Adding to what you say we could equally fail to cosmetically remove the word 'know' from our lexicon while continuing to tread the spiritual path Chet Hawkins seems primarily concerned with. — Janus

I make no claim that I understand his schema. He laid out some information above, but I felt like it would take more time than I am willing right now to suss it out. That said, it seems to me that his communication often looks extremely certain. Things are often bluntly stated and if this was a different thread or I just came at those posts, I would likely assume that he is on the high end of thedamn well sure he is correct and sharing knowledge spectrum. Despite not saying he knows X or Y.. Presumably, behind the scenes he does not think he knows. My point being however that I don't think removing the words know and knowledge is either necessary or effective.

In addition, I don't think there is a problem with having moments of certainty. I don't think we can or should organize out minds that way. In part because it takes language so literal and final. I see language as expressive, ad hoc, context dependent and having all sorts of uses. Telling my kid it's a bad idea for them to keep a bottle of toxic pesticide on a shelf in their bedroom and that I know this is a bad idea, is to me not a problem. And I wouldn't spend a moment debating over whether I merely believe it's a bad idea. Yes, it may be possible that it's somehow not a good idea is some scenario I can't imagine right now, but I don't have time to unravel what seem like minute possibilities. I gotta make breakfast and go to work.

Also, I see language as eliciting things, not just containing things. Oh, that assertion might contain something that could possibly be false. Sure, but I wasn't - in some other scenario - presenting a portion of my Bible of unquestionable truth that we can mount on a wall. I was seeking to elicit things. If we look at truth models there are problems with language mirroring reality and correspondence theories of truth. Language is a very versatile set of tools - containing information being one, but only one of many.

And then, if we are to avoid claiming we know because we might not know then this includes judgments that one should never use know.

And the moment you get to where you are judging people as bad or immoral or evil for not using words the way you believe they should, you might as well be making a knowledge claim. I mean, you went that far. (you in the general sense, not you in the Janus sense)

The distinction you seem to point to is that many people feel certain about things they obviously cannot be certain about. — Janus

There's certainly that, but my point was more that I think many of us use the word 'know' while generally understanding that we might be wrong AND then there are people who don't use the word know (on a specific occasion or in general) but who think they are infallible in what they consider true.

We can cosmetically remove the word 'know' but easily continue with what CH is concerned about.

1) Admit to the greater truth behind the assertion. It is dangerous to speak in terms of 'knowing'.
2) Realize that all of us are guilty of this trouble, when we allow that pattern to continue.
3) Challenge yourself to do better by first recognizing when you are failing morally by using such words and phrases. — Chet Hawkins

So, these are mainly attitudinal. Which is good information for me. I just want to separate it out from the practical changes to the language itself. Numbers 1 and 3 mentions 'such words and phrases' and 'knowing' and 'know' is clearly on the dangerous list.

4) Actually correct the words used in speech and in writing from yourself.
5) Begin to realize when others do this same thing. Note the abundance of the wrong pattern.
6) Challenge the pattern when the mood is right to be a discussion where progress can be made by those thus challenged.
7) Fit all of this into a model of the way you live to make it a consistent part of who you are, your beliefs personified. — Chet Hawkins

And this gives a kind of plan along with the first ones.

But I was wondering more about this part:

What other changes are needed? What are the signs or problematic communication? What are the signs of communication that are more harmonious with the truth? — Bylaw

For example, in a philosophy forum, we have the words on the screen. The people writing may have similar attitudes - potentially even when they use the word know, not taking this at all to mean it is necessarily infallible. And/or when they avoiding knowing and know, they may be utterly certain that what they say must be correct and never will need to be revised.

So, what way should people write to be more harmonious with the truth beyond avoiding 'knowing' and 'know'.

I am not denying the importance of the attitudinal shifts, but give the specific danger of 'know' and 'knowing' in your schema, it seems like the actual language use is important.

Are there other things to be avoided or added to avoid the danger?

Yes, so you have stated the real pattern. But at no point was certainty involved. We should become comfortable with that and speak and write that way to be more harmonious with truth. — Chet Hawkins

So, how does one do this?
I understand that eliminating 'know' is a good idea from your perspective. What other changes are needed? What are the signs or problematic communication? What are the signs of communication that are more harmonious with the truth?

Yes, well you are now proving that it's hard to get people to understand. I am apparently not a great explainer, who knew. Sticking just to the erroneous colloquial definitions of emotions will not aid you in any way. — Chet Hawkins

If you can link me to where you have other definitions or give me a description here, it would help. Otherwise sure, I'm going to assume colloquial definitions or ones from psychology. You might as well make up words for them, then at least we'll be pretty sure we haven't the slightest idea what you mean.

Remember that I consider 'knowing' a moral failure, more akin to certainty seeking, expression an imbalance between anger and fear by definition. So defenders of that wording are like to over-express fear, ... is my forecast. — Chet Hawkins

In my experience people who are afraid tend to be less sure and people who are angry tend to express more certainty.

Fear is synonymous with order. — Chet Hawkins

I can see fear leading to order and rage leading to order. The law and order crowd often seems very angry. Fascists and other dictators who enforce extreme order often seem rather angry to me. In any case.

Anger holds its ground against everything. — Chet Hawkins

Anger can be defensive in this way, but it also can be offensive.

Readiness to change stance is critical. Anger knows this. — Chet Hawkins

If anything I would say fear is more ready to change stance. In any case we often use anger to bolster our stances rather than feel the fear that we might be wrong and might well need to change (be open to something else or something new).

I don't understand your schema, but perhaps starting with something specific like what I quoted above might help.

I see both emotions having their place, dependent on context.

Something like 'knowing' can really get in your way amid such a process. — Chet Hawkins

I didn't suggest 'knowing', I suggested referring to that set as better beliefs. You referred to some things as wisdom. That is also a category distinguishing some beliefs from others.

No. Existence is being in essence, mass, anger. A fear based approach would prefer to categorize things. My inclination is just to refuse, as anger simply stands for itself using mass to make its argument. — Chet Hawkins

You refuse to categorize things? Are you not categorizing with your fear, anger, desire schema? For example.

Anger's sin is laziness. In the righteous rejection of immoral desire and the challenge for a fight towards immoral fear {see here now}, anger is doing its part. But often enough, anger or the lazy exemplar avoids conflict and moral choice suffers.

Peace is delusional. It is not what anyone that advocates for it thinks it is. Any and every task is hard by a rough parallel to its worthiness. There is no long term respite. Indeed anger suggests that to be finally moral, one must learn to never need rest. Of course medical practitioners aplenty will disagree and chastise the righteous for their sense of moral duty. And they are like most fear path types, more right than not, as in, probability is on their side that the anger type will fail, not being perfect. But this ignores the real truth, the hidden mystery, of perfection. Perfection transcends all cases, and we must practice for it. That means that finally, rest cannot be needed. It is a tautology if one understands or comes close to grasping without knowing the nature of perfection itself.

Every act one or we take, must be maintained by constant vigil. This is the nature of 'no rest'. But there is maybe a way to properly rest amid the approach such that fallibility is taken into account in the best way possible. Each unit (us) must take turns manning the wall. Surround evil on all sides and chant! Maintain a pure discipline. Re-commit each day, each hour, sometimes each minute, to the pusuit of truth and the GOOD.

You had best martial your anger, indeed! — Chet Hawkins

Would you categorize this as knowledge?

And wouldn't this better way include a collection of assertions that you think are better than pragmatist assertions? Aren't you dividing the set of beliefs into those that are better and those that are worse? — Bylaw

I have made nothing but assertions. — Chet Hawkins

Yes. I didn't say anything about you not making assertions.

If you are just ignoring my many statements because they are not formally numbered, that would laughable. — Chet Hawkins

I was responding to your statements not ignoring them. And I said nothing about their being numbered or not.
I asked above two questions you quoted.
Aren't you dividing beliefs into those that are better and those that are worse? If so, would naming those that are better, better beliefs be delusional?

I do still number some of them as above quoted to assist in fear types understanding. ;)

Assertions themselves are a prison, a logical or fear based path artifact. Take in all streams that are delivered via experience. It is precisely the ones you are not skilled at that will inform you more. — Chet Hawkins

I didn't understand this section.

In general, you are discussing what I call the path of anger, of being, which is what empowers real confidence. Of course, if you understand my model, which admittedly is not yet fully revealed here, — Chet Hawkins

Yes, I don't understand your model and I didn't really understand this post of yours.

Thanks for the quotes and search. It was mainly that word 'evil' I was surprised by, but I looked through the search and found some odd and interesting quotes. I couldn't get a handle on the anger issue: if this was positive or negative in his view. But seeing posts more generally instead of just his responses to me it struck me that despite being one of those seeing all beliefs as mere beliefs, his beliefs are expressed with a great deal of certainty and judgment. But perhaps the idea is that as long as you say everything you say is a mere belief, you are then allowed to plow forward without qualitification. Is that the anger?

Granted that Pragmatism can enjoy this position and that most people will not have the courage to argue against its workable everyday ways. In other words most people are both 1) Willing to accept that when you say you know that knowing is possible. AND 2) That its ok to say you know if you have done some UNKNOWN amount of justifications, especially if some reasonably thought-of-as-known(not really known) authority (group of bozos wearing the same orderly clothing and using the same orderly practices) says so. THAT is Pragmatism.

I adhere to a better way. — Chet Hawkins

And wouldn't this better way include a collection of assertions that you think are better than pragmatist assertions? Aren't you dividing the set of beliefs into those that are better and those that are worse?

You have your way of thinking about it, and I have mine, and the twain shall never meet, it seems. I think we know many things, as I've said, but I admit there is no perfect, absolute, context-independent knowledge, and since such a thing is impossible, I find it to be an absurd inapt principle by which to attempt to assess and understand our concepts. — Janus

I tend to agree with this. I think using 'know' and 'knowledge' is fine. I don't take assertions put in those categories as impossible revise. Yes, it can happen and has happened. But I don't need to walk around doubting everything all the time. I think I remember that I boil the water first before I put in the egg, but then perhaps my memory is false and I don't know that that works. And then working is working getting my egg boiled the way I like it. What if my liking it that way is actually not liking it? What if I am someone else? and so on. Having a category we call knowledge works well. Yes, you might run into problems if you consider all things considered knowledge unrevisable. But the opposed danger of thinking every belief is a mere belief and it's wrong to divvy that set up into subgroups seems to instantly create a mass of problems. Like today, now, in the next few minutes dozens of problems will arise and any moment of decision becomes an infinite regress.

It's not clear to me he is saying we have to doubt everything (all the time?) or that he doesn't categorize beliefs into better and worse groupings.

I don't share the optimism that changing the words will make much difference. And people assert things as if they are certain all the time without using the verb know or the noun knowledge.

As is the contention that those who do not accept his ideology are evil - that those who think they know things are angry and cowardly. — Banno

wow. Do you know where that post is in the thread?

That is to say, it is better to use 'I am aware of some aspects of this subject' rather than I KNOW this subject. In every way, the former is more accurate. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, but people can manage to assert things in ways where they seem certain, without using know or knowledge. And they do all the time. In fact, I'd say this is more common. People asserting things without qualification. Rather than saying I know this subject, they act like they know the subject. I don't hear that formulation much 'I know this subject'. Instead one gets a lot of blunt statements.

You can call it whatever delusional thing you prefer to call it. It still is actually JUST belief. — Chet Hawkins

So, if you or I labeled some beliefs that we thought were more likely to be true than others, that label would have to be delusional?

We cannot KNOW or be certain of anything. — Chet Hawkins

Presumably including this and that any label for beliefs we consider better justified would be a delusional label.

If I said that believing asking my bicycle chain to repair itself was a less well justified approach than replacing a broken chain with one I buy, I would be delusional? IOW if I break my or someone's beliefs down into well justified and other beliefs.

We need a better way of expressing ourselves that allows for doubt, the unpleasant condition, to be maintained with less need for the false comfort of the delusion of certainty. — Chet Hawkins

I can manage to use a lot of formulations, even 'knowledge' without feeling that there can be no doubt belief X is correct.

2) Knowledge in the colloquial sense is really only beliefs. — Chet Hawkins

Is there another sense where it means something else?

2) The word and its ramified terms, 'to know' is not well used often. It is taken most often to mean certainty, which is wrong. — Chet Hawkins

I don't take it that way. I guess I'd need to know the context to know if it is most often taken to be certain (and then perhaps what certain means - does this mean that someone is infallible when they categorize something as knowledge? I can't say I know how many groups would answer, but it seems like there are quite a few people who think knowledge may end up getting revised and are aware that this has been the case in most fields in the past. But I don't know numbers.

The set is or is not accurately believed as 'related in the sense of what defines the set' Sets do not include better or worse members until we filter or intersect them, — Chet Hawkins

again
given our purposes. If I look at the set of beliefs and my purpose is to find a range of unique suggestions/strange seeming ideas, I will view different members of the set as better or worse...for my purpose. If I want to know how deal with a loose chain on my bike, because I really want to fix it, some beliefs about this will be better than others. They're all peachy members of the set, if the only issue is, does it belong in the set. But my purposes will lead to some members being better than others. And given that knowledge is part of the topic, that often leads to purposes, for me, around how to navigate my way around life and the world. Some will be better or worse for that, given my purposes. And I have critieria for determining which I will try - whose beliefs I am more likely to try out myself, for example.

So that is only the meat of the argument, as in what is needed to explain the relationship between certainty and belief. Beliefs are most commonly accepted as uncertain, by definition. Knowing is sadly not understood to be only a matter of belief. Therefore many and most people treat 'knowing' as if the believer is certain — Chet Hawkins

As if the believer is certain or as if the belief is accurate. Do you mean that people assume that if someone says they know those people falsely assume the person is certain or they falsely assume that what that person claims to know is correct?

In any case THAT is the problem. The reason it is a problem is one that I have qualified over and over and over again in these posts. That is ... people use it as a stand in for certainty — Chet Hawkins

I don't. I am aware of scientists that consider knowledge to be open to revision. We have rigorous criteria, they would say and if something passes those it gets considered knowledge, but they are aware that it might be revised later. I know people in other fields who have similar ideas. As I said earlier I can't really speak to numbers, but I find this a fairly common position. Of course, sometimes it is the official position but this gets forgotten in the specifics.

Well, I did qualify it. But at least you and I are in agreement on that point of knowledge not being certain and therefore being ... yep ... merely belief. — Chet Hawkins

There is the whole knowledge is JTB camp and in discussions in other threads some people, myself included, objected to using the T. I think that objection is fairly common in philosophy forums.

In any case THAT is the problem. The reason it is a problem is one that I have qualified over and over and over again in these posts. That is ... people use it as a stand in for certainty. Maybe you don't. But you are participating willingly by your own admission in a cultural practice that spreads confusion. That confusion is allowed or caused by the situation that people object to or TYPICALLY intend for the word 'know' to mean certainty. And it is being OK with that nonsense, that is the root problem. It is not wise. It cannot be wise. It is wise to challenge people to stop doing that. It is wise to NOT be happy to use that word as long as so many people use it that way. So very many communications are confused by this concept. — Chet Hawkins

So, if you do decide that some beliefs are more likely to be true or better justified, what do you call that set of beliefs, if you call it anything?

Subset has the word sub in it. By bizarre personal or colloquial standards of the day I could claim you are trying to dominate British cities by the category cities and you expect sub drop and eyes lowered. Why? Why? — Chet Hawkins

Yes, sub means under orginally, but it has lost that connotation, means part of the set. I'm happy to us any other noun for mean it contains some of the members of the larger set of beliefs. But....
The issue isn't really the word. If you don't mean something negative with only and mere, then it doesn't matter. It seems like you are saying all beliefs are the same when you say this. If that's what you mean then we can discuss that. If that's not what you mean we can hop over that discussion.

I agree experts are not always right. But I go further, amid honesty. Experts cultivate their position in order to sell out. It is the NORM, not the exception. The Capitalist system (and others but especially that one) foment a culture of sell outs. Fake it til you make it and then sell out. What a system! — Chet Hawkins

I recognize this phenomenon. But still, I will tend to believe experts over random non-experts. And, as I say later in my previous post, I also take a portion of beliefs to be better than others. I have my own methodologies. I am not separating beliefs into different categories just on expert opinion.

It's not clear to me yet what your overall position is, so much of what I am doing is triangulating, probing, until, hopefully I do understand it.

Do not trust anything at face value, especially authority. — Chet Hawkins

I'd say I am an outlier in my criticism of authority and expert opinions. Of course, often I am going with marginalized expert opinions that have informed my disagreement. Also my understanding in general that leads to my rejection of authority, when I do that, is also informed by the work of experts. I have intuition, experience added into the mix and also a sense of paradigmatic biases.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.
— Bylaw
Incorrect. Reality is objective, so subjective belief does not matter to truth.

Sets include only members and set theory has no designation for 'lesser' and 'greater' until we redefine the set in those terms. You are wrong. — Chet Hawkins

It's not wrong. And I went on to give examples. Of course better and worse have subjective elements - given our purposes!!!!!!, but if we are saying all members are the same and we have no context for that, well, who cares. But to me there is a context for discussing the issue of knowledge and beliefs and that has to do with what we want and how we use these things.

If this topic is just about sets for you and getting the members that fit those sets and you have no other purpose, OK, fine. It's not a topic that interest me and I'll bow out.

Notice that I even gave examples of different subjective uses for the set of beliefs.

, given the purposes one has. — Bylaw

you quoted this part but seem to have ignored it. Given the purposes we have which would be based on our subjective values. I'd prefer to know that 2 inches of ice would likely hold my weight and I'd want a good source for that information. I don't want just any belief from the set of beliefs, I want one that meets my criteria. Our purposes are subjective, yes. That condition is right there in my explanation (given our purposes). A surgeon has a set of tools available but doesn't ask for 'a tool', she asks for the one that is better for her purpose. If they were playing some game in the operating room with no patient there, than other purposes might be afoot and any tool would do.. Given the purposes.

Characteristics of elements within a set are a case for intersection, not exclusion. So you are burning a strawman. — Chet Hawkins

Honestly I have no idea why you called my explaining my thinking....note: my thinking - a strawman.

For me when two people are communicating with each other, here online especially, I think it is important to lay out my thinking. This often helps prevent talking past each other. In the process of trying to understand and yes, possibly also criticize, someone else's position, I will do a number of different things.

You mentioned earlier that you were used to being insulted or it seems implicit in what you said. Is it possible you are seeing my posts through the lens of how other people have reacted to you? Are you assuming that I fully understand your position, so, for that reason and/or other factors you think everything I say is an attack or somehow supposed to be a representation of your position? If so, that's not what I'm doing.

They imply a perfection, an objectivity, that is NOT and CANNOT be present. — Chet Hawkins

I find the distinction useful and at the same time do not assume knowledge, for example, must be and is perfectly correct. I don't even assume despite the capitals and lack of qualification in what you said above that you mean what you said MUST be 100% correct. Perhaps you think it is, but I don't assume that's the way you think. And even if one avoids using those words - the ones that you think entail a claim of infallibility - one still batches some beliefs over there, some here, some in another batch. With varying degrees of confidence in them. I'm happy to use the word knowledge. If someone else assume this means perfection, well, I disagree, but I'm open to whatever noun they use for the category of beliefs they have a great deal of confidence in.

If I read your post it comes across that you are not just a skeptic. You tell me, for example, something I said was incorrect, period. No qualification. Many of your positions and reactions seem very confident. Nothing wrong with that. So, when you assert things this way, that set of assertions, which presumably reflect beliefs of yours, what do you call that set?

No, 'only' and 'mere' are PRECISELY the same (to me) in meaning and they are certainly no worse than 'subset'. So, I confess, I do not get this complaint. It's like saying to 'them' that 'OK, if you concede the main point about your door, we will agree to paint it chartreuse, as you direct.' — Chet Hawkins

'mere' has negative connotations.

adjective
used to emphasize how small or insignificant someone or something is.

and only can have the same meaning. Not necessarily, but possibly. Oh, it's only a regular pizza, no toppings. And given that you present them as the same, I disagree with their use there. And subset alone is fine.

Subset is neutral. British cities are a subset of the category cities.

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.
— Bylaw
Most 'grouping up' as a fallacious attempt to argue by mass or numbers, is cowardly, if you follow, an approach/need of fear and order. Anger does not care if others agree or not. It will hold the line to the balance of its own belief, regardless. At least that is GOOD anger. — Chet Hawkins

I mentioned methodologies. This would include my own methodologies also, so really it has nothing to do with number. I am lying in bed and I think it's raining. I thought they maybe said something on the news that it would rain today, but I'm not sure. But I believe it is raining. Or, I get up, look out the window, see drops falling, hitting puddles. I now also believe it is raining, but the methodology I used in the second instance I respect more. So, it is when I evaluate how others reach conclusions: their methodologies - and perhaps past record, my sense of their trustworthiness and other criteria.

This has nothing to do with fear or anger.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.
— Bylaw
Yes, on some of that we can agree. But we both know that in reality and especially human reality, there are many situations where the fox ends up guarding the henhouse. Why is that? I 'know' (ha ha) why. It's fair to use the fox's tricks against them, maybe (not really) The fox is likely to sell out truth. The fox is likely to call it doubters facetious when they are the serious ones. The fox was appointed by other foxes. It's there to corrupt the serious nature of truth, precisely to let slip things in a certain way. We are all beset by wisdom, by truth. It is too hard to live up to. The 'powers that be' have to make sure that some roads to truth are obscured. This aids in the pragmatic short cutting of truth in daily life. This aids in immorality, the opposite of wisdom. — Chet Hawkins

Sure, I haven't said: if the experts say X, X must be true.

But I recognize differences between beliefs. I use the word knowledge for beliefs that I consider very likely to be correct. It is a subset of beliefs that I have confidence in over other subsets of beliefs. I don't expect perfection, because I and we are fallible. We do our best.

Messi is a football player. He is one football player in the set of football players. But I would choose him to play on my team over three random players.

The parallel here is not that Messi is a kind of knowledge, though he certainly has that.
It's just I have no reason to say he is only a football player or a mere football player because he is part of that set.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.

If I am interested in surprising beliefs, then out of the set of beliefs, many beliefs not considered knowledge and many considered knowledge will fit my needs.

If I am trying to successfully navigate the world, then those in the subset knowledge tend to work better.

But I see no reason to use mere or only, especially if the latter is considered a synonym of the former.

My statements are intended precisely to call this foolishness into question. A fact or knowledge, both, are only a subset of beliefs. — Chet Hawkins

I wouldn't use the word only (or mere). It's a subset.

Even if (perhaps especially if) you assess certain groups (scientists, intellectuals) you will narrow that spread because all of them are closing ranks as a rep of the group DESPITE personal feelings or beliefs or 'known (ha ha) facts' to the contrary, because they would rather do that than let chaos get a toehold further into their protected spaces. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.

All sorts of categories can have as subsets, members that work much better than others.

There are chess players. Magus Carlsen is a chess player. He's not only a chess player or a mere chess player (the word 'only' her taken in a similar sense to 'mere.' But he is an individual subset of the set of chess players.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.

I did try discussing philosophy with you. You've perhaps forgotten. It had to do with cogito in a number of ways, including your incorrect interpretation of 'therefore'' no shame in that, English not being your native language. But I found your responses were not grounded in either philosophy or my posts. I think how people behave in a philosophy forum matters, but it seems in this case, you have no interest in feedback. Now I know that. Perhaps you haven't noticed how many people have arrived at very similar conclusions about you here. And people with a variety of differing opinions about the cogito. But, yeah, that's all probably a coincidence.

In any case, I thought you were moving forward. I am, in any case. I'll be ignoring you. I suggest you actually move forward yourself. Perhaps we'll have a lovely interaction on some other issue after a break.

Take care.

Maybe I did, or maybe I didn't. — Corvus

Ah, ok. For many people when they make a claim about another person, it actually matters to them if it was correct. It seems from what you write here, that you don't really care if what you said about Flannel Jesus was correct. Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't. People sometimes misquote. Which is, of course, true. Some who misquote and have this pointed out and have said negative things about someone based on that, think it is polite to see if that is the case, and perhaps retract what they said based on the misquote. Others don't care about such things.

Just wondering what your point is keep repeating the others' sayings word by word. — Corvus

That's a good thing to wonder about. I notice that for the second time you have referred to this instance as a pattern. That I do this with others' sayings. I did it with two things you said. I reassured you that my being critical of what you are doing here does not mean I think you can't write what you feel. Obviously, given your reaction it makes sense to specifically address your concern in your words. As far as the emotional volatility accusation you made It was not a saying, it was a judgment and not in the form of a saying. My aiming it back at you was to show how easy it is to claim that someone is being emotionally volatile. Rather than, for example, deal with some of the factual issues in that post. But, of course, you are free to ignore anything troublesome, just as you are free to not check to see if you misquoted Flannel Jesus. You're free to never show the logic book that showed your deductions were correct. You're free to claim you were always doing induction, despite the obvious deduction symbols you used. You're free to make up things about Flannel Jesus and me. You're free to do all sorts of things and I would defend your right to keep posting here, if the subject ever came up. If you want to move forward, well obviously you are free to move forward, whatever it says about your character.

I'll also move forward.

Well, I certainly used your words in that post back to you. But there's no pattern. You misquoted Flannel Jesus, based your 'discovery' of 'his confusion' of deduction and induction on that misquote and that's all easy to check.

I didn't know you didn't know even the difference between deductive and inductive cases in logic — Corvus

You misquoted him, and then you referred to this misquote as what led to your discovery he didn't understand. This was pointed out to you, and you seem to have opted not to actually check this. You seem emotionally volatile, but I do think you have the right to say what you feel is correct, even when you are this obviously confused or disingenuous.

There is not much helping people who don't want to understand. Descartes invited us in meditation by writing His. — Lionino

and viewed as a meditation or exploration it's very interesting. I'm certainly not critical of Corvus' behavior because he's skeptical about the cogito. I'm skeptical about the cogito. Though I'm not skeptical because denying the antecedent shows there's a problem or some of his jumping from deduction to induction and pretending he was using induction all along. I think the problem with the cogito is that it allows for an assumption, at least potenially of the 'I'. But this has been said by others and in greater detail. But I don't think that makes it useless or simply wrong. Someone needed to do what he did and it's easy to post-Descartes take shots at it.

Those who do that however, are not willing to face the consequences of their unbounded skepticism. Either they do so, or accept Descartes argument. But they want to have the cake and eat it. — Lionino

I think this is often true. Being unconvinced is safer ground than mounting arguments that demonstrate one's skepticism is correct. There's a lot of fruit of the poison tree in philosophy forums.

Though if we view these also as exploratory, they can be a fine part of a discussion.

Ah, yes, that was an amazing explanation. Even down the accuracy of the different ways that short sentence can be read, given its confused grammar.

I can say anything I feel correct
— Corvus

Projection, anyone.

Yes, i You need to read that post again. You just agreed with him, while saying it shows all these confusions on his part.

Here is a question for you. Is "I think therefore I am" a deductive or inductive statement? — Corvus

It is intended as deduction. It's not, I was thinking and hey, look I was also existing. Then I tracked many instance of thinking and existing was happening, so it's probable that they are connected causally or something like that.

Descartes was saying given that I am thinking this presumes I am. I could not think if I did not exist. It is part and part with ANY COGNITIVE ACTIVITY at all or any action on my part.

One can get into the issue of whether the 'I' is getting snuck into his deduction, but it is NOT deductive argument and 'therefore' is a term talking about logical inference and not at all suggesting that thinking leads ontologically to being. Nor is it asserting that thinking causes existence.

And if you thought it was about deduction why in goodness name did you spend so much time calling it Modus Ponens, which is deduction? And even when you finally acknowledged that it wasn't modus tollens, did you continue to write deduction symbolic logic rather than using inductive reasoning.

And then why would you go into Flannel Jesus's motives, when it is so clear that being not wrong has led you to the most circuitous avoidance and distractions now in two threads.

Someone else could potentially chastize FJ for pursuing this, but it makes not the slightest sense for you to.

Further, if he thinks you are wrong, but you can't see it or admit it, then the issue is not closed. He can continue to wonder (against great odds) if he missed something. And when asked, you can say whatever that is.

That whole line was just gaslighting.

The rigor is all in the J - the J is where all our confidence in the T comes from. — flannel jesus

Agreed. Which is close to the reason I think the T is superfluous and misleading.

If it's rigor we're looking for, then we should place a threshold on the minimum amount of J before we call it "knowledge". Which is probably what we do anyway, given we don't have access to a universal dictionary of objective truths. — flannel jesus

To me it works to add in 4 further letters and take out the T. (this is partly ironic since it's too many letters to be useful, but it reflects my thinking.
1) NF - not falsified
2) BE - best explanation (so far)

Giving us JNFBEB :grin:
Justified not falsified best explanation belief.

By best explanation I am leaving room for parsimony - there's no equally predictive explanation that has less newly posited entities. Possibly things like clarity, lack of ambiguity, fits with current models.

I think it is fine to refer to such things as knowledge and that we know it. Even though it may turn out later that we were incorrect. We can be fussy later and say we thought we knew, but we didn't, but really I think there's no need to do this. Knowledge changed.

We have no separate access to truth. Oh, that's well justified, not falsified, and.....testing......and it's true. I understand that the T is generally not looked at a step in the methodology of determining if something is knowledge. Like first we justify then we check the truth of X. But I think the label is misleading in that direction and in any case redundant in the present. If it is well justfied (and meets my other criteria) then there we don't need to somehow also thin of truth or true as an adjective. I think it's confusing to add the T.

And then we just have beliefs with varying levels of justification, and the ones with the most justification we call "knowledge" - and some of that knowledge is probably wrong. — flannel jesus

Agreed.

The JTB definition of knowledge involves belief, and we might say that it frames knowledge as a "form of belief": namely justified true belief, but it does not follow that it is nothing more than belief, because the 'justified' and the 'true', as conceived, have nothing to do with belief. — Janus

Sure, knowledge is a rigorously arrived at belief in JTB theories of truth.

Foremost, you can't know something if it is not true. This is how the grammar of "know" works. If you hold it to be true, but it isn't, then you only believe it, you don't know it. — Banno

Right. Notice you wrote this all in the present tense. I know you have a more nuanced understanding of this. But I just want to immediately mention that I am looking at what happens through time and what we know/think/have access to at any given moment.

It might be best to look at what I say in an overview...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/893764

Secondly, it is plain that there are true statements. This statement is true. So are the theorems of arithmetic and logic. That you are reading this is also true. — Banno

yes, I think you are still assuming that I think we can't know anything.

This works only in limited cases. Some counterexamples have already been given. Here's another: Supose you are playing Checkers and your opponent reaches over and moves one of your pieces - yo say "You can't move my pieces!" Would you accept their reply if it were "HA, but there you have it - I have falsified that rule: I can move your pieces!" — Banno

Of course not. But I think my response to you makes it clear that there are things we can know. You seem to be arguing that extreme skepticism is problematic. I agree, that's not my point at all. Of course, I could be wrong about what just happened, what my opponent just did, in the checkers game, but that's not what I'm arguing.

You seem to be taking what I said as saying that we cannot know anything and we should doubt everything, in practice. Yeah, that's not what I'm saying at all.

I am focus on having True as something in addition to justification. Like I check off the justification. I check to make sure it hasn't been falsified (so far). Then I check to see if it is true. Well, not. That's an non-real step and a non-real criterion. Which doesn't mean nothing is true. Nor does it mean I take a similar skeptical attitude to everything nor am I suggesting we throw up our hands and say we can't know anything. But this is in my previous posts.

If it still seems to you that I am saying these things, then we are talking past eachother.

Wl, yes. Sometimes folk get things wrong. They think they know stuff when they don't. And the only way this can happen is if they believe something that is not true.

So there is a difference between believing and knowing: If something is known, it is true. — Banno

Yes, I understand that. But I am talking about our in situ situation. Perhaps what we consider we know now may turn out not to be the case.

My suggestion is not that we can't know anything, but rather that adding that it is true, creates a problem. We work with it as if it is true. We have rigor in what we decide to consider knowledge. We don't add on to it being well justified and not (yet) falsified that it is also true.

Folk think it cleaver to say that we don't know anything. The implication is that there are no facts. That leads to all sorts of inconsistencies. — Banno

Was this directed at me? Is that what you think I am saying and also are you saying I think I am clever?

I distinguish between knowing and believing. I distinguish between belief and knowledge. I use know and knowledge and mean something different than (to merely) believe and (mere)
belief, considering the former terms rigorously arrived

You can't "realise your error" unless there is error. Error occurs when you believe something that is not true. For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Right, but I am looking at the now situation. The now situation means that where there does not seem to be an error, there may be an error. We don't know, if we are adding true to the criteria, if it will remain true. Now. Saying something is well justified and not falsified I get. And I think calling those things knowledge is useful. But then to add that it is also true I think is hubris. I treat those things as true. I work with them as true or working, but I have no extra step where I justify X according to a rigorous methodolgy and/or note that others have, check to see if somewhere it has been falsified, and then I make the check to see it is true step. So far it is not false. So far it is working better than anything else.

For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Sure.

Knowledge consists of truths or not-yet-falsified claims the statuses of which are independent of dis/belief. — 180 Proof

I'm down with the first part, but I'm not sure what you mean by the second part.
And, of course, things that get falsified might end up later being resurrected.

You only know stuff that's true. — Banno

Then can one know whether one knows things, given potential revision.

We have our rigorous criteria, decide we know X. But later we may realize errors or get new data and then we know X is false. Did we falsely think we knew before?

And if we didn't know before, then our knowledge now might not be knowledge. So, is it ok to say we know, knowing we may in fact not know?

I think there is a valid distinction between knowledge and belief, — Janus

The former is a subset of the latter. Different people/groups have different reasons for saying this batch of beliefs over here, they've got promise or they sure seem to be working so far or they fit X and Y really well and those over there don't fit it so well and those over there we can't make sense of to even tell.

The T in JTB is kinda awkward. If someone says they believe something, they're already saying they think it's true. — flannel jesus

I think better would be: not demonstrated false - by some well justified argument. JNFB