I don’t know what you mean.

Rain exists or it doesn’t. — Michael

And if it does, then the world (or region) satisfies the sentence in question. If not, not.

And if it does, then the world (or region) satisfies the sentence in question. If not, not. — bongo fury

If by this you mean that the sentence “it is raining” is true if and only if the rain exists then that is exactly what I have been saying.

If by this you mean that the sentence “it is raining” is true if and only if the rain exists then that is exactly what I have been saying. — Michael

It could be that a person uses that sentence as a euphemism. In the movie Young Frankenstein, Gene Wilder's character comments, while exhuming a grave, that it "Could be worse. Could be raining.". Immediately after he says that rain starts pouring down. So when a person says, "It's raining." they may mean that things have gotten worse.

You need a theory of meaning that covers this kind of speech. What do you propose?

So when a person says, "It's raining." they may mean that things have gotten worse.

You need a theory of meaning that covers this kind of speech. What do you propose? — frank

Then what they say is true if and only if things have gotten worse.

If all you mean to say is that Tarski’s T-schema is an impoverished account of natural language then I agree, and I’ve addressed some issues with it earlier.

But none of this is relevant to what I’m claiming, which is that being true and being false are properties of sentences, not properties of rain (and that there is no Platonic third thing that “sits” between the two).

But none of this is relevant to what I’m claiming, which is that being true and being false are properties of sentences, not properties of rain (and that there is no Platonic third thing that “sits” between the two) — Michael

Sentences are also abstract objects. If you're talking about the sounds and marks we make, the correct word is utterance, not sentence.

Sentences are also abstract objects. — frank

Are they mind-independent abstract objects? I don’t believe in any such things.

Truth and falsity are properties of sentences, sentences are features of language, and language is a social (and psychological) activity performed by and between people.

So if there are no people there is nothing which has the property of being either true or false. But assuming that idealism/phenomenalism isn't the case, there is still gold and rain and so on.

Are they mind-independent abstract objects? I don’t believe in any such things. — Michael

They're independent of any particular mind, like numbers. Think of it as a pattern if that helps.

Truth and falsity are properties of sentences, sentences are features of language, and language is a social (and psychological) activity performed by and between people. — Michael

Yea. If you don't want to deal with any abstract objects, you'll need to use utterances as your truthbearer.

So if there are no people there is nothing which has the property of being either true or false. — Michael

Ok. This is truth skepticism. That's just what it's called.

Ok. This is truth skepticism. That's just what it's called. — frank

You're going to have to flesh this out. From here:

Five different forms of truth skepticism are examined and defused: (1) the view that truth is indefinable, (2) that it is unattainable and unknowable, (3) that it is inextricably metaphysical and hence not scientifically respectable, (4) that there is no such thing as truth, and (5) that truth is inherently paradoxical, and so must either be abandoned or revised.

I suppose that maybe a case can be made for (1), but I'm not arguing for any of the others.

That is a great book! Get his books on the history of AP. They're great too.

An essential feature of thought is the objective narrative. This is like the third person voice in a novel that describes things that no one actually saw or experienced.

You use this all the time as you navigate the world. For instance, imagine you're looking for your sunglasses.

Gotta go. Hopefully you see where I'm headed with this, if not I'll finish later!

Right, so as you're looking for your sunglasses, you are, in a sense, looking for a truth (whatever your truthbearer is). You have expectations, hypotheses, speculations, etc. You don't know which, if any of them is true, but you believe there is some truth regarding the matter.

If you eliminate the use of truth except in cases where an utterance has occurred, you're saying that this folk psychology about truth is all wrong. You have also bumped off realism, because this confidence in unknown, but knowable truths is essential to realism. You're a truth skeptic and an anti-realist. You just can't have it both ways. It's a contradiction.

Likewise, if you're a realist, you have confidence that the pre-human world was full of events, all of which are describable in principle. Just as you have confidence that there is some true statement about some unknown detail of Pluto, you believe there are all sorts of true statements about worlds where humans do not exist.

Right, so as you're looking for your sunglasses, you are, in a sense, looking for a truth (whatever your truthbearer is). — frank

No, I'm looking for my sunglasses.

You have expectations, hypotheses, speculations, etc. You don't know which, if any of them is true, but you believe there is some truth regarding the matter. — frank

I believe that some sentence is true, yes.

Likewise, if you're a realist, you have confidence that the pre-human world was full of events, all of which are describable in principle. Just as you have confidence that there is some true statement about some unknown detail of Pluto, you believe there are all sorts of true statements about worlds where humans do not exist. — frank

You're conflating Truth in a World and Truth at a World.

but knowable truths is essential to realism. — frank

That's anti-realism. Realists allow for unknowable truths. We had a long discussion about this when discussing Fitch's paradox:

Fitch’s paradox of knowability ... concerns any theory committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. Historical examples of such theories arguably include Michael Dummett’s semantic antirealism ..., mathematical constructivism ..., Hilary Putnam’s internal realism ..., Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth ..., logical positivism ..., Kant’s transcendental idealism ..., and George Berkeley’s idealism.

...

The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle.

But I don't know why you've brought up knowability here because I'm not discussing that anymore. I'm only saying that truth and falsity are properties of sentences, that sentences are features of language, and that language depends on language users.

10 million years ago, it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers.

I don't see a problem.

10 million years ago, it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. — frank

What does "it" refer to?

I would instead say:

1. "10 million years ago some dinosaurs had feathers" is true.

Or just:

2. 10 million years ago some dinosaurs had feathers

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are true only if some truth-bearer existed 10 million years ago. Why? I don't think it's necessary at all.

The existence of dinosaurs does not depend on the existence of a truth-bearer.

You can say it however you like, but my language community agrees that it's fine to say

10 million years ago it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. Because it definitely was true.

You can say it however you like, but my language community agrees that it's fine to say

10 million years ago it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. — frank

And it's also fine to say "I don't know nothing" when claiming ignorance, even though a literal interpretation of the sentence means the opposite.

So you're more than welcome to talk about there having been truth-bearers 10 million years ago, but that's just a case of fictionalism. The truth (pun intended) is that truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago (but dinosaurs did), and it is only the sentences we use now (about the past) that are either true or false.

But to be pedantic dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago.

I don't why you're making this so complicated. 10 million years ago, it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. Easy.

See my previous comment.

See my previous comment. — Michael

Birds are dinosaurs.

I was referring to this:

And it's also fine to say "I don't know nothing" when claiming ignorance, even though a literal interpretation of the sentence means the opposite.

So you're more than welcome to talk about there having been truth-bearers 10 million years ago, but that's just a case of fictionalism. The truth (pun intended) is that truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago (but dinosaurs did), and it is only the sentences we use now (about the past) that are either true or false. — Michael

You're just repeating the same fictionalist account.

Truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago, even if our everyday claims imply that they did.

You're just repeating the same fictionalist account.

Truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago, even if our informal language implies that they did. — Michael

So you have a special language where it wasn't true that some dinosaurs had feathers? That's weird.

I have the normal English language where it is true that some dinosaurs had feathers.

So it is true now, but it wasn't true then? For real?

So it is true now, but it wasn't true then? For real? — frank

Truth bearers didn't exist 65 million years ago. Do you agree or disagree?

Truth bearers didn't exist 65 million years ago. Do you agree or disagree? — Michael

I agree. Still, it was true. Ask any scientist.

I agree. — frank

Truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers.
Truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago.
Therefore, truth was not a property of anything that existed 65 million years ago.

Ask any scientist. — frank

They will agree with me that feathered dinosaurs existed 65 million years ago.

Truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers.
Truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago.
Therefore, truth was not a property of anything that existed 65 million years ago. — Michael

So this is my question: when someone says "The truth of the matter is unknown." What does that mean? Where is the truthbearer?

So this is my question: when someone says "The truth of the matter is unknown." What does that mean? Where is the truthbearer? — frank

That depends on what they're talking about. If they're talking about the existence of aliens then either they're saying that the truth of the sentence "aliens exist" is unknown or they're saying that the existence of aliens is unknown.

That depends on what they're talking about. If they're talking about the existence of aliens then either they're saying that the truth of the sentence "aliens exist" is unknown or they're saying that the existence of aliens is unknown. — Michael

They're talking about why Yoon Park disappeared. There's some truth regarding this, but we don't know what it is. Where's the truthbearer?

They're talking about why Yoon Park disappeared. There's some truth regarding this, but we don't know what it is. Where's the truthbearer? — frank

There's an answer to the question "why did Yoon Park disappear?" and the sentence "Yoon Park disappeared because he was kidnapped" is either true or false.

So given that you accept that truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago, what about my position do you disagree with? Do you disagree with my claim that truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers? Are you claiming that truth can be a property of something else, or that truth isn't a property but an entity of some kind in its own right?

There's an answer to the question "why did Yoon Park disappear?" — Michael

The answer exists? Where is it?