The rigor is all in the J - the J is where all our confidence in the T comes from. — flannel jesus

Agreed. Which is close to the reason I think the T is superfluous and misleading.

If it's rigor we're looking for, then we should place a threshold on the minimum amount of J before we call it "knowledge". Which is probably what we do anyway, given we don't have access to a universal dictionary of objective truths. — flannel jesus

To me it works to add in 4 further letters and take out the T. (this is partly ironic since it's too many letters to be useful, but it reflects my thinking.
1) NF - not falsified
2) BE - best explanation (so far)

Giving us JNFBEB :grin:
Justified not falsified best explanation belief.

By best explanation I am leaving room for parsimony - there's no equally predictive explanation that has less newly posited entities. Possibly things like clarity, lack of ambiguity, fits with current models.

I think it is fine to refer to such things as knowledge and that we know it. Even though it may turn out later that we were incorrect. We can be fussy later and say we thought we knew, but we didn't, but really I think there's no need to do this. Knowledge changed.

We have no separate access to truth. Oh, that's well justified, not falsified, and.....testing......and it's true. I understand that the T is generally not looked at a step in the methodology of determining if something is knowledge. Like first we justify then we check the truth of X. But I think the label is misleading in that direction and in any case redundant in the present. If it is well justfied (and meets my other criteria) then there we don't need to somehow also thin of truth or true as an adjective. I think it's confusing to add the T.

And then we just have beliefs with varying levels of justification, and the ones with the most justification we call "knowledge" - and some of that knowledge is probably wrong. — flannel jesus

Agreed.

The JTB definition of knowledge involves belief, and we might say that it frames knowledge as a "form of belief": namely justified true belief, but it does not follow that it is nothing more than belief, because the 'justified' and the 'true', as conceived, have nothing to do with belief. — Janus

Sure, knowledge is a rigorously arrived at belief in JTB theories of truth.

Foremost, you can't know something if it is not true. This is how the grammar of "know" works. If you hold it to be true, but it isn't, then you only believe it, you don't know it. — Banno

Right. Notice you wrote this all in the present tense. I know you have a more nuanced understanding of this. But I just want to immediately mention that I am looking at what happens through time and what we know/think/have access to at any given moment.

It might be best to look at what I say in an overview...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/893764

Secondly, it is plain that there are true statements. This statement is true. So are the theorems of arithmetic and logic. That you are reading this is also true. — Banno

yes, I think you are still assuming that I think we can't know anything.

This works only in limited cases. Some counterexamples have already been given. Here's another: Supose you are playing Checkers and your opponent reaches over and moves one of your pieces - yo say "You can't move my pieces!" Would you accept their reply if it were "HA, but there you have it - I have falsified that rule: I can move your pieces!" — Banno

Of course not. But I think my response to you makes it clear that there are things we can know. You seem to be arguing that extreme skepticism is problematic. I agree, that's not my point at all. Of course, I could be wrong about what just happened, what my opponent just did, in the checkers game, but that's not what I'm arguing.

You seem to be taking what I said as saying that we cannot know anything and we should doubt everything, in practice. Yeah, that's not what I'm saying at all.

I am focus on having True as something in addition to justification. Like I check off the justification. I check to make sure it hasn't been falsified (so far). Then I check to see if it is true. Well, not. That's an non-real step and a non-real criterion. Which doesn't mean nothing is true. Nor does it mean I take a similar skeptical attitude to everything nor am I suggesting we throw up our hands and say we can't know anything. But this is in my previous posts.

If it still seems to you that I am saying these things, then we are talking past eachother.

Wl, yes. Sometimes folk get things wrong. They think they know stuff when they don't. And the only way this can happen is if they believe something that is not true.

So there is a difference between believing and knowing: If something is known, it is true. — Banno

Yes, I understand that. But I am talking about our in situ situation. Perhaps what we consider we know now may turn out not to be the case.

My suggestion is not that we can't know anything, but rather that adding that it is true, creates a problem. We work with it as if it is true. We have rigor in what we decide to consider knowledge. We don't add on to it being well justified and not (yet) falsified that it is also true.

Folk think it cleaver to say that we don't know anything. The implication is that there are no facts. That leads to all sorts of inconsistencies. — Banno

Was this directed at me? Is that what you think I am saying and also are you saying I think I am clever?

I distinguish between knowing and believing. I distinguish between belief and knowledge. I use know and knowledge and mean something different than (to merely) believe and (mere)
belief, considering the former terms rigorously arrived

You can't "realise your error" unless there is error. Error occurs when you believe something that is not true. For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Right, but I am looking at the now situation. The now situation means that where there does not seem to be an error, there may be an error. We don't know, if we are adding true to the criteria, if it will remain true. Now. Saying something is well justified and not falsified I get. And I think calling those things knowledge is useful. But then to add that it is also true I think is hubris. I treat those things as true. I work with them as true or working, but I have no extra step where I justify X according to a rigorous methodolgy and/or note that others have, check to see if somewhere it has been falsified, and then I make the check to see it is true step. So far it is not false. So far it is working better than anything else.

For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Sure.

Knowledge consists of truths or not-yet-falsified claims the statuses of which are independent of dis/belief. — 180 Proof

I'm down with the first part, but I'm not sure what you mean by the second part.
And, of course, things that get falsified might end up later being resurrected.

You only know stuff that's true. — Banno

Then can one know whether one knows things, given potential revision.

We have our rigorous criteria, decide we know X. But later we may realize errors or get new data and then we know X is false. Did we falsely think we knew before?

And if we didn't know before, then our knowledge now might not be knowledge. So, is it ok to say we know, knowing we may in fact not know?

I think there is a valid distinction between knowledge and belief, — Janus

The former is a subset of the latter. Different people/groups have different reasons for saying this batch of beliefs over here, they've got promise or they sure seem to be working so far or they fit X and Y really well and those over there don't fit it so well and those over there we can't make sense of to even tell.

The T in JTB is kinda awkward. If someone says they believe something, they're already saying they think it's true. — flannel jesus

I think better would be: not demonstrated false - by some well justified argument. JNFB

It can't go unnoticed how various people "know" things that contradict what other people "know" as well. — flannel jesus

It also can't get noticed that some things we consider - pretty much regardless of group - that we know now, we later realize we were wrong about, and this includes in the history of science.

The creation of this thread is motivated by a claim made by Chet Hawkins:

Knowledge is only belief.
— Chet Hawkins — Janus

This is a bit like saying Magnus Carlsen's chess games are chess games. Well, yes. But ithey are rigorously arrived at games, showing great skill. Chess isn't particular about something else. But in the game of believing, the beliefs are about things. They lead to useful activities and skills applicable to all fields of life, or they don't.

I think it is good to realize that knowledge is form of belief. I think that adds a note of humility. What we are sure is true today may be overturned.

But the word 'only' can be misleading. All beliefs are the same and what people call knowledge is no better than any other belief, might be the conclusion/implication.

Some methodologies are better than others.

If this persons truth-discovering tools like reason and logic are compromised in such a way, how could this person *discover the truth* that his truth-discovering (or filtering instead of discovering, if you prefer) tools are compromised and unrelaible? — flannel jesus

I thought I'd revisit this and made a list off the top of my head of terms that have to do with reasoning. Processes/functions that need to work well or you may have a problem with reasoning. These are not distinct categories; they overlap.

Some of the ones that I think account for bad reasoning (in all of us, at some point, and in certain people regularly). I just bolded the last three and these three also overlap. I think when people are bad at reasoning it is often these three functions that are not up to snuff. You need have the ability to notice small cues in yourself that you might be wrong. IOW I think people often get signals from themselves that they are not sure - when presenting as sure - or the nagging sense that something might be off, but these signals get ignored. It's not just that we can't take criticism from others or recognize the validity of other perspectives, but we actually don't listen to ourselves. We don't want to. If we don't want to because it hurts - to consider we might be wrong on a particular issue or ever - then we lack grit in the face of cognitive dissonance. We can't sit with those uncomfortable feelings. We want to win, make those go away, be right, period. If we're not aware of what our feelings think are at stake, we won't be vigilant about such cues. If we're not aware of past biases or interpersonal habits we have, we may converse with poor reasoning. That's some floppy muling over those last few terms which we might not think of as involved in poor reasoning. Oh, he doesn't understand logic or deduction or whatever. That's certainly an issue with people. But in general I think if we encounter someone with bad reasoning, there's only a real problem if those last three items are weak.


Critical Thinking
Logical Reasoning
Problem-Solving
Decision Making
Analytical Thinking
Inductive Reasoning
Deductive Reasoning
Cognitive Flexibility
Meta-cognition
Introspection
Grit in the face of Cognitive Dissonance.

hey! Who's been driving my car!? — flannel jesus

After a week of mulling I decided I was time travelling. Which makes sense since it was a week later. Or as I put it to myself 'therefore I am a time traveler.' If I hadn't noticed the hood, I wouldn't have been a time traveler.

It seems as though, with our one example of this situation on this forum, one has to be willing to see contradictions before one is able to see contradictions. Our one test example on the forum, when faced with the contradiction, can just will themselves out of seeing it — flannel jesus

So, then: can one be bad at reason and be willing to see contradictions. I would say yes. Unless we take 'bad at reasoning' to mean one never draws correct conclusions. But one could draw the conclusion that it would be good to notice contradictions as the result of bad reasoning. Like 'I've never seen Angelin Jolie where she was clearly not noticing Contradictions' 'Therefore she is good at noticing contradictions' Everyone should be like Angelina Jolie' Therefore I will look for contradictions. And so they do look and find and slowly realize that while their original reasoning for deciding this was not perfect, they're glad they decided to look for and notice contradictions.

Then we have to ask ourselves if someone can notice with utterly terrible reasoning. Well, it depends how terrible is terrible.

The hood of my car gets warm when I drive the car and this lasts for 10 minutes. I didn't drive my car in the last hour so it is not warm now.

Goes outside in the 98 degree heat to his car parked in the sun and notices the hood is warm, but he hasn't driven the car for weeks. Suddenly, I think some percentage of bad reasoners will recognize a problem. Not all, clearly, but some.

↪Bylaw I wonder why you chose Korean specifically. But take a look at this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857740 — Lionino

I searched his posts for something else and found him saying he was Korean. So, I did a bit of research to see if 'therefore' might cause problems for a native Korean speaker. And lo......

in a post in response to you in fact...

I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.

and it clearly includes the definition about introducing a logical conclusion. — flannel jesus

Yes, exactly. Yes, it can be used in other ways, but here it is not
first part of sentence comes earlier in time ontologically than what is mentioned in the second part.
Any chronological is about one being able, when one notes the first, to conclude that the second was also present at the time of the thinking.

It's a basic misinterpretation of therefore in this context. Discussions by philosophers of the cogito will show that they all get this and interpret therefore and donc in a way different from Corvus. Corvus is a non-native speaker. In his language it is easy to mistranslate therefore to a words that has the meaning he projects on to the English word (and the French word also). There is another way to translate it into Korean that is better, and so on.

Instead of for one second considering he might be misinterpreting the term and exploring that for a bit, he accuses me of leading everything into nonsense.

I gather that he is making mistakes in symbolic logic also, but that's not something I'm as familiar with.

I just found this so galling...

You totally distorted the meaning of the word "Therefore" in your claims. Therefore means by the result of, for that reason, consequently. Therefore it has implications of chronology and cause and effect transformation for the antecedent being the past, or cause, and the descendant to imply the result, consequence and effect.

If you deny that standard meaning, then you are denying the general principle of linguistic semantics. And that is what you have done to mislead the argument and further present the nonsense.

I mean, this is precisely an error a native speaker of Korean can make. It's easily forgivable that he makes that mistake. It's easy to find out this is a problem coming from Korean, and that there are two words used to translate 'therefore' one much closer to this use in the English cogito (and also donc in the French version). Several different native speakers are telling him he is misunderstanding the word. And when it's pointed out he tells me I am not using the standard definition. Well, there are a few ways to use 'therefore' in English.
Just for thoroughnessI'll like to what you're responding to of mine: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/892205 and which you linked to.

Earlier he told Flannel Jesus that he could look in any logic textbook and find that his denying the antecendent was correct. Yet recently he chided Banno for citing logic books. And he never got around to showing us how his logic book said he was correct. But when a logic work (supposedly) supported his position, it was fine to point this out. (though never to get around showing us that it did). I don't understand the language. Banno doesn't understand the difference between truth and validity. Flannel Jesus doesn't understand....and on and on.

I do often wonder how conscious people are of what they seem to be avoiding admitting (to themselves? to us?) that maybe, just maybe other people might have a point. Conscious or not I think there are dozens of examples of disingenousness in this thread.

To backseat drive a bit: I think a key area is the 'you don't know how to apply logic to specific cases and I do.' My wording, perhaps unfair, of something I have seen Corvus assert a number of times. I think that needs to be explored. Is he saying that the rule is being misapplied when it comes to the cogito? Why there? Also, it seems sometimes like a concession that his rule isn't a rule, and we can't use it in general, but in the case of the cogito it is, according to him, a good argument against it AND it is appropriate given the nature of the nouns involved. However, at other times it seems like a rule considered fallacious in logic is being argued by him as universally correct. Teasing out what is going on there seems like a core issue. Perhaps a period of just asking after clarification and greater explication would be useful. IOW intead of objections to what seems fallacious, piece by piece, accepting for the moment such things as information about his position and then asking a lot of questions: are you saying this holds in all cases? Are there examples where this is not the case? You've said I/we don't understand why the cogito in particular is problematic and so this rule of logic applies. Could you give other examples? What is the rule for these examples that makes them exceptions or the criteria? And so on. Likely my backseat driving is based on missing where this has been done and is unwarrented. But given how intractable the disagreement has been so far, I thought I'd throw out a suggestion. Apologies in advance for all the ways this is obnoxious and likely underinformed - and yet I am doing it anyway, knowing this, which is even worse on may part.:joke:

Yes, why do the epiphenomenologists talk about consciousness? Because they noticed they had subjective experience. They mulled this over and they started talking about it. If it could lead to any causes of physical things they we need a reason why their lips or fingers started moving in those ways to communicate about consciousness. It seems to me also, though I haven't fully worked this out, that we shouldn't believe in other minds if we are epiphenomenologists. We could well believe in other cognitive functions, but not that there are other experiencers. Otherwise the experiencing of our own set of qualia was used to decide other people have this stuff also.

I can see someone arguing that we would, like robots, do the same things. We just have this internal witness. But the problem for me is, we sure talk about subjective experience, consciousness, qualia. So, in some way the fact of experiencing is in the domino chains just like everything else. It isn't epi. It seems like it has to be a substance dualism. But why does it ever come up in conversation. That other substance is necessarily causal. Perhaps it has nothing to do with causing actions, but it sure causes our noticing it which then causes us to talk about it, which then is an action. We don't have locked in syndrome.

The word “therefore” can be a source of confusion, especially when translating philosophical or logical statements.
Causal Interpretation:
In English, “therefore” is a logical connective that indicates a conclusion drawn from preceding premises.
However, in Korean, the equivalent word “그러므로” (geureom-eoro) can sometimes be interpreted more causally or chronologically.
Korean speakers might associate it with a cause-and-effect relationship, even though the intended meaning is more about logical inference.
Context Matters:
The context in which “therefore” appears plays a crucial role.
Philosophical discussions often involve nuanced reasoning, and the precise meaning depends on the overall context and philosophical background.
Alternative Translations:
To emphasize the logical aspect, one could use alternative translations like “결론적으로” (gyeollonjeog-eulo), which directly means “conclusively.”
Using “그래서” (geulaeseo) is another option, which is less causal and more focused on the logical connection.

Or it could just be a coincidence that the native speakers here are pointing out thattherefore is being taken by Corvus as causal and chronological, when in fact this is not the case, AND this is real possibility for native speakers of Korean to take the word in those incorrect ways.

My hypothesis is that it's a language issue. Somewhere back in time he or she mentioned he or she was not a native speaker.
I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.
Why he or she didn't mention this when it was pointed out how 'therefore' was being interpreted i this thread, I have no idea. I realize that the parallel error is happening in the symbolic logic, but perhaps it is inspired by not really getting 'therefore' (which can be used a few ways), as somewhat tricky word in a second language.

Pages 20 to 30 of this very thread would blow your mind. — Lionino

I avoided parts of this thread to prevent that.

To be fair, 'therefore' is a tricky word with a few different uses. And both the English and French versions of the cogito are very concise: the French extremely so. So, this can create some ambiguity if one just focuses on the single sentence without the context, especially for non-native speakers.

yeah of course, I misunderstood your previous post. — flannel jesus

I think I communicated poorly. Sometimes when I'm being ironic or start ironic I end up saying things I do not intend.

Yeah, which would make it VERY puzzling why philosophers as a group like the cogito very much. Obviously it doesn't mean that - if it did, that would be the FIRST counter argument you hear against it when you look for what people think about it - rather than some obscure counter you've only ever heard once in your life, from a guy who thinks fallacies are valid deductions. — flannel jesus

Yes. Instead of saying Hey, that's isn't as self-evident as it seems it'd be
Hey, how the hell did he think that was self-evident at all?

In philosophy it might well be worth exploring and Idealists, at least some of them might be saying that in some way. But it's not what Descartes was saying.

Do a lot of other philosophers think that? What do they think "therefore" means? — flannel jesus

Oh, well, in the cogito they all think it means 'so I can conclude' or 'so it must be the case that'. And why, well, the idea is that because if you are doing something, you need to exist, it's built in. It is not, dear Jesus, well you also Flannel Jesus, saying that thinking causes existence. It is not saying that if we have thinking, then later we will have existing. It's not saying that. I find it miraculous that this even needs to be said. The chronology is in the though process of the philosopher thinking about thinking and existence.

And I do not mean the cogito is right because it says this. I just find it miraculous that it is contentious what was intended by donc/therefore.

If it didn't mean that, then it would mean that Descartes' conclusion included the idea that one could think while not existing, at least for a moment - if it was chronological or causal
the left of the cogito causing that which is on the right in the cogito.

And you just ain't gonna find anybody, including Descartes saying that's what he was saying.

We could, of course, skip the middleman (in this case) of Descartes and forget donc, forget therefore and just ask each other do you think that one mus exist if one is thinking. Or to put it the other way. Could something that does not exist think? That's what D decided was self-evidently not the case.

For me to tricky part is what exists, not so much that existing/thinking is going on.

I've been thinking about the issue, or, at least, there's seems to be thinking occuring, but I don't exist, so I've decided not to participate any more in the discussion, given that ontological 'I' can't.

I mean, seriously, who am 'I' to weigh in and say that 'therefore' does not mean 'which causes' in the cogito if I don't exist.

And all the philosophers who think that Descartes meant a different 'therefore' suffer the same ontological absence. I am suffering this absence, but I am not.

Therefore can imply chronology, but it need not and it certainly doesn't there. And it is often used in the sense Descartes meant, and all those who focus on the English version, that we can conclude that GIVEN I think I also am. The am may well come before, but it is a necessary condition, at the very least for thinking.
And only very rare individuals who have a very fixed reading of therefore think it usually or there means chronology.
And I doubt there is a single published philosopher who took it in the sense you mean.
I don't agree with the cogito, but your interpretation of it is incorrect. It's not claiming that thinking causes or leads to existence or is prior to it.
But if you can find some philosopher discussing it in that way, let us know. They'd still be in a very tiny, tiny minority, but it'd be fascinating.

Let me repeat again that I disagree with the cogito, but I think there is something you are misinterpreting about it. I think you are treating sentence order as chronology and interpreting 'therefore' as meaning causes/is prior to. When in fact if anything it means the opposite, but actually is not that kind of ontological term. It means, 'so, given that [what came before the word therefore[ is occuring that which [comes after the word 'therefore'] must also be happening

Existence comes first. Logically, and ontologically. — Corvus

This is exactly what the cogito is asserting.

Then he should have said, "I exist, therefore I think." He obviously misunderstood something.
He put the cart in front of a horse.

Sum, ergo cogito, makes sense. But it doesn't say anything new or exciting, does it?

If you do what you suggest here, you are actually arguing in favor of panpsychism. That which exists can then think.

There's a fundamental misinterpretation of what the word order of the sentence is saying about chronology and ontological necessity.

I think, therefore I am.

Does not in anyway say that thinking leads to existence or is a necessary precursor or facet of existence. If anything the opposite. But it is not focused on chronology.

And I think you are reading that sentence as indicating chronology. And again when you say.....

Existence comes first. Logically, and ontologically

You support the cogito.

And then I will reword this:
It seems to me you read the cogito as indicating via word order and the word 'therefore' that thinking is prior to existence. But that's not what the word order or 'therefore' indicates. In fact it's a misread of 'therefore.' Therefore means 'I get to conclude that something else is also true and, if anything was true before 'I think' occurred. It's not asserting this. The two processes could be simultaneous, for example. But it is not asserting precursion nor causation. And it is not saying the stuff in the beginning of the sentence causes the stuff in the second part.

Therefore could indicate that kind of chronology IF!!! there was future tense in the second part.

It is raining, therefore I will get wet (when I go out). But without 'will', it is not that kind of word.

When you reverse the cogito

I am, therefore I think.

You are actually doing what you complain about. Making existence dependent on thinking.

It indicates a process of thought not a proces of causation or chronology. The detective's thought process, not the scientists proclamation of causation and order in time.

So, again, I think you misunderstand 'therefore' and are confusing word order with a diagram of events in time.

Given what you are saying here, it sounds like you are saying something different from what Corvus was saying earlier. He was using logic and what gets called a fallacy of denying the antecedent to demonstrate the cogito is false. Here you are saying that a premise in the cogito is false. That's a completely different argument and one I tend to agree with.

One way to look at the issue, is that, really. we all have this issue. We are all stupid/stuck in certain areas. It could be reasoning about people, or certain cognitive skills that are covered by IQ, or in certain fields, or in chess or something similar. If we just compare ourselves to peers, we may seem fine. But the moment we try to work on one of our weak areas or run up against someone who is a real expert or genius, it's a different story. And do we know we are weak? I would guess pretty much everyone mis-evaluates themselves on certain cognitive skills. Either too positively or too negatively or both.

I understand that someone with global deficits, then has a better chance of not noticing problematic feedback from life and other people. But really, we are all in this boat, I think.

We may be solid enough coasting on what we are, in fact, correct in thinking we are good at. But somewhere, at edges of our skills, we may not know we have a problem and, if we decided to try to improve, might not do the right things to achieve that.

I have my guess, like others, where this thread came from. I think we are dealing with an over-creative approach, combined with a dislike of what most people think of as authority. Or perhaps better put, a joy in challenging what seems obvious to others. This may lead to some real stubborn mistakes. I could be projecting, since I have had both of these problems myself.

Another way to extricate oneself might come when one realized what is actually going on in interpersonal, global personality drive ways and how these affect reasoning. There are many ways like can come and smack you upside the head (don't I know it) and get one to start noticing bad habits that affect cognition and reasoning.

One has to, I think, actively stifle moments of awareness that something is off. In a way, all the person has to do is to start is to let those flashes of doubt and insight get more light and air.

I do get the idea. Any feedback (from others, from life) can be ignored, given the problem. And any attempts to fix the problem can be bad attempts...given the problem.

In specific they can choose someone well regarded by expert peers. Of course, this is no guarantee, but what else can one do, but do one's best, in part based one what seems to be the best suggestions from others.

I think most people can improve, once they realize there is a problem.
And I think it is possible for anyone to get a sense there is a problem, if only for a few moments.

If this persons truth-discovering tools like reason and logic are compromised in such a way, how could this person *discover the truth* that his truth-discovering (or filtering instead of discovering, if you prefer) tools are compromised and unrelaible? — flannel jesus

If they are an armchair philosopher, rarerly interacting irl with other philosophy hobbiests, that there's little blowback from abstract arguments,even if everyone disagree with this person.

But we use logic and reason at work, in the family, in life in general. You rule something out, 'logically', and it turns out to be what happened, that's blunt feedback. You spend your boss' money based on 'logic and reason' that may well ending earning some blunt feedback.

Of course I think humans are capable of denying pretty much anything, so there's no guarantee for the hypothetical person.

But there are many ways feedback can come and be hard to be ignored.

If he still cares about the truth, but he has come to accept that his tools for discovering or filtering truths are compromised, what should he do? — flannel jesus

Apprentice (verb). And for the mentor, a tried and true method of teaching is for the mentor to use whatever the skill being passed is and think out loud while doing it.

Yes, but your example and the other's examples are the case of categorical mistake. This is the problem with the symbolic classical logic. Because it uses variables instead of the real objects and cases in the world, they think they can use any irrelevant items and cases into the variables, which looks like the general rules doesn't make sense. That is why sometimes you must investigate the content in the propositions to see if they make sense. — Corvus

That's fine, but then both sides of the use of denying the antecedent here are arguing using symbolic logic. If we need to look at the individual case, then we can skip either use of the the rule (the symbolic logic) and just make the case focused on individual qualities and categories.

Maybe this was done earlier in the discussion and I missed it, but it would seem to me that your argument here would be that both sides stop using symbolic logic.

Having said that, I agree with your point, that this particular case would have done with more stringent conditionals on the premise and also the assumptions. — Corvus

Or, yes, one could do that.

Cogito could have been not a statement that can be proved logically first place. Because it was never a logical statement. So, if we agree that Cogito is an epistemological issue, then it still is absurd to say Cogito necessitates existence. It would be rather perception, memories, imagination and sensations as well as reasoning and all the rest of the total mentality which grant one's own existence, I believe. — Corvus

It does matter what the Cogito is trying to demonstrate. I think 'experiencing is happening, something exists' is less troublesome, though it's almost redundant: what is before the comma is a paraphrase of what is after the comma.

Good point. I am not going to deny your point straight away. I wouldn't be that rude.
But it seems that you talking about again totally different case in your example. Why it is irrelevant, if you want know, then let me know. — Corvus

OK, I was under the impression you were arguing with only the general rule. IOW using a general rule that shows the cogito is false. I don't think it's a good rule, for reasons/examples given by others. But here you say it is a different case. Well, then it doesn't like a rule is being used.

In that case it is not the rule the is running the argument but something more complicated.

IOW if I look at many of your posts it seems like you are saying the rule shows that it's false. But the moment you indicate that it works 'in this case' (but not in others), it seems to me, this is directly acknowledgement that it's not the rule. It's a specific situation or a specific condition, for example the 'if and only if case' special condition.

And, hey, post a picture of the textbooks. If it's there, that will surprise people and might move things forward.

Oh, and this isn't because I buy or like the cogito. I actually don't.

I robbed a bank, therefore I committed a crime.
I did not rob a bank, therefore I did not commit a crime

argues the man accused of rape
after the video of him raping the victim is shown

Of course, there can be situations where denying the antecedent can also be true. But if it is presented as a logical necessity, it doesn't hold. It's not enough. Throw in an if and only if, and it can work, but that's a different condition.

Right. And my point was that sexual preference has been treated much more harshly and in a different light than transgender. There is tacit acceptance of transgender actions up to a point. Even a hint of an incorrect sexual preference was often extremely villified. The grander point is they are two separate topics, so lets keep it that way if possible. — Philosophim

But no one thought the people called dykes or fags were homosexuals. My point wasn't that being transgendered was ok and showing it through terms that with those terms. My point was terms were flung at people with hate or more neutral classification. To get called 'fag' generally did not mean someone thought one was gay. It was just like saying weak, not boy enough - and it could be said even if one did not do anything transgender, let alone homosexual. My point was that tom boy was not used in this way. I can't even imagine a child or teenager calling someone a tomboy with hatred. They'd go for other terms.

That is determined by the culture you are in. If you are viewed as transgendered, then you are in that culture. You can try to change their minds, but its ultimately their decision. — Philosophim

I don't see how their belief changes me. Yes, it's their decision, thoughts arose in their minds. Nothing happend to me. I'd accept phrases like 'you will be thought of as _______' 'people will judge you for being what they consider______________' But that I have become transgendered, nah. Does it count if I walk into a bar in a wider culture that would not consider me something but when I walk in there, that subculture will judge me that way. What is the ontology of location? I'm giggle a bit as I write this, but I'm also serious. I don't grant changes in them to be considered a change in me, for example.

You became transgendered in that culture. I think this is the confusion some people have. You do not own gender. — Philosophim

Then I shouldn't get the label, in a context like this. IOW here we are talking abstractly from a metaposition. I understand that if I go to culture X I may be seen as category B. It has nothing to do with me is more or less my point. Also, gender tends to include not just visible/audible behavior but also attitudes and emotions. If they never notice, but I walk around having the attitudes that the other biological sex is supposed to have to the degree I have it, am I transgendered, suddenly because I am there, or not. I, personally, cry more than most women - I'm a guy. But I don't do that on the street. I doubt I would if I was a woman - though that's speculation of course (snorting a bit with laughter again.) But at home, sure. So, at the hotel, in Sicily, sure. Am I transgendered? Or am I not transgendered because they didn't notice and they couldn't see when I walk around or am at the beach that my attitudes and the way I talk to the people I am with are supposedly traditionally female? I'm not hiding, per se. Is it only the act of judgment on their part that makes me suddenly be in a new category? mere presence where the other views hold sway, though clearly not everywhere, even there?

Further I'm not sure there is agreement that others own the judgment:

How does someone know that they are transgender?
People can realize that they're transgender at any age. Some people can trace their awareness back to their earlier memories – they just knew. Others may need more time to realize that they are transgender. Some people may spend years feeling like they don't fit in without really understanding why, or may try to avoid thinking or talking about their gender out of fear, shame, or confusion. Trying to repress or change one’s gender identity doesn’t work; in fact, it can be very painful and damaging to one’s emotional and mental health. As transgender people become more visible in the media and in community life across the country, more transgender people are able to name and understand their own experiences and may feel safer and more comfortable sharing it with others.

For many transgender people, recognizing who they are and deciding to start gender transition can take a lot of reflection. Transgender people risk social stigma, discrimination, and harassment when they tell other people who they really are. Parents, friends, coworkers, classmates, and neighbors may be accepting—but they also might not be, and many transgender people fear that they will not be accepted by their loved ones and others in their life. Despite those risks, being open about one’s gender identity, and living a life that feels truly authentic, can be a life-affirming and even life-saving decision.

Do I become transgender if I get off a bus in the midwest, but stop being transgender when I get back on the bus since the other passengers are, like me travelling through the midwest? I we have a stop in a little town in the Midwest, say a bus trip, and I walk into a diner where everyone has different ideas about gender than the rest of the county, am I transgendered or not during my bus trip breakfast?

How do we know if someone is transgender? Must others in the dominant cultural group openly express the judgment? Do we assume they have it but haven't said it, given what we now about that culture or think we know?

If you understand those expectations, and go against them in public, then you are transgendered in your explicit violation of the cultural norms. — Philosophim

So, if I don't know, then I am not transgendered while I am there? But then I at least partially own my gender. It would be part of my identity.

And the person who goes and knows part or a little of the other culture?

Again, this is all part of a more general issue. I think that when the changes are not in the self, but primarily have to do with beholders' judgments (and even this may not exist in your schema - they may be inured to tourists and their difference and no longer notice it, or just be thinking about other things) then it is better to label the scenario and not me.

If people are judged mentally ill in a certain culture for doing things considered within the range of the normal in my culture, and I go there and do them, I am not mentally ill suddenly. Perhaps I am rude not to respect their traditions, given I know it, but I am not mentally ill suddenly then healthy when I get back on the plane.

It's the use of language here and what it implies ontologically.

Gender owns you because it is an expectation from people other than yourself that they expect you to comply with. — Philosophim

I don't think there is consensus at all about how transgendered is used. But further I'm with the Scotting guy.

So if you're a Scottish man and get told you're "Dressing like a woman," you would claim, "No I'm not! This is a kilt that men wear!" — Philosophim

I'd leave off that last sentence, since I'd know not all men wear kilts. Perhaps, adding, yeah, here. I mean, if I actually got into a conversation with someone. But I guess on some level I grant them no expertise. You and I, having this discussion, are in a metaposition. And it sounds like neither of us cares that much how other people behave in relation to gender. In other countries, whatever my challenging personality traits, they tend to be the less visible ones when I am in public regardless of country - that's me, others have different situations. But my attitude on some level is, no, your not some objective expert on what a man or woman is what gender is and so on. I don't consent to the judgment or because I am here you are now suddenly right about my behavior. I do have a when in Rome attitude about many things. I don't point my feet at people in Thailand or make fun of the King. And there are many even fairly subtle things I adjust to when I even go to someone's home for dinner. But I don't grant the objective expertise that seems implicit, even in their country. I don't want to be rude. I've put on kippah in orthodox schools, taken off shoes in mosques and temples. And all sorts of what I would call polite. But that tends to be specific to entering houses and buildings and that's true in my home countries also. All the darn subcultures - including things like corporate and government agency subcultures - where I do some adjustment, though often because of power or not wanting the hassle of dealing with irritated people. It's not like I'm advocating spitting in the face of local traditions.

But yeah, if someone says to me in my kilt that I am dressing like a woman, I'd probably say, 'Actually no. I'm not. But I know men here don't do this.' Unless I thought a crowd was ready to beat the hell out of me. But I wouldn't grant that the person was correct, except for self-protection and then I'd be lying.

From my perspective anyone who can be in a position to become president is an elite. Left and right mainstream are just differently wings of the same neoliberal elite. — Tom Storm

I hoped I got that idea across also, but in any case, I agree. I don't think of them as the core of the elite and I am not sure how organized the elite is, but they need elite approval to get in and they have obligations to (and common interests with) the elite.

I'd say, looking at the current situation, the idea that there are elites who are getting more and more power and undermining democracy is correct. The problems with populism can coexist with this being true. IOW the situation could be populism leads to bad and things and the analysis is wrong about the current situation. Or it could be that populism leads to bad things, despite the analysis being correct.

A disorganized response:
1) as said I think the analysis is correct. There is more and more concentration of power in government, media corporations, banks and other financial institutions and corporations in general. Power and money are getting more concentrated and things like government oversight of industry, for example, or equal treatment under the law are now going back to less fair times and practices.
2) populism is not restricted to the politicians who get labelled this way. In the US both Republicans (who were career politicians and not considered fringe by most) and Democrats (also having those characteristics) have run with significant degrees of implied or stated populist rhetoric.
3) which hints at the problem for me: the people running as populists are part of the elites. They may claim outsiderness, but at most their sort of black sheep of the elites. Trump and Clinton for example have been attending the same events and power groups for decades. So, you get a slightly to significantly loose cannon elite member when you vote for a populist. Why is this so? Well, you just can't be some kind of (merely seeming) outsider with any chance of winning without having tremendous power and connections. But given the myth of outsiderness, now you have a mandate to make changes, sweeping and deep changes. Well, that's autocratic. Of course, it could be a benevolent dictatorship and there are a few rare instances where people came in made big changes and allowed other factions to take over when voted in. But it's rare.
4) Not enough people are willing to face the fact that the system is messed up and getting worse. Which means that how to make fundamental changes and all the negotiation and analysis that needs to go into that, and a broad set of players engaging in the process is ruled
out.
5) And then we want to get rescued by a strong daddy (or, now, potentially, mommy).

I think because you were not a tom boy, that you don't have the understanding of what tom boys went through. — Philosophim

I know what the one's called 'dyke' went through. I know what the guys called fag went through. Remember these names are not meant just for the target. They are meant as open gossip, telling others what to think of that person. I don't remember pressure to think there was anything wrong with tomboys. I certainly did with other names, even milder stuff like wimp.

Calling someone a tom boy is expressing publicly that a woman is not behaving within the cultural gendered norm of their sex. — Philosophim

Well, again, all I can say is it did not have a 'calling out' quality and there were terms that were a calling out and criticism.

No denial that she's hiding what she is. Gender often asks us to behave, act, and dress in ways we would rather not. Much of gender is a holdover from a less technologically advanced and enlightened society, and is too often an undercurrent of sexism. Gender is a social construct, and a social construct that pressures you to act, dress, or behave a certain way. — Philosophim

To me it then has little to do with the self. Unless it does. But if it doesn't. My wife wore a headscarf in one country, but she hadn't changed. Just a practical and perhaps safety issue. Some people on the other hand are transgendered. IOW for them they decide to shift over on what for them is an essential level and or they feel like 'really' they have been but his this essential nature. In those situations I feel comfortable given them a name that implies something essential. I just don't think it makes sense when most of what happens is in other people.

Same with calling someone else's son a girly man or mama's boy. Being transgender doesn't have anything to do with your sexual orientation. — Philosophim

-Sure, my point was that with names like these there is anger and negative judgment.

To be clear from earlier. Everyone makes transgendered actions. To be identified as 'transgendered' you must be someone who willfully violates gender norms consistently and willfully. — Philosophim

Well, we're all doing that, we're just at varied distances from the places that see them this way. And given subcultures and individuals, we're all probably near people who do this. Stuff happens when they see me. The do/feel/react in certain ways.

Viewing you as transgendered doesn't make you differently sexed. — Philosophim

Nor does it make you differently gendered. It doesn't do anything unless it leads to action on the part of that person making the judgment.

Viewing you as transgendered doesn't make you differently sexed. Being transgendered by definition, is committing actions associated with the cultural expectations of the other sex, and not your sex. You do not own gender. Culture does. Gender is not genetic. You can be a girly boy or a manly man. Neither is gender. You can like painting your nails or not as a man. That is not gender. Gender is culture's expectation of how you should act based on your sex. — Philosophim

That last sentence says it for me. The actually event is in the beholders. I act in way X in my city and people don't see me as transgendered, except in some neighborhoods. I travel to another land or enter a subculture's turf in my country or meet by partner's parents and her big family. They judge me differently. I didn't become transgendered. What I am like triggered a set of thoughts in people. Something happened in them. Their expectations got contradicted and this led to irritation, fear, confusion, hatred, whatever....in them. They changed. They didn't change gender. But something occurred in them.

My point isn't restricted to this term 'transgendered'. It would hold for many other terms where I would say that reifications of procceses into nouns coupled with misapplying the reification (the label) is aimed at the place where actually there was no change. Where the change process happened elsewhere.

Good conversation Bylaw, I really appreciate you digging in. :) — Philosophim

Thanks. I think we actually agree about many things, but, yeah, I'm being stubborn about a few points.

Perhaps they are all worried that the other side will convince you that your sins are virtues. — substantivalism

There seems a strong urge to define me (along with everyone else) and oversimplify me (and everyone else) on both sides.

Instead of having to learn via intuition and experience, everyone wants an adhered to label. One side thinks you can change your label, but once you have that label on your head we know you.

I think there's a huge fear of having to navigate reality, which is concrete and specific and detailed.