Well, yes. But is the set of all possible sentences different to the set of all sentences? — Banno
1. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects
Which of these do you disagree with? — Michael
We don't need to know that a sentence is true for it to be true. — Michael
I mean what the word ordinarily means. It is possible to say something truthful that answers the question.
How is this not clear? — Michael
I'm saying that it is possible to respond to the question by saying something true. — Michael
No, when I say "there's an answer to the question" I am saying that it is possible to answer the question with a truthful sentence. — Michael
There's an answer to the question "why did Yoon Park disappear?" — Michael
That depends on what they're talking about. If they're talking about the existence of aliens then either they're saying that the truth of the sentence "aliens exist" is unknown or they're saying that the existence of aliens is unknown. — Michael
Truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers.
Truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago.
Therefore, truth was not a property of anything that existed 65 million years ago. — Michael
Truth bearers didn't exist 65 million years ago. Do you agree or disagree? — Michael
You're just repeating the same fictionalist account.
Truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago, even if our informal language implies that they did. — Michael
See my previous comment. — Michael
Are they mind-independent abstract objects? I don’t believe in any such things. — Michael
Truth and falsity are properties of sentences, sentences are features of language, and language is a social (and psychological) activity performed by and between people. — Michael
So if there are no people there is nothing which has the property of being either true or false. — Michael
But none of this is relevant to what I’m claiming, which is that being true and being false are properties of sentences, not properties of rain (and that there is no Platonic third thing that “sits” between the two) — Michael
If by this you mean that the sentence “it is raining” is true if and only if the rain exists then that is exactly what I have been saying. — Michael
Notice the bit where we can chose between realism and antirealsim? That's my suggestion for the answer to the OP. That the choice between realism and antirealism is a choice about how we talk about stuff, not a debate about metaphysical actualities. — Banno
But there are models available to predict this — Benkei
How is that a mystery? — Benkei
Consider that question for a moment, and then tell me again how it's the bare sentence and not the use made of it that matters. — Srap Tasmaner
Right. I mentioned earlier that worldview (or hinge propositions) are in play regarding dinosaur truths. It's not something that gets worked out logically.Once again what looks like metaphysics is a choice of language. — Banno
The wouldn't you need an interpretation of the interpretation? — Banno
Seeing as he doesn't provide an answer, that's pretty sad. But also probably accurate. — Banno