To the writer of this essay, if you have published some books, after your identity is revealed here on June 16th, please post a link to your books. When it comes to political analysis, and especially political analysis of the United States government and the culture that gives it a context, you stand on level ground with Alexis de Tocqueville.

Wittgenstein's hinges bear a remarkable resemblance to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, revealing unprovable mathematical statements. This resemblance points to deeper questions about how both domains handle foundational issues. Both Wittgenstein and Gödel uncover limits to internal justification, a connection I will examine. — Moliere

Does anyone suspect, as I do, that the linkage connecting Wittgenstein's hinges to Gödel's incompleteness theorems suggests some type of symmetry (and conservation of the possible scope of narrative elaboration (whether verbal or numerical) i.e., conservation of containable fundamentals within a system ) extending from verbal language to both numerical language and chains of reasoning?

An axiom is something you can’t deny without using it. You don’t prove it — proof relies on it. — Moliere

Sine qua non has a voice that denies the void

1. LIFE PERCEIVES — awareness helps life navigate.
2. LIFE BUILDS — structure helps life resist decay.
3. LIFE AFFIRMS — survival demands commitment to being. — Moliere

1.Illumination; 2.Order; 3.Esteem

LIFE - reflexive perpetual motion indivisible without beginning or ending

AFFIRMATION - esteem insuperable without beginning or ending

GOODNESS - uncontainable possibility hovering at the cusp of preservation of vitality

LIFE IS GOOD. — Moliere

The flesh of uncontainable possibility hovering at the cusp of preservation of vitality transcends corruption

What I’ve learned from our debate: a) still waters run deep regarding predication of non-existent things; b) I must open up my mind by a great volume regarding the material/immaterial debate.

Thank-you for your time and attention.

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare. — ucarr

Not discussing purpose of life though. — noAxioms

Neither am I discussing the purpose of life. I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history, and that's a continuing sequence of positions you occupy physically.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional? — noAxioms

Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact? — noAxioms

You do.

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? — ucarr

A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object. — noAxioms

Quantum fields are measured.

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic.. — ucarr

Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified. — noAxioms

I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic. I think general existence, or the Standard Model, is a necessary first-order system for consciousness. In the presence of consciousness, existence is self-evidently true.

Your position sounds like rationalism. You pivot away from anything suggesting confinement of exploration, but your restless ideation seems rooted in the demand for reasoning to every belief to the exclusion of axioms. This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven. A theory is just a working hypothesis always subject to revision or replacement.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being. — ucarr

No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated. — noAxioms

Here's my demonstration.

If it's true nothing can be asserted prior to existent mind (MPP), then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind (non-existent things - such as is minds - have predications (E2,E4,E5,E6)) is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction. — ucarr

Where is yours?

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. — ucarr

But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water. — noAxioms

If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.

Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive. — ucarr

We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there. — noAxioms

You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow. This claim sounds like a stretcher that explodes reason, but it doesn't because general existence is the non-local part of every existing thing emergent as a temporal material thing. This means that all material things are tied in with the Standard Model basis for existential symmetries and their conservation laws. Nothing is created or destroyed; only the forms of material things change. General existence is everywhere at all times, and that's a part of your material existence as it is of mine.

QM has thrown open the shudders on omnipresent general existence, and subject-dependent measurement of material things is one of the symmetries of general existence. It's the mirror image of non-locality. Just as we're not completely local to our measurable position, the objects of our perception are not completely local to their perceived (by us) objectivity. This is QM entanglement.

I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence. — noAxioms

We're either engulfed in solipsism or idealism, and there's no mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, or there is a mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, and we're using our empirical experience of same to generate cognition about reality ambiguously interior/exterior.

Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself. — noAxioms

You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.

The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes. — noAxioms

Why do you think position non-causal? Presence, always tied to location, dynamically consumes the material phenomena provided by physics. The symmetry of a dynamic presence drives the rotation and reflection of physics, chemistry and life. The groups supported by position and presence animate nature. This depth of functionality is deep causation.

With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. — ucarr

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical? — ucarr

It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? You think NaCl results from minds performing alchemy?

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. — ucarr

This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body. — noAxioms

You might access memory to imagine yourself sitting in your study while you stand in the kitchen, but these two brain circuits are independent and your bedroom frame is virtual while your kitchen frame is empirical. Any higher sentient with memory supports a virtual frame portable simultaneous with an empirical frame. Where is the contradiction?

Yes, [existence is] axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason.

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? — ucarr

It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms. — noAxioms

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic. Proof it's not axiomatic depends on your ability to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to you without you pre-existing your examination of your existence.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? — ucarr

An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process. — noAxioms

You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?

How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? — ucarr

I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them. — noAxioms

You believe a man thinks without proactive support of his fertilized egg?

I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of. — ucarr

Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. — noAxioms

If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.

Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? — ucarr

Effortless actually since I utilize a number line in almost no calculations. They're handy for graphs though. — noAxioms

You mis-understand the question. With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. This reality translates to not being able to do the four big math operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Numbers and their symbols have no meaning without movement through space which is physical. Saying numbers are not physical equals denying their foundational meaning as nodes for relationships between positions in space. Abstract thought doesn't establish independence from movement through space and time because it's supported by neuronal activity traveling through space and time.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. — ucarr

I could count the number of times the light blinks. 3 blinks, all in the same physical space. I don't conclude that 3 has a physical location from this. — noAxioms

In this example, 3 has a temporal motion.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say that’s one object in space, a compound. — ucarr

Two objects becoming one seems to be an ideal, not anything physical. I did a topic on it here. You seem to have commented on that topic. — noAxioms

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial. — ucarr

My body has extension. It is physically present at events (events are physical) but the spatial location of those events varies from frame to frame, and frames are abstractions. So for instance you talked about me going to the kitchen, but maybe the kitchen goes to me when I need a drink. It changes location, not me, since I am at all times 'here' (also an abstraction). Anyway, I said I knew what you meant. — noAxioms

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. Change of context implies change of position, which is motion. Where you are bodily is not an abstraction.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. — ucarr

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned. — noAxioms

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond. — ucarr

Yea, but I didn't say anything was reading it. It's in isolation we said. — noAxioms

In our context here, isolation and meaning are opposites. Isolation, as in the case of non-existence, has no connection to meaning, so written words in such theoretical isolation (which isolation is already noted as absurd) cannot have meaning because they cannot have referents. What you say is true if the isolation is really spatial and temporal separation from context, not discontinuity from context. A book is a portable point-of-view, viz., point of reference, for a spatially and temporally non-local context. This non-local context is made local by decoding of the word-signs, viz., by reading.

Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding. — ucarr

And here I am looking for one. Yes, it's axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason. — noAxioms

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? So proving EPP strengthens your commitment to what you know to be axiomatic? So proving ¬EPP, with predication of non-existent things, gives license to your aversion to axioms? So proving ¬EPP vindicates your website name of noAxioms?

Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it? — ucarr

Sure. Just don't posit EPP. — noAxioms

If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence.

I don't assume that. I said it in the OP. 'I think therefore I am' is a non-sequitur without EPP. But 'I think, therefore I decide Io posit that I am' seems to work far better. There is no fallacy to that, just as there is no fallacy in saying "'I balk, yet I decline Io posit that I am'. It becomes a personal choice instead of a logical conclusion. There is a pragmatic utility to making the first choice, but logic seems not to forbid the second choice. As you said, it's an axiom, an assumed thing, not something necessarily the case. — noAxioms

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number. — ucarr

I think there are entire math text books that never once reference 'distance in space'. The ones that do are probably using an example from physical space (like the length of a rod) rather than spatial separation of numbers.

My example was about counting objects, like nuts on one's hand. There's no 'space' between 13 and 14 when doing that. It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not. — noAxioms

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. — noAxioms

You say, "There's no 'space' between 13 and 14... It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not." How do you tell one nut from another? They occupy different positions in space. How do you tell one number from another? They occupy different positions on the number line. Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? Some say at the singularity - a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions - the laws of physics break down. Those laws are a bunch of numbers.

Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects... — noAxioms

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say that’s one object in space, a compound.

Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts?

Actually no, but I know what you mean. You're describing physical space. — noAxioms

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. — ucarr

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned. — noAxioms

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond.

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words. Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material? — noAxioms

I notice that you did not answer this question, instead telling me about things that we both agree are physical. I don't think that the count of nuts in my hand is physically present at mostly to the far right of a police lineup, even if there is a reference to the number there.

The vast majority of numbers cannot have a physical representation since there are countable many ways to represent numbers, but the reals are not countable. — noAxioms

Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding.

Material and matter share some common ground as to their meaning.

Regarding 14 as a sign, it is material as in the example of ink on paper. Its referent, a position on the real number line, holds material as in the example of the neuronal circuits supporting your entertainment of the thought. Larger numbers are farther from zero, just as larger objects are farther from a zero measurement of dimensional extension. A given color of the visible light spectrum has a specific wavelength measurement. Given this, we can say, meaningfully, the color red, for example, has a number identity. The geometric configuration of material objects, when considered at the atomic scale, varies. Crystals have a different geometric structure than non-crystals.

The set of real numbers is uncountable, but its members, even its irrationals, are individually mappable to material things, as in the case of pi.

Don't bother with trying to answer the question, "Why existence?" It's a brute fact that can't be analyzed. This is another way of saying, "Existence is insuperable." Yet another way says, "Matter is neither created nor destroyed." — ucarr

Exactly. I've noticed that. I question it. Everybody else just assumes it, calling it 'brute fact' despite the lack of justification. The nature of it seems very different than what most assume. — noAxioms

Can you show a chain of reasoning that evaluates to existence independent of the existence making the effort possible? Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it?

There can be no mixing of the two modes because the attempt to do so annihilates non-existence — ucarr

Mixing it also seems to annihilate existence, leaving you in neither state. — noAxioms

This is why they don't mix: the presence of either state excludes the other.

Firstly, you present a segment of an infinite series, which is all anybody can do; this because an actual infinite series is a limit forever approached, never arrived at. Secondly, notice I say, "supposition" of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end. As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence, and thus any intention to access non-existence is precluded by the intention. Thirdly, the progression of the negations is absurd because the act of negating (even without sentience) assumes existence across an infinite series. — ucarr

But I was supposing an infinite series. Clearly I cannot post each element since there is a posting limit on this forum. But the supposition is there. — noAxioms

If you suppose an infinite series of negations, then it never ends and thus the annihilation of existence is forever approached but never achieved.

As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence — ucarr

Yours might. Mine is not making any such assumption. — noAxioms

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence. Thinking about non-existence, because it examples consciousness and thus your existence as the thinker, forestalls any possibility of your transcendence of existence in pursuit of non-existence. It follows, therefore, that all of your examinations of non-existence are really a convoluted variety of examination of existence. By undertaking your cogitations on non-existence, you demonstrate another part of what it means to exist as a thinker.

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. Number lines are an abstract way of visualizing them. Yes, it is a space of sorts, hence the x being greater than y sort of thing. Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects, thus from roots of positive integers. The rest came later. — noAxioms

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.

Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing).

When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4?

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. Number lines are an abstract way of visualizing them. Yes, it is a space of sorts, hence the x being greater than y sort of thing. Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects, thus from roots of positive integers. The rest came later. — noAxioms

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.

Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing, and without using a collection of objects defined numerically by their separation from each other in space).

When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4? — ucarr

Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed... — ucarr

14 is never a shape. You're instead referencing a numeral (symbol), not a number (a quantity maybe). Don't confuse the two. — noAxioms

Yes, numeral is the symbol representing the unique position of a number on the real number line. Uncouple the numeral from the unique position of a number on the real number line named by a number-word and you have a random form without meaning.

Anyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true. — ucarr

I disagree that either 14 or a number line is anything physical. — noAxioms

Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts? Does the computer have a unique position it occupies? Are you physically present in your unique position? Is the computer physically present in its unique position? When you leave your chair and walk to the kitchen for a glass of water, do you travel to a different unique position? Are you physically present in your new unique position? Is your entire life a sequence of you moving from one position to another? Have you been physically present in all of them? If someone were to attempt to remove you from your current position and moreover attempt to remove you from all possible future positions you might physically occupy, would you fight for your life? If so, would this fight be physical?

Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line. — ucarr

The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors. — ucarr

Yes and No. Yes: a relation and a predicate. No: I am cautious about the distinction of 14 meaning something and being something. I would have chosen the latter. The numeral (as a symbol) means something. Again, thoughts, not assertions. — noAxioms

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. Meaning, being contextual, is inter-relational. Meaning radiates outward from inter-relational being. I think Heidegger writes about being residing within something "ready to hand," an inter-relational situation.

All of existence is grounded in material; matter is neither created nor destroyed, etc. 14 – placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line – is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence.
— ucarr

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words.
Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material? — noAxioms

Imagine you're standing in a police lineup in the number 14 position. Are you physically present in that space? Are numbers 13 and 15 physically present on either side of you? Are the 15 total lineup positions inter-relationally meaningful? Are the positions meaningful to the witness trying to identify the perp?

Don't bother with trying to answer the question, "Why existence?" It's a brute fact that can't be analyzed. This is another way of saying, "Existence is insuperable." Yet another way says, "Matter is neither created nor destroyed."

I'm saying you consist of atoms along with myriad additional attributes supporting predications.

Larger numbers hold different positions from smaller numbers, just as being farther away from your computer holds different positions from those closer it. You don't get confused about these differences because you and they are both physically real. If numbers were not physically real, inter-relationally as positions in space, you could shuffle them around willy-nilly. That not being the case, when you're on the roof of a tall building, whether you're one foot inside the boundary of the roof, or one foot beyond the boundary of the roof matters (to you) greatly.

Non-existence – a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end — ucarr

Existence – an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end. — ucarr

About these, what about the case of a finite series of affirmations or negations of presence, or a mixed series, finite or not. Does the thing exist or not? It just seems like you left a lot of cases not covered by these two definitions which are supposed to handle any case. — noAxioms

From our position within insuperable existence, there is no actual non-existence, only an (absurd) approach to it. There can be no mixing of the two modes because the attempt to do so annihilates non-existence; this because conceiving such a project assumes existence which is insuperable.

For instance, I have an infinite series for all displacements from arbitrary origin X:
{...,
ucarr not present at X-13,
ucarr not present at X-12,
ucarr is present at X-11,
ucarr not present at X-10,
ucarr not present at X-9,
ucarr not present at X-8,
...}
That is an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end, and one affirmation of material presence. Therefore you don't exist by your definitions above. — noAxioms

Firstly, you present a segment of an infinite series, which is all anybody can do; this because an actual infinite series is a limit forever approached, never arrived at. Secondly, notice I say, "supposition" of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end. As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence, and thus any intention to access non-existence is precluded by the intention. Thirdly, the progression of the negations is absurd because the act of negating (even without sentience) assumes existence across an infinite series.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe

So it's a predicate then? States of something are predicates. 'apple is ripe', 'Santa is fat'. Universe is existing. — noAxioms

States of something support predications. For this reason, sentences have subjects. They're the states of being either performing actions or expressing states of being. If you merely say, "ripe," "fat," or "existing," your thought is incomplete and we don't precisely understand what you intend to communicate, although we easily infer you're probably making a predication about a subject.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion. — ucarr

Numbers are part of what can be used to identify a point in space, but they do not themselves represent such points. Your wording makes it sound like all numbers constitutes spatial references. — noAxioms

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. Every number is assigned a unique position on the real number line. Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed, with the juxtaposition likewise meaningless. With reference to its unique position, 14 is a number, a material thing. When 14 connects to you as a number, it predicates you to a specific and relative position on the real number line. Anyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true.

Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line.

The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors.

There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. — ucarr

If ontology is nothing but an abstraction as I described just above, then the ontology of number is simply a matter of personal choice. The ongoing debate about say anti or pro-Platonic-existence of numbers is a debate simply between two different choices being made, with no actual fact to the matter either way. — noAxioms

I didn't say it causes EPP to fail. I said it causes EPP to fail given a definition of existence grounded in material. 14 is not a material thing, so it doesn't exist by that definition. But 14 is even, so it has predicates. Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where. EPP might hold given a different definition of existence, so I make no claim that 14 causes EPP to fail. — noAxioms

All of existence is grounded in material; matter is neither created nor destroyed, etc. 14 – placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line – is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence. 14 accepts the predicate “even.” This predicate names the set of numbers with the same relative position in context as 14. 14 is a particular instantiation of “even,” a set to which it belongs. EPP is not wrong by E4 because 14 is material, and thus it’s an example of a material thing existent with predication.

My assumptions here say objective reality is material and supposedly mind-independent.

Presence – the ability to hold a relative position in context materially.

Meaning – the ability to articulate into jointed extensions connecting to other presences; this articulation supports holism. Meaning is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity.

Non-existence – a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end.

Existence – an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end.


E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) (existence is one of the parts of many parts of objective reality)

“Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where.”

E = General Existence; Given the symmetries and their conservation laws, viz., “Matter is neither created nor destroyed; it only changes forms,” E ≡∞. Moreover, E is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity, where no laws of physics exist. This tells us E cannot be parsed, so ∄ E {n+∞, n-∞, n x ∞, n/∞}.

E4 is an invalid definition of E because E ≡ ∞ means it cannot be parsed by the four basic math operations: add, subtract, multiply or divide. E4 tries to contain E as ∈E4={A,B,C,D,E…}, but that’s a subtraction from the unbounded scope of E. The axiom of choice doesn’t apply here because E cannot be constrained as a bounded infinite series amenable to the building of an infinite subset not equal to its unbound set. This leads to E being a proper subset of itself, something forbidden.

If this reasoning is sound, then it vacates E2, E3, E4, E5, E6. Only E1 is valid.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. — ucarr

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way. — noAxioms

The whole of cognition - which includes social consensus - is a form of mind-dependency.

Inference beyond empirical experience, or pure reason, is the most extreme form of mind-dependency.

Nothing in existence, as it is rendered to the understanding, lies outside of the inter-relatedness linking all material and material-based existences. This is the general meaning of symmetry, the conservation laws and the Standard Model. Why do you think the pursuit of super-symmetry is called the theory of everything?

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation). — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the subject of an action upon it (measurement), how can the action be prior to it?

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome. — ucarr

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'. — noAxioms

When you say, "...measurement is what collapses a wave function..." you're talking about an observer doing a measurement, such as an experimenter calculating with Schrödinger's Equation. This unless you think calculating with Schrödinger's Equation can be done without an entity doing the calculation.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted. — ucarr

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance. — ucarr

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that. — noAxioms

Predication is verbal.

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted. — noAxioms

My definition of existence says, "Existence has two parts: a) the local and temporal material forms emergent from the quintet; b) the non-local part (the quintet) that funds the local part.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Gauge Theory establishes the symmetries of the quantum fields of the Standard Model. The Standard Model elementary particles fund the physics of nature and the presumed mind-independent things. What is known (the cognition/materialism relationship un-clarified) and what is math-restricted in scope (equation symmetry un-clarified) sums to a pair of artificially parsed definitions of limited existence inconsistent with my two-part definition describing existence as an all-encompassing context both local and non-local.

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence. — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Maybe it's now clear the big difference between our points of view. If, as it appears to me from what you say above, you make a hard separation between cognition (acquiring knowledge and understanding by reasoning from sensory input), and the physics of objective reality, then that puts a big difference between your view of reality and mine. I don't believe there exists such a hard separation between the two. In my view, E2 and E4 are not polar opposites. Considering this, my oscillations between E2 and E4 are not contradictory. My simple explanation says, "cognition is a mental activity emergent from the elementary particles that make up the physics of the brain. If one holds this view, then there's nothing perplexing about claiming, "All temporal things material and emergent from the Standard Model - such as the human brain - are only known about and understood by means of the abstract and reasoning mind." Regarding E2 and material emerging from the mind, I say the opposite, "mind emerges from the physics of the elementary particles making neuronal circuits of the brain possible."

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence. — noAxioms

There's a strong link between definitions and theories. Can you cite an example of a definition and a theory both viable and contradictory?

Metaphysics is merely the conclusions of reasoning at the scope of broad generality within a given discipline. In this conversation you endeavor to examine metaphysical claims about mind-independent reality and its inhabitants. You think general existence an empty predication suggesting the need for its de facto abandonment. I think mind-independent reality a second-order emergence of abstract reasoning, itself an emergent property of brain activity. This chain link of connections confines mind-independent reality within the mental architecture of cognition. We can theorize about what it might be like, but our closest approach to it finds us still standing firmly within our physics-dependent cognition grounded within the Standard Model.

MPP is no article of faith because articles of faith and rational beliefs alike are mind-dependent. If this is true, then clearly all notions of mind-independence are thoroughly mind-dependent.

If MPP is dependent on EPP, then E2 and E3 are based upon clear-eyed reasoning, not upon blind trust. E2, E4, E5 and E6 are rationalistic partitions of EPP. If so, it follows they can't exist without EPP. My views herein follow Sartre's, "Existence precedes essence," an early expression of mind emergent from matter.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process. — noAxioms

Regarding your method of ontological perception, you seem inclined to hedge every boundary you encounter, thinking it keeps your options at maximum. That you think abstraction not necessarily material is my impression of you based upon some of the evidence quoted below:

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

You allow yourself to flow between opposites while charging me with self-contradiction for doing same. I think your view of the partitioning of opposites harder than mine, viz., I navigate the grayscale between polarities more than you do. Why is it okay for you to use both E1 and E2 and not for me?

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself. — noAxioms

This is part of our trench warfare; herein we're slugging it out. In response to your batting away, I keep batting away your supposition we can do otherwise than talk about concepts of things.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example. — noAxioms

Saying I confine existence to material things is a simplification. I ground existence in material things, a complex interweave of physics and its emergent properties.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all. — noAxioms

You think cognition and objective reality equal? By asserting their equality, you endorse my side of our central argument: mind-independent reality is wholly contained within mind-dependent cognition. My declaration assumes mind-independent reality coincides with objective reality.

My statement about objective reality and mind follows the form of Objective Reality → Mind. Mind → Cognition. In consequence, the mind's cognition, examining objective reality, sees its dependence upon the environment of nature, which is objective reality.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be. — noAxioms

You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb?

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y
Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it. — noAxioms

You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ↔︎ Y.

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena — ucarr

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates. — noAxioms

Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates). Nothing is prior to the standard model as the fundamental particles and their forces are neither created nor destroyed.

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am. — noAxioms

Any predication implies existence of mind; MPP → EPP.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...} — ucarr

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things. — ucarr

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

The earth is emergent from the singularity.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction. — noAxioms

You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent. — noAxioms

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

You make an argument against my interpretation of E4. In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position. If you're right and existence lacks a measurable position, then your argument fails because it must assume an attribute (lack of measurable position) establishing its existence. If you're wrong and existence possesses a measurable position, then your argument succeeds with the proviso existence exists.

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence? — ucarr

I think so. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind. — ucarr

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined. — noAxioms

If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience. — noAxioms

Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing. Generalizing from here, we know the possibility of mind independent things is impossible because the conceptualization of such a possibility is mind-dependent. Truly mind-independent things cannot be conceived of.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus. — noAxioms

You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus. Barring that, we're back to:

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition. — noAxioms

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition, holds consistent with:

"...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts..." — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind?

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. — ucarr

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again) — noAxioms

No. We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that. We know the newborn uses its brain to live before it knows it's using its brain. This is social-consensus verification of objective reality not affected by a theoretician's definitions. Theoretical exploration in definitions is language play and, as you say, "...the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works."

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

Here I present an argument that evaluates to a contradiction resulting from the rejection of EPP. It’s the rejection of MPP that necessarily concludes in a contradiction. Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms

If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question, then I’ve reasoned to your own conclusion to the effect of saying:

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

and thus predication without the priority of EPP and MPP is impossible.

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist. — noAxioms

My question aims at perceiving whether Pegasus is mind-independent. Pegasus exists as a mind-dependent entity. Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. Only the mind's eye of the imaginative person has seen Pegasus.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception. In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality. If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence. This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. Some of your language implies you believe in EPP.

Your language statement, a realist position, undermines catastrophically your exam of EPP concerning the establishment of predication without existence. If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language, then it produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact. This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication. Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication. Such predications are tantamount to empty sets. Predication without existence doesn’t undermine EPP because an empty set ≠ a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

Santa is not non-existent — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified. Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication. — noAxioms

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

If it's true the two statements have the same evaluation for E1-E6, then they're not different by force of "Santa being anything is a predication." So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that. — noAxioms

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.[/quote]

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

[/quote]

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent. — noAxioms

Your declarations about mind-independence have kept much of my focus upon MPP.

An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1. — noAxioms

Can you develop a chain of reasoning from non-existent subject to analysis?

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary — ucarr

I think your statement above in bold aligns you closely with E1. I, too, am closely aligned with E1. The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary. — noAxioms

Regardless of the spectrum of definitions of existence in context, your statement in bold aligns you with the Standard Model regarding existence. You frequently pivot away from E1 to the others, but allegiance to E1 aligns you with me on the relationship between the Standard Model and existence.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence, and moreover, the material ground of the elementary particles is not a very restricted context. Apparently you think abstractions immaterial whereas I don't. We agree that cognition is an emergent property of the elementary particles. If this is correct so far, then you're the one holding inconsistent beliefs as, per my view, emergent cognition that supports abstract thought demonstrates abstract thought, like cognition, being grounded in elementary particles, and thus not immaterial.

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality.
Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex. — ucarr

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions. — noAxioms

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I want to modify your characterization of general existence [within the context of EPP]. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent. — noAxioms

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C — noAxioms

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation. This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio. Given this, how is it not true that O → C? Perhaps you're arguing from the premise, "There are parts of Ohio not Columbus." This separation of territory cannot be inferred from O without the restriction O ≠ C. So O ≠ C = ¬(O → C).

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP. — noAxioms

In the case of predication, the subject noun is always the object of the predication. When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject." we're saying the subject is the object of the predication, and thus predication is a modifying function. Perhaps now you can see why predication about a non-existent subject evaluates to zero. The existence of the predication as a modifier depends upon the existence of its object, which is the subject.

Yes, my definition of existence here is mind-dependent. However, as explained above, I've been invoking MPP throughout our conversation. EPP is prior to MPP, so MPP applied to E2 also implies EPP applied to E2.

I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions. — noAxioms

Don't conflate the application of A with A. The former is about the use of A within a context. The latter is about what term is being applied within a context.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes modification. Given this fact, the predication of the existence of existence is allowed. — ucarr

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious. — noAxioms

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence? Existence Precedes Predication is a statement, not a question. This means the existence of existence is presumed. The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right? The existential precedence of existence vis-á-vis predication is clearly something different from the brute fact of existence, right? Perhaps you think the proximity of "predication" with "existence" shows a mind-dependent declaration establishing "existence," the thing to be proven. The omnipresence of cognition within all human inquiries and exams supports MPP. Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things. — noAxioms

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? Consider the two definitions below.

principle | ˈprinsəp(ə)l |
noun
1 a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning: the basic principles of Christianity.
• (usually principles) a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior: struggling to be true to their own principles | she resigned over a matter of principle.
• morally correct behavior and attitudes: a man of principle.
2 a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
• a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine: these machines all operate on the same general principle.

cognition | ˌkäɡˈniSH(ə)n |
noun
the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses: these infections can adversely affect cognition and educational achievement | a scientific study of human cognition.
• a perception, sensation, idea, or intuition resulting from the process of cognition: greater emphasis should be placed on examining cognitions of individual family members.

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics. — ucarr

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model. — noAxioms

I'm referring to the Standard Model as a centerpiece of modern science that has referents within the scope of elementary particles. Of course the cognition of the scientists who established the Standard Model precedes its expression.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

IIn your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

Sure. One counter example is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple. Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning. — noAxioms

E2 Existence is what is known; E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

[Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This is why I say in our exchange immediately above that, "Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind."

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits supporting abstract concepts are temporal, but the logical relations posited are atemporal. For example, we can let x stand for any number, and this function is atemporal. We never talk about the rate at which a function outputs a y in place of x.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one." — ucarr

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

Of course my definition of existence depends upon me, as yours depends upon you. When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you. Unless you're claiming to have seen a winged horse alongside a crowd of other human observers at a horse show, I know your description of Pegasus is based upon your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

...there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence. — noAxioms

Pegasus exists as a material thing in the form of a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain.

...EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. — noAxioms

Scope-limiters applied to existence by definition get over-ridden by the symmetries and their conservation laws. For example, if you define Pegasus as a winged horse of the mind, then Pegasus exists as a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain. All of the activity of the brain and mind are emergent from a pre-existing fund of conserved physics. The imaginative cognition of mind can configure Pegasus however it wishes, but that cognition is an emergent temporal form drawn from the pre-existing fund of conserved physics.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

I'm not putting myself at odds with physics because my point is based in the belief abstractions - although platformed by temporal neuronal circuits of the brain - signify their meanings in terms of atemporal samplings of multiple instances of a state of a system condensed to a generalization.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

I've established my allegiance to mind independence through social consensus based upon empirical evidence that similarity of human behavior as a reaction to stimuli denotes similarity of stimuli independent of one observer. I acknowledge my belief what is real depends, ultimately, upon the mind in conversation with other minds.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms

Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock. This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it. It doesn't matter if you see the rock with your physical eyes, or with your mind's eye. Either way, the empirical reality of the rock you can experience always involves your mind.

...I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity. — noAxioms

Directly below your words show that you, like me, believe a stop sign holds existence apart from its predication.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other. — noAxioms

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q. Moreover, causation implies correlation. If A makes you sick, removal of A from your presence cures your sickness. This is to say that as A becomes zero, so S for sickness becomes zero.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals. — noAxioms

The point is that correlations, like causal relationships, involve correspondents. P alone doesn't imply Q. Given P → Q, there's a correlation because of correspondence. Red, as an adjective, by definition, implies a subject it makes predication about. Predication, with no existing subject to make a predication about, examples nonsense.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q. — noAxioms

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R. — noAxioms

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

Coordinate systems map to material things local.

E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence. — noAxioms

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted. — noAxioms

I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities: — noAxioms

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

E2 Existence is what is known

Mind → E

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...}

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

( ∃ x ) ( | x | > 5 )

Your stipulation prohibiting assumption of EPP en route to evaluating to EPP is invalid. A clarifying parallel goes as follows: Stipulation 01: Evaluate to math given: for m = math, ( ∃ m ) ( | m | m < ∞ ∧m > 0). This statement quantifies the existence of math such that math has a positive value and therefore math exists. Stipulation 02: Evaluate to the existence of math without using math logic. Since math is essential to math logic, you cannot evaluate to math existence using math logic without assumption of math. Likewise, you can't evaluate to mind exists if you stipulate no assumption of MPP (Mind Precedes Predication) because without MPP you can't make the predication of "Math exists." without presumption of (and use of) the prior mind that makes the predication.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor. — noAxioms

I conclude your multi-verse attack on the pertinence of the symmetries and their conservation laws of our universe fizzles into irrelevance. The symmetries and their conservation laws connect all material things as emergent forms temporal. There are no empirical non-existences, whether directly observed or logically inferred.

Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent
number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions. — noAxioms

Parsing existence into separate categories is a falsehood. All material things are emergent forms temporal. Existence cannot be analyzed. Avoid confusing analysis of emergent forms temporal with analysis of existence general. You can analyze the attributes of yourself as an emergent form temporal. You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Pegasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist. — ucarr

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous. — noAxioms

Your division of existence into separate categories has no bearing on the symmetries, so, WRT general existence, your categories merge into general existence. I expect you to counter-narrate this, so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding. — noAxioms

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The issue of measurement within QM adds complexity and uncertainty of interpretation WRT the subject-object binary. There's evidence supporting the view they're entangled. The Schrödinger Equation allows us to infer super-position, but we never see it. Does the wave function collapse under observation? The measurement issue links directly to your ability to examine mind-independent existence. It fogs over your clear vision of its measurement.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. — noAxioms

We've already discussed the scope of existence within my definition; it includes mind-dependent abstractions of the mind and also presumed mind-independent material things understood by inference from social interactions revealing similar responses to perceived stimuli.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about. — noAxioms

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds, or do all human minds assemble Pegasus internally from their memory banks? I'm familiar with E1-E6. What is D5?

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist. — noAxioms

Your opening clause, independent, is inconsistent with your second clause, dependent. Your use of "mind-independent" as a modifier for real things shows their independence is only rendered as fact through the activity of the mind that asserts mind-independence. Mind-independence can't be conceived without mind, and thus it is encompassed within mind, a fact making it clear "mind-independence" is never apart from mind.

My statement specifically addresses mind-independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind-independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experiencing mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence. — ucarr

So don't access it directly. — noAxioms

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. — noAxioms

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms

This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Saying, "So an apple is red only if the apple exists..." examples our inability to refute the existence of something without first assuming its existence. In the situation of the true non-existence of a thing, no thought of its refutation would occur. We can think of things not known to exist independent of mind, and the language here says the important thing, we can think of things only extant within the mind. Indeed, within the mind they do exist, so likewise in the mind, we can think about refuting their existence. Yes, mental-only things have a type of existence that can be made the object of refutation. Truly non-existent things cannot even be thought of.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms

Santa is not non-existent. Santa exists as a mental simulation of a mind-independent man.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

What is your response?

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it. — noAxioms

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. — noAxioms

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist. — ucarr

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there. — noAxioms

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

realism | ˈrēəˌliz(ə)m |
noun
Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence. The theory that universals have their own reality is sometimes called Platonic realism because it was first outlined by Plato's doctrine of “forms” or ideas. Often contrasted with nominalism.
• the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to
universal mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent. Often contrasted with idealism (sense
2). - The Apple Dictionary

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. — noAxioms

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things?

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. Specifically, I equate metaphysics with the grammar, viz., the foundational rules governing the complex (as in multi-part entity) of material reality and its emergent forms (cognitions of the mind-scape).

I think metaphysics an emergent property of material things. As such, it's part of the sub-domain of material things labeled cognition. Within cognition, metaphysics is the grammar governing both material things and cognitive things.

The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. — noAxioms

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics.

I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.[/quote]

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its
subject-object complex.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number? — noAxioms

You seem to be asking whether math is encompassed within The Standard Model. Yes, it's contained within cognition.

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. — ucarr

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is. — noAxioms

For proper understanding of my intended communication, my quote needs to be presented and evaluated in its entirety.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

The main point of my argument points to the generality of existence in terms of its grasp of all of the forms taken by emergent material things. Saying existence has no properties is like saying variable x doesn't signify a specific number because its range encompasses all numbers (when you add (a+bi) to the mix).

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me. — noAxioms

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — noAxioms

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist. — noAxioms

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things. — ucarr

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction. — noAxioms

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states.
So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

I read your two above quotes as evidence of you talking about abstractions towards examining whether EPP can be eliminated without causing a problem. I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp. — noAxioms

Let's establish that here we're examining: a) a material red stop sign that's mind-independent; b) a concept of a material red stop sign that's mind-dependent.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

You address the core issue of this conversation when you say, "I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way."

Can we go beyond the bounds of mind in our observations of nature? We've already agreed we get beyond our own solitary mind through social reality. By observing the behavior of others, when we compare it to our own behavior in similar situations entailing similar stimuli, and when we see similar reactions, we infer other minds are perceiving what our mind perceives.

Perhaps we disagree on the interpretation of objective reality inferred from social interaction. I think the subject/object couplet is a fluid dynamic associated with entanglement of subject-object. With your talk of mind independence, and your frustration with my adherence to mind dependence and perception in application to observation of nature, you suggest to me a striving for clearly articulated separation of subject and object, as if somehow observation can be done without subjectivity.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14. I was not talking about the conception of it. — noAxioms

You were talking about it because whenever you talk of mind independence, that's just more neuronal circuits in your brain allowing you to entertain another concept. You've acknowledged this by saying, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time? — ucarr

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates. — noAxioms

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstractions, a set that predicates belong to. Abstractions, being mind dependent, don't inhabit the realm of mind independence. Given this limitation, predicates are contingent things. Their position within the causal cone of material things establishes them as contemporaries of material things but logically subsequent to them. This argument establishes EPPL, viz., Existence Precedes Predication Logically.

EPPL establishes (E ∧ P) as a two-part complex. It precludes predication without existence because ¬(E ∧ P) = (¬E ∧ ¬P) = { }.

If predicates do have temporal coordinates, then they exist as abstractions derived from multi-part sampling of observations of individual material things linked thematically and collected into a set expressed by the abstract concept. They are materially encoded within the brain as neuronal circuits.

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through its attachment to its material referents (14 stones). This attachment gives 14 existential meaning and presence as a position on the number line. Detached from its material referents, 14 becomes graphic markings without ontics or physics.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates sans existence. — ucarr

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow. — noAxioms

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them. You're never independent of time, so your cognitive claims about things timeless are always based upon your temporal neural activity. You cannot set aside your material subjectivity. No material existence, no claims about immaterial things. Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event.

X = 1. Where is the elapsing time in this measurement?
— noAxioms

The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P? We only know correlative relationships through pairing. Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

...There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. — noAxioms

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

If non-events equal non-existence in your context here, then all events - including predications - expressed in terms of non-events, are category errors.

...this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them. — noAxioms

This topic, and all others, must necessarily be concerned with knowledge as facts. There is no mind independence paired with subjectivity.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles. — noAxioms

Inference from calculations applied to experimental data detected phenomena now labeled QM. Math analysis of QM phenomena translates to the technology enabling our online dialog. QM is the basis of the information age.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The white horse exists relative to the mind and also to other material things. Pegasus only exists relative to the mind.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers. There's a presumption of mind independence within the context of mind-inter-dependence, something that reduces to individualized mind dependence.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe.

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”
— ucarr

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist.

Consider: You're teaching numbers to your child. In your backyard you've laid two stones set apart. You walk your child to the first stone and place his hand upon it. You say aloud, "one." You coax your child to say aloud, "one." You repeat this action at the next stone. You then put the two stones close together and place your child's hand on each stone, one after the other. At each stone the little person says aloud, "one." You then say aloud, "two." While speaking, you put your hand onto one stone and then onto the other. Finally you coax the child to say aloud, "two." The child picks up a stone in each hand and runs around the yard excited, yelling, "two!"

Does the child, completely ignorant about numbers, see the difference between one stone and two stones?

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence. — noAxioms

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Peagasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist.

This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. — noAxioms

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. Your assumption doesn't specify which domain he occupies, and thus his absence from Moscow has no bearing upon the fact of his existence. Can you demonstrate predication sans existence without paradoxically assuming the existence of the non-existent thing?

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings — ucarr

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise. — noAxioms

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence. There's no logical refutation of EPP via demonstration of predication sans existence if it's assumed (or presumed).

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. — noAxioms

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, — noAxioms

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes.

modify | ˈmädəˌfī

|verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft. — ucarr

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one. — noAxioms

predicate

noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

verb | ˈpredəˌkāt | [with object]
1 Grammar & Logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word that predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
2 (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject.

I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr

I already commented on that definition. — noAxioms

If you're talking about my sentence quoted below, it expresses an implication of existence by predication. The definition of existence comes just before it.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible — ucarr

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again. — noAxioms

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.

What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me. — noAxioms

A finite series of negations doesn't equate to non-existence because the material universe is infinite.

The meaning of negation-to-non-existence by infinite series examples language approaching what cannot be arrived at: non-existence. Existence is an insuperable context. Talking about non-existence, implies existence doing the talking. The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence.

Yes, negation of existence is a predication, this fact being more evidence you can't arrive at non-existence while existing. The answer to the question, "Why existence?" is the fact of it being asked. Such fact means existence of the questioner. In the unspeakable reality of non-existence, there can be no questioner and no question, "Why existence?" This lets us know that when the question is raised, the fact of it being raised answers the question. It cannot be asked unless existence obtains.

Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence. — noAxioms

Of course my definitions are based upon perceptions and, later down the line, upon abstract reasoning from the info and understanding made possible by empirical experience. We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. There's no disputing the entanglement of sentient beings and their environments.

...you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. — ucarr

Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP). — noAxioms

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experience mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. — ucarr

I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.

Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence. — noAxioms

The currency of our debate is thought expressed in words. With the expression ¬A, we understand not A or no presence of A. An infinite series of negations is likewise words expressing erasure of an infinite series of existences.

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time. — ucarr

None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)? — noAxioms

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. Furthermore, I'm saying the Newtonian physics humans know empirically is linked by symmetry and conservation to the Standard Model. If these two premises are true, then predication of existing things is governed by symmetry and conservation within the context of the Standard Model.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.

Saying Santa is nonexistent is a simplification and distortion that terminates in falsehood. The neuronal circuits of the brain, physical realities, support imaginings about Santa and the like. It's wrong to think abstract cognition is divorced from material reality.

You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area. — ucarr

Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something. — noAxioms

It does break something; it makes the curvature disappear. Since the city of Columbus lies within the border of Ohio, we know every part of Columbus is also a part of Ohio. If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally. In a parallel, curvature is a part of the sphere; it's a part of the definition of sphere. If the sphere disappears totally, its curvature disappears totally.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container. — ucarr

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere — ucarr

This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of. — noAxioms

The preposition subordinates predication without reference to location of the thing predicated. Consider: "I see the red car." One of the predications in this sentence is the description of the car as having red color. This predication, like all predications, is about something. Break the connection and the predication, by definition, disappears.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

The last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied. — noAxioms

Does this statement beg EPP? In defending EPP, I'm allowed to reason from the definition of predication since it's fundamental to EPP. In saying, "When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." I'm articulating the definition of modification. I assert nothing that explicity assumes existence being prior to predication. If the definition of predication implies its subservience to existence of what it modifies, then denial of EPP is blocked by the definition of one of its fundamental parts.

predicate
noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.[/quote]

In making your effort to pivot away from my argument, you appear to have taken recourse to E2 and its reliance upon language. In doing so, you appear to be contradicting your purpose in this conversation:

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.

I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology. — noAxioms

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right?

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

If this is correct, then you acknowledge proof is limited by mind-dependence. Given these points, the first part of your claim is inconsistent with the second part.

You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction. — ucarr

Still not demonstrated, only asserted. — noAxioms

My assertion, without the negation of existence, is consistent with existence. All assertions, save one (negation of existence), are internally consistent WRT existence. We can only make an approach to non-existence. We cannot arrive there. We cannot even describe non-existence without speaking paradox.

Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that. — noAxioms

Although your sentence is understandable, non-existence cannot be the subject of a predicate.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — noAxioms

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

modify | ˈmädəˌfī |verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be all of the states of the apple within its entire history and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

In your example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts. — noAxioms

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things.

Regarding change of states of material things, explain how a infinite series of negations (non-existence) of the existence of things with states of being allows such states to be changed.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass. None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions. — noAxioms

There's no simple division of mind-independent reality and mind-dependent reality. EPP, whether accepted or discarded, articulates an inter-weave of the two realities. Were that not the case, there would be no controversy about it. This inter-weave is the foundation of your conversation and our debate. E1-E6 are distillations from a fluid inter-weave of noumena meets phenomena. There will be no perfectly discrete separation one from the other. E1 is mind-independent reality. E2 is mind-dependent reality. Without their inter-weave, no philosophy possible.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. Do you suppose you'd be making statements without them? Can you show something non-physical not tied to the them?

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time — ucarr

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time?

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above. — ucarr

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked. — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge. — ucarr

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology. — noAxioms

The distinction is partial. What we know must have an referent external to itself. The Incompleteness Theorem of logic demonstrates math axiomatic systems' inability to justify all their true statements. This is proof of the entanglement of E1 with E2.

Without this entanglement of ontology and epistemology, knowledge, if it could exist, would be nothing more than a vacuous circularity. Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

...you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not. — noAxioms

Here's the distinction between something directly observable and something not directly observable.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5. — noAxioms

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived. — noAxioms

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain. — noAxioms

If it's Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. in London, and not some ontic Baker St. in physical London, then there is no example of non-existent Baker St. with predicates. Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. has predicates in the world of fiction; ontic Baker St. in physical London has predicates in the real world of objective reality.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it. — noAxioms

I understand you to be saying I can't show EPP is necessary because the lack of it evaluates to a contradiction. I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. — ucarr

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others. — noAxioms

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr

If you want to see the original post of this definition with full context, use the link below.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/976808

This definition is more that axiomatic language because you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. This is proof that for humans existence is insuperable. Therefore, all thought and talk of non-existence is just more naming of existence. This leads us to understand that talking about non-existence as humans confined to existence is a contradiction. This is my short route to the lack of EPP necessarily leading to a contradiction.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe. — noAxioms

You say, "'E1- Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality' has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws." Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. We agree on this point. However, because you are cementing the fact numbers exist with the example of the eight planets, your example is of the type predication about two existing things. Haven't you been rebutting me by arguing predications about non-existence are possible?

As a factor, zero negates the presence of all other things, and yet that's still not non-existence because the evaluation to zero has a number as its conclusion.

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. — noAxioms

All numbers can use base 10, but not all number bases are 10. Some other number bases include base 2, base 8 and base 16.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. — ucarr

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it. — noAxioms

If two wings are a part of Pegasus, given that Pegasus doesn't exist, then also given that two wings a part of Pegasus don't exist. If we stipulate two wings exist with no existing Pegasus, we can't prove they're a predication about Pegasus. If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past with two wings, inferring two wings are a predication about Pegasus is an historical claim about a prior state; it is not a predication about a non-existent Pegasus.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings, unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible — ucarr

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again. — noAxioms

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical. — noAxioms

...the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

My interpretation of your statement quoted above understands that when you say, "'has wings has an object to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence," you're saying that something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence. These two states combined into one thing: a) an object that can be modified; b) an object that lacks the property of existence examples a paradox.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist.

When you claim something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence, you argue for predication outside of EPP, but you do so by resorting to paradox. If you don't resort to paradox, you evaluate to 2 { } = 0.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure — noAxioms

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

..it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything. — noAxioms

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. — ucarr

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. — noAxioms

Eternal universe precludes "nothing."

Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all. — noAxioms

Don't confuse necessity of matter with necessity of existence.

If there are meaningful distinctions between E1-E6, then existence supervenes on all of their applications.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

The conservation laws establish and maintain the noumenal substantiation of the ontically-supported abstractions - as opposed to the ideals - you stipulated in your quest for a metaphysical definition of existence.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms: — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either. — noAxioms

The wave function in quantum fluctuations at the singularity stands as a good candidate for eternal matter.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? — ucarr

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way. — noAxioms

Even to desist implies the existence of a subject carrying out the action described.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time.

preposition - of | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun - attribute | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature… a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

The part/whole relationship connecting functions to the dynamic system (material thing) they describe examples an indivisible unity. The emergent system, a temporal form, encloses the defining characteristics within its perimeter. You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

This overview of the insuperable container by the thing it contains insuperably equals the thing contained being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere and observing the whole sphere with itself as a part. This is an example of the curvature of the surface area of the sphere being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself, a contradiction.

This contradiction is inevitable whenever a subordinate attribute attempts to describe the insuperable whole encompassing it.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.

If philosophy wants to use "predication" in a sense other than "part of a surrounding whole" then it needs to establish a separate philosophical sense of "predication." Let's suppose you're six feet tall. Do you define yourself overall as six feet of length? Do you, instead, think of your height as a part of a larger, more inclusive identity?

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence.

If A ∈ {A,B,C} and {A,B,C} ≠ {¬A,¬B,¬C}, then A ≠ ¬A.
— noAxioms

So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP. — noAxioms

By this argument, EPP is allowed as the causal history of Sherlock Holmes as rendered in the socially-verified mind-scape. E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1. Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1. This is the argument for EPP protected by contradiction if EPP is denied.

The issue herein concerns the relationship between E1 and E2. Can anyone verify a distortion factor in the translation between the two too large to render a functional translation?

...all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v. — noAxioms

Causal relationships are not temporal. When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before. Speaking reciprocally, when you were conceived, you became effect to their cause, and not a moment before. This relationship will always be true.

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.

Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that. — noAxioms

The inter-relatedness you describe here is parallel to the inter-relatedness that general existence, as the quintet funding physics, holds in relation to all temporary physical forms emergent from it.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained. — noAxioms

The part/whole relationship connecting spacetime_universe might be emergence of universe from spacetime. If so, then the two are fundamentally connected. The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. — ucarr

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration. — noAxioms

Deformation of flat spacetime resulting in shorter time-like worldlines between two events isn't warping of spacetime around a massive celestial body?

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously? — ucarr

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

From your quotes here it sounds like you're describing a worldline dimension warping around a massive celestial body.

Gravity and acceleration causing the passing of time to slow are well known, long established predictions of Relativity. Do you deny the validity of the experimental verification of these predictions and do you deny their truth content?

The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion. — ucarr

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe) — noAxioms

Are you saying passing time is contained within the universe and applies to its parts but doesn't apply to the universe as a whole?

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states. — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be a whole apple and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged. — noAxioms

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws. My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time. The dimension of time applies to both modes. My saying your "analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field," does not establish an either/or binary governing the two modes.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds. — noAxioms

Observer entanglement raises doubt about cognition having no impact upon E1, E3, E4, E5, E6.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence. — ucarr

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception. — noAxioms

I don't argue with the claim all of our human perceptions of existence are mind-dependent. My "inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence." stands as my argument inference from observed behaviors of other persons gives us reliable information about their cognitive states as objective reality. No reasonable person disputes one person's ability to predict another person's behavior on the basis of inference from past observed behavior.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric. — noAxioms

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2. Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality. — ucarr

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless. — noAxioms

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics. E2 "I know about it," refers to cognitive things of the mind-scape. E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe," as I understand it, refers to a flying horse defined by physics as rendered through a cognitive thing of the mind-scape.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the [referent of] predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there. — noAxioms

From our consensus-based social reality, we know the stop sign is red because we infer from the similar behavior of others reacting to it their mental content in reaction to it. This means the mind-independent physics we call "stop sign" lies in the causal history of the socially verified public reaction to it. Why should we, the perceiving society, think the causal history of the referent might be, WRT language, an intentional deception or an unintentional distortion of the mind-independent state of the stop sign? This type of supposition presents itself as likely being a capricious frolic of a wayward mind.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote. — noAxioms

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. It's like multiplying 'has wings' by zero with a total non-existence result.). Next you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." Your first sentence posits an object. Your second sentence denies its existence. The two sentences describe a paradox.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.

Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.

There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. — noAxioms

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

If numbers exist as a concept, then they exist. Zero does not equal non-existence because it's an unsigned number that's a placeholder and, as such, it can add great positive value to other numbers. For example,

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

in base 10, the difference between 1 and 10 is a factor of ten, a big difference of value.

In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether. Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. It negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence — ucarr

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong. — noAxioms

Everything in the sentence has existence as a concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur. — noAxioms

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. — noAxioms

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.”

preposition | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 … a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle [EPP] is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature. — noAxioms

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? It's quite distinct from what you argue below:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

Things that exist/don't exist simultaneously are paradoxical. — ucarr

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms

No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist." See your own quote below.

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. — noAxioms

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim. If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio. Although a human-level mind is required to know this, a chimp in Cincinnati is also simultaneously in Ohio, and this is an existential truth independent of whether or not the Chimp knows it.

So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept. — noAxioms

You and Meinong, when talking about predication sans existence, navigate the mind-scape of abstractions including paradox. At the level of practical English, and everyday conversation, if I say, "Yesterday, I looked at the red..." In response, you would probably say, "You looked at the red what?" My statement is either an incomplete thought with a adjective dangling, or it is a complete thought about a noun expressed by the word "red." An example of the latter is "red" used to designate a radical leftist.

These two predications, assuming existing things, make declarations about them. The scope of predication always includes existing things. Our declarations fall into two categories: a) claims about the behavior of an existing thing; b) claims about the state of being of an existing thing. We can wax fanciful and make claims about non-existing things - such as a winged Pegasus of the mind non-existent - but such talk inhabits the realm of paradox.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If “existence” and “predicate” are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.

If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective. — ucarr

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.

Regarding your example sentence, in your prepositional phrase, "about the homeless." the modifying adjective "the" attaches to the noun "homeless." If you remove "homeless" from the sentence, the sentence disappears and becomes an incomplete thought with the article dangling.

Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse. Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic. — noAxioms

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality. — noAxioms

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent. — ucarr

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition. — noAxioms

Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.

If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others? — ucarr

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. — noAxioms

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway. — noAxioms

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction. — ucarr

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? — noAxioms

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition. — noAxioms

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? — ucarr

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property. — noAxioms

Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. — ucarr

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'. — noAxioms

So-called emptiness ≠ emptiness.

When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? — ucarr

It has a temporal dimension. — noAxioms

Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me. — noAxioms

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying,

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them. — noAxioms

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else. — noAxioms

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2. — noAxioms

Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. — noAxioms

I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.

This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration. — noAxioms

I think here you have a good policy.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — ucarr

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. — ucarr

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'. — noAxioms

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism. — noAxioms

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. — ucarr

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers. — noAxioms

Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them. — noAxioms

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes? — ucarr

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood. — ucarr

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so. — noAxioms

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming? — ucarr

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.

None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them. — noAxioms

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. — noAxioms

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.

The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime. — noAxioms

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?