...since classical-scale systems (e.g. brains-sensoriums) cannot directly interact with planck-scale systems. — 180 Proof
Yes, as e.g. Spinoza points out, human knowledge of unbounded (infinite) reality is necessarily perspectival and therefore bounded (finite). Basic epistemic mereology (re: maps < terrain), no? — 180 Proof
I think your "strategic incompleteness" overstates the case and incoherently conflates teleology with formalism with empiricism. — 180 Proof
Okay. Proceeding from the observer as an always local person, if we bind the thinking of an always local person to that always local person, then it too, is always local, and the abstraction of abstract thinking starts dissolving. — ucarr
I don't know what you mean by "bind". If a local person indulges in abstract thinking, and shares that thinking with other local and non-local thinkers, how does the abstraction of abstract thinking dissolve? — Ludwig V
I didn't understand a lot of the intervening ideas. — Ludwig V
I have a lot of difficulty with the idea of something true but unprovable. How could we know that such things exist, and if we do, how do know what they are? But this is a bit more specific and so it helps. I still haven't seen an example of such a truth and would love to do so. — Ludwig V
There may not be any elegant simplicity axiomatic to everything. — ucarr
But isn't that just a methodological principle that applies when there are competing theories in play? — Ludwig V
By the way, what is the criterion for simplicity? — Ludwig V
However, it occurred to me that, as a definition, "Statements about statements" captures far too much... — Ludwig V
Berkeley's Dialogues for example can be read as a philosophical text, but also as a historical or religious text. The difference is not in the text, but in the approach to the text. — Ludwig V
True physics would be the set of all facts in the physical universe, i .e. physical reality.
Any proposed set of physical axioms does not need to be a lossless compression of physical reality either.
The compression is actually allowed to lose a lot -- or even most -- of the information contained in physical reality.
The compression merely needs to be sound. — Tarskian
If the compression deems a fact to be true, then it must indeed be verifiably true in the uncompressed reality. — Tarskian
The foundational crisis in mathematics does indeed have a distinct metaphysical sonority to it. It describes issues in arithmetic reality but it may actually also apply to physical reality, if both realities happen to be structurally sufficiently similar. — Tarskian
The observer cannot be abstracted from the experiment. — ucarr
Yes. But the observer, in my book, is not an abstraction - a point of view. (At most, a point of view is a location for a possible observer.) An observer is a person. — Ludwig V
What would be the criterion of success? THAT would be the definition. — Ludwig V
I have many problems with this - and with self-reference. Not the least of which is that I'm inclined to think that if a language cannot talk about itself, then there is something it cannot talk about, so it is incomplete. Nor is there anything wrong with self-reference. Some specific uses of it are problematic, but since I'm not committed to avoiding all logically problematic uses of language by ruling them out of court in advance, I'm not much bothered by them. — Ludwig V
I don't think they give rise to any major problems of philosophy. — Ludwig V
Logicians and mathematicians have adopted the project of constructing a language with a grammar that rules such statements out. That's their choice. But it seems clear that a language that include those possibilities is perfectly workable. — Ludwig V
A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:
It is irrelevant that it is raining today. — Tarskian
I'm afraid I'm completely stuck in my opinion that the example is not a philosophical statement, unless you mean that it being used as a philosophical example makes it a philosophical statement. Which I think would be unduly stretching the scope of philosophy. — Ludwig V
I am wondering, however, whether self-reference may not be part of the distinction between science and the humanities. — Ludwig V
...can there be science of science. I doubt if it could follow some version of scientific method, including the experimental method, so would such a discipline be scientific? — Ludwig V
History, literature, and some approaches to language are about actual human beings, not abstract concepts — Ludwig V
Is philosophy included here? Depends on what you mean by philosophy. Much philosophy presupposes an abstract observer, but Wittgenstein, of course, challenged that. — Ludwig V
A statement about a fact is not philosophical. For example:
It is raining today.
A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:
It is irrelevant that it is raining today.
This explains in simple words what the true meaning is of Godel's incompleteness theorem.
A theory is incomplete if it can express statements about its own statements. In other words, a theory is incomplete if it is capable of philosophy.
Self-referential statements are just a special case of the general case, which is the philosophical statement. If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself. — Tarskian
Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. — ucarr
...I don't really understand what you mean. — Ludwig V
To me, adverbial modification means walking purposefully, or ambling or wandering or limping. But you might mean that interpretation is... — Ludwig V
It is possible that the prediction of the behaviour of organic molecules using hard physics is not computable, just like the behaviour of a human stomach can't be predicted using hard physics, even if we accept that we live in a purely physicalistic universe that regularly obeys the fundamental laws of physics at every level. — Lionino
Even more challenging to the test designer, Jenkins adds, is to remember that taking a test is itself a behavior. This means that tests need to try to take into account the attitudes of test takers while they are taking the test.
This means some people may answer questions based on how they want to be perceived, rather than how they truly are.
One of the most difficult hurdles for researchers observing human behavior is how to deal with the reality that human test subjects are always aware they are being studied and can modify their behavior—purposely or unconsciously—in response. — "Tarskian
There are fields that are an tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. A good number of architectural rules have been experimentally tested for safety. Still, subjective aesthetics have always been a major consideration in the construction of new buildings. The same can be said about the design of cars or any consumer product. — Tarskian
That's right.
For millennia, humans have understood that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable, because if any of these qualities are omitted or prioritized the buildings become practical but not beautiful, or beautiful but unsustainable, or sustainable but regardless of how. — jkop
There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels.
— jkop
Does such a causal relation exist? — ucarr
Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop
So, one possible summit of a science-art mesh would be a building that's useful, ecological and beautiful. — ucarr
Yeah, those three (or closely related varieties of each) are the essential components of all successful structural designs. Also known as the Vitruvian Triad.
When the sciences divorced the humanities, many intellectuals (e.g. Schopenhauer) became reluctant to see architecture as an art. It just seemed too pragmatic, concerned with functions etc. — jkop
1 – Merriam-Webster is garbage;
2 – that is a metaphorical meaning;
12 – Merriam-Webster would have noted that were it not a terrible dictionary.
Even if it is somehow a valid definition, it is worthless for the argument being put forth. I won't invest my energies into explaining it. You can think about it if you want. — Lionino
Even if the universe turns out to have a theory, this theory will almost surely be incomplete and therefore be able to predict just a small fraction of its facts. So, there is indeed ample scope for mysteries and miracles. — Tarskian
The big difficulty is that one has to have competence in a field in order to assess how authoritative a source is — Ludwig V
In practice, that is not true. Competence in the field is not required, just common sense. A physics textbook by a professor from Utretch, used in physics courses internationally, is authoritative, a researcher's blogspot is not.
I don't need to know neuroscience to have the common sense to not take at face value a research paper (which isn't made for laymen) from 2011 with 2 citations and 1 no-name researcher. — Lionino
I am not interested in discussing physics with anyone before the moment of force of this high school problem is presented to me in Cartesian coordinates — Lionino
...HPU is not about either "existence" or "observation", these two mean nothing in physics. — Lionino
...observation is not relevant in physics, it is interference that is relevant, and interference happens through measurement, which is how we observe things (observation in itself is irrelevant). — Lionino
Is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about existence or observation? — ucarr
Neither. — 01Lionino
No. The HUP still is not about the "limits of quantised physical interactions". It has a clear physical meaning. — 02Lionino
Is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle about existence or observation? — ucarr
Neither. — 01Lionino
They call it common sense for a reason. It relies for its validity on normative conventions, which are a mixed blessing. They allow for social cohesion at the expensive of the intelligibility of novel insights, especially in less conventionally oriented fields like philosophy. Sometimes what is needed is uncommon sense. As Heidegger wrote “ …a philosophy is creatively grasped at the earliest 100 years after it arises.” — Joshs
Do you buy the existence of humanity as a miracle of improbability? — ucarr
That is the fine-tuning problem and most secular philosophers don't think it is a miracle (I am taking "miracle" here to mean intelligent design or sheer chance (~40%)). — Lionino
Do you deny the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was worked out as a math inequality? — ucarr
No. The HUP still is not about the "limits of quantised physical interactions". It has a clear physical meaning. — Lionino
As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi
If we want to know what something is, objectively, we turn to science.
If we want to know what it's like, subjectively, to walk a mile in another person's shoes, we turn to art.
These are two profoundly different states: the "what" versus the "how." — ucarr
I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. This then lead to you holding to How for one line of questioning where it suits you whilst holding to Why for another (even though - to repeat - they are BOTH What questions). — I like sushi
I acknowledged this overlap long ago. Now, it's your turn to argue the point that overlap obliterates difference.
Discovery of "what" is rooted in the predication of the fact of existing things.
Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery. — ucarr
...the idea that consciousness is subjective, but science is objective, and therefore we can't have a science about consciousness, conflates two different senses of 'subjective'.
Consciousness is ontologically subjective as it exists only for the one who has it, but that doesn't mean epistemically subjective. We can be conscious of science, and we can have science about the conscious states of individual organisms. — jkop
"Miracle" here is used casually and sophistically, but the above fact does not leave ample scope for miracles in a Humean sense either. — Lionino
Do you deny the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was worked out as a math inequality?I can't work with Quora quotations. — Lionino
I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. — AmadeusD
Science is a method for ascertaining facts about hte world. Facts about science are plainly different things? — AmadeusD
I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. — AmadeusD
This is a non sequitur that does not relate to the discussion. — AmadeusD
Picking up the award is not acting a play out. Presenting your findings at a conference is not carrying out experiments under controlled conditions. — AmadeusD
Art has no right/wrong value. It has good/bad value (and subjective, at that). Science is the opposite. It has right/wrong values, and no good/bad values. — AmadeusD
I don't recognize anything in the above in my account. I think you've jumped some massive guns here and landed somewhere entirely alien to both what I've said, and what I intended to convey. — AmadeusD
Can we see, herein, that right and wrong is concerned with what things are, whereas good and bad is concerned with the moral meaning of how things are experienced? — ucarr
No, not at all. I don't actually see how what you've said is at all illustrative of this point, ignoring that I think the point is extremely weak and bordering on nonsensical. — AmadeusD
I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore.
— I like sushi
What would philosophy be without dubious sentences? — jkop
A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. — jkop
But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive. — jkop
Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.
This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."
Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.
This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."
This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.
David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what." — ucarr
We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.
a day ago — ucarr
Can you turn that into a four-dimensional pentahedron? — Athena
The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. — ucarr
The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.
Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though. — AmadeusD
This is impressive thinking. :up: — Athena
It is your thread so you should provide clarity of what you are asking instead of throwing out random questions and having others guess what you are talking about. — I like sushi
If you are just riffing, fair enough. If you have something explicit to say I have not seen it yet. — I like sushi
The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”
Write an elaboration of what you think this means.
I’ll begin with my own elaboration:
What = existence; How = journey — ucarr
I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. — I like sushi
you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi
...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi
My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.
The what modality is a narration of things as things.
The how modality is a narration of things as experiences. — ucarr
...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi
They [sic] is no direct question in the OP (very nebulous). — I like sushi
that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically — ucarr
It doesn't. There are different kinds of knowledge other than scientific. — Lionino
I take it you are referring to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not about "limits of quantised physical interactions". — Lionino
There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino
Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database? — ucarr
invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. — jkop
A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. — jkop
This demon cannot exist because of Cantor's generalized theorem (or "Cantor's diagonalization"). — Tarskian
...the following theorems are all a consequence of Cantor's generalized theorem: — Tarskian
Instances of diagonal theorems:
Russell’s Paradox
Grelling’s Paradox
Richard’s Paradox
Liar Paradox
Turing’s Halting Problem
Diagonalization Lemma
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem
Tarski’s Undefinability of the truth
Parikh Sentences
Löb’s Paradox
The Recursion Theorem
Rice’s Theorem
Von Neumann’s Self-reproducing Machines — Tarskian
And you start by making an obvious error. All questions are "what?" questions.
How does ice melt? = What are the processes/mechanisms that cause ice to melt? — I like sushi
I think Husserl started to address this by pointing out thatpsychology doesscientific philosophy and methodology do not deal with subjectivity - — I like sushi
Science is defined by hard and fast rules/laws that are accurate enough to surpass mere blind opinion or singular subjective perspectives. — I like sushi
you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi
Maybe you wish to ask 'What would we mean by saying Consciousnessing?' rather than relying on the term "thinking"? — I like sushi
As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi
Gödel's incompleteness theorems does [sic] not automatically apply to physics. — Lionino
There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino
Even though a mathematical theory -- if it is capable of arithmetical string manipulations -- cannot prove the consistency of its own string manipulations, it does not mean that these string manipulations are necessarily inconsistent. — Tarskian
There are true strings that can be expressed in the language of an arithmetic-capable theory that cannot be generated (from its axioms) by means of legitimate string manipulations in the theory.
This incompleteness does not contradict the formalist view that mathematics is just about string manipulation. — Tarskian
...formalism is just one possible view on mathematics. Platonism, for example, is also a perfectly sustainable view. — Tarskian
Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop
From your writing above I'm thinking you're not totally averse to my claim science and art differ mainly in terms of two different modalities of discovery: science leans towards objective discovery; art leans towards subjective discovery, and QM establishes where the twain shall meet! — ucarr
Well, that is such an obvious difference that I am baffled why you would wish to point it out? If your point is merely that Art is subjective and Science is objective (broadly speaking) ... so what? — I like sushi
What = existence; How = journey — ucarr
Yet the modern functionalists systematically disregarded the beautiful (or reinterpreted it as a function) as they prioritized practical qualities of planning, engineering, economy, service etc. — jkop
There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels. — jkop
There are fields that are a tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. — Tarskian
So, can you spin out a narrative of difference that illuminates the meaning of science being accurate measurement and art being touchy-feely measurement? — ucarr
That is an oversimplification I feel. Science does require creativity as much as art. — I like sushi
There are not just TWO distinct disciplines. There is a good deal of overlap between various fields of interest within and between Science and Humanities subjects. — I like sushi
If you wish me to focus merely on 'accuracy of measuring' then I guess I can try, but that is not what science is. Nor would I say the humanities is just 'touchy feely' as each leaves an impression on the other (science affects humanities and humanities affects science). — I like sushi
...both 'measure' in different ways. I guess it is a matter of Value; the arts are concerned with subjective value that nevertheless approaches pure abstracted ideas of beauty and such (feelings/impressions) whereas the sciences are concerned with objective value that can be formulated into an abstract 'meaning' (equation). — I like sushi
...science is an epistemic domain governed by a justification method. It really does not matter what exactly it is about as long as the justification method of testability can successfully be applied. — Tarskian
The same is true for mathematics. It is the epistemic domain governed by the justification method of axiomatic provability. — Tarskian
This means that a purely formalist view is perfectly sustainable in mathematics and science: — Tarskian
According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other coextensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't "about" anything at all.