The future is a non-physical dimension of time which, in turn, contains the dimension of free will? — ucarr
I would not say that it contains freewill, or else it woud not be free. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a dimension can be conceptualized as a type of set, then the set of free will has what type of members?
— ucarr
The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I understand your timeline of future-to-past, the linkage along the channel of possibility connecting ontological possibility and logical possibility is critically important because this is the continuity wherein free will can act to change contingent things. — ucarr
As I said, the two are not linked, there is a discontinuity, and this allows for the reality of freewill acts being concealed by the discontinuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
Part 2: Probability: the event may or may not occur. Haven't we been examining the boundary between the actual and the probable? Isn't the future-to-past arrow of time the thing that links ontological possibilities with logical possibilities via free will en route to changes in physical things actualized? Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr
I think I see how you misunderstand now. Let's start with two categories, ontological possibilities and ontological actualities. These two constitute our assumed reality as future and past. The boundary between the two (which is really more like an overlap) is the present. We relate to these two through logical possibility, where the three fundamental laws apply to the possibilities for past actualities, and the logic of probabilities relates to the ontological possibilities of the future.
Probabilities are just an extension of the logic of past actualities, so probabilities do not accurately represent the true nature of ontological possibility. Therefore logical possibilities, and probabilities are not linked to ontological possibility. "Probability" which is the way we understand ontological possibility, is linked to logical possibility, which is linked to the actualities of the past. Freewill is the only principle we have which links to ontological possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
The ontological actual is linked to the ontological possible, by the present. The logic, by which we represent these two, does link the possible and the actual, but in a different way. The logic is based completely in the actual (past) without a true representation of the future, or present. Therefore the logical representation contains a gap or lack of information where the past is not properly reated to the present or future.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that is why I conclude that the future (the possibility of the thing) is logically prior to the past (actuality of the contingent thing) . However we do not commonly represent things this way. Due to false premises, we represent the past (actuality) as prior to the future (possibility). — Metaphysician Undercover
The desires of free will change ontological possibilities such that, for example, a girl exercises her free will to receive a green scarf for Christmas instead of a red one. Towards this end, she prays every night before bed to get the green scarf on the big day. Lo and behold, the ship from China comes in at the eleventh hour with green scarves to restock the depleted supply in time, and the girl just knows her prayers made this happen. — ucarr
Was there a point to this? — Metaphysician Undercover
...there is an incompatibility between temporal priority and logical priority. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do we know that actual things were possible before becoming actual as, for example, the possibility of a building eventually standing upon a previously vacant lot? — ucarr
Yes we do know this. We know it through the way that we know the planning and construction of the building. Since we can plan for something, and produce it, we know that the possibility of the thing is there before the thing itself. Then as time passes, we act to ensure that all the required actualities (efficient causes) are produced from the possibilities as they emerge out of the future, during the passing of time, so that the project can be successful — Metaphysician Undercover
Conversely, do we know in advance that things logically impossible don't actualize as real in the world as, for example, a failed attempt to create a statue made of circular triangles? — ucarr
I don't know how this is relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation is not a true representation. It does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Does the future-to-past arrow of time make the revelation QM uncertainty is a fiction? — ucarr
The uncertainty is not fiction, it is a real aspect of the physics. — Metaphysician Undercover
The info gap is the boundary between the actual and probable which physics cannot cover because this boundary is occupied by non-physical reality? — ucarr
You do not have the causal relation correct here. The area of the boundary is called non-physical because physics cannot cover it, not vice versa. This is when observation is impossible, and physics relies on observation, so physics cannot cover it. Therefore it is non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens to the principle of entropy within the future-to-past arrow of time? — ucarr
I don't know. It's information not available to us by our current models of time. It's simply written off as a part of reality which is unintelligible. The idea is that by changing perspective it could become intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover
It makes the boundary intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover
At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover
The infinite regress is the math model of the approach of the past to the present? If the present has temporal extension, does the logical model show future and past overlap the expanding present as Venn diagrams? Do Venn diagrams of a timeline of overlapped future-present or present-past represent composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time? — ucarr
Perhaps it could. — Metaphysician Undercover
Please click the link below for a quick logical argument regarding the possibility of free will. — ucarr
Right, that is why the freewill approach is incompatible with the determinist approach. — Metaphysician Undercover
We know ontological possibility and logical possibility are linked. — ucarr
The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
We know that the free will by which the details of ontological possibilities change becomes active in the future. — ucarr
I don't understand what you're trying to say here. "the details of ontological possibilities change". — Metaphysician Undercover
This appears very confused. Consider "ontological possibility" as possibility which exists independently from whether it is actualized, or even apprehended by a mind, in a way similar to the way we would say that actual things exist independently of being apprehended by a mind.
Ontological possibility, being independent of both mind and physical things, stands up as possibility real within the world?
Now, ontological possibility provides the means by which free will may change the world. "Logical possibility" remains distinct as unable to apprehend ontological possibility due to the information gap. So creative forms of logic, such as modal logic, are produced in an attempt to bridge the gap. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover
In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why the future-to-past arrow of time allows the ontological possibility (causation) of free will to change things? — ucarr
The freewill acts within that informational gap, so it escapes the determinist understanding. By the determinist understanding, the continuity of past actuality, extends through the boundary of the present, into the future, so that there is no informational gap. Future events are apprehended as a necessary continuity of the past actuality, such that there is no possibility of a freewill act. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation... does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if we maintain the boundary, then when we extend the past-present-future timeline through the present, we see that is passes from actual to probable. This provides for the lack of necessity, where the freewill acts. However, to be understood this lack of necessity, and the boundary itself, has to be accounted for by real principles. This may incline one to adopt the future-present-past representation, to incorporate the boundary into the representation. Then the possibility of an action is prior to the act itself, and the passing of time is itself an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of physical things, the arrow of time moves from ontological possibility (the future) towards logical possibility (the past) and from logical possibility towards realization of a definite and contingent outcome (the more distant past)? Moreover, the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) apply to this contingent outcome? — ucarr
I don't quite understand this. The arrow of time, in this representation, moves from ontological possibility (future) to ontological actuality (past). Logical possibility, in its basic form, is an epistemic principle, describing how we relate to past occurrences, actualities, when we are not sure exactly what actually occurred. But "logical possibility" gets more complicated when we look toward future events, predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover
Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover
...the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. This is the "gap" referred to in your linked video, and what I called an "informational gap". The informational gap produces a false representation, "superposition". Ontological possibility is represented as logical possibility, with "superposition", and this is a false representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur. — Metaphysician Undercover
...the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. — Metaphysician Undercover
Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics
Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
logical possibility as sufficient reason
Logical possibility causes physics — ucarr
I don't understand your use of "logical possibility". — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information — ucarr
As I explained, observation does not resolve "the trajectory" of an elementary particle. That's why it's commonly said that the particle takes every possible path. You are still talking about the particle as if it has a trajectory. It does not. — Metaphysician Undercover
The photon has no trajectory. I've repeated this already, yet you keep talking as if it has a trajectory. You will never understand what I am saying until you drop this idea that the photon has a trajectory. Check this article (or any similar article), where it is stated "First, the photon has no space trajectory; it famously “follows all paths” like a wave." https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402621003983
The photon has a location at T-1, and a location at T-2. The two locations are not the same, and there is no trajectory which accounts for how the photon moved from position A to position B. Therefore we can conclude that there is discontinuity of information, relating to what happened to the photon between T-1 and T-2. The reality of the discontinuity of information is indicated by the fact that the photon's location is represented by a probability distribution rather than as having a specific, necessary trajectory. Furthermore, observable evidence of wave phenomena indicates that there is a discontinuity of the photon itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
How does this exemplify discontinuity?
For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr
Your example does not represent "uncertainty" in our context, which is a statement about what we can know. Suppose the greater certainty we have about whether child A is up or down, this implies that we have less certainty about whether child B is up or down. That is analogous. This is contrary to "if child A is up, child B is down", and indicates a discontinuity between the two, because knowledge of one does not translate to knowledge of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's a bad assumption. But you keep insisting on it even when I tell you not to. — Metaphysician Undercover
The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..." — ucarr
That line explicitly states "we have something... which produces the illusion of continuity". Why would you conclude that "something" refers to the probability distribution, when I've already stated that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not to the probability prediction? What is stated is that there is something there, which produces the illusion of continuity, and it also supports the assumption of necessity. I make no claims as to what that "something" is, but it is obviously not the probability distribution itself, because I've already explained how it is not that Your interpretation makes no sense. It's like you are intentionally making an obvious misinterpretation for the sake of claiming that I contradict myself — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time. — ucarr
I told you why relativity is unacceptable. So reference to it really does little here. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.
Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide.. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. — ucarr
I told you, freewill. You... are somewhat interested in freewill, probably because it actually is a self-evident truth... Still... you refuse to accept it as a premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, to address your complaint, I did discuss details concerning how the material world is created anew at each passing moment, and I described the type of model of time which is required for this. You told me mathematics and diagrams would help. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not the case that the time proposed is bi-directional. What I propose is that physical things come into existence (are recreated) at each moment of passing time. Once it is created at the present it cannot be changed, but until that moment it is not determined. The second dimension of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past (receive material existence) prior to others, at the present. This means that the present is multidimensional because some types of objects are already in the past (fixed), while other types are just beginning to materialize. Empirical evidence indicates that massive objects are created and move into the past first, that is why they have inertia, obey basic determinist laws, and it is more difficult for freely willed acts to change them. Massless things are created last, having their moment of the present later, and this provides free will the greater capacity to use them for change.
So consider the premise that anything, any state of being, which comes into existence at the present. must be predetermined (principle of sufficient reason) by something. Now imagine a number of parallel horizontal lines, as arrows of time, in the same direction, arrows pointing left. At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. "The present" refers to when each type of object gains its physical existence. Notice that at any moment, massive objects already have physical existence before massless objects do. This allows that a slight change to a massive object, through a freely will act, is capable of producing a large effect on massless objects. This effect we observe as our capacity to change things. — Metaphysician Undercover
Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty. — ucarr
By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction.Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr
Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. — ucarr
Another false premise. You keep insisting that the only way to the nonphysical is through observation of the physical, and I insist that this is false. Yet you keep insisting on it. We can derive information from ways other than observation. This is how a person comes to accept freewill as self-evident, through knowing one's inner self, and this is not a matter of observation. — Metaphysician Undercover
But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act... Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
The future is present to us through feelings like desire and anticipation, it is not present to us as "abstract ideas". We have contact with the nonphysical through these emotions. This gaves rise to the abstract concept of "freewill", which is how we relate to our contact with the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
The future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self. — ucarr
If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting. — ucarr
This is addressed above. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? — ucarr
Desire and anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover
...the future is present to the mind as desire, anticipation, and such emotions which influence us in relation to the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
The so-called "empirical present" is a 'present" which is purely past, as you admit. So you assume, when you say "understanding is in the empirical present", without any justification, that "understanding" is in the past. But this is clearly wrong because true "understanding" must involve the future just as much as the past, because the future is just as much a part of our reality as the past is. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. — ucarr
Sure representing the present in this way is "useful", that's what I've argued from the beginning. — Metaphysician Undercover
The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover
...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr
I don't see an argument, just more false premises. An infant cries to fulfil its wants. Your claim that an infant has no capacity to fulfil its desires is unfounded and unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So my past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding. — ucarr
Something with no physical evidence, time travel, and the capacity to change the past, cannot be offered as physics. Therefore I take it merely as a desire which you have. It serves as more evidence of the reality of my perspective, that in reality, desires are given priority over physical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?" — ucarr
This is evidence that "the present" as a point with zero dimension, though it is useful in many situations, reaches the limitations of its usefulness at QM. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. It is not in relation to the prediction, which is a prediction of probability. When a prediction of probability is falsely assumed to be a prediction of necessity, as in the case of a cause/effect prediction (the falsity demonstrated by Hume), this false "assumption of necessity" is consistent with the idea of continuity (which is an illusion of sense observation). There is a relation between the two "the assumption of necessity", and "the illusion of continuity", by means of which each one supports the other logically. So it is a sort of biconditional relationship of a vicious circle of falsity. Necessity (logical) implies continuity, and continuity (observational) implies necessity. The fact that the whole thing is based in probability rather than necessity, such that the whole vicious circle is actually irrelevant, is dropped right out of the picture.
Please explain how you apprehend contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
QM uncertainty is a discontinuity, the discontinuity of information, — Metaphysician Undercover
By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr
Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite — Metaphysician Undercover
I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood. — ucarr
This makes no sense. How are my "observations of physics" rooted in physics, when I am educated in philosophy, not physics? You only interpret them as rooted in physics because you cannot apprehend any other possibility due to the influence of your physicalist bias. I don't deny my dualist bias, but I deny that my "observations of physics" are rooted in physics, because my observational perspective is derived from an education in philosophy. This puts my observational perspective outside of physics. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, the problem is the limitations of observability. Yet you are restricting your knowledge of the world to "the observable world". That is the influence of your physicalist bias — Metaphysician Undercover
You are only demonstrating that you are failing in your effort to understand. All observations are of things past. We have never, and simply cannot, observe the future. Since "the present" as what constitutes the reality of "what is", consists of both past and present, there is therefore a large aspect of the reality of "what is", which has never been observed, and simply cannot be observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your attitude appears to be "if we just wait a Planck length or two, the future will become the past, and then it becomes observable, and measurable, so what's the difference?" The difference is that if we wait for it to become past, before acting on it, then we can never get what we want. In this case, what is wanted is a more complete understanding of reality. Therefore your proposal of "semi-independent reality" ought to be rejected as not having the capacity to be productive in relation to the goal of getting a more complete understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe. — ucarr
Only from your perspective of physicalist bias, am I left with nothing but physics to explain what I believe. This is a restriction which your attitude imposes on me. You will only accept an explanation in physical terms. Therefore I have no choice but to demonstrate the deficiencies of physics, to get across the need for something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
From the perspective of some mysticisms for example, within which the givenness of Newton's first law is rejected, and the assumption that the entire world is created anew at each moment of passing time is adopted, the constraints of "physics" are left behind, and we may speak freely in terms of willful creation. But such a discussion can only be meaningful if those physicalist assumptions are first rejected. That is why the reality of free will must be adopted as the primary, and self-evident, premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. — ucarr
We discussed this already as well. The restriction is due to the limitations of "observability", and imposed by the need to observe in the science of physics. Therefore "that's all the info there is" is not implied at all. The lack of information available for the representation, is attributable to the restrictions of the scientific method of physics. The information we have is restricted due to the limitations of observability. — Metaphysician Undercover
For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present? — ucarr
We already discussed this. The "now" of the present cannot be an extensionless point in time, for the reasons we discussed. Therefore it must be a duration. "Empirical present" is unacceptable because it implies that the entire duration of the present is in the past. We need to acknowledge that since "the present" refers to a duration, it consists of both past and future. To say that the present consists only of past is self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover
The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover
...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr
I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground.
— ucarr
I see no reason for your so-called "common sense conclusion". The past cannot be altered, but the future holds the possibility of getting what you want. I don't understand why you would not prioritize the possibility of getting what you want, over that which is impossible to change. — Metaphysician Undercover
MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous — ucarr
...I argue that in the case of quantum "particles", the lack of information is due to a real, ontological, gap of existence of the physical "particle". This is an ontological discontinuity of the physical "particle" between t1 and t2. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a particle has momentum (movement), it cannot have a location ( a position), and if it has a position it cannot have movement (momentum). — Metaphysician Undercover
But this invites a fully valid philosophical question. If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite. So a philosopher might ask, what is happening, what type of change is this, when a thing's rate of acceleration is infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover
The evidence of the nonphysical is the existence of activities which are contrary to, or cannot be grasped by physics. This includes free will acts. So the assumption of the nonphysical is not grounded in physics, it's grounded in the fact that physics cannot explain everything which is observable. And, my argument concerning time shows that it is highly probable that there are activities which physics will never be able to explain. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise, we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it. — ucarr
This is utterly misleading. We cannot say that the supposed "particle" takes any "particular trajectory". Therefore we cannot say that it has "a trajectory", "a journey", or even that it exists in the meantime. There is a very clear lack of continuity of the supposed "particle", in this time period, Therefore we cannot talk about changes to the particle in this duration. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover
I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. — ucarr
If I could see contradiction in my own words, I would not have said them. You need to explain to me in your words, why you think what I have said is contradictory....Now you just take snippets of what I said, without any context, and wrongly claim that these snippets constitute contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction. — ucarr
OK, so my language was unclear, and you thought there was contradiction where there was not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes. — ucarr
No it does not. That is the issue, with the uncertainty of the particle's location. We cannot say that the particle traverses that length because it's location in that extremely short duration of time when it is assumed to be moving, cannot be known. That is why physicists say that it takes every possible path from A to B. There is a discontinuity of information, such that we cannot really say that a particle even exists during this time. That's why its better to defer to the non-physical at this point, the circumstances are such that the principles of physics do not apply. — Metaphysician Undercover
...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly." — ucarr
.The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover
...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy. — ucarr
You may insist that this "uncertainty" is the result of an "existential limitation on measurement", and that is what I called the limitations of observability, but this is not a complete explanation. It does not explain how these limitations cause the knowledge which ought to consist only of certainties, to get contaminated with uncertainties. — Metaphysician Undercover
I explained to you already how this uncertainty is due to a lack of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover
The uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is due to this lack of correspondence, which is an epistemic problem. This failure of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world, allows that the unknown, (which could be excluded from physics, and left as the non-physical part of reality which physics cannot explain), gets incorporated into the expression, the representation of the physical world, as the uncertainty of that representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability. — ucarr
Once again asking the wrong question. This has nothing to do with what was disputed. THe dispute has to do with your erroneous claim of contradiction. It was erroneous. I do not need to clothe the Emperor. — AmadeusD
You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD
...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD
Consider: Two basketball players. Each player tries to hit the same jump shot from the same free throw line. A statistical analyst watches each player shoot the same shot twenty-five times. He calculates a probability distribution based on the twenty-five shots taken by each player. His conclusion says Player A has a fifty per cent chance of making shot #26, and Player B has a twenty-five per cent chance of making shot #26. Now we see Player A's chance of making the shot is twice that of Player B's chance of making the shot, according to the probability distribution.
Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr
...they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. — ucarr
This is a clear example of you misunderstanding the basic tenets I pointed out. No, They do not need to 'prove their absence'. If the prosecution has no evidence they were there, the prosecution has no case. — AmadeusD
You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant — ucarr
False. Cases are often thrown out because of this, or at least don't make it to trial. — AmadeusD
Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial. — ucarr
Are you under the impression that all cases come with overwhelming evidence? Or that evidence of presence could somehow be rebutted once produced at trial? — AmadeusD
Don't be misled by the fact the prosecution must prove its case against the defendant, and not the other way around. Both the prosecution and the defense [are liable to] make claims of fact they must prove [in their own interest]. — ucarr
No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound. — ucarr
As I said above, and you seem to have missed, Judges regularly instruct juries to make nothing of the defense producing no evidence or not testifying. This is not uncommon. This literally happens weekly, possibly daily, across various courts. Lawyers often instruct their clients not to testify... — AmadeusD
Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it? — ucarr
This is just as disingenuous as the previous part of your reply which was just so. — AmadeusD
No. If you've made that of what i've said, that is a misinterpretation. One that seems, I am sorry to say, purposeful. You made a claim. I denied it. That's the end of that, unless you want to provide support for your claim. You failed to provide any support for your claim (on my view, to be sure). I am free to walk away denying it. That's how it works. I am not required to answer to a claim which has not been supported. That is also how courts work, to the point that what's called "summary judgment" has been invented to cover this common circumstance. — AmadeusD
In this case, there is no judge. In my view, you failed to support your assertion. Therefore it was dismissed. Hitchens Razor.
These are all standard concepts. Your position is counter to them. Therefore, I am confident in leaving it here. — AmadeusD
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I read your above quote, I get: The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.
Compare, side-by-side, my two readings, which boil down your words to the gist of their meaning:
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD
It's clear from your words [Metaphysician Undercover] that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD
Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. — AmadeusD
You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD
...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD
In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. — ucarr
Absolutely not. BUt if this is how you feel things go, then I am not surprised. Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. In court, particularly important. Judges remind juries constantly that a defendant not providing any testimony or evidence does not indicate anything whatsoever. The entire point is that the prosecution prove their case, either on probability, or beyond reasonable doubt. At no stage, ever, does a judge require proof of denial. You're talking about disputed facts. — AmadeusD
Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr
You're not asking close to the correct question to address the issue. The distribution and the relation are separate properties/elements. — AmadeusD
You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD
a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD
It does seem, unfortunately, that you misunderstand basic tenets of exchange, reason and relation. It is making things difficult. We ran into this last year, and it seems MU is getting it now. Perhaps reflect on some of these criticisms with an open mind. It seems your entire mode is to simply push-back even when things you say aren't relevant. — AmadeusD
...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover
Correct, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is when the prediction of probability is taken as a prediction of necessity, which creates the illusion of continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. However, when we assume the cause/effect relation to be one of necessity, and we assume therefore that the prediction is one of necessity rather than one of probability, this creates the illusion of continuity.
Therefore, the illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution itself, it is related to the assumption (belief) that the prediction which is based in probability is a prediction of necessity.
Where is the contradiction here? — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
I really don't see how you apprehend contradiction here. The prediction is based in a relation of probability, not in a relation of necessity. However, when this relation (the cause effect relation) is taken to be a relation of necessity, the illusion of continuity is created. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. — AmadeusD
probability distribution — Metaphysician Undercover
is not — AmadeusD
of probability — Metaphysician Undercover
a relation of probability — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr
Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD
I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.
Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr
As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics". — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead. — Metaphysician Undercover
...I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr
Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover
Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr
You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause. — MoK
Do you believe time is immaterial?
Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?
Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?
Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?
Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?
With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?
Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr
Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr
I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr
The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon — ucarr
Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional? — Metaphysician Undercover
...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.
The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this.— Metaphysician Undercover
It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr
Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something. — Metaphysician Undercover
Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr
What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr
Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
...some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover
The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr
The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover
In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established. — Metaphysician Undercover
Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option. — ucarr
How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr
The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover
The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.
Firstly, I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.
Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded two of your statements that contradict each other. Given this contradiction, your argument is nonsense.
So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event.— Metaphysician Undercover
Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.
For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time? — Metaphysician Undercover
How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?
Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time. — Metaphysician Undercover