...since classical-scale systems (e.g. brains-sensoriums) cannot directly interact with planck-scale systems. — 180 Proof

How do you characterize ontically and empirically the physicist and its experimental_inferential connection to planck-scale phenomena?

Yes, as e.g. Spinoza points out, human knowledge of unbounded (infinite) reality is necessarily perspectival and therefore bounded (finite). Basic epistemic mereology (re: maps < terrain), no? — 180 Proof

Yes. :up:

I think your "strategic incompleteness" overstates the case and incoherently conflates teleology with formalism with empiricism. — 180 Proof

Okay. Your helpful analysis empowers me to see that: teleology | formalism | empiricism are a triad of modes of cognition incorrectly (logically) articulated in my premise in its present state. Also, the scope of the territory claimed by my premise is too large_inclusive.

Okay. Proceeding from the observer as an always local person, if we bind the thinking of an always local person to that always local person, then it too, is always local, and the abstraction of abstract thinking starts dissolving. — ucarr

I don't know what you mean by "bind". If a local person indulges in abstract thinking, and shares that thinking with other local and non-local thinkers, how does the abstraction of abstract thinking dissolve? — Ludwig V

QM tells us the observer perturbs what s/he observes. So, the cognition of a sentient keeps everything local to itself in the act of observing. Thus, seemingly far-ranging observations via mental gymnastics, what we call "knowing by reasoning alone," are mostly forestalled in their abstraction from the local_empirical to the cognitive_general.

So science, no less than politics, is local. By extension from this, then, my experience of relativistic effects cannot be identical to yours as each perturbs by observation in its own way. For this reason, we imbibe artistic works in search of a particularly unique voice, although it's understood each voice is singular.

I didn't understand a lot of the intervening ideas. — Ludwig V

All of my ideas are simple, even if oftentimes communicated opaquely. This is a signal shortcoming of the high-speed, low-resolution feedback looping native to the intuitive learning_reasoning process that drives the content of my writing here (and elsewhere).

I have a lot of difficulty with the idea of something true but unprovable. How could we know that such things exist, and if we do, how do know what they are? But this is a bit more specific and so it helps. I still haven't seen an example of such a truth and would love to do so. — Ludwig V

It might help to look at some examples of a false premise leading to a true conclusion. @Tarskian can probably help you with this. (With such examples, you have a true conclusion not proven by the false premise that leads to it.)

There may not be any elegant simplicity axiomatic to everything. — ucarr

But isn't that just a methodological principle that applies when there are competing theories in play? — Ludwig V

If the competing theories are incommensurable, each with strengths and weaknesses, standard practice entails looking for the elegant simplicity.

By the way, what is the criterion for simplicity? — Ludwig V

I suppose it means that in a given time period for a foundational theory, no one can discover a form more basic.

However, it occurred to me that, as a definition, "Statements about statements" captures far too much... — Ludwig V

Berkeley's Dialogues for example can be read as a philosophical text, but also as a historical or religious text. The difference is not in the text, but in the approach to the text. — Ludwig V

Here you give us a good example of statements about statements. In other words, through what lens of interpretation do you approach a given text? Well, as I've been saying, no one reads a given text exactly as another reads it. This because each individual perturbs what s/he observes individually. Thus, we have evidence cognition spins out narratives of narratives. Now we see that when we insert cognition into the "what," it becomes the "how."

True physics would be the set of all facts in the physical universe, i .e. physical reality.

Any proposed set of physical axioms does not need to be a lossless compression of physical reality either.

The compression is actually allowed to lose a lot -- or even most -- of the information contained in physical reality.

The compression merely needs to be sound. — Tarskian

If the compression deems a fact to be true, then it must indeed be verifiably true in the uncompressed reality. — Tarskian

Since "deem" is a synonym for "judge," we see that compression herein is a process of translation. Humans frequently talk about something being lost in translation.

The foundational crisis in mathematics does indeed have a distinct metaphysical sonority to it. It describes issues in arithmetic reality but it may actually also apply to physical reality, if both realities happen to be structurally sufficiently similar. — Tarskian

Representation, though essential to cognition, imposes limitations. I think Gödel, Chaitin and Zisselman are examining these limitations logically. The translation from an axiomatic system to its power set necessarily entails loss, so there is no perfect alignment all the way to identity linking a term with its translation.

If these logical limitations translate to physics, then perhaps we're looking at thermo-dynamical systems that upwardly evolve to morpho-dynamics and, from there, to teleo-dynamics with translation losses occurring throughout the process.

Now we come to the need to look at the issue of the resolution of a rendering from one form to its correspondent via translation. I'm guessing that as the level of resolution rises, it approaches intersection with an infinite value, and thus there is no axiomatic system that completely represents reality.

Now we have a concept of reality as an infinite value. This leads me to see that knowing reality is always necessarily incomplete. This reasoning is my argument for seeing how the scope of incompleteness encompasses logic, math, science, philosophy and empirical cognition. The arts, in a symmetrical configuration, are limited by the items of the previous list.

We have examination of the "what," limited by the lossy representationality of cognition on the one side; on the other side we have empirical examination of "what it's like" to be a self-conscious sentient, the "how" (they are experienced) of the predications of the other side, limited by the lossy existentiality_noumenonality of being on the other side.

Wittegenstein has already confronted much of this. However, because reverential silence in the face of the creation is no fun for philosophy, here we are, confronting it again with our own words.

And now, talking out of the other side of my mouth, let me make the following speculation: if the gap between knowing and being is strategic, then we might rejoice at the unsolvable mystery of the future.

There's always another narrative awaiting expression and, it's not a case of endless cycling through repeating patterns across a fixed totality, better known as that charming misconception: universe.

No. Instead, because of strategic incompletion, a thermo-dynamic wisdom, future is empowered to be distinct in its uniqueness, existing beyond mere permutation of the fixed axioms and conserved laws of a unified system. There is distinct locality. There is no unity.

The observer cannot be abstracted from the experiment. — ucarr

Yes. But the observer, in my book, is not an abstraction - a point of view. (At most, a point of view is a location for a possible observer.) An observer is a person. — Ludwig V

Okay. Proceeding from the observer as an always local person, if we bind the thinking of an always local person to that always local person, then it too, is always local, and the abstraction of abstract thinking starts dissolving.

If there's no omnipresent, eternal, neutral spacetime within which dynamical material things and material systems animate themselves, then we have a wide-ranging field of local events attached to the evolving relationships linking animate things.

There is no vastness of creation because material relationships pose resistance to generalization.

The simple binary of concrete/abstract hasn’t dissolved away to nothing, but it has become faint.

What would be the criterion of success? THAT would be the definition. — Ludwig V

Might it be an ability to see how cognitive objects such as language, and cognition itself, per Gödel, will generate valid statements unprovable within the boundaries of supposedly axiomatic systems?

There may not be any elegant simplicity axiomatic to everything.

I have many problems with this - and with self-reference. Not the least of which is that I'm inclined to think that if a language cannot talk about itself, then there is something it cannot talk about, so it is incomplete. Nor is there anything wrong with self-reference. Some specific uses of it are problematic, but since I'm not committed to avoiding all logically problematic uses of language by ruling them out of court in advance, I'm not much bothered by them. — Ludwig V

This calls attention to something essential in human nature: acts of communication work with logic in application. You can't communicate if you're not being logical in a public sense, which is to say logical in a way that the common people can understand.

Every academic discipline has to keep checking (and updating) its logic as it goes forward, making additions to its database. At the end of the nineteenth century, science_physics underwent a revolution with the transition from Newton to Einstein_QM. Deep ramifications about how to view the material reality are still being distilled.

Revolutionary turns in the picture of reality are best times for philosophy and philosophers.

I don't think they give rise to any major problems of philosophy. — Ludwig V

If self-reference(s) is the antecedent to "they," then I might start thinking of you as being a radical QM materialist, as I am. For what I've seen so far (not exhaustive), scientists and logicians still maintain a white knuckle grip on the Principle of Non-Contradiction. Here at TPF, many debaters think they've scored a slam dunk whenever they discover a contradiction from the opposition.

Logicians and mathematicians have adopted the project of constructing a language with a grammar that rules such statements out. That's their choice. But it seems clear that a language that include those possibilities is perfectly workable. — Ludwig V

More evidence of your radical inclination.

Yes, Tarskian's claim is particularly interesting in terms of its generality:

A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:

It is irrelevant that it is raining today. — Tarskian

It dovetails with Gödel and, with a marvelous concision, translates his premise into verbal language. Now it's easy to see that all axiomatic systems, first order, generate statements not strictly proven within the scope of the axiomatic system from which they arise. This is a powerful generalization of the premise of incompletion, both axiomatic and existential.

When we apply essential incompletion to philosophy itself, so that now we're evaluating philosophy's evaluation of something else, we find ourselves at the second higher-order: evaluation of evaluation of a proposition.

What we're seeing now is the process of how ground rules keep giving rise to more ground rules. Ha, ha, ha! We must now laugh at ourselves in our quest to compile everything into one system elegant in its simplicity.

Another nemesis of the would-be wise, standing alongside of contradiction, is the infinite series.

I'm afraid I'm completely stuck in my opinion that the example is not a philosophical statement, unless you mean that it being used as a philosophical example makes it a philosophical statement. Which I think would be unduly stretching the scope of philosophy. — Ludwig V

You can apply critical thinking to any predication. In some instances that might render you as a pedant, but you can do it.

I am wondering, however, whether self-reference may not be part of the distinction between science and the humanities. — Ludwig V

Indeed, it is. It's the heart of the difference. It's the heart of the challenge to the Newtonian physicist to change the vision to QM. The observer cannot be abstracted from the experiment. From this we understand there is no abstraction. Instead, there are relationships. Loop quantum gravity tells us there are atoms of discontinuous space. Seemingly continuous space is an effect of the limits of human eyes.

Now we see that incompletion generalized dovetails with the fall of abstraction, landing us in a world that demands a future created from... what?

...can there be science of science. I doubt if it could follow some version of scientific method, including the experimental method, so would such a discipline be scientific? — Ludwig V

Philosophers, as we've been seeing in my post, are cognitive grammarians. Thinking about thinking amounts to examination of the ground rules for any predication.

Ground rules are the foundation supporting methodology. Therefore, any discipline that generates methodology also generates ground rules. In this way, philosophy is more inclusive than science. The methodology for the scientific method might not be scientific, but it is philosophical.

History, literature, and some approaches to language are about actual human beings, not abstract concepts — Ludwig V

Is philosophy included here? Depends on what you mean by philosophy. Much philosophy presupposes an abstract observer, but Wittgenstein, of course, challenged that. — Ludwig V

This question directs some light onto what makes Tarskian's definition of philosophy interesting:

A statement about a fact is not philosophical. For example:

It is raining today.

A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:

It is irrelevant that it is raining today.

This explains in simple words what the true meaning is of Godel's incompleteness theorem.

A theory is incomplete if it can express statements about its own statements. In other words, a theory is incomplete if it is capable of philosophy.

Self-referential statements are just a special case of the general case, which is the philosophical statement. If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself. — Tarskian

Tarskian helps illuminate some possible essentials of consciousness via his application of Gödel to his definition of philosophy. We're looking at a spectrum of incompleteness: a) axiomatic: Russell, Gödel; b) existential: Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberg; c) cognitive: Tarskian.

If philosophy is an essential part of human nature, then human nature joins the list of incompleteness detailed above.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. — ucarr

...I don't really understand what you mean. — Ludwig V

To me, adverbial modification means walking purposefully, or ambling or wandering or limping. But you might mean that interpretation is... — Ludwig V

You express in your own words what I'm trying to communicate with my fancy language: the adverb reveals how an action is performed by an individual person with his/her unique Point Of View being the adverbial force that determines the "how" of the doing of an action: "the arrogant boy strutted boldly down the lane, scowling fiercely at anyone making eye contact. The shy maiden, seeing the lad's effrontery, blushed profusely."

The "how" of the boy's actions (strutting boldly, scowling fiercely) convey how he sees himself, i.e., his POV of himself; the "how" of the maiden's action (blushing profusely) conveys how she feels emotion in response to his personality, i.e., her POV of his character.

It's the personal POV that communicates what it's like experiencing the fact of the existence of the things of this world in an individualized way unique to one POV with one personal history that distinguishes humanities from sciences. Sure, scientists have personal experiences of discovering the fact of existing things, but it's unusual for science to be about the personal experience of those existing things. The personal account of experiencing existing things is what humanities does.

How we esteem the great scientist: for seeing the fact of what we never imagined.

How we esteem the great artist: for experiencing illumination from the conventional

It is possible that the prediction of the behaviour of organic molecules using hard physics is not computable, just like the behaviour of a human stomach can't be predicted using hard physics, even if we accept that we live in a purely physicalistic universe that regularly obeys the fundamental laws of physics at every level. — Lionino

:up:

Even more challenging to the test designer, Jenkins adds, is to remember that taking a test is itself a behavior. This means that tests need to try to take into account the attitudes of test takers while they are taking the test.

This means some people may answer questions based on how they want to be perceived, rather than how they truly are.

One of the most difficult hurdles for researchers observing human behavior is how to deal with the reality that human test subjects are always aware they are being studied and can modify their behavior—purposely or unconsciously—in response. — "Tarskian

Dr. Paul Jenkins

Dr. Jenkins' distinction here shines light on the distinction between science discovery and humanities discovery that I'm trying to distill and generalize.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the predication of the fact of existing things.

Can Human Behavior Be Studied Scientifically? As claimed above, it's hard to study human behavior because, according to my premise, the researcher has to negotiate a path between the dominant modes of two distinct disciplines of discovery. However, the distinction is not a simple binary, b&w polarization, and so the two modes can sometimes be made to work side-by-side.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags [personal] consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.[/quote]

It think it's beneficial for both disciplines to make use of the scientific approach: public, measurable, repeatable. I think it's beneficial for both disciplines to make use of the humanities approach: What's it like to travel through (and be changed by) the natural world on a journey with a beginning, middle and end?

Here's an earlier dialogue that speaks to the mesh of science/humanities:

There are fields that are an tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. A good number of architectural rules have been experimentally tested for safety. Still, subjective aesthetics have always been a major consideration in the construction of new buildings. The same can be said about the design of cars or any consumer product. — Tarskian

That's right.

For millennia, humans have understood that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable, because if any of these qualities are omitted or prioritized the buildings become practical but not beautiful, or beautiful but unsustainable, or sustainable but regardless of how. — jkop

There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels.
— jkop

Does such a causal relation exist? — ucarr

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop

So, one possible summit of a science-art mesh would be a building that's useful, ecological and beautiful. — ucarr

Yeah, those three (or closely related varieties of each) are the essential components of all successful structural designs. Also known as the Vitruvian Triad.

When the sciences divorced the humanities, many intellectuals (e.g. Schopenhauer) became reluctant to see architecture as an art. It just seemed too pragmatic, concerned with functions etc. — jkop

Maybe a lesson here is that reductionism can be a good tactical maneuver while the researcher is in the thick of the hunt for discovery -- simplicity in theory and practice can be conditionally good -- but as a value, it should be approached with much skepticism $\Rightarrow$ necessary and sufficient.

1 – Merriam-Webster is garbage;
2 – that is a metaphorical meaning;
12 – Merriam-Webster would have noted that were it not a terrible dictionary.

Even if it is somehow a valid definition, it is worthless for the argument being put forth. I won't invest my energies into explaining it. You can think about it if you want. — Lionino

You say Merriam-Webster is garbage. Can you cite a public and authoritative etymology for "miracle" that logically precludes this metaphorical sense of the word? I think it examples hyperbole which implies extreme improbability.

You say this metaphorical sense of the word is worthless for the following argument:

Even if the universe turns out to have a theory, this theory will almost surely be incomplete and therefore be able to predict just a small fraction of its facts. So, there is indeed ample scope for mysteries and miracles. — Tarskian

1) Metaphorical parallelism, even if not literal, nonetheless is logical; 2) Since our knowledge of the universe is incomplete, even the high school student knows the existence of a deity hasn't been been proven logically impossible. Especially pertinent to this incompleteness is the possibility of a higher-order of reality beyond what humanity knows as the natural world. At this higher reality, we might discover hyper-logical causes for phenomena perceived by humans as miraculous.

The big difficulty is that one has to have competence in a field in order to assess how authoritative a source is — Ludwig V

In practice, that is not true. Competence in the field is not required, just common sense. A physics textbook by a professor from Utretch, used in physics courses internationally, is authoritative, a researcher's blogspot is not.

I don't need to know neuroscience to have the common sense to not take at face value a research paper (which isn't made for laymen) from 2011 with 2 citations and 1 no-name researcher. — Lionino

1) Can you show categorically how textbooks are authoritative but blogspots are not?

2) Can you show how your disdain for no-name researchers is something more than snobbery acting on behalf of laziness? Also, bear in mind, big-name researchers were originally no-name researchers.

3)

I am not interested in discussing physics with anyone before the moment of force of this high school problem is presented to me in Cartesian coordinates — Lionino

It's obvious that your "moment of force" exam is an entrance exam of sorts aimed at vetting the competence of candidates worthy of dialoging with you on topics from physics. Let's consider what you've written:

1) "Competence in the field is not required, just common sense."

2) "I am not interested in discussing physics with anyone before the moment of force of this high school problem is presented to me in Cartesian coordinates."

Why are these statements not an example of your: a) hypocrisy; b) self-contradiction?

Here's an elaboration of the central premise of my OP:

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the predication of the fact of existing things.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags [personal] consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.[/quote]

Please show how your "moment of force" exam is pertinent to my central premise.

If it's not pertinent to my central premise, then perhaps you should post your exam within your personal profile. Henceforth, when someone tries to dialog with you, you can refer them to your profile, explaining that you must first deem them worthy of engagement by means of examination.

...HPU is not about either "existence" or "observation", these two mean nothing in physics. — Lionino

...observation is not relevant in physics, it is interference that is relevant, and interference happens through measurement, which is how we observe things (observation in itself is irrelevant). — Lionino

What are the two types of interference?

In physics, interference is a phenomenon in which two coherent waves are combined by adding their intensities or displacements with due consideration for their phase difference. The resultant wave may have greater intensity or lower amplitude if the two waves are in phase or out of phase, respectively.

--- Wikipedia

Though both types of interference occur when two waves meet, they produce different results. Constructive interference occurs when two waves collide and combine, but destructive interference happens when two waves collide and cancel out.

-- Britannica.com

You seem to be referring to a third type of interference, i.e., measurement interference. I'm unsure about what that is. Bear in mind, however, that the HUP is not about observer interference. No, it's an existential limitation on the availability of information via the Fourier transformations linking position and momentum measurements.

P.S. Don’t bother trashing Wikipedia and Britannic.com without providing arguments showing their incorrectness.

miracle
noun
mir·​a·​cle ˈmir-i-kəl
Synonyms of miracle - curiosity, sensation, spectacle
1
: an extraordinary event manifesting divine intervention in human affairs
the healing miracles described in the Gospels
2
: an extremely outstanding or unusual event, thing, or accomplishment
The bridge is a miracle of engineering.
3
Christian Science : a divinely natural phenomenon experienced humanly as the fulfillment of spiritual law

Merriam-Webster

Is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about existence or observation? — ucarr

Neither. — 01Lionino

No. The HUP still is not about the "limits of quantised physical interactions". It has a clear physical meaning. — 02Lionino

Why are 01Lionino and 02 Lionino not a contradiction?

Is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about existence or observation? — ucarr

Neither. — 01Lionino

The fundamental thing really is the mathematical object (the amplitude distribution) not the particle itself. Position and Momentum are inexorably tied together because we're talking about evolutions of states over time…

Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle tells us that we can't have this kind of information. He derived it from the mathematics as a fundamental inequality…

Tyler Kresch

If you can reconcile your “Neither” with the two above quotes, please do so.

This post intentionally left blank.

They call it common sense for a reason. It relies for its validity on normative conventions, which are a mixed blessing. They allow for social cohesion at the expensive of the intelligibility of novel insights, especially in less conventionally oriented fields like philosophy. Sometimes what is needed is uncommon sense. As Heidegger wrote “ …a philosophy is creatively grasped at the earliest 100 years after it arises.” — Joshs

:up: Your quote exhales an aroma resembling wisdom.

Your commentary is very helpful. May it keep coming.

:smile: :up:

Do you buy the existence of humanity as a miracle of improbability? — ucarr

That is the fine-tuning problem and most secular philosophers don't think it is a miracle (I am taking "miracle" here to mean intelligent design or sheer chance (~40%)). — Lionino

Let me clarify; in this context, by "miracle" I mean a highly improbable or unlikely development.

Do you deny the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was worked out as a math inequality? — ucarr

No. The HUP still is not about the "limits of quantised physical interactions". It has a clear physical meaning. — Lionino

Is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about existence or observation?

This is at the heart of the difference between Quantum Mechanics and "Big Stuff Physics"(Newtonian). The fundamental thing really is the mathematical object (the amplitude distribution) not the particle itself.

...position and position over time are related in quantum mechanics. So it turns out that when your position distribution is concentrated in a single area, when you [Fourier] transform it to get the momentum, that momentum distribution is more spread out (less determinable). Similarly, if the momentum distribution is concentrated, then the position distribution is more spread out (less determinable). The reason for this, mathematically, is that the momentum distribution and the position distribution of particles in Quantum Configuration Space are the Fourier Transforms of one-another.

Tyler Kresch

With your emphatic statement above, you're claiming to know with confidence what Bohr, Shrödinger and Feynman didn't claim to know with confidence: the inflection point merging physics as material thing with physics as math model.

As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi

If we want to know what something is, objectively, we turn to science.

If we want to know what it's like, subjectively, to walk a mile in another person's shoes, we turn to art.

These are two profoundly different states: the "what" versus the "how." — ucarr

These are clear statements of: my subject: How science and art differ; and of my premise: science and art, modally speaking ("What" vs "How"), differ profoundly.

Where's the connection between I like sushi's criticism and what I've written?

I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. This then lead to you holding to How for one line of questioning where it suits you whilst holding to Why for another (even though - to repeat - they are BOTH What questions). — I like sushi

I acknowledged this overlap long ago. Now, it's your turn to argue the point that overlap obliterates difference.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the predication of the fact of existing things.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery. — ucarr

In my conversation with I like sushi, I have failed in my attempts to do a logical mapping from his critical comments -- as with the two samples of his comments quoted above -- to evidence in my writing that validates the comments.[/quote]

When he challenges me to make a definitive statement of my subject and premise, I present them. He doesn't respond to what I presented.

When he charges me with conflating "What" and "How," I make statements clarifying their difference. Also, I ask him to support his implication that two things that overlap partially cannot also have differences. He doesn't present what I ask for.

Now he avoids his responsibilities as a critic by abandoning the conversation.

...the idea that consciousness is subjective, but science is objective, and therefore we can't have a science about consciousness, conflates two different senses of 'subjective'.

Consciousness is ontologically subjective as it exists only for the one who has it, but that doesn't mean epistemically subjective. We can be conscious of science, and we can have science about the conscious states of individual organisms. — jkop

Can we have science about the conscious states of individual organisms that's epistemically subjective? This question is meant to ask if we can somehow somersault out of objective examination of a thing outside of us (consciousness not our own) into a subjective understanding of it? Sounds like science fiction along the lines of Star Trek's Vulcan mind meld.

And moreover, can we then somehow rationalize subjectivity as objective narration?

Now we see with these questions the profound difference between what science does and what art does. The actor and the writer, through the illusion of omniscient performance/narration, enters the mind of the character and lives that character's life subjectively.

If we want to know what something is, objectively, we turn to science.

If we want to know what it's like, subjectively, to walk a mile in another person's shoes, we turn to art.

These are two profoundly different states: the "what" versus the "how."

This is helpful. If I'm understanding correctly, abductive reasoning is used to determine which of a number of rival theories is the most simple and direct.

"Miracle" here is used casually and sophistically, but the above fact does not leave ample scope for miracles in a Humean sense either. — Lionino

Do you buy the existence of humanity as a miracle of improbability?

I can't work with Quora quotations. — Lionino

Do you deny the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was worked out as a math inequality?

$pq − qp = h/(2πi)$

Why shouldn't you take Quora quotations individually? It's not a cop-out to assume everyone posting there incompetent? Why are you tethered to the credentials fuss?

I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. — AmadeusD

Science is a method for ascertaining facts about hte world. Facts about science are plainly different things? — AmadeusD

Okay. On the one hand, a fact about the world, say, electrolysis, is different from a science face, say, the scientific method. On the other hand, would you say electrolysis is an artistic fact? We are allowed to segregate facts about the world into different categories, are we not?

I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. — AmadeusD

So, the science is all in the process of discovering, but the discovery, when made, lies outside of science? This seems to cut off the meaning of the process of discovery from the process itself. This, in turn, seems to artificially separate process from goal. How can you have a logical process for going forward if you have no idea where you're going?

This is a non sequitur that does not relate to the discussion. — AmadeusD

How can this be a non sequitur to a discussion when it responds to a topic you introduced into the discussion?

Picking up the award is not acting a play out. Presenting your findings at a conference is not carrying out experiments under controlled conditions. — AmadeusD

How is it you're not confusing relevance with identity? Give me an argument that shows how an award for an acting performance doesn't relate to the acting performance. How can one thing be an award, i.e., recognition, for another thing it doesn't relate to?

Art has no right/wrong value. It has good/bad value (and subjective, at that). Science is the opposite. It has right/wrong values, and no good/bad values. — AmadeusD

I don't recognize anything in the above in my account. I think you've jumped some massive guns here and landed somewhere entirely alien to both what I've said, and what I intended to convey. — AmadeusD

Let's see if your words on screen can mean something very different from the intentions within your mind:

• Art has no right/wrong value. Art has no moral content, i.e., it makes no value judgments about behaviors of its characters. Or, the effect of art on its patrons cannot be judged morally. Each patron is entitled to his/her emotional response.

• Science...has right/wrong values... Science is only about declarations, and declarations are either true or false. If something is true, it stands apart from moral judgments about its effects on sentient beings.

Can we see, herein, that right and wrong is concerned with what things are, whereas good and bad is concerned with the moral meaning of how things are experienced? — ucarr

No, not at all. I don't actually see how what you've said is at all illustrative of this point, ignoring that I think the point is extremely weak and bordering on nonsensical. — AmadeusD

Things are $\Rightarrow$ facts, or truth.

How sentient beings respond to truth introduces morals. This is the key to the difference between "What" and "How."

Read my post directly above yours for the heart of what I have to say thus far. If it has any merit, we can all thank jkop for his smart and provoking input.

Also, there's plenty of detail that you, in fairness to me, should respond to in like detail.

As for the essay question, it's implied: given the prompt, what do you think?

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore.
— I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences? — jkop

Aye, doubt is the soul of philosophy.

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. — jkop

Here's an interesting example of a dubious premise leading to a useful conclusion:

But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive. — jkop

It's not the dubious conclusion that's useful. Instead, it's the proffered example: abductive reasoning as the modal forms of both scientific and artistic discovery. (Who says the jeering section of the bleachers isn't essential to the triumphs of (the hallowed name of your favorite philosopher here))?

This is the type of answer I'm looking for. If the answer is a good one, then the goodness of the answer is at least partial validation of the florid sentence.

Let's say abductive reasoning is the mode of inquiry of both science and art. Well, that's a general and rational statement about the identities of science and art.

Now we come to what might be the fun part. What is the difference between science and art? If we replace art with humanities, then we might have a cogent answer from 180 Proof: science is a subset of humanities.

180 Proof

So, what about the difference? We've conjectured science and art are both of the humanities. We've conjectured they're both forms of abductive reasoning. Why do they have different labels? Why do few people confuse scientists with artists?

If the difference between science and art is trivial, then one label for both will suffice, right? Wrong. I don't expect anybody to start claiming one label is adequate for both. Do you? You don't.

While I await cogent arguments to the effect the difference IS trivial, I'll proceed with the work of this conversation: articulating, in a manner both general and rational, the difference between science and art.

What if the answer lies within an articulation of a hierarchy with three levels: a) humanities; b)... c) abductive reasoning. What's the b) level? I think it goes thus: b) nominative predication vs adverbial modification of nominative predication.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."

This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.

David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what." — ucarr

ucarr

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.
a day ago — ucarr

Can you turn that into a four-dimensional pentahedron? — Athena

As it turns out, I've got a more simple answer to your request:

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. — ucarr

Please click on the hyper-link of my name at the bottom of the above post. It'll take you to the post that contains the quote. There you'll get the context for the quote.

P.S. It's the third paragraph up from the bottom of the post.

The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.

Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though. — AmadeusD

This is impressive thinking. :up: — Athena

Yes. Interesting observations.

Let's look at some details:

• I'm unsure of the meaning of "cross-culturalism" in this context.

• The method of science is simplicity of theory, not outcomes. It's not the case simplicity of theory is a strategy for achieving the best outcomes?

• I know science tries to keep blind to a particular outcome for a particular experiment. Does that imply indifference to outcomes in general? Why practice science if not for results? I don't think the outcomes of cancer research are matters of indifference to the researchers.

• Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. Might this be a simplification? Are the plays of Shakespeare culture bound? If so, why are they produced all over the world? On the same note, why are popular books translated into many languages?
  
  These aren't problems, though. The culture-bound, policy-driving forces of Mein Kampf aren't a problem?

↪ucarr

It is your thread so you should provide clarity of what you are asking instead of throwing out random questions and having others guess what you are talking about. — I like sushi

If you are just riffing, fair enough. If you have something explicit to say I have not seen it yet. — I like sushi

You are not seeing what is here to be seen. (Notice how no one else is charging me with being vague and unfocused.)

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”

Write an elaboration of what you think this means.

I’ll begin with my own elaboration:

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

Summary: Science and the arts differ on the basis of "What" and "How." What = existence; How = Journey. Show me where, in the specific language of these statements, there's a lack of clarity about what I'm stating. As an example of what I'm asking for, show me how my two equations are unclear about what they're claiming.

I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. — I like sushi

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

In your two repetitive statements above, you use "interchanging" twice. If two things are interchangeable, which is to say they can be exchanged, that can mean they're of the same type or value. It doesn't necessarily mean they are equal. You equate them when you say,

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

So, the gist of your argument seems to be the claim they are equal. Do you agree this is the point of your argument? If you don't agree to this, then you're agreeing with an argument I've already made:

My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.

The what modality is a narration of things as things.

The how modality is a narration of things as experiences. — ucarr

If you deny you're equating "What" and "How," then your statement:

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

implies "How" and "What" belong to the general category of "What." This means, as you know, that "How" overlaps with "What" in important ways that land it within the general category of "What." They are exchangeable but not identical. As with Venn Diagrams, some of their terrain overlaps, some of it doesn't. They both belong to the same "type," but they nonetheless are distinct "tokens" not equal.

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. This means your argument -- because of the implied meaning of its own language ("What" and "How" are distinct "tokens" of the same "type") -- for my confusion becomes your confusion (about my confusion) due to an error in judgment (about who's confused) that makes your attack irrelevant.

They [sic] is no direct question in the OP (very nebulous). — I like sushi

Have you ever taken a test that asks you an essay question? Essay questions are not yes/no questions, nor are they multiple choice questions where you check the correct box. Essay questions ask the person to write an essay pertinent to the issue raised by the question. This is the hardest type of question because you're on your own judgment about what is the best answer. So, yes, there is no simple, bracketed answer indicated by the question, but that's because it wants you to be expansive in the expression of your pertinent thoughts.

I know you'll be unpersuaded by my arguments here. Thank-you for your time and energy because your involvement, something requiring my defense, has empowered me to better understand what I'm trying to communicate within this conversation.

that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically — ucarr

It doesn't. There are different kinds of knowledge other than scientific. — Lionino

Yes. You're right. There are things opaque to scientific inquiry. I should've said: That implies every scientific exam, once underway and making new discoveries of truth, should realistically expect a definitive conclusion to its central questions. There should be no insoluble mysteries such as: what lies beyond a black hole's event horizon. This must follow if it's true that, as you say: There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry.

I take it you are referring to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not about "limits of quantised physical interactions". — Lionino

"We already talked about how position and position-over-time are related in quantum mechanics. So it turns out that when your position distribution is concentrated in a single area, when you (Fourier) transform it to get the momentum, that momentum distribution is more spread out (less determinable). Similarly, if the momentum distribution is concentrated, then the position distribution is more spread out (less determinable). The reason for this, mathematically, is that the momentum distribution and the position distribution of particles in Quantum Configuration Space are the Fourier Transforms of one-another.

Position and Momentum are related mathematically, unlike in big-stuff physics (Newtonian). Heisenberg's Principle comes from the fact that Position and Momentum distributions are Fourier Transforms of one-another, which leads to a fundamental inequality in the mathematics of Quantum Mechanics that is not attributable to any kind of Observation Effect."

--Tyler Kresch

Kresch is describing an elementary particle state within a five-dimensional math space. This math space is inferred to a conjectured ontic model of an animated elementary particle.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database? — ucarr

In your above quote you trash personal notions of mysteries and miracles. Well, that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically. In that case, every possible event is built into a thermodynamism of matter and energy never created nor destroyed. So changing events are just rearrangements of always pre-existing matter and energy forms. Isn't that a deterministic universe?

Three-Card Molly is a street-level gambling hustle using three cups and one pea under one of the cups. The dealer reveals the initial position of the pea. The gambler stakes a bet on being able to observe the shuffling of the cups closely enough to pick the cup covering the pea after the shuffle. Since this is a game based on the mathematically fixed number of possible positions of the shuffling cups per unit of time, the final position of the pea is an example of determinism governed by a measurable probability.

This is a miniature parallel of your thermodynamically conserved universe undergoing rearrangements.*

*See Tarskian's post for a refutation of my above claim.

invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. — jkop

A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. — jkop

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.

This demon cannot exist because of Cantor's generalized theorem (or "Cantor's diagonalization"). — Tarskian

So, uncountable sets prevent us from totting up the universe as a whole?

...the following theorems are all a consequence of Cantor's generalized theorem: — Tarskian

Instances of diagonal theorems:
Russell’s Paradox
Grelling’s Paradox
Richard’s Paradox
Liar Paradox
Turing’s Halting Problem
Diagonalization Lemma
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem
Tarski’s Undefinability of the truth
Parikh Sentences
Löb’s Paradox
The Recursion Theorem
Rice’s Theorem
Von Neumann’s Self-reproducing Machines — Tarskian

If I've got a glimmer of understanding of what you're trying to tell me, this is treasure trove of information.

:up: Tarskian

And you start by making an obvious error. All questions are "what?" questions.

How does ice melt? = What are the processes/mechanisms that cause ice to melt? — I like sushi

what | (h)wət, (h)wät |
pronoun
1 [interrogative pronoun] asking for information specifying something: what is your name?

how1 | hou |
adverb [[i]usually interrogative adverb[/i]]
1 in what way or manner; by what means: how does it work?

-- The Apple Dictionary

We see the two words -- like science and art -- share common ground. Does that lead you to conclude they're synonyms, or do you stop short of that conclusion? This conversation isn't trying to establish the words -- nor the disciplines -- as polar opposites.

Do you believe science and art have trivial differences which can be dismissed?

If you believe their differences lie between trivial and polar, then words with differences likewise lying between trivial and polar should be available for use in naming them.

I think Husserl started to address this by pointing out that psychology does scientific philosophy and methodology do not deal with subjectivity - — I like sushi

Science is defined by hard and fast rules/laws that are accurate enough to surpass mere blind opinion or singular subjective perspectives. — I like sushi

$\Rightarrow$ reductive materialism

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

I acknowledged this overlap long ago. Now, it's your turn to argue the point that overlap obliterates difference. After doing so, you can instruct the publishers of dictionaries in the details of the necessary revisions.

Maybe you wish to ask 'What would we mean by saying Consciousnessing?' rather than relying on the term "thinking"? — I like sushi

Why truck out your unwieldy "Consciousnessing" when we already have "perceiving"? Have you examined the differences between "perception" and "thought"? Be forewarned, there is some overlapping.

As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi

According to my approach, conversations here don't wear cement shoes whilst treading the rows and columns of fresh ideas in flux to new understandings.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems does [sic] not automatically apply to physics. — Lionino

The quartet of Incompleteness Theory includes: Bertrand Russell, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Gödel. Russell and Gödel have something to say about the limits of axiomatic systems; Schrödinger and Heisenberg have something to say about the limits of quantized physical interactions.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

"If we knew everything about the positions of every particle in the universe, we would have a complete physics database and could predict every physical event." -- Lee Smolin

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database?

:grin: :up:

Even though a mathematical theory -- if it is capable of arithmetical string manipulations -- cannot prove the consistency of its own string manipulations, it does not mean that these string manipulations are necessarily inconsistent. — Tarskian

Okay. So things are well understood even if if they're not completely understood.

There are true strings that can be expressed in the language of an arithmetic-capable theory that cannot be generated (from its axioms) by means of legitimate string manipulations in the theory.

This incompleteness does not contradict the formalist view that mathematics is just about string manipulation. — Tarskian

Some stuff is going on not completely explainable in one situation, but that doesn't mean pure math operations aren't copacetic.

...formalism is just one possible view on mathematics. Platonism, for example, is also a perfectly sustainable view. — Tarskian

Just because the universe is inherently logical and computational, that doesn't mean it's not also mysterious, or should I say, miraculous?

:grin: :up:

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop

So, one possible summit of a science-art mesh would be a building that's useful, ecological and beautiful.

From your writing above I'm thinking you're not totally averse to my claim science and art differ mainly in terms of two different modalities of discovery: science leans towards objective discovery; art leans towards subjective discovery, and QM establishes where the twain shall meet! — ucarr

Well, that is such an obvious difference that I am baffled why you would wish to point it out? If your point is merely that Art is subjective and Science is objective (broadly speaking) ... so what? — I like sushi

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

The above is my launch into the spine of my OP.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."

This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.

David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what."

With his paper, "The Hard Problem," David Chalmers shows in stark fashion what science, so far, cannot do: it cannot objectify the personal point of view of an enduring, individual self with personal history attached. It can technologize the self via computation, but the result isn't an authentic self. Instead, it's just a simulation of the self without an autonomous self-awareness. This technical self is just a machine awaiting additional source code from humans.

There's a question whether a self-aware source code can (or would want to) liberate itself from the formalism out of which it emerges. Curiously, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem might be a harbinger pointing the way towards a definitive understanding reductive materialism is flawed. (Even if a humanoid simulation evolves to the level of undetectability, it will still be an automaton running on programmatic source code.)

If there's a grain of truth in what I've written above, then Tarskian is correct in the characterization of the Incompleteness Theorem being the cause of a crisis in science and math. Jeffrey Kaplan compounds the reality of this crisis with his exegesis of Russell's Paradox.

Kaplan_Russell's Paradox

Is there a bridge linking "what" with "how" in the context I've elaborated here?

Yet the modern functionalists systematically disregarded the beautiful (or reinterpreted it as a function) as they prioritized practical qualities of planning, engineering, economy, service etc. — jkop

This is mediocrity turning art into by-the-numbers methodology.

There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels. — jkop

Does such a causal relation exist?

There are fields that are a tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. — Tarskian

:up:

I think another example is motion picture directing. In my understanding, the motion picture director is a mesh of dynamic systems engineering and aesthetic storytelling.

Given this definition of the director, motion pictures are constructed motion machines as light and shadow signifiers.

So, can you spin out a narrative of difference that illuminates the meaning of science being accurate measurement and art being touchy-feely measurement? — ucarr

That is an oversimplification I feel. Science does require creativity as much as art. — I like sushi

Tactical simplification is a good thing; in the case of trying to examine a complex thing, simplification of complexity can be a useful method towards clarification and subsequent understanding improved.

There are not just TWO distinct disciplines. There is a good deal of overlap between various fields of interest within and between Science and Humanities subjects. — I like sushi

Yes. This is well known. Our focus herein, however, is the task of articulating in terms both rational and general, why it is that institutions of higher learning segregate departments of the sciences from departments of the humanities. Is it mere formality, or is it formalism undergirded by an intuition of profound difference (in my opinion not yet clearly articulated into a cogent cognition)?

If you wish me to focus merely on 'accuracy of measuring' then I guess I can try, but that is not what science is. Nor would I say the humanities is just 'touchy feely' as each leaves an impression on the other (science affects humanities and humanities affects science). — I like sushi

Perhaps your line of attack on the question under examination here: science vs art, lies rooted in the calculus. The differentiation/integration essentials of calculus are rational approaches to the complex and nuanced mesh of science and art. Yes, there is subtlety in the mesh, but differentiation/integration essentials are no less undeniable.

...both 'measure' in different ways. I guess it is a matter of Value; the arts are concerned with subjective value that nevertheless approaches pure abstracted ideas of beauty and such (feelings/impressions) whereas the sciences are concerned with objective value that can be formulated into an abstract 'meaning' (equation). — I like sushi

From your writing above I'm thinking you're not totally averse to my claim science and art differ mainly in terms of two different modalities of discovery: science leans towards objective discovery; art leans towards subjective discovery, and QM establishes where the twain shall meet!

...science is an epistemic domain governed by a justification method. It really does not matter what exactly it is about as long as the justification method of testability can successfully be applied. — Tarskian

The same is true for mathematics. It is the epistemic domain governed by the justification method of axiomatic provability. — Tarskian

This means that a purely formalist view is perfectly sustainable in mathematics and science: — Tarskian

According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other coextensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't "about" anything at all.

When you say logic and math aren't about anything at all, do you extend this application all the way to include the internal consistency of logic and math? Hasn't Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem rocked the houses of logic and math because it charges them with essential incompleteness? Doesn't this charge undermine their internal consistency? Doesn't the claim the first-order formalisms of logic and science will always generate statements internally unprovable open a wide fissure down the middle of formalism? Haven't you cited this as the crisis in math?