They are actually distinct concepts for him but he nevertheless uses them interchangeable which obscures his arguments. — jancanc
Motives seem to be the individual instances that drive a person to do something, which may fit into the incentive of self-interest, malice, and compassion. — schopenhauer1
So when Schopenhauer says that the "absence of all egoistic motivation" is the criterion of an action of moral worth, it's not really the full picture. Because the motive interacts with an incentive to cause actions, as I said.
It should be like the "absence of all egoistic motives stimulating the incentive of egoism". — jancanc
It's weird in the sense that in my opinion, he overmined the idea of Platonic forms. He had it for each species, for each grade of object, for each individual human's character. I just don't buy it as a metaphysical claim, though I find it interesting. His ideas on the willing/striving nature of humans though are extremely compelling and is where I find him most interesting to read. However, I think his ethics can still be useful for understanding ethical claims. I do think there is something to be said for compassion being the basis of ethics. Even his idea that some people's characters are inclined towards compassionate incentives seems to have some merit. However, is it really that fixed? Probably not. Are people's characters somehow beyond space/time/causality? Probably not.It's pretty weird right?! — jancanc
It's weird in the sense that in my opinion, he overmined the idea of Platonic forms. He had it for each species, for each grade of object, for each individual human's character. I just don't buy it as a metaphysical claim, though I find it interesting. — schopenhauer1
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