Where are the pro-Russians? Where are the experts of propaganda, morality, military, economics, geopolitics criticizing the European lapdogs and the Great Satan? Those who have predicted everything since day one?
Russia is getting everything from the US and Ukraine has lost since day one, Putin has achieved all his goals the same ones he had since the beginning of the war, Zelensky is a catastrophic corrupt clownish American-lapdog looser whom all Ukrainians hate. Why is Putin not stopping this fucking war?

More threats from Trump against Zelensky, the corrupt clown American lapdog Nazi and Jewish warmonger catastrophic looser (have you seen his cloths?!): https://nypost.com/2025/04/23/us-news/trump-gives-zelensky-dire-warning-on-russia-ukraine-war-accept-peace-or-risk-losing-the-whole-country/

What is the propaganda Trump is spinning about the conflict in Ukraine? The silence of the US propaganda critics is destabilizing me. Peace in one day? Nope. In 90 days? Nope. And now "let's take a pass within days" if no progress in peace negotiations (let's make it 100 days?). And Zelensky was just a clownish corrupt American lapdog, how can Ukraine be in the way of blocking two superpower leaders' efforts to bring peace in a devastated land, with no men left fighting or wanting to fight, with no military support, corruption everywhere, and humiliated for all their catastrophic choices and losses they have suffered? While Russia has already won since day one: they just wanted the Donbas and Crimea from day one, and they got that. Why is this conflict not over yet?

Trump in Afghanistan again?
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/the-mysterious-case-of-the-bagram-airbase-1503420373.html

More on Russia signaling goodwill to become a laughing third along with Europe in the prospect of a future US-China war:

Russian propagandist warns Brit and French troops 'we will kill you all' and threatens to sink London under a nuclear tidal wave in TV rant
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14507187/Russian-propagandist-warns-Brit-French-troops-kill-you-threatens-sink-London-nuclear-tidal-wave-TV-rant.html

Russian State TV Host Threatens Strikes on NATO Countries
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-host-threatens-strikes-nato-countries-1991581

Putin Ally Threatens to 'Erase' NATO Ally 'Off the Face of the Earth'
https://www.newsweek.com/putin-ally-vladimir-solovyov-threatens-germany-nato-2037345

Russian TV Says Europe Will Be 'Destroyed' By 2029
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0unhxkWkiKY

Russian propagandist targets EU Parliament VP with harsh insults
https://decode39.com/10155/russian-propagandist-targets-eu-parliament-vp-with-harsh-insults/

Putin Threatens To Send Arms To Countries That Could Attack Kyiv's Allies
https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-russia-ukraine-nuclear-europe-us/32980827.html

State TV says Russia will divide Europe if JD Vance wins in 2028
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFBvas94-ps

Trump mocks world leaders, claims they are ‘kissing my ass’ to make a deal on tariffs
https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/trump-s-trade-chief-admits-us-running-up-the-score-with-tariffs-on-australia-20250409-p5lqap.html

https://bsky.app/profile/snellarthur.bsky.social/post/3llf6e32oe22x — Punshhh

Trump doesn't seem to want to gift Ukraine to Russia, nor does he want to leave Europe to Russia. He wants to take Ukraine from both Europe and Russia, and to make them both dependent on the US.

What I do not really understand is why corrupt, coward, dumb, servile European leaders and Zelensky the clown are not doing right away what they are being told by their master, the Great Satan. Can the experts of geopolitics, economy, propaganda, international law, moral, etc. in this thread explain the mystery? I'm begging on my knees.

Brussels ask EU citizens to prepare a 72-hour emergency kit for crises
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/26/brussels-ask-eu-citizens-to-put-together-a-72-hour-emergency-kit-to-face-crises

Tourist Detentions at the U.S. Border: What International Visitors Should Know
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/travel/us-border-crossing-international-visa.html?partner=slack

Free to be expelled

Prohibition to enter the United States and then the repression of a French researcher who came to attend a conference, because he had expressed a "personal opinion" on American research policy.

"I learned with concern that a French researcher", on a mission for the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), "who went to a conference near Houston was prohibited from entering US territory before being expelled," said the Minister of Higher Education and Research, Philippe Baptiste, in a statement transmitted to the France-Presse (AFP) agency (AFP). "This measure would have been taken by the American authorities because the phone of this researcher contained exchanges with colleagues and friendly relations in which he expressed personal opinion on the policy carried out by the Trump administration in matters of research," he added.
Read also | Article reserved for our subscribers "in the United States, science is attacked, hampered, and even prohibited"

According to a diplomatic source to AFP, the incident occurred on March 9. This spatial researcher would have undergone random check when he arrived, during which his professional computer and his personal phone would have been searched. Similarly, messages evoking the processing of scientists by the Trump administration would have been found. He would have been criticized for messages "which reflect a hatred towards Trump and can be qualified as terrorism". His professional and personal equipment would have been confiscated and the researcher would have been sent back to Europe the next day.
Reminder of freedom of opinion

According to another informed source of the file to the AFP, "hateful and conspiracy messages" were reproached for the French researcher by the American authorities. An FBI investigation would have been announced to him, for which "the charges were abandoned," said the source.

"Freedom of opinion, free research and academic freedoms are values ​​that we will continue to claim proudly. I will defend the possibility for all French researchers to be faithful, in compliance with the law, "said the Minister of Higher Education and Research. The Embassy of the United States in Paris, requested by AFP, referred to customs services. The American customs, contacted, did not react immediately.

source: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/03/19/etats-unis-un-chercheur-francais-refoule-pour-avoir-exprime-une-opinion-personnelle-sur-la-politique-menee-par-l-administration-trump_6583618_3210.html

Pro-Kiev Italians Collapse

Regarding the conflict in Ukraine:

57% of Italians do not support either side (three years ago it was 28%);
32% of Italians support the Ukrainian cause ;
11% of Italians are on Russia's side .

source: https://eurofocus-adnkronos-com.translate.goog/politics/crolla-sostegno-italiani-kiev-sondaggio-ipsos-dati/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp

:up:

16:11 Right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans for protection
16:17 from 140 million Russians who have been unable to overcome 50 million Ukrainians for three years.”
16:24 Well, when you put it like that, it’s almost embarrassing.

Impressive summary

Trump weighs recognizing Russian control over Crimea as part of peace deal
https://tass.com/world/1929567

The Baltics and Nordic Nations Should Discuss Acquiring Their Own Nuclear Deterrent with Poland
https://balticsentinel.eu/8207598/finnish-researcher-the-baltics-and-nordic-nations-should-discuss-acquiring-their-own-nuclear-deterrent-with-poland

↪neomac
Of course. Trump wants to overthrow Orban because... 4D Chess? — ssu

I was ironic... remember pro-Russians complaining about Euromaiden as a coup?
However I think Trump may be interested to stir far-right European (anti-EU) nationalists on his side and also steal them from Putin's grip.

EU can make everything that they need, if they just want it. Including yes, starting from nukes. — ssu

What is the time frame given the Ukrainian urgent needs?

You do understand that when European NATO countries agree to raise their defense spending, that spending will go mainly to their own defense industry and NOT to the US defense industry. — ssu

I'll understand the need for this to happen, but I'm less sure to what extent this is feasible in the short term. Poland and Italy for example look more vulnerable to Trump's demands than France or the UK. On the other side, while the European countries that are less reluctant to engage with Putin, are likely more compelled to pursue strategic independence from the US defense industry than those more reluctant to engage with Putin, the latter could also be less interested to re-arm against Russia in general.

providing Ukraine with whatever it needs to defend itself, either supplied from Europe where possible or bought by Europe from elsewhere and given to the Ukrainians if not

European action must now start from the premise that the US cannot be trusted, or relied upon

OK where else should Europeans buy weapons for Ukraine from? China? If China accepts. And Turkey? If Turkey accepts (South Korea too). But if China accepts, then this may set greater pressure on the relation between China and Russia, and between the US and the EU. The same goes with Turkey, because Turkey could be a problem for Russia: since Turkey aims at expanding their sphere of influence in Central Asia. But Turkey could be also a problem for Israel (US ally), since Turkey aims at expanding its sphere of influence in Syria.

If Europeans buy from the US, the problem is still there: dependence on the US + the US (as unreliable partner) could impose constraints on selling weapons to Europeans to help Ukraine. (By the way what if the US sells weapons/intelligence to Russia against Europe/Ukraine?)

Serbia's largest-ever rally sees 325,000 protest against government
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2g8v32q30o

Yet another coup by the CIA... dah

Hungary's opposition rallies as Orban pledges crackdown on media, NGOs
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarys-orban-vows-fast-crackdown-media-ngos-over-foreign-funding-2025-03-15/

Romanians rally to show support for Europe amid election tensions
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romanians-rally-show-support-europe-amid-election-tensions-2025-03-15/

Tens of thousands converge in Serbia's capital for protest against corruption
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/03/15/large-crowds-converge-in-serbia-s-capital-for-protest-against-corruption_6739183_4.html

Mass protests against PM Fico’s pro-Russian turn continue across Slovakia
https://intellinews.com/mass-protests-against-pm-fico-s-pro-russian-turn-continue-across-slovakia-370809/

Trump has threatened to annex Danish territory Greenland. Now the US is asking Denmark for help with egg shortages
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/egg-prices-bird-flu-inflation-denmark-b2715100.html

Russian oil supplies to China down 12% in January — OPEC report
https://tass.com/economy/1926787

Trump deepens NATO’s crisis of trust on sharing intel
https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-crisis-slovakia-donald-trump-hungary-slovakia-national-defense-academy/

we ourselves never were sincerely committed to, and still aren't. — Tzeentch

Name the countries that the US or European countries have invaded and (partly) annexed to their territories after the end of WW2, through war. Here are the ones for Russia:
Chechnya (Russian Federation, after wars of independence in the 1990s and early 2000s)
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (De facto control since 2008, and open for annexation, though not internationally recognized)
Crimea (Annexed in 2014, internationally unrecognized)
Donetsk and Luhansk (Annexed in 2022, though internationally unrecognized)

“We will no longer tolerate criticism of our democracy. Our democracy is the best,” Dmitry Peskov declared at a youth forum in Sochi on the Black Sea coast.
https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-kremlin-elections-our-democracy-is-the-best-in-the-world/

Signaling democratic spirit while emphasizing the need for respect - typical authoritarian shit.

they're rejecting temporary cease-fire deals and insist on a long-term peace agreement. — Tzeentch

Pax Ruski: i'll kick your ass now, so you'll be finally at peace under my ass in the future

What would be more sensible to do for the US to re-balance trade deficits and security issues with Canada? — neomac

And you think anything like that can be made with a demented and crazy idea of annexing Canada? They aren't willing to be Americans, it's just extremely offensive. And if by a magical wand Canada would be a part of the US, they'd be hardcore Democrats against the MAGA-cult. And Canada isn't so "white" anymore that the racists would get a response to the "browning" of the US. It's simply utterly crazy and you just sidelining the whole issue as it wouldn't be the reason for the anger in Canada simply shows it — ssu

.

I’m not sidelining anything. I’m giving you my understanding of Trump-style imperialism as much as I did about Putin’s imperialism a while back. Canada as much as Ukraine may respond to imperialist aggressions the way they see fit, but then they have also to be ready to pay the consequences. If there are no peace agreements, then they have to fight it out. Besides, given the issues I’ve spoken about: the burden of overstretch and the pivot to Asia, I find it unlikely the US will start a conventional war with Canada to occupy and annex it as Russia did with Ukraine.
Finally, your outrage could be more myopic than you seem to realise. Indeed, there could be paradoxical benefits for the US historical allies in Trump’s “crazy ideas”: more security self-reliance and strategic initiative. If the liberal/peaceful West must win against the challenges posed by predatory foreign foes, then it has to earn it also through actual brute force.

Still: (About Article III — neomac

Well, what are the Europeans doing? In fact this is the most logical response. When Trump is wanting them to spend more on defense, they are spending more on defense. If the US is leaving NATO -> spend more on defense. This is a no-brainer. — ssu

Focus. From the US perspective, the problem is that responsibility sharing among NATO members should have happened WHILE the US is in NATO, not after the US leaves NATO. The US would be no longer interested in NATO if there is no responsibility sharing (even more so if the compensation/benefits for the US security support are not equivalent to its perceived efforts). And if Europeans increase their efforts in a defensive alliance which doesn’t include the US, still there are benefits for the US: Europeans may still need to buy for their security from the US to speed up readiness, Europeans will still take the burden of containing Russia (while Trump could still propose his assistance/mediation to Putin), and Trump can still meddle in European national politics via European pro-US populist bootlickers.

But Trump leaving NATO, perhaps on similar invented reason like the fentanol-issue with Canada, is that they don't spend 5%, which even the US doesn't spend. So Trump can walk away. In fact, it seems that Trump is walking away from every alliance the US has, except Israel. — ssu

Why do you think Trump is making such an exception for Israel?

An example of Russian views:

The Deputy Speaker of the Duma: "Our enemies are being tamed by the animalistic fear of our army"

"If you Europeans were capable of looking at things objectively, you would have to admit that you have already lost this war." Always a pleasure, Pyotr Tolstoy. Great-great-grandson of the great writer. But above all, Deputy Speaker of the Duma, head of his country's delegation to the OSCE, a name of some weight within United Russia, Vladimir Putin's party. The depth of his personal curriculum has never prevented him from making statements as a pure hawk, a tough guy among the tough guys. "I say what my people think. We know very well that Europe has now advanced its anti-Russian delirium so far, that you are all rooting for the continuation of the war."

What do you think of Trump's ultimatum to you if you don't accept the truce?
"That any serious negotiation takes a long time, and Russia is certainly in no hurry. It seems to me that there is exaggerated concern for the results of the meeting in Jeddah. While they were talking, our heroes are outlining a new negotiating scenario, completing the cleanup of the Kursk region."

So should Russia go all the way?
"In my opinion, we should give less importance to the well-groomed faces of American negotiators or to the always identical suit of that gentleman in Kiev. We should never again look to the West with hope, always looking for a subtext in the speeches and gestures of their leaders. What difference does it make to us what the Americans think, or the Ukrainians, who said what during their negotiations or how much you Europeans intend to spend? They will not be the ones to end this war."


Who will do it then?
"Us. A simple Russian soldier, capable of walking for fifteen kilometers inside a gas pipeline and then winning (referring to an episode of recent days much celebrated in Russia, ed.). Our enemies are made docile only by their animalistic fear of our army. It has always been this way, it will always be this way."

What a beautiful prospect.
«Russia is proposing peace. We can stop the war on our own, but a return to the previous situation and a return of what we have conquered is out of the question. Once this principle is established, let's make peace».

Do you think Putin shouldn't accept the truce proposed by Trump?
«I'm not speaking for the president. But whatever the enemies propose,Russia must win. I'm sure we will be able to reason calmly, with confidence, and without regard for the programs and timetables imposed from abroad. This is exactly what our army is doing. It would be good for all of us to learn this».

Do you consider Trump an enemy?
«The new American president is as concrete as a real estate agent. He immediately understood what you don't: the regions of the former Ukraine that have passed under Russian control, and which are now part of Russia in accordance with our Constitution, will remain with us, as I said. We are trying to trust him, but you know, trust is always the result of tangible actions, especially in foreign policy. Trump has not yet said anything about what he really has in mind regarding the negotiations. Russia will never agree with certain proposals that are circulating in Western public opinion. Let's wait and see."

What could be the Russian counterparts for the peace offered by Trump?
"Why should we offer anything? Trump says every day that Ukraine has lost. Even Europe implicitly admits it: in three years, you have gone from the desire to bring the Russian aggressor to its knees with two thousand economic sanctions and massive aid to Ukraine, to the proud intention of considering a capitulation by Kiev unacceptable. But if necessary, we can wait another three years, to give you time to understand that, sooner or later, Ukraine will lose."

Do you think Trump wants to give you more time?
"At least he immediately said: let's discuss. He is not doing it for the love of our country or Putin. He simply does not want the West, and especially the US, to emerge as losers from this confrontation."

Are you convinced that Putin’s delaying strategy will lead you to victory?
“Time is on our side. We remain focused on the main objectives: winning the war and ensuring Russia’s security for generations. We don’t need anyone but ourselves.”

If the U.S. really doesn’t want overstretch, all she needs to do is enable Europe to take on the role of policing Europe and Western and Northern Asia. — Punshhh

What should Trump do to enable Europe to take on the role of policing Europe that previous US administrations didn’t do already and still failed?

Putin will continue and increase his efforts to destabilise Europe. Europe will become a thorn in the side of the U.S., while Russia cannot be trusted. Just to deal this is level of global overstretch would require a vast army of spies to keep Europe under check — Punshhh

I don’t doubt that Putin will pursue his goals at the expense of the Europeans and, possibly, of the US.
But here is the thing: Trump may not be interested to keep all Europe under US hegemony.
Trump could just be fine with having Europe as a contested territory for hegemonic competition, because the US could have greater chance to “win” this competition anyways, to the extent Europeans are more Russophobic than USphobic, and to the extent Russia can afford to overstretch even less than the US. Local nationalisms can be played either way to partially appease Russia’s ambition to a sphere of influence at least in Eastern Europe, but also to contain Russia’s expansionism (it’s sort of an updated version of Cold War era, without ideological implications). What Trump may hope for is just to turn enough European states into complacent clients of the US, opening their markets to the US products (including a lot of weaponry), instead of snobbish allies. I think Putin and Trump’s shared wet dream would be a puppetization of Europe.

All your talk of mineral deals is just trade and money, Trump is a used car salesman, he has no idea about the geopolitical implications of his wheeler dealing. He will mess up big time, although it looks as though the U.S. economy will implode before he does too much damage. — Punshhh

Again, Trump has his pool of advisors (see Stephen Miran), He's not alone, nor he enjoys autocratic power yet. The problem is that as long as Trump’s foreign policies are supported by the Americans and his entourage, Europeans have to deal with it as much as they have to deal with Putin.

You are offering reasons which could plausibly be compelling to many Europeans (people and politicians). — neomac

Just look at how the US northern neighbors are taking Trumps nonsense. Most stupid to harm good ties with your neighbors. All this 51st state humbug really worth it? — ssu

What would be more sensible to do for the US to re-balance trade deficits and security issues with Canada? See, to many Americans, if these problems persist from previous administrations, then it means that previous administrations couldn’t do much to fix them with a more conventional and soft approach. So Trump and the US he represents may be persuaded that time is running out for dealing with pressing issues of national interest. And since soft-power didn’t faire well to solve them so far, then it’s time for brute force. This can be as ugly as it gets given Trump’s aggressiveness. The strategy can still fail, but Americans are willing to try it, as much as Putin was willing to try it against Ukraine.
Did Putin succeed or fail? What do the Russians think?

And a lot of those critique about NATO that I've read from Americans is usually their anger that it hasn't worked as tool of the US because it genuinely is an international organization where members aren't obligated to follow what the US president wants. — ssu

Still:

"It is often overlooked, but NATO’s collective strength isn’t just in its ability to defend its members from an attack (Article V of the 1949 Washington Treaty) but also in its requirements to ensure members are undertaking necessary domestic activities to prepare for crisis response and, potentially, military action (see Article III of the Washington Treaty). This allows for resilience, something which, in a dynamic world, needs to be more deeply invested in and more comprehensively approached.”

”Allies should spend 4 percent of their GDP on defense and security annually: States should spend a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense, though NATO should continue to explore and allow more flexibility in the way those monies are spent nationally, particularly for states that do not have sufficient absorptive capacity to spend 2 percent on their defense capabilities and programs. The balance—between 2 and 4 percent—should be allocated toward activities that are strategically vital to the alliance but are not accounted for in NATO’s methodologies for defense spending, such as peacetime preparedness and resilience.”

(Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/burden-sharing-responsibility-sharing)

And remember that what you claim to be holding for the transatlantic relations, it may very much hold also within EU. EU can take decisions, mediate and change rules to facilitate individual EU member states' spending for their defense and implementing a collective strategy. But then it’s still on EU member states to act accordingly, and EU members aren't obligated to follow what the EU president wants.

And of course, you might take into account the possibility that Russia, which just last year declared the US being an enemy and it being at war with NATO, might not be so trusting with the US and so eagerly become it's loyal sidekick, but simply might want to fuck the US up as much as possible — ssu

Maybe one thing is the pre-Trump US , another is Trump’s US, right? I’m not sure Putin dislikes Trump’s US as much as he disliked pre-Trump US. The problem to me is less about who’s liking whom or who is playing whom, and more about the fact that Trump’s power is constrained by constitution and time, and this is what’s complicating Putin’s dilemma about Trump’s trustability, even assumed that Trump’s bargaining chips were appealing to Putin.

If the US walks away from NATO alliance, that past American leaders worked so hard for, it will leave 31 countries 633 million people simply being competitors, which don't have much incentive to adjust their policies to the US foreign policy or basically even listen to the US as they have done now. — ssu

You are offering reasons which could plausibly be compelling to many Europeans (people and politicians). Still “31 countries 633 million people” are not a DE FACTO compact front where each and everyone is thinking and feeling exactly the same things that you think and feel on these matters. So I’m simply pointing out the fact that there are enough frictional factors like European Nationalisms (which were fueling anti-NATO and anti-EU rhetoric even before Trump), demographic decline, all sorts of economic vulnerabilities (trade/energetic dependencies, etc. which can also impact the defense industries) which could obstruct a European collective strategy in the short, medium or long term. And both Russia and the US could profit from that.

Secondly, the US just lost a HUGE, REALLY HUGE (as Trump would say) defense market that the Europeans will now try frantically to bring up, because the US is so unreliable. The US has been selling more weapons and arms to Europe that it has sold to the Middle East. Tell me, how on earth has that been a burden to you? 1/3 or so of arms exports going to Europe EVEN when Europe was spending so little on defence. You think it's a little thing that you lose more than a third of your arms exports to Europe, really? — ssu

Thirdly, France has already said that it can enlarge it's nuclear deterrence (as there is no credible US nuclear deterrence) to other EU/NATO member states. — ssu

If you have the time, just listen this speech by Ursula von der Leyen about the urgent need for rapid rearming of Europe. And do notice that she talks of EUROPEAN military industry, EUROPEAN joint acquisitions and never, ever, talks about the US or relying on it's defense industry. Perhaps what Trump in his senility doesn't understand that if he demands Europe to pay, Europe will increase it's defense spending, but that won't come to him... — ssu

These are all consequences that you anticipate not accomplished facts.
The US didn’t lose yet the entire European market (whose demands increased during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but prior to that the trend was decreasing), France has not yet extended its nuclear deterrence, a EUROPEAN military industry is not yet a reality.
It will take several years and financial/technological/cultural efforts to Europe to build a credible deterrence based on its own military industrial complex. Consider just Russia’s nuclear arsenal which dwarfs the combined Anglo-French stockpile warheads. And the asymmetry isn’t just quantitative but also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is designed to coerce adversaries into concessions, while British and French nuclear arsenals, are just meant for minimal deterrence.
I’m not saying the Europeans are doomed to fail. Nor that Trump’s decisions won’t backfire as you suggest.
I’m saying that the problems I pointed out (imperial overstretch, pivot to Asia, and European “parassitism”) are of paramount importance to the US, and in order to address them a strategic revision of the US foreign policy was necessary. Besides Trump can pursue this revision in ways which preceding administrations committed to the globalization (Western-style liberalism, democracy, universal human rights, international law, multilater partnership) couldn’t easily afford.

But you can go with the "Europe is a burden for us" narrative. — ssu

That all above just shows how the Great Weakening of the US will happen. Why Americans want to emasculate themselves, drop their values and just serve few billionaires is beyond me. In fact what Trump (and seems that you too) don't understand at all is the following: keep your largest potential rivals as friends and allies to you. That is how you had Pax Americana, or the US as a Superpower. Now thanks to Trump, the MAGA-crowd is destroying this. — ssu

Many geopolitical analysts and U.S. foreign policy advisors have critiqued NATO’s role in the years prior to Trump’s presidency, emphasizing that the U.S. bears a disproportionate financial and military burden and questioning NATO’s strategic relevance in the post-Cold War era. They argue that NATO's expanded responsibilities and military commitments have not always aligned with U.S. interests, and that a reduced U.S. commitment or a restructured NATO could better serve American national security.
Maybe these are good summaries of burden sharing issue within NATO:
https://cdainstitute.ca/back-to-the-past-a-critical-review-of-nato-burden-sharing-from-1949-to-the-present/
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/ws/send_file/send?accession=ohiou1658418238274699&disposition=inline

And if Trump's manages to bring Russia on a strategic partnership to contain China, this may be an acceptable compensation. — neomac

And just where do you get this sort of hallucinations from? Why would Putin do that? What fucking delusional incentive would he have for that? At least one third of Russia's exports go to China now. Russia has a huge long border with China and a nearly empty Siberia facing populous China. It makes absolutely great sense for Russia to be good friends with China. What the hell do you think Russia would gain from opposing China and braking the warm ties the countries have? That China could then demand back the territories that belonged to it earlier in Siberia? It makes absolutely NO SENSE at all. — ssu

I already told you what possible incentives Putin may have. Cultural prejudices and security concerns may compel Putin to unwelcome a strategic dependence on China. Russia is forced into such a partnership by the circumstances due to their costly ambitions to assert a sphere of influence in Ukraine which was about to fall under the Western sphere of influence, right? So Trump can use Ukraine as a bargaining chip. Also letting Russia expand its political influence in other parts of Eastern Europe could be a bargaining chip. Also removing sanctions to let Russia sell oil/gas to Europeans (a greater price than what he sells to China) and weaken Russophobic sentiments is a bargaining chip. Also establishing a strategic partnership to contain China (Siberia, Central Asia and the Arctic region over Russia can be contended by China if Russia is weak enough and isolated) and grant Russia a superpower status for deciding the fate of the rest of the world like in the Cold War era may be a bargaining chip for Russia. And I think that other forms of business/technological cooperation can be offered by Trump to lure Putin and vice versa (like the rare earth extraction and trade)
In any case, it’s not on you to establish if these bargaining chips are enough but on Putin.

Aren't you forgetting, that the parasitic Gay Europe wokesters aren't going to be around like they were in Kuwait/Bosnia/Kosovo/Indian Ocean (Somali pirates)/Afghanistan/Libya/Iraq? So go to fight your fight with China, because even Australia doesn't seem worth as an ally to you: — ssu

But the US would not be alone if Russia partners with the US. Besides countries near China (like Japan) may still be compelled to contain and fight China as much as Europeans are compelled to contain and fight Russia, no matter how embittered the partnership with the US is.

Musk expresses support for rival to Reform UK as feud in Farage’s party intensifies:

That article is behind a paywall, I don’t need to read it though. The Reform party is Nigel Farage, this is what Musk doesn’t understand. Just like the way that the Republican Party is Trump. Take Farage out of the party and Reform reverts to some form of the BNP. A fringe party of racists that the electorate won’t go near. — Punshhh

The evidence still serves to better understand Trump's administration strategy in Europe, which includes supporting far right movements. So, bold and repeated attempts of interfering with European politics by Trump and his entourage (Musk, Bannon, etc.) should be expected.

You obviously don’t understand the European people, Germany has flung open the doors to over a €trillion for defence spending. Including large grants for member states to invest. The U.K. with the EU is looking at some kind of associate membership of the Single Market so as to streamline the process of cooperation in this endeavour. This development itself will bring the EU into new economic growth in one move. The U.K. and France alongside some others already have the skills to usher in a military industrial complex.

You do understand don’t you why European countries haven’t re-armed significantly over recent decades? And that the reason for this “complacency” has disappeared in an instant. — Punshhh

Focus. If you are talking “trends”, I’m talking “trends”. Bringing up what you wish to see in an “instantaneous” change of attitude, even if it is true, it’s not very compelling as a counterargument.

Europeans was more a burden than a deterrence to rival powers, do you deny that? And if Trump's manages to bring Russia on a strategic partnership to contain China,

You keep repeating this, it would only have some validity as an argument if Trump had become an authoritarian dictator. At the moment, Trump’s “rule” is looking like a temporary aberration and we will be back to business as usual come the next election. But the trans-Atlantic alliance will be in a much stronger position with a re-arming Europe.

But you suggest the U.S. for some reason would want to strengthen Russia,, have a blind eye to her expansionism and the resultant turmoil this might engender in Europe. Lose the alliances with Europe. For some notional strategic goal re-China. It’s weird, even if Trump were a dictator. — Punshhh

I keep repeating because you keep ignoring. Do you deny that pivot to Asia and the danger of overstretch (which includes the burden transatlantic alliance) are major issues for American administrations, and especially for Trump? I’ve argued about this on several posts, I don’t remember you bringing pertinent evidence or arguments against my claims. And I take into account great powers’ actual strategic reasoning over their foreign policies way more seriously than your imaginative future scenarios grounded on instantaneous decisions made under emergency. Decisions may be instantaneous the collective impact of such decisions can take years to materialise, if they ever materialise, since things can go wrong in so many ways (see, also the Ukrainians’ expectations about Western support).

Musk expresses support for rival to Reform UK as feud in Farage’s party intensifies:
https://www.ft.com/content/d7cbb26a-57b8-4fd5-ac5b-00de25d53a0e

A lot of countries aren't danger of being occupied by Russia, but they sure can feel Russian hybrid warfare and the political pressure. Don't think that this only about direct military confrontation — ssu

I agree on this, see my my previous post:

Russia’s threats to Europe are not limited to conventional warfare. Hybrid warfare must the taken into account and hybrid warfare can be enough to induce concessions to Russia’s demands. — neomac

US is doing, is just destroying it's own credibility and it's own base of power, that has grown from having such wide alliances. — ssu

I think you are looping over the same arguments. From the US perspective, such military alliance with Europeans was more a burden than a deterrence to rival powers, do you deny that? And if Trump's manages to bring Russia on a strategic partnership to contain China, this may be an acceptable compensation. If it doesn't, well Russia will remain the primary incumbent threat to the Europeans wrt the US, and this will keep Russia occupied on its western front. So the US will still rip some benefits off without indebting itself further toward Europe.

All right. Look, I can get that the business model of the military industries in a capitalist society introduces some moral hazards and it can somehow railroad US foreign policies into certain directions, also in Ukrainian-Russian conflict. However I still find very questionable the explanatory power of your beliefs.
First of all, historical evidence doesn’t seem to fit well with your theory. Concerning the current conflict, why can’t the drip feed approach continue another year or another 10 years? The longer the conflict lasts the better is for the US defence industry business. So if they managed to push Biden in keeping the conflict with Russia alive and sustainable, they could do the same with Trump. Yet Trump now wants peace (and not only in Ukraine but also in the Middle East).
Besides, If “socialism is a far more efficient and strategically sound approach to arms production”, yet it’s socialist Soviet Union which collapsed not the capitalist US at the end of Cold War.
Secondly, and most importantly, your conceptual framework is plagued by oversimplification for reasons that I’ve already laid out in previous posts. In short:
1 - Lobbies can directly influence politics to the extent they can finance politicians to win the political competition or grant results that are politically marketable by politicians. The defence industry is one powerful lobby, but in the US capitalist society there are many powerful lobbies (financial, energy, big tech, trade, ethnic, agricultural, labor union, etc.) that can compete with the defence industry lobby and even overtake them by far (https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252498552/Big-Tech-eclipses-telecoms-and-arms-giants-as-biggest-lobbying-spenders). Besides Ukraine is rich on resources (energetic, alimentary, metal and mineral, etc.) that can be exploited by the US (instead of the EU). And also rebuilding Ukraine is a source of business. So other lobbies could benefit from that more than the defence private companies. Besides the US can feel the financial burden of engaging in neverending conflicts, however geographically contained.
2 - Any state concerned about its own security has to offer a credible deterrence against potential enemies. So either they build such deterrence themselves or they get it from others. Hence the importance of having a solid military industrial complex to create credible deterrence because it ensures defense + strategic independence + power projection (making others dependent on your defense industry and win over competing foreign military industrial complexes). And there are also other benefits with a domestic military industrial complex: technological progress and work opportunities. Being security a paramount collective good, it can hardly be driven just by strictly market logic. So psychological reasons (the greediness of defense private industries) are relevant to the extent they are proven to be disfunctional to the US national interest (from national security to hegemony). Not only you didn’t provide any compelling evidence to support that, as far as I’m concerned, but...
3 - The current geopolitical predicament is such that Trump is determined to brutally cut down on imperial overstretch which brought internal instabilities, and empowered both China and Russia. So now the strategy is arguably to focus on China’s containment with the help of Russia (and in the literature I’ve always found more convergence on this explanation than on the perceived risks of a nuclear escalation). So also the defense private industries must adjust their business strategies according to national interest as perceived by Trump, not the other way around.

To me, deeper structural factors bear a greater explanatory power over geopolitical collective dynamics, then just the psychology of leaders or business people.

Sure the US doesn’t look in an existential danger as Europeans are. — neomac

Are you really sure about that? Putin hates the US. Yet the Maga idiots thinks that Putin being a cultural conservative and against Gay Europe is a friend. As if Putin would break ties with China to a few years of Trump chaos? He surely knows that 80% of Americans don't trust him (Putin). His intention is to destroy US power in the World. How isn't that a danger? — ssu

I can readily concede that Trump’s approach is not immune from risks. But we can agree on the fact that the US doesn’t look in danger of being aggressed and occupied as other European countries bordering with Russia, right?
Said that, given the Russian cultural prejudices and security concerns, it’s plausible to assume that no matter how much Putin hates the US, still he wishes to deal with Trump way more than with Xin. Besides, Putin has always been looking for a US confirmation for precluding to Ukraine a future inside NATO, no matter what France, Germany, Hungary could say against it, right? After all Putin is a nostalgic of the Stalin and the Cold War era where the US and the Soviet Union were the superpowers deciding the fate of the rest of world. Putin’s endorsement of Trump and waving at business prospects seem to confirm a convergence of interests.
On the other side, Trump seems willing to concede Russia its sphere of influence, differently from his predecessors. In addition, he seems also willing to remove sanctions against Russia. All this in exchange for a strategic partnership that his predecessors (especially the democrats) couldn’t much afford to sponsor as Trump can. The hidden bug I see in this approach , as I said in another post, is that Trump is not an autocrat like Putin, his power is way more constitutionally and temporally constrained than Putin’s, so Putin may not be willing to play along as Trump wishes if this partnership won’t survive Trump’s mandate and whims. Still, turning down Trump’s offer may trigger a bitter reaction from him as well.

But not all European are in existential danger as those which are bordering with Russia. — neomac

Before weren't, but now the issue is of the whole defense treaty. Don't underestimate how historical this is. If Trump withdraws the US troops and perhaps leaves a small detachment to Orban's Hungary, don't think that people have gotten the message already.

At least for Sweden and Finland it isn't so bad because we have had to have already a military capability to defend ourselves. It's actually countries like Netherlands or others that really have trusted their security policy on NATO that have to think it over now.

Our politicians might be diplomatic, but for example reading comment section in the biggest newspaper, the majority think that Trump is a traitor, a Russian agent and a Quisling. In fact, the few politicians that have said something positive about Trump are getting their asses chewed off by the public. — ssu

I don’t mean to discount the gravity of this predicament or to dismiss concerns about Russia military aggressiveness in Europe (nuclear threats against Europeans could be already enough). Still threat perception is not the same in all Europe. And European public opinions, especially on the Western side of Europe, may be very reluctant to abandon their comfort zone when thinking about risks of war with Russia. We can’t ignore this fact. (Side note: it’s interesting to note that Trump is meditating to push the US troops not only closer to Russia but inside pro-Russian Hungary which may be bad news for Germany but also for Russia)

he’s still addressing issues which preceded him and will likely follow his mandates, in ways that are more consistent and arguably more sustainable than their predecessors’. — neomac

Actually, he isn't. Not in any way now. And Trump knows it, actually.

Getting your allies to participate more in the cost isn't the same thing as going against your allies, against the shared values and becoming an enabler for your adversary.

Alliances are a lot more than transactions like buying a service, just as soldiers of fortune are far less trustworthy than soldiers that have taken an oath to serve their country. NATO has been around for 76 years, so I guess there has been something to it. Yet when a country doesn't care of those values, when everything is just a transaction, a lot has gone wrong. — ssu

Trump’s aggressive approach is alienating many Europeans and may end up being overall counterproductive as a negotiation strategy, ok. But you keep forgetting that it’s not only Trump who is averse to NATO and EU. Also many vocal Europeans (people and politicians) are/were averse to NATO and EU or to engaging with Russia.

Under the mental framework you're suggesting, the US does not actually have any interest in European military capability though, has it? Under that framework Europe is an "entangling alliance" to ditch and replace with more easily controllable client state relations. — "Echarmion

The US has a greater interest in having Europeans buying US weaponry, intelligence, troops than having European military capabilities that could fully replace the US… its US security as a service ("If they don't pay, I'm not going to defend them.” https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-if-nato-members-dont-pay-us-wont-defend-them-2025-03-07/)

Scaring Europe into investing significantly more into defense is a workable strategy, as current events demonstrate. Yet the US would have to start injecting itself back into the debate before the European plans have really solidified. Or else bet on European attempts failing. Which I guess could be a way to go about it but seems like an unnecessary risk. — "Echarmion

Or worse, the US may try to indirectly interfere with the European debate (as much as Russia did/does) to sow division among Europeans, since this may help keep in check both Russians and Europeans.

Yeah, that does seem plausible. Though Trump is only part of the mystery to me. There's also Elon Musk and JD Vance, who seem to be pushing US policy towards Russia and Ukraine in the same direction. Thus this seems to be more than just a personality quirk in Trump. — "Echarmion

Well, Musk may see Trump as a way to pressure Europe into opening to his multi-pronged business.
For Trump, Musk’s transnational business plans can help to explore and bridge margins of cooperation with Russia and/or China (https://apnews.com/article/musk-putin-x-trump-tesla-election-russia-9cecb7cb0f23ccce49336771280ae179). Yet, the liaison between Musk and Trump may be more ambiguous than it looks so one can’t really tell who is manouvering whom (https://theconversation.com/how-elon-musks-deep-ties-to-and-admiration-for-china-could-complicate-trumps-beijing-policy-249988). Indeed, even though Musk can help and helped Trump via X, X can be used also by Russian and Chinese trolls. Musk may have his own political agenda. So if Trump feels the need to have his own social network, maybe that’s also because he doesn’t feel like to fully trust Musk.
JD Vance looks more prone to isolationist views, as fas as I’ve understood, and because of that his role may be to Trump as Medvedev’s role is to Putin: namely, to be more outrageous than their leaders. It can be convenient to strong leaders like Trump and Putin to showcase more extremist views than theirs. So theirs can appeal to their target audience as more moderate.

Is Putin offering support for a US autocratic turn in the form of Russian information operations and possibly some kind of public gesture? That's a frightening possibility. — "Echarmion

Frightening indeed.

My issue is that the changes we actually see are haphazard and chaotic. In particular, apart from the suppression of internal dissent, there seems to be little reason to rush decisions as much as they're doing. — "Echarmion

All right, but there are two hints that could make this behaviour more intelligible: one is the “madman theory”, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madman_theory#Donald_Trump . The other is timing: Trump may feel pressed to reach results as soon as possible by institutional factors (mid-term elections and congress/supreme courts interventions can weaken/obstruct his power), political competition (democrats and/or pieces of the deep state could sabotage him), international competition (Trump’s window of opportunity is constrained by the reaction time of other actors like Russia, China, Europe, so as long as these actors feel to be some steps behind his moves, he can play them better), and… terrorist threats? (Trump has survived an assassination attempt, so we can’t exclude extremists on the loose who would want his head). Given how deeply revisionist his approach to domestic and international politics is, he may find himself caught in a situation where he has lots to do in so many directions yet in too little amount of time.
Then of course you can always add bluffs, whims, poor execution, unforeseen consequences, etc. on top of this.

This is not about enthusiasms for outcomes, but rather looking for trends. — Punshhh

The prospect of Europeans re-arming still looks more like a knee-jerk reaction under emergency than a raising trend spanning over years, if not decades (as it was the case for Russia and China), right? We will see how persistent, consistent and integrated the European effort will be in building up a credible deterrent against the big sharks.

However the resolve and camaraderie between EU leaders is clear to see. — Punshhh

With the noticeable difference that Europe would be a strong world power — Punshhh

It's a very long way for Europe to become a united world power. See, UK is not even in the EU (the Brexit, remember?). I don't see the point of getting enthusiastic over strategic revisions that are still on the making. And then let our imagination jump to desirable future scenarios as if they were already within reach. Things can go awfully wrong in so many ways.

For example, why would the US government not attempt to milk the current relations with the EU to maximum advantage, e.g. trying to leverage it's military protection to get a more unified front against China? — Echarmion

Well, the US has tried to warn/persuade the EU to align more with the US interest, especially Germany. But since a soft-power approach didn’t work as desired. Now the US may be wanting to test historical allies and see if aggressive diplomacy can do the trick. Consequently, as I said in an earlier post, “for Trump, abandonment could be a policy goal or a bargaining chip. Europeans now have to prepare for both scenarios: https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/trump-card-what-could-us-abandonment-europe-look”

Or why is the administration not tying Russia down with some kind of commitment before they hand a bunch of concessions to them? — Echarmion

That’s indeed a good question to me too, as I admitted in a previous post: “What however strikes me the most is the idea that Trump is taking by far the initiative to reset the relationship with Russia, without much evident concessions from Putin other than political flattery.”
One can just speculate without much supporting evidence. My idea is that, first, Trump cares much less about codified agreements and international law, than personal agreements between strong leaders of powerful/threatening countries. Private personal agreements between strong leaders come with some benefits: they hedge against the risks of sabotaging from internal and/or external enemies, they preserve the possibility to withdraw from these agreements whenever needed, and they grant greater freedom to adjust propaganda as needed. Second, Trump’s may have been already in contact with Putin by the end of last year, so it is possible that agreements have been already established a while back (https://www.axios.com/2024/10/08/trump-putin-bob-woodward-book). Not to mention that Trump’s bromance with Putin was already developed during Trump’s first mandate since the elections, also thanks to a network of intermediaries (https://swalwell.house.gov/issues/russia-trump-his-administration-s-ties). Third, and most importantly, official commitments are not necessary when mutual benefits and means of retaliations are secretly shared by both leaders. In its current predicament, maybe Russia can’t possibly afford a “vindictive” Trump as enemy, along with a rearmed EU. While the benefits of closing the Ukrainian conflict, removing US sanctions and regaining a superpower status beside the US can very much compensate for the losses. What this personalistic approach may however foreshadow is the following problem: how can Putin be sure that Trump will be in condition to fulfil his promises in the long term given the limited and temporally constrained power of the POTUS within a democratic regime? Well, an authoritarian turn in the US under Trump can likely increase Trump’s trustability in Putin’s eyes.

Or why is the administration not tying Russia down with some kind of commitment before they hand a bunch of concessions to them?

Even if we ascribe purely Machiavellian intentions to the US government, the abject chaos and whiplash they're causing doesn't appear to be in their interest. This is also true if we compare recent US behaviour to that of Russia or China: Those countries would not suddenly and publicly throw their allies under the bus. They're generally careful to avoid public outbursts, at least by officials, and while they'll use economic and military pressure to gain advantages, they'll do so quietly.

Granted it might simply be a case of Occam's razor as ssu pointed out: the reason it doesn't quite make sense is that we're not dealing with a monolithic and purely rational administration but a bunch of volatile egos. — Echarmion

I’ve already commented on this in previous posts [1]. In short, even if we discount Trumps’ personal resentment toward Europeans, Biden and Zelensky, and penchant for authoritarianism or egomania, he’s still addressing issues which preceded him and will likely follow his mandates, in ways that are more consistent and arguably more sustainable than their predecessors’. Risks must be taken into account and if Trump fails, a democratic successor can try to re-adjust the US foreign policies to mitigate the perduring damages.
In any case, even if the Trump fails, that doesn’t mean EU will succeed in addressing the challenges of the multi-polar world.

[1]

To make it all about the “erratic” or “vindictive” psychology of the leader or his official speeches or his personal conflict of interests is very myopic to me.

To me, leaders matter to the extent they are supported (actively or passively). Leaders matter to the extent they aggregate, represent, and guide collective interests coming from ordinary people, powerful economic and media lobbies, geopolitical experts, political entourage and advisors. And such interests are related to domestic and foreign challenges. So to make it all about the “erratic” or “vindictive” psychology of the leader or his official speeches or his personal conflict of interests is very myopic to me. One has to understand what are the perceived challenges from whoever supports Trump’s views, approach, official speeches in his background. That’s why I’m talking about logic: the exercise is to understand what could possible be the more widely shared premises (no matter how implausible they look to you) by collective interests which support Trump and then what most coherently can follow from such premises. This holds for Trump, for Putin, for Netanyahu, as any other political leader.
Besides Trump is the product of a political regime which is different from Putin’s. In the US political regime power is much more distributed and therefore constrained than in Russia. For sure Trump has amassed lots of power more than any of his recent predecessors, given the current US regime, and, given his mindset, he could very much exploit such favourable institutional conditions to push further for a regime change in the US in an authoritarian sense. The problem for the Europeans is that they have now not only Putin but also Trump as enemies.

I think that in the US most people and politicians (left or right leaning, it doesn’t matter) have finally converged on the idea that the US can’t afford anymore to overstretch: overwhelming debt for military expenditure, dispersing resources around the world in geopolitical arena without significant return of their political, military, economic investment while enemies and allies grow fatter and hostile toward the US.

US people and politicians can widely converge on such premises (remember that “pivot to Asia”, "fuck the EU" Nuland, steps toward disengaging the US from competition with Russia and from Middle East happened under Obama’s administration already). So much so that while Russia and China enjoyed greater internal stability and wider popular support wrt the US, the burden of US imperialism was nurturing domestic political instabilities. Hence the need to make American great AGAIN.

Trump can be handled by a) the US economy going down and b) his base getting angry at him. Luckily and thanks only to Trump, you are now facing a recession.

When it's about the sovereignty of nation states and issue of war... who gives a fuck about the stock market? It's a minor detail. People don't give a fuck about losing half of their savings, if the issue is about war or peace, their own lives and their countrymen's lives at stake. This isn't anymore about Ukraine, it's all about the Transatlantic alliance. Only the truly blind and the totally ignorant won't see this. But that is what is at stake. — ssu

Sure the US doesn’t look in an existential danger as Europeans are. But not all Europeans are in existential danger as those which are bordering with Russia.
Threat perception varies over countries and one has to clarify the nature of the threat (which can range from conventional war and occupation to hybrid warfare and political interference which may lead to civil wars and regime change) and the degree of its incumbency.
On the other side, hegemony can be to powerful countries an obsession as much as existential threats are to less powerful countries. And the reason is that once one country loses hegemonic power than it can suffer from dangerous internal instabilities (as it happened in the US) and turn into prey of more powerful countries, especially if they had them as their historical enemies.
To my understanding the problem is and has always been not only about Ukraine, not even about the Transatlantic alliance, but about all the material and institutional conditions that allowed Western-style democracies to prosper.

No, it's not logical to break down the globalization that empowerd the US and made it to be prosperous. You can spend without any limits because the US has been a reserve currency, which IS A POLITICAL decision your allies have accepted, not an economic decision or a thing that has emerged just from the free market. Please let that sink in. The World has gone on for thousands of years without a "reserve currency" and can do that again. It's plain an simple: companies participating in foreign trade can use a basket of currencies and don't have to rely on a "reserve currency". Why should let's say Italy and Saudi-Arabia use dollars for oil trade. There is absolutely no reason for this ...other than the US had provided security guarantees for both countries.. — ssu

Your argument looks rather fallacious to me. Power comes from different sources and in must be assessed in relative terms. If dollar is a universal “reserve currency" that is a tool of power, it gives leverage to the US, but that’s not the only factor. And from the end of the Cold War up to now, the US power has decreased significantly wrt powerful competitors like China and Russia, even more so if they are allying to further erode US power. Europeans are helping China and Russia to erode not only US material power but also soft-power.
“Logic” means beliefs and actions are consistent with certain general premises which are held to be true. One can try to question the validity of the premises but I find the premises if not unquestionably true (also because uncertainty remains part of the problem of assessing political strategies), yet plausible enough to be rationally compelling. Indeed, US people and politicians can widely converge on such premises (remember that “pivot to Asia”, "fuck the EU" Nuland, steps toward disengaging the US from antagonizing Russia and from Middle East happened under Obama’s administration already). So much so that while Russia and China enjoyed greater internal stability and wider popular support wrt the US, the burden of US imperialism was nurturing domestic political instabilities. Hence the need to make American great AGAIN.

And then just think of the immediate consequence of this rift between the US and Europe. What will emerge as an obvious result is strategic autonomy, a thing that France has promoted. Sure, France has been an ally of the US, fought in it's wars, yet has not depended on US arms exports. And that makes total sense, because I can easily imagine the rest of Europe being in situation as Ukraine is with the US when Trump acts like he does. If you really think good relations are gotten with bullying and threats, then think again.. — ssu

As I said in another comment “I think it’s still too early to be optimistic about European reactions. No matter what they are going to decide to counter Russia or to revise the European collective approach to security, European leaders are still slowed down by an aging population which is sticking to mental habits and material privileges coming from the pre-Trump era, but which now do not look anymore adaptive. What needs to be changed is more radical than just re-arming. Europeans need an anthropological change that will take generations” .
Besides there is a lot on the table to digest by European politicians and people that is broader than re-arming or, even, raising a European army: namely, growing a European military industrial complex for strategic autonomy, nuclear deterrence and high-tech warfare (satellite, drones, AI, etc.).
Meanwhile the US and Russia can find ways to slow, destabilise or disrupt the European security collective strategy, also by spinning European countries’ domestic and inter-European polarization.

That’s what I keep doing, but you do not want to listen. I’ll repeat it in short. Pivot to Asia, the burden of Globalization, EU parasitism are the main premises of the reasoning. — neomac

And I repeat my line and my question to you: Trump didn't make us to spend more in defense. Putin did. Putin is a threat to Europe. Now you are siding with Putin. What does that make the US for us? — ssu

An enemy

So why be friendly with Russia, a basket case of a country with huge problems, which is run by a dictator and could have it's own revolution, and then push away and anger an union of 500 million people that have thought of America and Americans as friends that share the same values? Why make us the adversary? That's what Trump is doing. It doesn't make any sense.

If Trump wants that, OK. The US won't be a superpower anymore. It will loose it's allies. — ssu

Again I totally get that Trump is taking a risk. But European reaction, like rearming, has been taken into account (e.g. see again Miran’s plan). One has to see to what extent it will play to US favour though. The point is that Europeans do not seem in condition to strategically unite (actually their division can even be nurtured by Russia and the US). There are plenty of European bootlickers eager to serve as puppets.
Anyways, even if Europeans manage to join their forces effectively, the primary incumbent enemy is Russia and this condition plays again in US favour, since Russia would be exposed to security challenges coming from both Europe and China, more than the US is. So the US can play the good cop with Russia.
Concerning the 500k people EU market, notice that it was directly or indirectly more protectionist toward American products than to Chinese products and Russian oil/gas. At the same time Euro as a reserve currency was also a potential competitor to the US dollar if not even a tool of European emancipation from the US (read “A Plan for a European Currency” 1969 by Robert Mundell). So why would the US keep a EU/Euro big market which the US can’t benefit from?
Finally, in a multipolar world where nobody can rely on nobody for their security and that of their business, the US has still a good chance to preserve its supremacy as long as it keeps its strong economy, its technological and military superiority, geographic benefits (location and abundance of natural resources) and sound demographic (compared to Europe, Russia and China’s, see https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-chinese-german-and-russian-demographics). And a much narrower network of powerful/threatening countries, like Russia and Israel.