We can go further back: the Arabs colonised Palestine too. — neomac
Which "Arabs"? When? Coz, if you want further back, we can consult Deuteronomy.
Of course, that response was to the issue of self-determination, not who settled where in pre-history. — Vera Mont
The whole situation is one of the many dark sides of colonialism. Britain promises everything to everybody in order to further its own war effort and then arbitrarily disenfranchises some of its allies, while enabling other groups. They did the same with natives in North America and Africa a few decades or centuries earlier. All that guff about self-determination went on the scrap heap when the Big Four were carving up Europe after WWI, and and the even bigger three redrew the borders after WWII. — Vera Mont
↪neomac
↪neomac
Oh fun, let's pretend it's inevitable for two people to bash each other's head in. — Benkei
The reductio of that argument is that genocide is ok. So, yes, it's wrong. And I don't care that they don't care but I (e.g. my country) shouldn't be picking a side as a result. — Benkei
So, really what's your point? Two people are fighting and they both don't want to stop? So they should continue? That seems the wrong answer. — Benkei
Russia is not invincible, but is winning because that's NATO policy for Russia to win. — boethius
Are War Crimes Ever Justified?
↪neomac
The imperialist interpretation I'm referring to has been mostly forwarded by ssu, which I'm replying to. I take it as a given others have read that interpretation, so I don't need to set it out. — Benkei
And nowhere have I given justification, only explanation. I think most countries largely act immoral, driven by real politik considerations. I condemn Western’s needless fanning of the flames in Ukraine, increasing their own "security concerns" as a result, raising Russia's security concerns in return. — Benkei
But I note that the facts I raised do not concern Western security at all. Only Ukraine could be affected by the "near abroad" doctrine and we can hardly complain about economic integration. So we can wonder in what sense Western security concerns were protected by expanding eastwards. — Benkei
Those considerations can only be of a geopolitical nature and not a direct military threat for which NATO is in principle the answer. For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei
My main problem with "real politik" views towards geopolitics is that they a) ignore the international legal framework (but of course it will be whipped out when it supports an argument) and b) a predisposition towards conflict that must be won if it materialises, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict. — Benkei
But the West (particularly US) will pursue conflict if it furthers their geopolitical agenda even if facts don't support their position (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). — Benkei
If then historically we've seen the most successful roads to peace have been extensive integration and co-operation then these decisions are consequences of us-them divisions, maintaining status quos (to stay top dog, you have to kick down the competition) and projection of power. So to me, the very methodology of framing international relations in real politik terms is an important driving force towards conflict, instead of avoiding it. — Benkei
And yes security concerns can justify some action. Not all and certainly not war crimes. But again, I think that mixes geopolitical theory and international law. — Benkei
I think I've said before in this thread:
1. from a geopolitical/international relations point of view both Russia and the West are equally to blame for the war in Ukraine
2. from an international law perspective Russia is an aggressor
But since 2 is in any case an optional argument (pace every "humanitarian" intervention ever and western-led wars) it should be ignored in favour of 1 - as much as that goes against the grain of what I studied and worked for for decades as a human rights trained lawyer. 2 is more about how the world should be and could've been if international law hadn't been applied in such a double standard way — Benkei
But an interpretation of these actions as "imperialist" isn't necessary where Russian security interests suffice to explain their actions. — Benkei
people may not pursue peace, if that means WHATEVER peace. — neomac
That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:
↪neomac
People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here. — Punshhh
indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?
Again it’s about risks, probability. — Punshhh
Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now. — Punshhh
First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”
This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors? — Punshhh
I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning. — Punshhh
If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?
That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU. — Punshhh
I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.
When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East? — Punshhh
Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps? — Punshhh
The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.
You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S. — Punshhh
It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too. — Punshhh
Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/
Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle. — Punshhh
Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population
There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. — Punshhh
It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.
I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. — Punshhh
I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling. — Punshhh
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.
As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of importance geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it) — Punshhh
You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office. — Punshhh
for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric
This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.
(and often pro-Russian)
Lol. — Punshhh
I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.
It’s relevant if that anger goes beyond the point of rationality. — Punshhh
That there are differences in foreign policy between U.S. and EU, such that U.S. would seek to keep EU down, or weak. Again I’m just not seeing it. — Punshhh
The alliance between them is strong and in lockstep. The status of Ukraine, or the expansion of EU and NATO to the east is not a controversial issue between them. — Punshhh
The Middle Eastern regional powers are small fry, Turkey is not far off a failed state and the Arab states just want to hold on to their decadent lifestyles. — Punshhh
The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.
This is the flawed argument I was referring to.
I think the best you’ve got here is some sort of general malaise and internal collapse in the EU, or U.S. The EU is now rearming and stronger as an alliance due to the example of the U.K. (having left the EU). Also as I say if Ukraine joins, it will provide a considerable boost in numerous ways. The U.S. is in a more precarious position, (I see Trump more and more as a busted flush now) but is still strong militarily and can print money to pull itself out of the malaise. — Punshhh
Yes, however there might be severe climate issues there in a few decades. Saudi has some dubious practices including building ski slopes in the desert and depleting water tables, something they’re doing to U.S. water tables too. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/16/fondomonte-arizona-drought-saudi-farm-water/ — Punshhh
Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.
Sounds more like a liability for China, Russia etc.. Also it would mean them getting into bed with these Islamists you talk about. — Punshhh
This is the flawed argument I was referring to. — Punshhh
Weak argument, unless we are talking of a world slipping into distopia. Climate change might deliver this though. — Punshhh
When speaking specifically about dissidents — those critical of their own countries — it’s kind of silly to ask “is there anything good about the US foreign policy?” The response, “All the countries we haven’t invaded — I like that,” and his explanation of why it’s silly is pretty obvious. In that context, it’s “not the job” of a dissident to discuss things he likes is clear. — Mikie
I think here below Chomsky tells it quite clearly why this criticism against the US. — ssu
Neomac, notice what Tzeentch argued:
Russia proposed to give back all the territory they conquered during the invasion in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality. — Tzeentch
Where is this kind of argument was my question. Please read what I say. — ssu
I don't recall hearing this. But please give an actual reference on it. — ssu
Do historical aspects justify more or is it the will of the people? Which justifies more?
As having studied history I understand the role of history here quite well: history is usually used to push an agenda by focusing and giving importance to the details that makes the agenda important. Thus history is usually done from a national point of view that justifies the existing state and all little details that have made it so. If history is a tool for this, it still is a tool. Existence of a state and a desire for an independent state is a lot more. — “ssu
Finally, if Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel while not recognising Israel, then also Palestinians don't want a two state solution. — neomac
Umm... they did recognize Israel. At least the PA did. (Do you know the Oslo peace accords?)
Following the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Palestinian Authority and Israel conditionally recognized each other's right to govern specific areas of the country.
This is the reason why Netanyahu just loved so much Hamas that he even financially supported them. For him the Palestinian that cannot be negotiated with is the Palestinian that he wants to have. Far more easy to ethnically cleanse when the other side are "human animals".
(And naturally many Israelis want to uphold the idea that they cannot negotiate with the Palestinians, that Palestinians just want to drive them to the sea. Or something like that.) — “ssu
Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.
↪neomac
Are you sure about that? — Punshhh
Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.
That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front. — Punshhh
How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?
Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.
I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position. — Punshhh
Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.
Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset. — Punshhh
Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.
So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.) — Punshhh
But how much some Bohdan Khmelnytsky was an Ukrainian nationalist is an interesting question (especially when he allied with Russia). — ssu
But here's the real question to you. The Zionist idea of Israel is very young. And so is the idea of independent Palestine. But the age of the idea doesn't matter, it's how many people genuinely believe in that cause. There is absolutely no prestige, no larger credibility or justification on this age issue. This is just the nonsensical debate that parties who want to thrash the other side in the Palestine/Israel debate. I don't understand at all the reasoning for this debate or why should it be important. The Palestinians do want an independent state from Israel. The Israelis don't want a two state solution.
We've actually seen just now a coming and going of one idea, an Islamic Caliphate in the form of ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh come, emerge and be squashed in the region. This isn't anything new, actually. Hence likely that the region hasn't seen the end of new nation forming. Likely in the year 2424 the map can be totally different from now. And those states will trace their glorious history back to our time and beyond to older history. — ssu
If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh
I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can be argued that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did
How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back? — Punshhh
I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.
You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo. — Punshhh
Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance
I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering) — Punshhh
Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites. — Punshhh
As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China. — Punshhh
Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. — neomac
I still think that their history makes them quite different from Jordanians, Egyptians or the Lebanese. As I said, Swedes and Finns are both Europeans. Both are majority Christians and share a common past. Yet for example the Swedish speaking Finns do not consider themselves Swedes, but Finns who just happen to talk Swedish. (And btw. this has been a huge reason why there isn't any rift between these two ethnic groups in Finland)
And let's remember that Pan-Arabism was tried and it crashed. Just ask the Syrians how well did that experiment go with the Egyptians having a one-Pan Arab state. And the relations between the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states who all are also members of the Arab League show how brittle these relationships are. — ssu
This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. — neomac
And how was it shown in 1945-1991? Yes, there is a history of Ukraine, but so has Palestine even a longer history. And Ukrainian nationalism emerged only in the 19th Century. And do notice that Palestinians had the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 against the British, where actually the Jewish fought alongside the British and gained military experience and competence (the Haganah just didn't sporadically emerge from refugees from Europe). And prior to that they were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as everybody else. — ssu
There is an understandable motive for the Israeli skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. It's quite similar to the skepticism of Ukrainian nationalism by the Russians.Ordinary you don't give credence to the enemy you are fighting and his objectives. Actually it's quite natural. And this goes vice versa: the talk of Israel as an "colonial enterprise" is a way to diss Israel. — ssu
In 1948 yes, the neighbors didn't care a shit about Palestinians. But now I think it's different: nobody wants to be responsible of 7 million Palestinians. So OK for them to have their own country...as it's Israeli territory, anyway. — ssu
1. its ideological roots are in pan-arabism and pan-islamism, both of which are broader ideologies than the idea of a Palestinian nation-state — neomac
I think that Palestines and Palestinians ideological roots have more to do with how the "Jewish Palestinians", the Israelis have gone with their own nation building. — “ssu
As I've said, Palestinian aspirations are reinforced how Isreal treats them, starting from the thing that Israel never was for them in any way. — “ssu
Independent Ukraine is only 33 years old. And many Russians are totally confident about the utter artificiality of the country as you are of the Palestinians...when compared to the Israelis. — “ssu
Yet it's very typical in a world made of nation states, people think that there must be something wrong with the people that don't have their own country. Either they are weak, incapable or not actually genuine. This silly argumentation on who has more moral right to the land where they now live and have lived for generations shows this. — “ssu
I think however that there are other factors that Israel can’t discount: 1. How the Arab states’ questionable attitude toward the Palestinians (and Palestinian refugees) may reinforce the Palestinians’ aspirations to a distinctive Palestinian nation-state. — neomac
Yet is it questionable that Arabs now see Palestinians differently from them? Finns and Swedes are surely European, even Nordic, but two different countries and people still. Are Palestinians then Jordanians? — “ssu
Which is more pro-Israeli and which would be more neutral? Just asking. — “ssu
What is the present Europe is happy about? — neomac
Hmm... prosperity, peace, integration. When compared to Middle East, which is the more happy story?
What is so confusing in calling for “pivot to Asia” by American ‘pivot-people'? — neomac
Because the US is already there in SE Asia. So continuously repeating about "turning to Asia" that focus isn't here but there. What is message you try to say here? That's the thing confusing. — “ssu
We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other.
↪neomac
What’s new. This has been going on for decades with every conflict the U.S. has been involved in. — Punshhh
What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.
The partnership between the U.S. and the EU will have tensions, so what? — Punshhh
If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now. — Punshhh
That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to.
So am I, the Israeli conflict won’t have big geopolitical consequences.
The Ukraine conflict will have big geopolitical consequences, but the direction of policy here hasn’t changed for decades. It’s the fallout from the Cold War and the U.S. and E.U. are pretty much in lockstep. — Punshhh
So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?
Not U.S. superpower status, rather the strength of the anti China alliance. — Punshhh
if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?
At no point have I said anything about the U.S. superpower status. Its position as a global superpower is secure and isn’t going to change.
I’m saying if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will greatly weaken and threaten the EU (as opposed to EU status if Russia loses the war). This will leave the U.S. vulnerable on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic..
Perhaps bullet points will help.
If Russia wins;
1, Russia strengthens, becomes a threat to EU on her borders.
2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.
3, Russia becomes strong re-establishes the Russian empire forms a strong alliance with China.
4, U.S. is vulnerable on two fronts from China and from Russia via threat to EU. While China and Russia are in strong alliance
5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.
If Russia loses;
6, Russia is greatly weakened, may even collapse.
7, Putin is seen as a failure, pariah
8, Ukraine becomes part of EU, NATO.
9, EU becomes strong with no threat on her border.
10, EU forms strong alliance with U.S.
In both cases a strong alliance is formed between two large powers. In the first case between China and Russia in the second case between U.S. and EU.. — Punshhh
Now going back to the Israel Palestine conflict.
There is no global shift in power, with either outcome in the conflict. Israel either becomes an isolated country bristling with weapons. Or Israel collapses and becomes another failed state in the Middle East. Either way it makes no difference to the geopolitical balance in the world.
Let’s say Israel goes to war with Iran. Again two more failed states with no change in the global power dynamic. There are other things that can happen in the region which could have geopolitical consequences, like oil, or conflicts between larger regional players. But they are not influenced that much by what happens in Israel Palestine. — Punshhh
And what a genius plan to ignore such warnings! — Tzeentch
European leaders themselves have admitted they treated the Minsk accords as a temporary armistice during which Ukraine could be armed and prepared for war. — Tzeentch
You're completely ignoring the West's provocative role in all of this. — Tzeentch
Ukraine was simply a mechanism by which the US could sow instability in Eastern Europe, which is clearly the reason it sought to change Ukraine's neutral status - the key to stability between Russia and Europe - because it's the only reason the US would pursue such a policy in a geopolitically sensitive region. — Tzeentch
No one here is arguing that Russia is right in what it does.
This is what you can't seem to understand: my argument is not that we ought to look more favorably on Russia's actions, but that we ought to look more critically at the United States' — Tzeentch
I do believe the matter of Ukraine becoming part of the American sphere of influence represented a legitimate security concern to the Russians. — Tzeentch
Again with your piece of pro-Russian propaganda? — neomac
You're responding to a simple statement of fact.
So obviously the Kremlin believed it was their business, and whether you agree with that or not, if you do not take warnings like these seriously, you're a fool, or you're the United States preparing to sacrifice a pawn. — Tzeentch — boethius
For example, if you pull a gun on me and warn me you'll shoot me if I take another step, I'd be a fool to ignore that warning whether I feel you'd be justified in shooting me or not. At the end of the day I don't want to be shot and I need to navigate the real world and not the world as I wish it was. I may wish you wouldn't shoot me despite your warning or then wish that someone would jump in front of me to take the bullet and so I don't suffer the consequences of my own actions, but if that's not what reality is like then I'm a fool to make decisions based on delusional wishes. — boethius
That the US would drop Ukraine like a hot potato the moment the war no longer serves US interests was as obvious at the start of the war as it is now.
You can complain about "complacency" all you want, but unless it's a surprise betrayal, which is not in this case, then that's not a basis for decision making.
People should do A, B, and C and therefore I will do D based on the assumption they will do what they should, is only valid if there's reason to believe people will actually do that. — boethius
The Ukrainians see the US abandon their "close allies" and "deal friends" in Afghanistan, watch Afghanis literally fall off the last airplanes, and then tell themselves: hmmm, I want me some of that. — boethius
Making decisions based on reality and not wishes or assuming what other people "should do" when they have no track record of dong it, is a principle of decision making so basic it even appears in Disney movies:
The only rules that really matter are these: what a man can do and what a man can't do. For instance, you can accept that your father was a pirate and a good man or you can't. But pirate is in your blood, boy, so you'll have to square with that some day. And me, for example, I can let you drown, but I can't bring this ship into Tortuga all by me onesies, savvy? So, can you sail under the command of a pirate, or can you not? — Captain Jack Sparrow
Which I've quoted before but clearly the lesson remains lost, but your philosophical compass should definitely point directly at this paragraph to see you through these conceptually rough seas. — boethius
Putin will be forced to use tactic nuclear bombs, now. European populists and men-of-honor save Europe with your indisputable all-knowing wisdom! — neomac
You still don't get it.
As Ukraine loses the capacity to legitimately threaten Russia, NATO can therefore augment whatever doesn't change the outcome. — boethius
Why is Steadfast Defender, the largest NATO military exercise since WWII, happening now rather than last year ... or the year before that ... when it would have actually been a legitimate threat of intervention as well as legitimate threat of moving even more more equipment and weapons into Ukraine? A threat that would have genuinely applied a lot of pressure on the Russians.
Because Russia is no longer under pressure in Ukraine and so this additional NATO pressure is no longer all that meaningful. — boethius