Do you believe time is immaterial?
Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?
Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?
Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?
Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?
With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?
Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr
Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr
I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — ucarr
I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr
The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon — ucarr
Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional? — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.
The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this.— Metaphysician Undercover
It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr
Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something. — Metaphysician Undercover
Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr
What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr
Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
...some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover
The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr
The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established. — Metaphysician Undercover
Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option. — ucarr
How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover
The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.
Firstly, I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.
Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded two of your statements that contradict each other. Given this contradiction, your argument is nonsense.
So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event.— Metaphysician Undercover
Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.
For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time? — Metaphysician Undercover
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?
Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time. — Metaphysician Undercover
In your example, are you establishing the shortest duration of time allowing physical change to occur? — ucarr
In your example, there is a quark at one moment, state A, then an anti quark at the next moment, state B,and you have proposed that nothing can be observed in the time between, hence the shortest duration allowing for physical change. So state B is different from state A, and there is time between these two. We can conclude that the change from state A to state B occurred during this time [one Planck length]. Do you agree with me, that something must have happened during this time, which constitutes, or substantiates "the change" from quark to anti-quark? — Metaphysician Undercover
Is it true that first you establish the shortest duration of time allowing a physical change from state A to state B, and then, in the following paragraph, you continue talking about this same duration of time until you jump to establishing a non-physical change based on info instead of on physics? — ucarr
There is no "jump", only a sound logical conclusion. We have an observation at t-1, and an observation at t-2. The two states are different. Therefore we can conclude that change occurred during the duration of time which is between t-1 and t-2. "Change" requires that "something happened" which would account for the difference between state A and state B. We have determined that this "something" which happened cannot be a physical change because it would be in a duration of time shorter than the one defined by state A then state B, which has been determined as the shortest possible period of time for physical change. This duration is between state A and state B, therefore shorter, and so it is too short for physical change, therefore it is non-physical activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
We are no [sic] talking about the shorter period of time, between t-1 and t-2, so we must conclude that the change which occurs in this time is non physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Information" is the name which I gave to the non-physical, as I explained at the beginning why information is non-physical. So what happens between t-1 and t-2, by the use of this term, is a change in information. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr
That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual". — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr
Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I've already addressed all this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can time pass without causing things to change? — ucarr
Since time passes, does its passing imply is physicality? If not, what is non-physical passing? — ucarr
Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr
Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock". — Metaphysician Undercover
Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a physics question, isn't it? — ucarr
You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover
But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr
I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing. — Metaphysician Undercover
*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr
Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarilypriorcontemporarytowith the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted. — Metaphysician Undercover
The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr
As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr
I'll reply to this with your own words: — Metaphysician Undercover
"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?" — ucarr
Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you? — Metaphysician Undercover
Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr
I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this. — Metaphysician Undercover
To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr
Ontology, I would say. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr
You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr
No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover
There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
"time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. — Metaphysician Undercover
...we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. — Metaphysician Undercover
We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The arrow of time outside of the boundaries of the empirical present is an abstraction. — ucarr
We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. Therefore I find "empirical present" to be self-contradicting. So I incorporate both, empirical (past), and anticipatory (future) elements into my conception of "present". You refuse to relinquish your idea of an empirical present, and this makes it impossible for you to understand my explanations. — Metaphysician Undercover
I can ask why the future-to-past arrow and the past-to-future arrow don't both possess determinist causation? — ucarr
Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because possibilities are in the future, and actualities are in the past, the flow must be future-to-past to allow that possibilities can get selected and actualized at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
...time is not a dimension, it has dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can I ask, what immaterialist premise gets through to you? — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, do you agree that a measurement requires an act of measuring. There is no measurement without that act of measuring. However, the thing to be measured exists as the thing to be measured, regardless of whether it has been measured or not. Because I am discussing the thing to be measured, and an approach toward the means for making accurate measurements, your request for measurements is unwarranted. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is your argument supporting the separation of activity from event? Thinking about doing something is not equal to the actual doing of the something thought about. In order to support your claim non-physical activity is prior - both logically and existentially - to events, you must show that priority, both logically and existentially. Show me, with mathematical inference, how non-physical time passes inside the Cern particle accelerator in such manner as to cause the animation of the material things that populate events. — ucarr
I've told you many times now, it's taken as a logical possibility, not as a proof. However, when we accept this logical possibility as reality, it makes freewill very intelligible. And, you can deny free will if you so choose, but then we'll have nothing more to talk about. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you think about your travel by car as passing through the interval of time required to arrive at your destination? — ucarr
No, I think of passing through the space between A and B when I travel, and I think that this takes time, i.e. time passes while I traverse this space. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is conventionally conceived as being a dimension. — ucarr
I know, and that's what I am arguing is a faulty conception. You can explain it to me all you want, but unless you justify it, your explanations do nothing for me. — Metaphysician Undercover
How about I let Einstein justify it?
Time dilation caused by gravity or acceleration
Time dilation explains why two working clocks will report different times after different accelerations. For example, time goes slower at the ISS, lagging approximately 0.01 seconds for every 12 Earth months passed. - Wikipedia
Note the above is not a thought experiment. It is scientific verification with real evidence supporting a prediction of Relativity. — ucarr
I don't see how this proves anything. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a natural thing resembles an artificial system, it's piss poor logic to conclude that it is a system. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am in no way trying to "establish what is factual". I am discussing logical possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look, "entropy" is a feature of a system, it accounts for the energy of a system which is no longer useful to that system... — Metaphysician Undercover
My model is a model of possibility. You think time is the measurement, so all you are doing is modeling the model. — Metaphysician Undercover
So "energy" is the product of measurements and applied mathematics, it is not a real force in the world, like the passing of time is. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where there's mass, there's time. This tells me time doesn't pass apart from events populated by animated things. — ucarr
This is an invalid conclusion. Like I explained, "where there's mass, there's time", implies that mass cannot exist without time, but it does not imply that time cannot exist without mass. — Metaphysician Undercover
You need to learn how to understand "logical priority". — Metaphysician Undercover
Logic works with proofs. How does logic, short of a proof, support a proposition? — ucarr
Clearly you take one way in which logic is used, and assume that this is all that logic does. — Metaphysician Undercover
In claiming free will as a self-evident truth, you're ignoring a perennial debate stretching across millennia. The continuing doubt about the existence of free will renders your following argument undecided WRT free will. — ucarr
Since the determinist perspective, and the freewill perspective produce incompatible models of time, we need to choose on or the other. I am not interested in discussing time with anyone who makes the self-contradicting choice, i.e. choosing that choice is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
There's a question whether time, or any other dimension, is causal. — ucarr
You continue to misrepresent "time" as a dimension, in the incompatible determinist way. I mean that's acceptable to that model of time, but if you want to understand "time" in this model you need to rid yourself of those incompatible premises. "Time" here is not a dimension of something, it is something with dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since time, per Relativity, is physical, in order for your conclusion to be true, you must overturn Relativity. — ucarr
Overturning relativity is not what is required, only to demonstrate it's deficiencies, like the one mentioned above. Another one which I've been arguing is that it wrongly renders the logical possibility of time without physical events as impossible. When a theory renders a logical possibility as impossible, through stipulation rather than through empirical observation, that theory must be held suspect. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since time is a physical dimension... — ucarr
Bad premise! — Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't shown contact between the non-physical and the physical. — ucarr
You haven't dropped your bad premise. Once you drop that premise that time is physical, what you ask for is accomplished. — Metaphysician Undercover
The correction to the cosmological contradiction of a pure origin - there are no pure origins - embodies as the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. This asymptotic progression toward the numerical present is evidence of QM properties being present within the Newtonian scale of physics. This is a way of saying we humans, like the elementary particles, have only a probable location in spacetime. At the Newtonian scale of physics, this seems not to be the case, and that's why Newton himself didn't include it within his physics — ucarr
Again, this is a terrible model. Why exclude "origins"? Having a model which excludes origins as unintelligible renders real origins as unintelligible. That origins appear to be unintelligible is the fault of the model, not because real origins are actually unintelligible. Origins are modeled as unintelligible, so whenever there is an origin it appears to be unintelligible. That's a faulty model. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look, the following makes no sense: — Metaphysician Undercover
As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. — ucarr
Earlier, you said we are in the "empirical present". Now you say we're moving in time, but never reaching the present. What does this mean, that we are always in the past, yet empirically in the present? Well how do we ever make freewill acts to change things then? The past is already fixed as unchangeable, if we never reach the present we never have the capacity to make a freewill act. — Metaphysician Undercover
The infinite series of the calculus and it's limit work very well. They aren't deficiencies. — ucarr
Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity.
Now we have a contradictory scenario, there is supposed to be an origin on the other side of that infinite series, but the infinite series denies the reality of the origin. Then arguments like mine which actually address the origin, can be dismissed, because the infinite series makes a real origin impossible. So all we have is 'waffle-land', deny discussions which take an origin as a premise, because the infinite series doesn't allow the origin to be real, yet also deny that there is an infinite regress by claiming that there is an origin behind the infinite series. — Metaphysician Undercover
...how can our lives not be memories of what hasn't yet happened? You're the one frequently claiming the future jumps into the past. — ucarr
Sorry, I really can't decipher what you are asking here. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm asking you why you think it's empirically true that we remember what happens before our present tense experience? You say there's a jump from future to past, with time being the force pushing us into the past. — ucarr
No wonder I couldn't understand. I don't think that. — Metaphysician Undercover
I never said anything about a jump. In fact i was implying that the future and past overlap, with my description of the dimensionality of the present. How is that a jump? — Metaphysician Undercover
Possibility is a logical understanding, whether ontological or not. In either case, the sentient experiences this awareness in the empirical present tense whereas both the past and the future are abstractions of the empirically present tense mind. — ucarr
Really, we are aware of the past, through memory. And, we are also aware of the future, through our anticipations and intentions. The "present" is just an abstraction. That's what I discussed concerning the faulty idea that "the present" is a nondimensional point which divides future from past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Check around and you'll see, if you haven't already, that the arrow of time and the arrow of entropy point in the same direction. — ucarr
I can't see an arrow of time, nor an arrow of entropy. These are abstractions, part of a (faulty in my belief) conceptual structure. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is, that you have this idea that the past is before the future, and this works as a model for determinist causation. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I tell you that it is necessary to understand the future as prior to the past, in order to understand the freewill perspective, you simply reverse the flow of time, and present that as my perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I keep telling you that is not the case, the flow of time is exactly the same, whether it's modeled with past before the future, or future before the past. What is changed is the way that one understands the floe of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
...it is necessary to understand the future as prior to the past, in order to understand the freewill perspective... — Metaphysician Undercover
The role of time within gravity does not match its role within QM. — ucarr
That's good evidence that Einstein's spacetime is a faulty theory of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
I infer from this statement that time without a past cannot be dimensionally extended because this state of the system presupposes the system being a proper subset of itself, a cosmic contradiction. — ucarr
The "time without a past" is not dimensionless though. That's the point. It still has a future, which is a dimension of time. And, the further point is that this condition you mention, "time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. Therefore if the extension of time is not infinite, future is necessarily prior to past. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the "logical possibility" I demonstrated to you, which you refuse to accept. — Metaphysician Undercover
If it is possible that during one period of time some things can be stationary relative to each other, then it is also possible that at a period of time all things might be stationary relative to each other. — Metaphysician Undercover
...now you seem very reluctant to leave the comfort of your convention, and so you fall back on "conventional wisdom" insisting that we adhere to it, despite the fact that you seemed to agree with the demonstration which showed that the conventional wisdom is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sound thinking in physics says spacetime can exist without matter_energy. If it’s the source of matter_energy systems, then we ask whether time alone is a system. If so, what kind of system, how does it work, and how does it ground matter_energy systems? I think these major concepts should be put into the first paragraph of your theory. — ucarr
As I explained, systems are artificial, made by human beings, and time existed before there was human beings. So this "systems" perspective is a non-starter. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me remind you, a "system" is always artificial. In one sense of "system" we construct a physical system, according to a design. In another sense of "system" we model a natural thing according to system theory. The thing itself is not taken to be a system, it is modeled according to a system theory. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you model an object as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, does the modeled object remain static and only appear to be animated on the basis of relative motion? — ucarr
No, it means that without the passage of time, the object would not change. It, the object in itself, is fundamentally static, and the passing of time is what causes it to be active. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's impossible that the passing of time could itself be an event, for much the same reason that it is impossible for a set to be a member of itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is impossible that the basis for that category is itself a red thing — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is not physical, and that's a big reason why "conventional wisdom" is so faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Anything dimensionally extended - something you want to do to the present tense - has a variable state of motion depending upon its frame of reference. So your dimensionally extended present tense is part of the phenomenon of relative motion. — ucarr
This argument is irrelevant because you are talking about spatial dimensions, and I am talking about temporal dimensions, so the principles do not apply. You are comparing apples and oranges. And only through the incompatible premise which makes time a spatial dimension, could the comparison be made. — Metaphysician Undercover
...the logical possibility is not presented as proof. However it does support the proposition, as evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps we don't say it, but we think it, don't we? I mean, if someone asked you, "Does time continue passing while you're asleep," you'd answer, "yes" wouldn't you? — ucarr
Of course, but I think that time passes. You, on the other hand think that the present moves through time instead of time passing. That's the issue, do you really think that you're moving through time while you're sleeping, or do you think that time is passing while you're sleeping? — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is conventionally conceived as being a dimension. — ucarr
I know, and that's what I am arguing is a faulty conception. You can explain it to me all you want, but unless you justify it, your explanations do nothing for me. — Metaphysician Undercover
I now suspect you're theory posits time, not as a dimension emergent from matter_energy transfer systems, but as another dynamical system in itself. — ucarr
That's right, but for the reason explained, "system" is the wrong word. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me remind you, a "system" is always artificial. In one sense of "system" we construct a physical system, according to a design. In another sense of "system" we model a natural thing according to system theory. The thing itself is not taken to be a system, it is modeled according to a system theory. — Metaphysician Undercover
Even if it is, cast in this role, it exemplifies the animation of matter, and is therefore not apart from it. — ucarr
This is backward. The animation of matter exemplifies time, not vice versa. The animation of matter is the example. This means that the animation of matter is not separate from time, but time is separate from the animation of matter. The relationship of necessity is in one direction, but not the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
..."time" is separate from the animation of matter because there is no logical necessity which implies that if time is passing there must be animated matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is the ever-closer approach to a start and to an end, but no arrival. — ucarr
I'm not interesting in discussing the deficiencies of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, this is not proven, That time might pass without physical events, is offered as a logical possibility which needs to be considered, instead of simply rejected as impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think all occurrences of events happen in time. — ucarr
I agree, and we can conclude that time is required for events. This means that time is logically prior to events, but not vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't read your statement as a self-evident truth. — ucarr
What is offered as self-evident truth is free will. And, when something other than a physical event (a free will), selects a possibility, and causes a physical event, this implies an activity (cause) which is not a physical event. Do you understand this basic principle? The physical event which is caused by a free will, is not caused by a physical event, it is caused by a free will. This implies a cause which is not a physical event. As a cause, it is necessarily an activity. And, activity requires time. Therefore we have time and activity without a physical event. There is an event which is caused by that activity but such an event is posterior to that activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Moreover, you haven't described any action time performs apart from material things. — ucarr
This is not true. I described the activity of time, as the future becoming the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me remind you, a "system" is always artificial. In one sense of "system" we construct a physical system, according to a design. In another sense of "system" we model a natural thing according to system theory. The thing itself is not taken to be a system, it is modeled according to a system theory. — Metaphysician Undercover
So show me your measurements of time passing without events passing concurrently. — ucarr
We discussed the difference between the measurement and the thing which is measured, way back.
Now, do you agree that a measurement requires an act of measuring. There is no measurement without that act of measuring. However, the thing to be measured exists as the thing to be measured, regardless of whether it has been measured or not. Because I am discussing the thing to be measured, and an approach toward the means for making accurate measurements, your request for measurements is unwarranted. — Metaphysician Undercover
I know your narrative overall is very complicated, but for the moment, I ask how can memories of the future not be what humans experience, given your claim time is prior to events? Since human lives consist of moments strung together, and time, as you say, is prior to all of these moments, how can our lives not be memories of what hasn't yet happened? You're the one frequently claiming the future jumps into the past. — ucarr
Sorry, I really can't decipher what you are asking here. — Metaphysician Undercover
Firstly, understanding that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event is an awareness that happens in the empirical now, not in the future. So, the possibility of an event, an abstraction of the mind, does not reside in the mind in the future, but rather in the empirical now. — ucarr
I'm not talking about "possibility" here, as an abstraction in the mind. I am talking about ontological possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
Secondly, in what direction does the arrow of time for the conscious human individual move? If we say it moves from the future toward the past, then we’re also saying the conscious human individual grows younger with the passing of time. — ucarr
That's a false conclusion for the reasons I've already explained. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since the present moves in time, it's not static. — ucarr
Your preferred model of time might have the present moving in time, mine does not. And, I explained to you why mine does not. If you want to understand mine, then you have to drop this idea, because the two are incompatible. If you insist that time must be modeled as having the present moving in time, then we might as well end the discussion right now, because I'm not interested in that model, I think it is obviously false. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is not a system, but a part of a system in the role of a dimension. — ucarr
OK then, what is "the system" which time is a dimension of? You do realize that all systems are artificial don't you? There is physical systems, and theoretical systems, but they are all produced by human beings. Are you saying that time is simply theoretical, part of a theoretical system? I think this is what you said earlier, when you defined time as a mathematical measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover
I explained why you have to get beyond that idea of time if you want to develop a true understanding of time. As I said, you need to drop these preconceived ideas, if you want to discuss time with me, because I am not interested in discussing time with someone who will relentlessly insist on false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
With this claim you validate the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. — ucarr
Again, you are applying incompatible premises in an effort to make what I say look contradictory.. The start time does not have to be "the present". It's not, that's the point of the example. As the example clearly shows, the start time is "the future". The future is first. If time started then it is necessary that there was a future before there was a past or a present. The only way to avoid this is to say that time is eternal, but that has problems. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
What's the value of an "example" that's merely whimsy about how the world might be? — ucarr
I told you the value of the example. It's a logical possibility. You refuse things based on your claim of "contradictory". But it only appears contradictory to you because you refuse to accept a valid logical possibility. When you accept it as a valid possibility, then your claim of contradiction disappears. It is logically possible that time can pass without any physical change occurring. You refuse and deny this logical possibility, and that's what creates problems for you. You frame it as a problem for my theory of time, but it's not. It's just a problem with your attitude. — Metaphysician Undercover
Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
We do not say that we were moving through time while we were asleep — Metaphysician Undercover
Activity is the condition of being active, an event is a thing which happens. I see no contradiction in saying that the passing of time is an activity which is not an event. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see that you have problems imagining the possibility of time passing without anything happening, and you are inclined to refuse this conception, but that's simply your refusal, your denial, having an effect on your ability to understand what I am saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you model an object as moving through time, you model it as moving from past to future, but if you model it as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, then change and movement are caused, by the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now you tell us material objects are not animated, yet they are being changed by the flow of time. So, a material object doesn't move. — ucarr
No, I did not say this, and this is not what I am proposing at all. As I said movement is the change of position of an object relative to another. What I said is that movement is caused by the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
You make a pronouncement that flies in the face of everyday experience, then give us no explanation why it isn't blatant nonsense. — ucarr
I think what I say is very consistent with everyday experience, and saying things like "we move through time" "the present moves through time", is what is not consistent with our experience. Really, when people say that we are moving through time, this only makes sense as a metaphor. Where is this medium called "time" which we would be traveling through? Obviously, anyone who considers the reality of the situation recognizes that time is passing, and we are not passing through time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I described the future becoming the past as a force. — Metaphysician Undercover
This contradicts: "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events." — ucarr
It appears contradictory to you, because in your condition of denial, you refuse to allow the possibility of what I demonstrated as a valid logical possibility, that time could be passing without any physical event occurring. Therefore you refuse to accept the distinction between being active, and being an event. — Metaphysician Undercover
The term "event" is restricted to a physical happening, but "active" is not restricted in this way. Therefore whatever it is which is active, is not necessarily a physical event. A physicalist would deny this difference, disallowing that there is anything more to reality than physical things and events. But anyone who recognizes the reality of what is known as "the immaterial", will allow for the reality of activity which is other than physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I warned you that it would be pointless to proceed into this discussion without accepting the reality of freewill. The concept of "freewill" allows for the reality of a cause which is not a physical event. If you cling to physicalist/determinist principles, you will simply deny and refuse the principles which make this thesis intelligible, and claim contradiction, as you are doing. So, if you refuse to relinquish this attitude, further discussion would be pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover
You say that motion is relative, and you say that the present is dimensionally extended. Since relative motion requires dimensional extension, you must explain why a dimensionally extended present is not a part of the phenomenon of relative motion. This explanation is especially important given the role of the present as a separator of future and past that moves in relation to them. How else could it separate them? — ucarr
I really do not understand what you are asking, but it appears like you are saying that any separator between future and past must be moving. I explained to you why this is false, and provided an example, the substance being forced through a membrane. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since the start of time takes time, there is no extant time without a past. — ucarr
If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your claim that "the start of time takes time" is contradictory, implying that there is time prior to the start of time implying that time is already required for time to start. This is clearly wrong, all that is required is a future, and along with that the impetus which causes it to become past. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think all occurrences of events happen in time. — ucarr
I agree, and we can conclude that time is required for events. This means that time is logically prior to events, but not vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think all occurrences of events happen in time. Following this line of reasoning that keeps time paired with events, separating an event from the date of its occurrence in time is a false separation we don't experience. — ucarr
I agree, and we can conclude that time is required for events. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is faulty logic. That all events happen in time implies that time is required for events, but it does not imply that events are required for time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now if we look at "Jan 9" as an event, instead of as a date, we will say that this event occurs after Jan 8 occurs, and we will represent this with a number line of sorts, showing that order. But according to my explanation, that number line represents the occurrence of events, it does not represent the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
If your argument is predicated upon the premise events occur outside of time (which includes dates) - and that appears to be the case - then it is obviously false. — ucarr
Why would you think this, when I've been arguing the exact opposite? I have been saying that time can pass without an event occurring. You did not like my example, saying that it doesn't prove this claim. It was not meant to prove the claim, only to support it by showing that it is logically possible for there to be time passing with no events occurring. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since time, being itself a phenomenon, is not prior to other phenomena, its progression is therefore contemporary with the animate phenomena it tracks numerically. — ucarr
You have provided no counter-argument, only the assertion, which I agree to, that my example is not proof. It's just an example. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is no progression of time in your representation, only a movement of the present to a newer present. But if the present moves this way, along the time line, or however you conceive it, something must move it, a cause, or force which propels the present along the line. — Metaphysician Undercover
But it should be obvious to you that there is no such activity as the present being propelled along a line. The real activity is the future becoming the past, and this is simply modeled as the present being propelled down a line. Of course that model is obviously wrong because the idea that there is a force in the world propelling the present down a line, is simply unintelligible, incoherent. What is really the case, is that there is a force which causes possibilities to actualize as time passes. This is very obvious, and this is the future (possibilities) becoming the past (actualities).. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is the premise of free will which makes the future to past flow of time evident, as we seek the means to avoid being swept into the past (the means to survival), by the force of the future becoming the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, going back to how we relate to events, we understand that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event. This implies that the event, exists as a possibility, in the future, prior to its actual existence. as the event moves into the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since it is the case, with all physical events, that the possibility of the event must be prior in time to the actual occurrence of the event, this is very clear evidence, "proof" I might say, that the future of every event, is prior in time to its past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is not on its own, i.e. not independent, for two reasons: a) time_future is an emergent property of a complex memory phenomenon; it is tied to the material animation of memory; b) time experienced empirically as the updating present is itself a physical phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be independent of itself. Relativity is a theory of physics; it is not a theory of abstract thought falsely conventionalized as immaterial. — ucarr
Human experience consists of both memory of the past, and anticipation of the future. You are focusing on "memory" while completely ignoring anticipation, so your representation is woefully inadequate. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time experienced as the updating present is the empirical present ever moving forward within a physically real phenomenon. This movement from the present to a newer present posits an arrow of time from present to newer present. It also posits an arrow of entropy from the present state of order to a lesser state of order. Both arrows move toward a newer state. — ucarr
Again, you are simply representing time as static, with the present moving through time. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are simply assuming that the present is something moving through a static medium, "time" — Metaphysician Undercover
*The empirical present... — ucarr
As I explained, there is no such thing as the empirical present. Sensation is of the past, and anticipation is of the future. The two might be united in experience, but this does not produce an "empirical present", it produces a theoretical present. And, as I made great effort to explain to you, our theoretical present is inaccurate. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is what your model would say, the model which puts thepastempirical now as prior to the future. It would say that thepastempirical now of Jan 4 progresses toward the future, Jan 5. — Metaphysician Undercover
You just asked for an example, not proof. I gave you an example, not proof. Please don't take it as an attempt at proof. — Metaphysician Undercover
Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
The time lag of experience rendered though the cognitive system has sentients experiencing the empirical present as a time-lagged older present relative to an ever-updating numerical present, an abstraction. This is evidence abstract thought is emergent from memory. Abstract thought emergent from memory is evidence the ever-updating numerical present is about time_future not yet extant. Since time_future is grounded in memory, this is evidence time_future is not an existentially independent reality standing apart from phenomena, but rather a component of a complex memory phenomenon. — ucarr
This is very wrong. "Future" cannot be grounded in memory. Memory applies only toward what has happened, the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
There are no memories of the future. "Future" is grounded in our apprehension of possibilities and anticipation of things to come, not memories of things past. — Metaphysician Undercover
We do not travel in time, we do not move from Jan 4 to Jan 5 in this model of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the principal difference of the model. Things, or people, do not move through time, the passing of time itself is an activity, a process, and this process has an effect on us, it causes change. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you model an object as moving through time, you model it as moving from past to future, but if you model it as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, then change and movement are caused, by the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I described the future becoming the past as a force. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see absolutely no reason to believe that the present moves, or changes in any way.... And, movement, motion, is an observed property of physical things, relative to each other... We do not observe any such movement with respect to the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see what you are asking. The events of Jan 4 are the events of Jan 4, and the events of Jan 5 are the events of Jan 5. One does not become the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, the time marked by, or referred to as "Jan 4", itself moves from being in the future to being in the past, as does the time referred to as "Jan 5". — Metaphysician Undercover
Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events. — Metaphysician Undercover
...we order events as past events being prior to future events, due to the way that events are observed by us through sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
...when we consider time on its own, as something which can be marked with indicators such as dates, then we understand that any indicated time, is in the future before it is in the past, like the example shows. — Metaphysician Undercover
...when we consider time on its own, as something which can be marked with indicators such as dates, then we understand that any indicated time, is in the future before it is in the past, like the example shows. — Metaphysician Undercover
Imagine that there was a start to time, time started, there was a beginning to time. At the point when time began, there was future, but no past, because no time had passed yet, but there was time about to pass. — Metaphysician Undercover
A true analysis shows that both Jan 4, and Jan 5. are in the future before they are in the past, so regardless of the order that these dates occur to us as events, the future part of time is prior to the past part of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now if we look at "Jan 9" as an event, instead of as a date, we will say that this event occurs after Jan 8 occurs, and we will represent this with a number line of sorts, showing that order. But according to my explanation, that number line represents the occurrence of events, it does not represent the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is unidirectional, future to past. This is an activity of the world, what we know as the future becoming the past, The day named as "tomorrow" becomes the day named as "yesterday" through this activity, this process of the future becoming the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The matter part is a term used by David Krakauer about the goal oriented matter — Darkneos
Someone... mentioned how this is an example of subjectivity without identity — Darkneos
Switching from the geocentric to the heliocentric model of the solar system does not change the direction that the planets move, it models the very same movement in a different way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr
Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the Planck time is the shortest possible time duration, then half of that duration doesn't exist, so it can't be an example of time independent of a material object changing its position in space. Moreover, by this same argument, the Planck time duration limit cements the existing bond between a material object changing its position in space and its math measurement. Again, by this same argument, your claim time exists independent of material objects and their math measurement renders it immaterial. — ucarr
The Planck length is not the shortest possible time duration, nor did I say that it is. I said its the "shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world". Notice the difference. The limit here is imposed by the restrictions to empirical observation. However, it is not a logical restriction. A shorter time period is still logically possible. Just because we do not currently have the capacity to observe it, does not mean that we ought to rule it out as a logical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're committing your temporal theory to a uni-directional arrow of time featuring a future that progresses to the present, and then a present that progresses to the past? — ucarr
Not really. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is unidirectional, future to past. This is an activity of the world, what we know as the future becoming the past, The day named as "tomorrow" becomes the day named as "yesterday" through this activity, this process of the future becoming the past. And, this activity is what is known as "the present". The real activity of this, in the assumed independent world, is what we termed "present-natural" — Metaphysician Undercover
You're hedging against a firm commitment to a uni-directional flow of time from the future to a dimensionally extended present. This is evidence components of your theory are inconsistent and contrary. Therefore, as you face a variety of refutations, you waffle between different positions according whatever you think the best defense in the moment. — ucarr
So, I propose that there is a true, non-arbitrary breadth of the present. So, not only do we have an arrow of time, the flow of time, but that arrow is not one-dimensional, it has a second dimension, breadth, the arrow has thickness. This is necessary to avoid the falsity of "the point of the present", and the arbitrariness of a duration of "the present". — Metaphysician Undercover
It is the premise of free will which makes the future to past flow of time evident, as we seek the means to avoid being swept into the past (the means to survival), by the force of the future becoming the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The other thing which the New Age theory doesn't provide, which is necessitated by free will, is the multi-dimensional present. — Metaphysician Undercover
This larger structure is the temporal timeline: future_present_past, including in its present, the second, nested future_present_past timeline. This multi-tiered complexity implies physical relationships whose questions about which you don't understand at all. — ucarr
You are not understanding the breadth of time at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
So this [ucarr quote immediately above] is irrelevant being based in that misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I mean that if we have to conceive of the relation between space and time in such a way as to allow that some specific objects are recreated at each moment of passing time, it wouldn't make sense to also use another conception of that relation to represent the existence of other objects. We'd have two distinct and incompatible conceptions of the relations between space and time. Imagine if someone wanted to model the earth as orbiting the sun but have the other planets and stars modeled the geocentric way. It would not work. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're committing your temporal theory to a uni-directional arrow of time featuring a future that progresses to the present, and then a present that progresses to the past? — ucarr
Not really. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is unidirectional, future to past. This is an activity of the world, what we know as the future becoming the past, The day named as "tomorrow" becomes the day named as "yesterday" through this activity, this process of the future becoming the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, this activity is what is known as "the present". The real activity of this, in the assumed independent world, is what we termed "present-natural". — Metaphysician Undercover
The real activity of this, in the assumed independent world, is what we termed "present-natural". — Metaphysician Undercover
However, "the present" also refers to how we represent this activity, for the sake of temporal measurement. That is "present-artificial". — Metaphysician Undercover
And these two constitute the two senses of "time", "time" as the thing measured being the former [present_natural], and "time" as a measurement being the latter [present_artificial]. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no need for deconstruction. The existing things as constructed simply move into the past. Imagine a "flipbook", except each page is created at the moment of the present, instead of preexisting. The page then moves into the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
As explained above. These two are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover
How are: a) Object A moves toward its future and b) the future moves toward Object A, its past, decidable given that time moves in both directions, albeit in two different senses (one relative and one true)? — ucarr
As explained above. These two are incompatible. It's like the difference between relative time and absolute time, or geocentric/heliocentric. We can model the world either way, but we cannot use both because there will be incompatibility where the two overlap. So we cannot, in one inclusive model, represent object A in both ways. — Metaphysician Undercover
Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
If your above quote tells us, in effect (although not explicitly), that the future approaches the present, then it tells us that simultaneously the present approaches the future because the position of the two things, relative to each other, changes. Since a dimensionally extended present supports such a relativistic approach bi-directional (whereas a theoretical point of zero dimensions present doesn't), doesn't that stalemate your future-to-past arrow of time into undecidability?
It's like the difference between relative time and absolute time, or geocentric/heliocentric. We can model the world either way, but we cannot use both because there will be incompatibility where the two overlap. So we cannot, in one inclusive model, represent object A in both ways.— Metaphysician Undercover
If the present is dimensionally extended, and if two different things are both in this dimensionally extended present, with one of the things overlapping this present with the past, and the other thing simply being in the present, then: a) what is the physics of the thing simultaneously in the present and the past; b) how are these two things related to each other within the present? — ucarr
I don't understand this at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present. — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide... — Metaphysician Undercover
Give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr
Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I described is not "time moving backward". That is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
For example, Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. This requires a sort of reifying of time, such that the day which we know as Jan 5 (that portion of time), can have a proper place "in time". — Metaphysician Undercover
It does not makes sense to think that only some specific parts of the universe are created anew at each passing moment, so we need to assume that the entire universe is. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since it is possible to annihilate X at any moment of the present, then X cannot have any necessary existence prior to the present, i.e. in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
...X must be recreated at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover
dimensional extension does not demand a specific direction, — ucarr
A specific direction is demanded. As I explained making the future prior to the past does not involve reversing the flow of time, it just involves recognizing that the future is prior to the past. For example, Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. This requires a sort of reifying of time, such that the day which we know as Jan 5 (that portion of time), can have a proper place "in time" — Metaphysician Undercover
Notice, that in the second sense of "time", the one you describe, the real activity of time, the passing of time, is not even a required aspect for the measurement. It is implied that there is such a real passing of time, in the concept of "temporal extension", but it is not at all a required part of the measurement. The measurement is simply a product of comparing two different motions, through the application of principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, the key point is conceptualizing and contemplating time in such a way which allows for freedom of choice. This does not require mathematics, it requires accepting a discontinuity at the present, such that the world can "change" at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act. — Metaphysician Undercover
...conceptualizing and contemplating time in such a way which allows for freedom of choice... such that the world can "change" at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act. — Metaphysician Undercover
The bread [sic] of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past prior to other types moving into the past... — Metaphysician Undercover
...so that relatively speaking, if something were able to extend itself across the present (similar to acceleration in relativity theory), this thing could move from the past into the future... — Metaphysician Undercover
....instead of the natural flow of time which has the future moving into the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
But this is a relative movement, which allows backward motion, across time, so time stays unidirectional in the true sense. — Metaphysician Undercover
I claim that a good definition of time says it's a method of tracking motion by means of a numerical system of calculation and measurement. — ucarr
Hmmm... do I agree with this? I'll tell you what I think. I accept Mario Bunge's definition of space and time. — Arcane Sandwich
So much for our outline of a relational theory of spacetime. Such a theory is not only relational but also compatible with relativistic physics... — (Bunge, 1977: 308)
...it (relational theory) does not include any of the special laws characterizing the various relativistic theories, such as for example the frame independence of the velocity of light, or the equations of the gravitational field. — (Bunge, 1977: 308)