but his conclusions might imply it. — Snakes Alive
If Will is what brings dissatisfaction, will-lessness is what brings the salvation. The cognition comes from a sort of recognition of what is happening. The hard part is trying to get rid of that which essentially causes the very world to exist in its subject-object form, and thus the "illusion" of a the very world itself. Somehow getting to a state of "nothing" without "willing" it. This is why really achieving "Enlightenment" is so hard in Buddhism I wold presume. Same type of deal — schopenhauer1
It's weird in the sense that in my opinion, he overmined the idea of Platonic forms. He had it for each species, for each grade of object, for each individual human's character. I just don't buy it as a metaphysical claim, though I find it interesting. — schopenhauer1
Too bad it doesn't mean much if you don't agree with how moral worth is being dictated. — Sapientia
1. There are only three kinds of moral behaviour: egoistic, malicious, and compassionate.
2. The only kind of moral behaviour which has moral worth seeks to prevent harm to another and seeks another’s well-being, i.e. it is just and philanthropic.
3. Egoistic behaviour only has regard only for one's own well-being, and therefore cannot be philanthropic.
4. Malicious behaviour seeks to cause harm to another, and therefore cannot be just.
5. Therefore, neither egoistic behaviour nor malicious behaviour can have moral worth.
6. Compassionate behaviour seeks to prevent harm to another and seeks another’s well-being, i.e. it is just and philanthropic.
7. Therefore, the only kind of moral behaviour which has moral worth is compassionate behaviour. — Sapientia
I think that Schopenhauer is wrong to rule out egoism in advance, due to his conception of behaviour that has moral worth, and I think that him doing so conveniently paths the way for his desired conclusion. But, if you accept his terms, then the rest does seem to follow, and it does seem to qualify as, or could be formulated as, a proof by exhaustion. — Sapientia
proof by exhaustion as it isn't given in your argument that egoism, malice, and empathy are the only possible things that moral behaviour could be based on. — Michael
The wording of the argument would need to changed to avoid circular reasoning. You couldn't have, "Moral behaviour cannot be based on egoism", as a premise, and, "Therefore, moral behaviour cannot be based on egoism", contained in the conclusion. — Sapientia
Motives seem to be the individual instances that drive a person to do something, which may fit into the incentive of self-interest, malice, and compassion. — schopenhauer1
Thought without language is most certainly possible. Artists, for example, think in terms in imagery, symbols. — Rich
Why internal vs external? Don't you think that, for the most part, this way of describing our every day experience misleading. For example, when everything is going well with our jobs, our sports, our band, our transport, etc. there doesn't seem to be any experience of the internal or external.We are simply there, involved in a meaningful world with shared moods, feelings and understandings. And the better things are going and the more involved in the situation we become the less and less our experience is "subjective" and the less and less is there any internal/external experience. It is when we abstract from the situation and attempt to do philosophy, science, or try and overcome some impediment to our tasks, or become self-conscious for whatever reason, that the internal/external distinction (which is an ontological distinction) can then be derived. In my experience, the internal/external distinction is always derivative, derivative of a more basic shared, involved and public experience of our worlds. This latter experience is called being-in-the-world. — bloodninja
The only caveat here is that this doesn't mean phenomena are unreal, only that, in comparison with the will, their reality is derivative. — Thorongil
No, he recognizes that there is no metaphysical distinction. — Thorongil
Salvation is an action. — Noble Dust
I see salvation as the supersession of compassion. — Noble Dust
compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will. — jancanc
Didn't he also think that we are ultimately responsible for causing the suffering in the world? This is because we are the Kantian transcendentally ideal subjects, and thus we are the conditions of possibility (e.g. space, time, etc) for the one will to 'individuate' and feed upon itself. — bloodninja
The concept has no place in a post-metaphysical world — bloodninja
I concede that we cant feel pain in their body. I'm a science man myself. But, if you think of ideals and call suffering one. When you encounter another's suffering, you would recognize the ideal, then the subtle ways this suffering is specific to this person, and feel that suffering of that specific kind, surely your body creates the sensation, but you didn't create that initial one of a kind formula of suffering.
These points are interesting, can you expand? I think you i interpret him to mean that by feeling another pain in another body....we experience a pain that originates in the other?
“in his person, — jancanc
We could not feel the pain without first becoming him, one could say. — Frank Barroso