Apparently Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is mutually antagonistic with his theory of salvation.
Briefly stated: compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will.

However, Schopenhauer said that both compassion and renunciation come from the same source (intuitively recognizing that all beings are metaphysically one) and they have the same result (denial of the individual egoistic will).

Thus how can two things which are "mutually exclusive" both come from the same source and have the same result? Seems strange — jancanc

One way to solve this is that he somehow thinks that true compassion/empathy has an element of self-denial to it, to the point where one is actually not using will, or only using will to divert efforts away from oneself and towards another, thus "getting out" of the state of individuation that the subject/object relationship of being an embodied will usually entails. This is probably why complete renunciation is what he considers a step better than even compassion, as there is complete denial of the will and turning away. However, I do see a contradiction in that ethics is based on dealing with other people, but by removing oneself and being ascetic, one is only renouncing one's own will. Perhaps in some metaphysical way the self and the world are the same for the ascetic, as the world is an illusion anyways perhaps in this line of thought. However, that doesn't sit right either. So it is true that the helping others vs. self-directed asceticism is a challenge that I'm not sure if Schop addresses.

Perhaps this can be solved thus: (I think you are intimating at this) In renunciation and compassion willing does continue, but willing-to-live ceases. Both renunciation and compassion require the denial of individual egoistic willing, but in both cases willing goes on. If one's body exists, it must will!

Also, all the ascetic saints Schopenhauer talks about in WWR are very compassionate beings, Jesus, Buddha, etc.

Perhaps this can be solved thus: (I think you are intimating at this) In renunciation and compassion willing does continue, but willing-to-live ceases. Both renunciation and compassion require the denial of individual egoistic willing, but in both cases willing goes on. If one's body exists, it must will! — jancanc

Yep seems to be along the same lines as I was saying.

Also, all the ascetic saints Schopenhauer talks about in WWR are very compassionate beings, Jesus, Buddha, etc. — jancanc

Perhaps self-denial means you can still walk the Earth telling others. However, in my personal opinion, if you are living, you are willing. The only thing that he can maybe have a point on is the people that starve themselves to death. But they are no longer willing because they are dead. Though somehow, dying by starvation means you made it big time in his philosophy. So can the ascetic saint still be living after he stops willing? Was Buddha really not willing? Schopenhauer seems to be more Jainist, the extreme versions where at some point, they starve themselves to death.

What this solution requires, I think, is a different understanding of "the will", as differentiated from the will-to-live:

I know Schop. uses “the will” and “the will-to-live” interchangeably, but we can understand them differently. “The will” is the blind striving entity that exists independently from human cognition; the will qua thing-in-itself . the “will-to-live” can be understood as the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in all humans in the phenomenal world. Since the will-to-live is the will qua thing-in-itself as it is manifested in spatio-temporal objects, it can also be termed the “individual will”. The individual will is driven by the will qua thing-in-itself , and, by default, involves the affirmation of the will-to-live; that is to say, by default, it is egoistic.

Now I think there is no contradiction

compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will. — jancanc

This doesn't follow. Rather, compassion requires stimulation of the will to help another, and salvation requires stimulation of the will to save another.

No, in salvation you deny the will to save yourself only. Like you deny your will to exist and thus are liberated from suffering. (according to Schopenhauer that is).

compassion requires stimulation of the will (to help another) but salvation requires cessation of the will. — jancanc

This is why some have said compassion and salvation are mutually antagonistic.

No, in salvation you deny the will to save yourself only. — jancanc

This isn't a counterargument to mine.

Like you deny your will to exist and thus are liberated from suffering. ( — jancanc

Explain? On your own terms, not Schopenhauer's.

I'm interpreting or reconstructing Schopenhauer. Trying to make sense of him.
Now he says that compassion is the basis of ethics. Compassion requires stimulation or activity of will. If I help you, I move my body and desire to aid you.

But he also says the most most preferred ethical ideal is salvation which is achieved through denying the will. The ascetics who don't will, don't desire are most free from the suffering caused by desire. So we must switch off the will.

So I'm trying to see how compassion and salvation are compatible.

It's an interesting juxtaposition.

I see salvation as the supersession of compassion. The will is the genesis of both. The will, divinely impregnated, moves an individual to compassion. Salvation is a special case of compassion in which the will is suspended, but not abnegated, in the face of goodness (which motivates salvation).

I see salvation as the supersession of compassion. — Noble Dust

what do you mean exactly? I salvation is compassion in overdrive? Sounds interesting

Sort of. Compassion is a state of mind; Salvation is an action.

can salvation be a will-less action?

No.

so some actions don't need an effort of will?

That doesn't follow from salvation being a willful action.

every action needs some effort of will. That's a predicate in the concept "action"

Agreed!

Salvation is an action. — Noble Dust

so how can Salvation be an action, per se? "Will-less action" can only be a metaphoric expression

so how can Salvation be an action, per se? — jancanc

To save is to prevent from "not-saved". The "not-saved" state is a negative state; death, harm, pain, etc. To save is to prevent this from happening; this prevention is necessarily an action.

"Will-less action" can only be a metaphoric expression — jancanc

"Will-less action" is nonsensical.

Interesting, I'll muse on this!