do you like about him?

Maybe we could trial downvotes? They have a harsh side where immature people downvote to signal disagreement, but they can also be an effective means of community self moderation.

Also a History of Philosophy, Volume 2: The Occidental Constellation of Faith and Knowledge
by Jürgen Habermas — Pantagruel

Ha! Habermas figures large in the book I'm reading, about German nationalism after WW2.

Another Country --German Intellectuals, Unification, and National Identity
Jan-Werner Muller

It was worse than an autocracy, it was colonisation. The British people were ruled with an iron fist for centuries, by French colonialists. The invaders eventually became the aristocracy and retained their privileged status until the 20th Century. — Punshhh

The Normans were uber bad-asses, yes. If the people living in England would have joined Harold Godwinson, the Norman invasion probably could have been deflected. When attacked, unify or be defeated. That principle shows up in Russian history as well.

That's not the issue. — Banno

Oh. :grin:

Anti-realists don't have to explain how there are unstated statements.

This is from an interesting interview with Noam Chomsky about his experiences as a Zionist:

CHOMSKY: I was connected to a considerable part of the Zionist movement which was opposed to a Jewish state. It’s not too well known, but until 1942 there was no official commitment of Zionist organizations to a Jewish state. And even that was in the middle of World War II. It was a decision made in the Hotel Biltmore in New York, where there was the first official call for a Jewish state. Before that in the whole Zionist movement, establishing a Jewish state was maybe implicit or in people’s minds or something, but it wasn’t an official call.

The group that I was interested in was bi-nationalist. And that was not so small. A substantial part of the Kibbutz movement, for example, Hashomer Hatzair, was at least officially anti-state, calling for bi-nationalism. And the groups I was connected with were hoping for a socialist Palestine based on Arab-Jewish, working-class cooperation in a bi-national community: no state, no Jewish state, just Palestine.

There were significant figures involved in that. Actually one of them in Philadelphia was Zellig Harris, the guy I ended up studying with at the University of Pennsylvania. He was one of the leaders of a group called Avukah. By the time I got there it had disbanded but through the 1930s and early 1940s it was quite an important organization of left-wing, Zionist, anti-state, young Jews. Plenty of people went through that—a lot of people who are pretty well-known now—from all over the place. It was not an insignificant part of the young, left Jewish community in the United States, and happened to be partially in Philadelphia.

I can remember when the UN partition resolution was announced in 1947. It was almost like mourning in these circles because we didn’t want a Jewish state.

The Anglo-American Commission claimed that about 25% of the Jewish population in Palestine was opposed to a state. There was kind of a different mentality at the time. To talk about socialism wasn’t considered a joke at that time. It was a real meaningful, live phenomenon. And a large part of the Yishuv—the Jewish community in Palestine—was, in fact, a co-operative community with collectives, co-operative industry, commerce, lots of socialist institutions. They were also racist Jews. But there was also a lot of opposition to that, too in our groups. We thought they should be Arab-Jewish.

From about then, from the late 1960s until the mid-1970s, I think bi-nationalism was actually a feasible objective. Even then it could have moved in that direction. By then it would have taken a different form than pre-1948, of course. But there could have been moves toward a kind of federalism, which might have evolved further into a more integrated, bi-national community. And, in fact, even elements of Israeli intelligence were pressing for something like this.

By 1975, the opportunity had been lost. By that time, Palestinian nationalism had entered the international agenda and mainly among Palestinians. And since about 1975, I don’t think there has been any way of realizing objectives like that except in stages with a two-state settlement being the first stage. If there was some other way of doing that, I’d be in favor of that, but I’ve never heard of it.

People now talk about one state—which would, of course, be a bi-national state—but without saying how you get there. At that time of my youth, there was, pre-1948. In the early 1970s, it was possible to think about how to get there directly. Now, as far as I can see, the only way to achieve goals like that is indirectly, through a two-state. — Chomsky 2011

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.

ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world. — J

I agree. As you say, the idea is that the world is made of events and states.

The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. — J

:up: And this ties back to Wittgenstein's statement that the world is all that is the case. He was referring to the insight that the world does not seem to be made of a set of objects, but of objects doing things. That gives us the notion that the world is a set of true propositions.

The bit from the Enlightenment that I think about from time to time is that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. So true.

Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. (again, Kantian noumenon). — I like sushi

But tomorrow isn't here yet.

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

I think you meant "Wow. I read the article you posted, and that's an amazing possibility. Thanks for sharing."

You're welcome.

In GR time begins at the singularity and the question of a time before the singularity is without a sense. — Banno

That's not true. The GR math doesn't say anything about a singularity. The idea of a singularity is just a product extrapolation.

So the black hole cosmology theory isn't outside GR.

@SophistiCat. is that correct?

Either way, such speculation is a waste of time. — Banno

Speculative physicists don't seem to think so.

There's no such time. Time came into existence along with the universe; the Big Bang is not an event in time but a boundary of time. — Banno

Maybe. There's a theory that we're in a black hole, which is inside a bigger universe. Instead of one Big Bang, there are Big Bounces that spawn universes. So our universe is in a bigger one, and our's is spawning more universes, which we detect as black holes.

The philosophical import being that we really don't know.

In the US that is supposed to be democratic, the Industries were modeled after Britain's autocracy. We have some understanding of our Industry being autocratic, but our understanding of this is non nonexistent. Would you like to develop this thinking? — Athena

What is said is that American industries were modeled after the US military, whose structure comes from the Prussian military.

The US went through a period of de-industrialization starting in the 1980s. That old military style evolved into something more flexible, but there are still elements of it to be seen.

And the British have never had an autocracy.

Can we please stop confusing the USA with democracy? — Athena

Strictly speaking, it's a republic, not a democracy.

The British have never really had autocracy due to the Magna Carta.

that we have senators instead of lords. Profound stuff. — Banno

You guys copied our federalism. I think you secretly love the USA.