Subset has the word sub in it. By bizarre personal or colloquial standards of the day I could claim you are trying to dominate British cities by the category cities and you expect sub drop and eyes lowered. Why? Why? — Chet Hawkins

Yes, sub means under orginally, but it has lost that connotation, means part of the set. I'm happy to us any other noun for mean it contains some of the members of the larger set of beliefs. But....
The issue isn't really the word. If you don't mean something negative with only and mere, then it doesn't matter. It seems like you are saying all beliefs are the same when you say this. If that's what you mean then we can discuss that. If that's not what you mean we can hop over that discussion.

I agree experts are not always right. But I go further, amid honesty. Experts cultivate their position in order to sell out. It is the NORM, not the exception. The Capitalist system (and others but especially that one) foment a culture of sell outs. Fake it til you make it and then sell out. What a system! — Chet Hawkins

I recognize this phenomenon. But still, I will tend to believe experts over random non-experts. And, as I say later in my previous post, I also take a portion of beliefs to be better than others. I have my own methodologies. I am not separating beliefs into different categories just on expert opinion.

It's not clear to me yet what your overall position is, so much of what I am doing is triangulating, probing, until, hopefully I do understand it.

Do not trust anything at face value, especially authority. — Chet Hawkins

I'd say I am an outlier in my criticism of authority and expert opinions. Of course, often I am going with marginalized expert opinions that have informed my disagreement. Also my understanding in general that leads to my rejection of authority, when I do that, is also informed by the work of experts. I have intuition, experience added into the mix and also a sense of paradigmatic biases.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.
— Bylaw
Incorrect. Reality is objective, so subjective belief does not matter to truth.

Sets include only members and set theory has no designation for 'lesser' and 'greater' until we redefine the set in those terms. You are wrong. — Chet Hawkins

It's not wrong. And I went on to give examples. Of course better and worse have subjective elements - given our purposes!!!!!!, but if we are saying all members are the same and we have no context for that, well, who cares. But to me there is a context for discussing the issue of knowledge and beliefs and that has to do with what we want and how we use these things.

If this topic is just about sets for you and getting the members that fit those sets and you have no other purpose, OK, fine. It's not a topic that interest me and I'll bow out.

Notice that I even gave examples of different subjective uses for the set of beliefs.

, given the purposes one has. — Bylaw

you quoted this part but seem to have ignored it. Given the purposes we have which would be based on our subjective values. I'd prefer to know that 2 inches of ice would likely hold my weight and I'd want a good source for that information. I don't want just any belief from the set of beliefs, I want one that meets my criteria. Our purposes are subjective, yes. That condition is right there in my explanation (given our purposes). A surgeon has a set of tools available but doesn't ask for 'a tool', she asks for the one that is better for her purpose. If they were playing some game in the operating room with no patient there, than other purposes might be afoot and any tool would do.. Given the purposes.

Characteristics of elements within a set are a case for intersection, not exclusion. So you are burning a strawman. — Chet Hawkins

Honestly I have no idea why you called my explaining my thinking....note: my thinking - a strawman.

For me when two people are communicating with each other, here online especially, I think it is important to lay out my thinking. This often helps prevent talking past each other. In the process of trying to understand and yes, possibly also criticize, someone else's position, I will do a number of different things.

You mentioned earlier that you were used to being insulted or it seems implicit in what you said. Is it possible you are seeing my posts through the lens of how other people have reacted to you? Are you assuming that I fully understand your position, so, for that reason and/or other factors you think everything I say is an attack or somehow supposed to be a representation of your position? If so, that's not what I'm doing.

They imply a perfection, an objectivity, that is NOT and CANNOT be present. — Chet Hawkins

I find the distinction useful and at the same time do not assume knowledge, for example, must be and is perfectly correct. I don't even assume despite the capitals and lack of qualification in what you said above that you mean what you said MUST be 100% correct. Perhaps you think it is, but I don't assume that's the way you think. And even if one avoids using those words - the ones that you think entail a claim of infallibility - one still batches some beliefs over there, some here, some in another batch. With varying degrees of confidence in them. I'm happy to use the word knowledge. If someone else assume this means perfection, well, I disagree, but I'm open to whatever noun they use for the category of beliefs they have a great deal of confidence in.

If I read your post it comes across that you are not just a skeptic. You tell me, for example, something I said was incorrect, period. No qualification. Many of your positions and reactions seem very confident. Nothing wrong with that. So, when you assert things this way, that set of assertions, which presumably reflect beliefs of yours, what do you call that set?

No, 'only' and 'mere' are PRECISELY the same (to me) in meaning and they are certainly no worse than 'subset'. So, I confess, I do not get this complaint. It's like saying to 'them' that 'OK, if you concede the main point about your door, we will agree to paint it chartreuse, as you direct.' — Chet Hawkins

'mere' has negative connotations.

adjective
used to emphasize how small or insignificant someone or something is.

and only can have the same meaning. Not necessarily, but possibly. Oh, it's only a regular pizza, no toppings. And given that you present them as the same, I disagree with their use there. And subset alone is fine.

Subset is neutral. British cities are a subset of the category cities.

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.
— Bylaw
Most 'grouping up' as a fallacious attempt to argue by mass or numbers, is cowardly, if you follow, an approach/need of fear and order. Anger does not care if others agree or not. It will hold the line to the balance of its own belief, regardless. At least that is GOOD anger. — Chet Hawkins

I mentioned methodologies. This would include my own methodologies also, so really it has nothing to do with number. I am lying in bed and I think it's raining. I thought they maybe said something on the news that it would rain today, but I'm not sure. But I believe it is raining. Or, I get up, look out the window, see drops falling, hitting puddles. I now also believe it is raining, but the methodology I used in the second instance I respect more. So, it is when I evaluate how others reach conclusions: their methodologies - and perhaps past record, my sense of their trustworthiness and other criteria.

This has nothing to do with fear or anger.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.
— Bylaw
Yes, on some of that we can agree. But we both know that in reality and especially human reality, there are many situations where the fox ends up guarding the henhouse. Why is that? I 'know' (ha ha) why. It's fair to use the fox's tricks against them, maybe (not really) The fox is likely to sell out truth. The fox is likely to call it doubters facetious when they are the serious ones. The fox was appointed by other foxes. It's there to corrupt the serious nature of truth, precisely to let slip things in a certain way. We are all beset by wisdom, by truth. It is too hard to live up to. The 'powers that be' have to make sure that some roads to truth are obscured. This aids in the pragmatic short cutting of truth in daily life. This aids in immorality, the opposite of wisdom. — Chet Hawkins

Sure, I haven't said: if the experts say X, X must be true.

But I recognize differences between beliefs. I use the word knowledge for beliefs that I consider very likely to be correct. It is a subset of beliefs that I have confidence in over other subsets of beliefs. I don't expect perfection, because I and we are fallible. We do our best.

Messi is a football player. He is one football player in the set of football players. But I would choose him to play on my team over three random players.

The parallel here is not that Messi is a kind of knowledge, though he certainly has that.
It's just I have no reason to say he is only a football player or a mere football player because he is part of that set.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.

If I am interested in surprising beliefs, then out of the set of beliefs, many beliefs not considered knowledge and many considered knowledge will fit my needs.

If I am trying to successfully navigate the world, then those in the subset knowledge tend to work better.

But I see no reason to use mere or only, especially if the latter is considered a synonym of the former.

My statements are intended precisely to call this foolishness into question. A fact or knowledge, both, are only a subset of beliefs. — Chet Hawkins

I wouldn't use the word only (or mere). It's a subset.

Even if (perhaps especially if) you assess certain groups (scientists, intellectuals) you will narrow that spread because all of them are closing ranks as a rep of the group DESPITE personal feelings or beliefs or 'known (ha ha) facts' to the contrary, because they would rather do that than let chaos get a toehold further into their protected spaces. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.

All sorts of categories can have as subsets, members that work much better than others.

There are chess players. Magus Carlsen is a chess player. He's not only a chess player or a mere chess player (the word 'only' her taken in a similar sense to 'mere.' But he is an individual subset of the set of chess players.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.

I did try discussing philosophy with you. You've perhaps forgotten. It had to do with cogito in a number of ways, including your incorrect interpretation of 'therefore'' no shame in that, English not being your native language. But I found your responses were not grounded in either philosophy or my posts. I think how people behave in a philosophy forum matters, but it seems in this case, you have no interest in feedback. Now I know that. Perhaps you haven't noticed how many people have arrived at very similar conclusions about you here. And people with a variety of differing opinions about the cogito. But, yeah, that's all probably a coincidence.

In any case, I thought you were moving forward. I am, in any case. I'll be ignoring you. I suggest you actually move forward yourself. Perhaps we'll have a lovely interaction on some other issue after a break.

Take care.

Maybe I did, or maybe I didn't. — Corvus

Ah, ok. For many people when they make a claim about another person, it actually matters to them if it was correct. It seems from what you write here, that you don't really care if what you said about Flannel Jesus was correct. Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't. People sometimes misquote. Which is, of course, true. Some who misquote and have this pointed out and have said negative things about someone based on that, think it is polite to see if that is the case, and perhaps retract what they said based on the misquote. Others don't care about such things.

Just wondering what your point is keep repeating the others' sayings word by word. — Corvus

That's a good thing to wonder about. I notice that for the second time you have referred to this instance as a pattern. That I do this with others' sayings. I did it with two things you said. I reassured you that my being critical of what you are doing here does not mean I think you can't write what you feel. Obviously, given your reaction it makes sense to specifically address your concern in your words. As far as the emotional volatility accusation you made It was not a saying, it was a judgment and not in the form of a saying. My aiming it back at you was to show how easy it is to claim that someone is being emotionally volatile. Rather than, for example, deal with some of the factual issues in that post. But, of course, you are free to ignore anything troublesome, just as you are free to not check to see if you misquoted Flannel Jesus. You're free to never show the logic book that showed your deductions were correct. You're free to claim you were always doing induction, despite the obvious deduction symbols you used. You're free to make up things about Flannel Jesus and me. You're free to do all sorts of things and I would defend your right to keep posting here, if the subject ever came up. If you want to move forward, well obviously you are free to move forward, whatever it says about your character.

I'll also move forward.

Well, I certainly used your words in that post back to you. But there's no pattern. You misquoted Flannel Jesus, based your 'discovery' of 'his confusion' of deduction and induction on that misquote and that's all easy to check.

I didn't know you didn't know even the difference between deductive and inductive cases in logic — Corvus

You misquoted him, and then you referred to this misquote as what led to your discovery he didn't understand. This was pointed out to you, and you seem to have opted not to actually check this. You seem emotionally volatile, but I do think you have the right to say what you feel is correct, even when you are this obviously confused or disingenuous.

There is not much helping people who don't want to understand. Descartes invited us in meditation by writing His. — Lionino

and viewed as a meditation or exploration it's very interesting. I'm certainly not critical of Corvus' behavior because he's skeptical about the cogito. I'm skeptical about the cogito. Though I'm not skeptical because denying the antecedent shows there's a problem or some of his jumping from deduction to induction and pretending he was using induction all along. I think the problem with the cogito is that it allows for an assumption, at least potenially of the 'I'. But this has been said by others and in greater detail. But I don't think that makes it useless or simply wrong. Someone needed to do what he did and it's easy to post-Descartes take shots at it.

Those who do that however, are not willing to face the consequences of their unbounded skepticism. Either they do so, or accept Descartes argument. But they want to have the cake and eat it. — Lionino

I think this is often true. Being unconvinced is safer ground than mounting arguments that demonstrate one's skepticism is correct. There's a lot of fruit of the poison tree in philosophy forums.

Though if we view these also as exploratory, they can be a fine part of a discussion.

Ah, yes, that was an amazing explanation. Even down the accuracy of the different ways that short sentence can be read, given its confused grammar.

I can say anything I feel correct
— Corvus

Projection, anyone.

Yes, i You need to read that post again. You just agreed with him, while saying it shows all these confusions on his part.

Here is a question for you. Is "I think therefore I am" a deductive or inductive statement? — Corvus

It is intended as deduction. It's not, I was thinking and hey, look I was also existing. Then I tracked many instance of thinking and existing was happening, so it's probable that they are connected causally or something like that.

Descartes was saying given that I am thinking this presumes I am. I could not think if I did not exist. It is part and part with ANY COGNITIVE ACTIVITY at all or any action on my part.

One can get into the issue of whether the 'I' is getting snuck into his deduction, but it is NOT deductive argument and 'therefore' is a term talking about logical inference and not at all suggesting that thinking leads ontologically to being. Nor is it asserting that thinking causes existence.

And if you thought it was about deduction why in goodness name did you spend so much time calling it Modus Ponens, which is deduction? And even when you finally acknowledged that it wasn't modus tollens, did you continue to write deduction symbolic logic rather than using inductive reasoning.

And then why would you go into Flannel Jesus's motives, when it is so clear that being not wrong has led you to the most circuitous avoidance and distractions now in two threads.

Someone else could potentially chastize FJ for pursuing this, but it makes not the slightest sense for you to.

Further, if he thinks you are wrong, but you can't see it or admit it, then the issue is not closed. He can continue to wonder (against great odds) if he missed something. And when asked, you can say whatever that is.

That whole line was just gaslighting.

The rigor is all in the J - the J is where all our confidence in the T comes from. — flannel jesus

Agreed. Which is close to the reason I think the T is superfluous and misleading.

If it's rigor we're looking for, then we should place a threshold on the minimum amount of J before we call it "knowledge". Which is probably what we do anyway, given we don't have access to a universal dictionary of objective truths. — flannel jesus

To me it works to add in 4 further letters and take out the T. (this is partly ironic since it's too many letters to be useful, but it reflects my thinking.
1) NF - not falsified
2) BE - best explanation (so far)

Giving us JNFBEB :grin:
Justified not falsified best explanation belief.

By best explanation I am leaving room for parsimony - there's no equally predictive explanation that has less newly posited entities. Possibly things like clarity, lack of ambiguity, fits with current models.

I think it is fine to refer to such things as knowledge and that we know it. Even though it may turn out later that we were incorrect. We can be fussy later and say we thought we knew, but we didn't, but really I think there's no need to do this. Knowledge changed.

We have no separate access to truth. Oh, that's well justified, not falsified, and.....testing......and it's true. I understand that the T is generally not looked at a step in the methodology of determining if something is knowledge. Like first we justify then we check the truth of X. But I think the label is misleading in that direction and in any case redundant in the present. If it is well justfied (and meets my other criteria) then there we don't need to somehow also thin of truth or true as an adjective. I think it's confusing to add the T.

And then we just have beliefs with varying levels of justification, and the ones with the most justification we call "knowledge" - and some of that knowledge is probably wrong. — flannel jesus

Agreed.

The JTB definition of knowledge involves belief, and we might say that it frames knowledge as a "form of belief": namely justified true belief, but it does not follow that it is nothing more than belief, because the 'justified' and the 'true', as conceived, have nothing to do with belief. — Janus

Sure, knowledge is a rigorously arrived at belief in JTB theories of truth.

Foremost, you can't know something if it is not true. This is how the grammar of "know" works. If you hold it to be true, but it isn't, then you only believe it, you don't know it. — Banno

Right. Notice you wrote this all in the present tense. I know you have a more nuanced understanding of this. But I just want to immediately mention that I am looking at what happens through time and what we know/think/have access to at any given moment.

It might be best to look at what I say in an overview...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/893764

Secondly, it is plain that there are true statements. This statement is true. So are the theorems of arithmetic and logic. That you are reading this is also true. — Banno

yes, I think you are still assuming that I think we can't know anything.

This works only in limited cases. Some counterexamples have already been given. Here's another: Supose you are playing Checkers and your opponent reaches over and moves one of your pieces - yo say "You can't move my pieces!" Would you accept their reply if it were "HA, but there you have it - I have falsified that rule: I can move your pieces!" — Banno

Of course not. But I think my response to you makes it clear that there are things we can know. You seem to be arguing that extreme skepticism is problematic. I agree, that's not my point at all. Of course, I could be wrong about what just happened, what my opponent just did, in the checkers game, but that's not what I'm arguing.

You seem to be taking what I said as saying that we cannot know anything and we should doubt everything, in practice. Yeah, that's not what I'm saying at all.

I am focus on having True as something in addition to justification. Like I check off the justification. I check to make sure it hasn't been falsified (so far). Then I check to see if it is true. Well, not. That's an non-real step and a non-real criterion. Which doesn't mean nothing is true. Nor does it mean I take a similar skeptical attitude to everything nor am I suggesting we throw up our hands and say we can't know anything. But this is in my previous posts.

If it still seems to you that I am saying these things, then we are talking past eachother.

Wl, yes. Sometimes folk get things wrong. They think they know stuff when they don't. And the only way this can happen is if they believe something that is not true.

So there is a difference between believing and knowing: If something is known, it is true. — Banno

Yes, I understand that. But I am talking about our in situ situation. Perhaps what we consider we know now may turn out not to be the case.

My suggestion is not that we can't know anything, but rather that adding that it is true, creates a problem. We work with it as if it is true. We have rigor in what we decide to consider knowledge. We don't add on to it being well justified and not (yet) falsified that it is also true.

Folk think it cleaver to say that we don't know anything. The implication is that there are no facts. That leads to all sorts of inconsistencies. — Banno

Was this directed at me? Is that what you think I am saying and also are you saying I think I am clever?

I distinguish between knowing and believing. I distinguish between belief and knowledge. I use know and knowledge and mean something different than (to merely) believe and (mere)
belief, considering the former terms rigorously arrived

You can't "realise your error" unless there is error. Error occurs when you believe something that is not true. For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Right, but I am looking at the now situation. The now situation means that where there does not seem to be an error, there may be an error. We don't know, if we are adding true to the criteria, if it will remain true. Now. Saying something is well justified and not falsified I get. And I think calling those things knowledge is useful. But then to add that it is also true I think is hubris. I treat those things as true. I work with them as true or working, but I have no extra step where I justify X according to a rigorous methodolgy and/or note that others have, check to see if somewhere it has been falsified, and then I make the check to see it is true step. So far it is not false. So far it is working better than anything else.

For you to occasionally be wrong, you must also sometimes be right. — Banno

Sure.

Knowledge consists of truths or not-yet-falsified claims the statuses of which are independent of dis/belief. — 180 Proof

I'm down with the first part, but I'm not sure what you mean by the second part.
And, of course, things that get falsified might end up later being resurrected.

You only know stuff that's true. — Banno

Then can one know whether one knows things, given potential revision.

We have our rigorous criteria, decide we know X. But later we may realize errors or get new data and then we know X is false. Did we falsely think we knew before?

And if we didn't know before, then our knowledge now might not be knowledge. So, is it ok to say we know, knowing we may in fact not know?

I think there is a valid distinction between knowledge and belief, — Janus

The former is a subset of the latter. Different people/groups have different reasons for saying this batch of beliefs over here, they've got promise or they sure seem to be working so far or they fit X and Y really well and those over there don't fit it so well and those over there we can't make sense of to even tell.

The T in JTB is kinda awkward. If someone says they believe something, they're already saying they think it's true. — flannel jesus

I think better would be: not demonstrated false - by some well justified argument. JNFB

It can't go unnoticed how various people "know" things that contradict what other people "know" as well. — flannel jesus

It also can't get noticed that some things we consider - pretty much regardless of group - that we know now, we later realize we were wrong about, and this includes in the history of science.

The creation of this thread is motivated by a claim made by Chet Hawkins:

Knowledge is only belief.
— Chet Hawkins — Janus

This is a bit like saying Magnus Carlsen's chess games are chess games. Well, yes. But ithey are rigorously arrived at games, showing great skill. Chess isn't particular about something else. But in the game of believing, the beliefs are about things. They lead to useful activities and skills applicable to all fields of life, or they don't.

I think it is good to realize that knowledge is form of belief. I think that adds a note of humility. What we are sure is true today may be overturned.

But the word 'only' can be misleading. All beliefs are the same and what people call knowledge is no better than any other belief, might be the conclusion/implication.

Some methodologies are better than others.

If this persons truth-discovering tools like reason and logic are compromised in such a way, how could this person *discover the truth* that his truth-discovering (or filtering instead of discovering, if you prefer) tools are compromised and unrelaible? — flannel jesus

I thought I'd revisit this and made a list off the top of my head of terms that have to do with reasoning. Processes/functions that need to work well or you may have a problem with reasoning. These are not distinct categories; they overlap.

Some of the ones that I think account for bad reasoning (in all of us, at some point, and in certain people regularly). I just bolded the last three and these three also overlap. I think when people are bad at reasoning it is often these three functions that are not up to snuff. You need have the ability to notice small cues in yourself that you might be wrong. IOW I think people often get signals from themselves that they are not sure - when presenting as sure - or the nagging sense that something might be off, but these signals get ignored. It's not just that we can't take criticism from others or recognize the validity of other perspectives, but we actually don't listen to ourselves. We don't want to. If we don't want to because it hurts - to consider we might be wrong on a particular issue or ever - then we lack grit in the face of cognitive dissonance. We can't sit with those uncomfortable feelings. We want to win, make those go away, be right, period. If we're not aware of what our feelings think are at stake, we won't be vigilant about such cues. If we're not aware of past biases or interpersonal habits we have, we may converse with poor reasoning. That's some floppy muling over those last few terms which we might not think of as involved in poor reasoning. Oh, he doesn't understand logic or deduction or whatever. That's certainly an issue with people. But in general I think if we encounter someone with bad reasoning, there's only a real problem if those last three items are weak.


Critical Thinking
Logical Reasoning
Problem-Solving
Decision Making
Analytical Thinking
Inductive Reasoning
Deductive Reasoning
Cognitive Flexibility
Meta-cognition
Introspection
Grit in the face of Cognitive Dissonance.

hey! Who's been driving my car!? — flannel jesus

After a week of mulling I decided I was time travelling. Which makes sense since it was a week later. Or as I put it to myself 'therefore I am a time traveler.' If I hadn't noticed the hood, I wouldn't have been a time traveler.

It seems as though, with our one example of this situation on this forum, one has to be willing to see contradictions before one is able to see contradictions. Our one test example on the forum, when faced with the contradiction, can just will themselves out of seeing it — flannel jesus

So, then: can one be bad at reason and be willing to see contradictions. I would say yes. Unless we take 'bad at reasoning' to mean one never draws correct conclusions. But one could draw the conclusion that it would be good to notice contradictions as the result of bad reasoning. Like 'I've never seen Angelin Jolie where she was clearly not noticing Contradictions' 'Therefore she is good at noticing contradictions' Everyone should be like Angelina Jolie' Therefore I will look for contradictions. And so they do look and find and slowly realize that while their original reasoning for deciding this was not perfect, they're glad they decided to look for and notice contradictions.

Then we have to ask ourselves if someone can notice with utterly terrible reasoning. Well, it depends how terrible is terrible.

The hood of my car gets warm when I drive the car and this lasts for 10 minutes. I didn't drive my car in the last hour so it is not warm now.

Goes outside in the 98 degree heat to his car parked in the sun and notices the hood is warm, but he hasn't driven the car for weeks. Suddenly, I think some percentage of bad reasoners will recognize a problem. Not all, clearly, but some.

↪Bylaw I wonder why you chose Korean specifically. But take a look at this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857740 — Lionino

I searched his posts for something else and found him saying he was Korean. So, I did a bit of research to see if 'therefore' might cause problems for a native Korean speaker. And lo......

in a post in response to you in fact...

I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.

and it clearly includes the definition about introducing a logical conclusion. — flannel jesus

Yes, exactly. Yes, it can be used in other ways, but here it is not
first part of sentence comes earlier in time ontologically than what is mentioned in the second part.
Any chronological is about one being able, when one notes the first, to conclude that the second was also present at the time of the thinking.

It's a basic misinterpretation of therefore in this context. Discussions by philosophers of the cogito will show that they all get this and interpret therefore and donc in a way different from Corvus. Corvus is a non-native speaker. In his language it is easy to mistranslate therefore to a words that has the meaning he projects on to the English word (and the French word also). There is another way to translate it into Korean that is better, and so on.

Instead of for one second considering he might be misinterpreting the term and exploring that for a bit, he accuses me of leading everything into nonsense.

I gather that he is making mistakes in symbolic logic also, but that's not something I'm as familiar with.

I just found this so galling...

You totally distorted the meaning of the word "Therefore" in your claims. Therefore means by the result of, for that reason, consequently. Therefore it has implications of chronology and cause and effect transformation for the antecedent being the past, or cause, and the descendant to imply the result, consequence and effect.

If you deny that standard meaning, then you are denying the general principle of linguistic semantics. And that is what you have done to mislead the argument and further present the nonsense.

I mean, this is precisely an error a native speaker of Korean can make. It's easily forgivable that he makes that mistake. It's easy to find out this is a problem coming from Korean, and that there are two words used to translate 'therefore' one much closer to this use in the English cogito (and also donc in the French version). Several different native speakers are telling him he is misunderstanding the word. And when it's pointed out he tells me I am not using the standard definition. Well, there are a few ways to use 'therefore' in English.
Just for thoroughnessI'll like to what you're responding to of mine: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/892205 and which you linked to.

Earlier he told Flannel Jesus that he could look in any logic textbook and find that his denying the antecendent was correct. Yet recently he chided Banno for citing logic books. And he never got around to showing us how his logic book said he was correct. But when a logic work (supposedly) supported his position, it was fine to point this out. (though never to get around showing us that it did). I don't understand the language. Banno doesn't understand the difference between truth and validity. Flannel Jesus doesn't understand....and on and on.

I do often wonder how conscious people are of what they seem to be avoiding admitting (to themselves? to us?) that maybe, just maybe other people might have a point. Conscious or not I think there are dozens of examples of disingenousness in this thread.

To backseat drive a bit: I think a key area is the 'you don't know how to apply logic to specific cases and I do.' My wording, perhaps unfair, of something I have seen Corvus assert a number of times. I think that needs to be explored. Is he saying that the rule is being misapplied when it comes to the cogito? Why there? Also, it seems sometimes like a concession that his rule isn't a rule, and we can't use it in general, but in the case of the cogito it is, according to him, a good argument against it AND it is appropriate given the nature of the nouns involved. However, at other times it seems like a rule considered fallacious in logic is being argued by him as universally correct. Teasing out what is going on there seems like a core issue. Perhaps a period of just asking after clarification and greater explication would be useful. IOW intead of objections to what seems fallacious, piece by piece, accepting for the moment such things as information about his position and then asking a lot of questions: are you saying this holds in all cases? Are there examples where this is not the case? You've said I/we don't understand why the cogito in particular is problematic and so this rule of logic applies. Could you give other examples? What is the rule for these examples that makes them exceptions or the criteria? And so on. Likely my backseat driving is based on missing where this has been done and is unwarrented. But given how intractable the disagreement has been so far, I thought I'd throw out a suggestion. Apologies in advance for all the ways this is obnoxious and likely underinformed - and yet I am doing it anyway, knowing this, which is even worse on may part.:joke:

Yes, why do the epiphenomenologists talk about consciousness? Because they noticed they had subjective experience. They mulled this over and they started talking about it. If it could lead to any causes of physical things they we need a reason why their lips or fingers started moving in those ways to communicate about consciousness. It seems to me also, though I haven't fully worked this out, that we shouldn't believe in other minds if we are epiphenomenologists. We could well believe in other cognitive functions, but not that there are other experiencers. Otherwise the experiencing of our own set of qualia was used to decide other people have this stuff also.

I can see someone arguing that we would, like robots, do the same things. We just have this internal witness. But the problem for me is, we sure talk about subjective experience, consciousness, qualia. So, in some way the fact of experiencing is in the domino chains just like everything else. It isn't epi. It seems like it has to be a substance dualism. But why does it ever come up in conversation. That other substance is necessarily causal. Perhaps it has nothing to do with causing actions, but it sure causes our noticing it which then causes us to talk about it, which then is an action. We don't have locked in syndrome.

The word “therefore” can be a source of confusion, especially when translating philosophical or logical statements.
Causal Interpretation:
In English, “therefore” is a logical connective that indicates a conclusion drawn from preceding premises.
However, in Korean, the equivalent word “그러므로” (geureom-eoro) can sometimes be interpreted more causally or chronologically.
Korean speakers might associate it with a cause-and-effect relationship, even though the intended meaning is more about logical inference.
Context Matters:
The context in which “therefore” appears plays a crucial role.
Philosophical discussions often involve nuanced reasoning, and the precise meaning depends on the overall context and philosophical background.
Alternative Translations:
To emphasize the logical aspect, one could use alternative translations like “결론적으로” (gyeollonjeog-eulo), which directly means “conclusively.”
Using “그래서” (geulaeseo) is another option, which is less causal and more focused on the logical connection.

Or it could just be a coincidence that the native speakers here are pointing out thattherefore is being taken by Corvus as causal and chronological, when in fact this is not the case, AND this is real possibility for native speakers of Korean to take the word in those incorrect ways.

My hypothesis is that it's a language issue. Somewhere back in time he or she mentioned he or she was not a native speaker.
I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.
Why he or she didn't mention this when it was pointed out how 'therefore' was being interpreted i this thread, I have no idea. I realize that the parallel error is happening in the symbolic logic, but perhaps it is inspired by not really getting 'therefore' (which can be used a few ways), as somewhat tricky word in a second language.

Pages 20 to 30 of this very thread would blow your mind. — Lionino

I avoided parts of this thread to prevent that.

To be fair, 'therefore' is a tricky word with a few different uses. And both the English and French versions of the cogito are very concise: the French extremely so. So, this can create some ambiguity if one just focuses on the single sentence without the context, especially for non-native speakers.

yeah of course, I misunderstood your previous post. — flannel jesus

I think I communicated poorly. Sometimes when I'm being ironic or start ironic I end up saying things I do not intend.

Yeah, which would make it VERY puzzling why philosophers as a group like the cogito very much. Obviously it doesn't mean that - if it did, that would be the FIRST counter argument you hear against it when you look for what people think about it - rather than some obscure counter you've only ever heard once in your life, from a guy who thinks fallacies are valid deductions. — flannel jesus

Yes. Instead of saying Hey, that's isn't as self-evident as it seems it'd be
Hey, how the hell did he think that was self-evident at all?

In philosophy it might well be worth exploring and Idealists, at least some of them might be saying that in some way. But it's not what Descartes was saying.

Do a lot of other philosophers think that? What do they think "therefore" means? — flannel jesus

Oh, well, in the cogito they all think it means 'so I can conclude' or 'so it must be the case that'. And why, well, the idea is that because if you are doing something, you need to exist, it's built in. It is not, dear Jesus, well you also Flannel Jesus, saying that thinking causes existence. It is not saying that if we have thinking, then later we will have existing. It's not saying that. I find it miraculous that this even needs to be said. The chronology is in the though process of the philosopher thinking about thinking and existence.

And I do not mean the cogito is right because it says this. I just find it miraculous that it is contentious what was intended by donc/therefore.

If it didn't mean that, then it would mean that Descartes' conclusion included the idea that one could think while not existing, at least for a moment - if it was chronological or causal
the left of the cogito causing that which is on the right in the cogito.

And you just ain't gonna find anybody, including Descartes saying that's what he was saying.

We could, of course, skip the middleman (in this case) of Descartes and forget donc, forget therefore and just ask each other do you think that one mus exist if one is thinking. Or to put it the other way. Could something that does not exist think? That's what D decided was self-evidently not the case.

For me to tricky part is what exists, not so much that existing/thinking is going on.

I've been thinking about the issue, or, at least, there's seems to be thinking occuring, but I don't exist, so I've decided not to participate any more in the discussion, given that ontological 'I' can't.

I mean, seriously, who am 'I' to weigh in and say that 'therefore' does not mean 'which causes' in the cogito if I don't exist.

And all the philosophers who think that Descartes meant a different 'therefore' suffer the same ontological absence. I am suffering this absence, but I am not.

Therefore can imply chronology, but it need not and it certainly doesn't there. And it is often used in the sense Descartes meant, and all those who focus on the English version, that we can conclude that GIVEN I think I also am. The am may well come before, but it is a necessary condition, at the very least for thinking.
And only very rare individuals who have a very fixed reading of therefore think it usually or there means chronology.
And I doubt there is a single published philosopher who took it in the sense you mean.
I don't agree with the cogito, but your interpretation of it is incorrect. It's not claiming that thinking causes or leads to existence or is prior to it.
But if you can find some philosopher discussing it in that way, let us know. They'd still be in a very tiny, tiny minority, but it'd be fascinating.

Let me repeat again that I disagree with the cogito, but I think there is something you are misinterpreting about it. I think you are treating sentence order as chronology and interpreting 'therefore' as meaning causes/is prior to. When in fact if anything it means the opposite, but actually is not that kind of ontological term. It means, 'so, given that [what came before the word therefore[ is occuring that which [comes after the word 'therefore'] must also be happening

Existence comes first. Logically, and ontologically. — Corvus

This is exactly what the cogito is asserting.

Then he should have said, "I exist, therefore I think." He obviously misunderstood something.
He put the cart in front of a horse.

Sum, ergo cogito, makes sense. But it doesn't say anything new or exciting, does it?

If you do what you suggest here, you are actually arguing in favor of panpsychism. That which exists can then think.

There's a fundamental misinterpretation of what the word order of the sentence is saying about chronology and ontological necessity.

I think, therefore I am.

Does not in anyway say that thinking leads to existence or is a necessary precursor or facet of existence. If anything the opposite. But it is not focused on chronology.

And I think you are reading that sentence as indicating chronology. And again when you say.....

Existence comes first. Logically, and ontologically

You support the cogito.

And then I will reword this:
It seems to me you read the cogito as indicating via word order and the word 'therefore' that thinking is prior to existence. But that's not what the word order or 'therefore' indicates. In fact it's a misread of 'therefore.' Therefore means 'I get to conclude that something else is also true and, if anything was true before 'I think' occurred. It's not asserting this. The two processes could be simultaneous, for example. But it is not asserting precursion nor causation. And it is not saying the stuff in the beginning of the sentence causes the stuff in the second part.

Therefore could indicate that kind of chronology IF!!! there was future tense in the second part.

It is raining, therefore I will get wet (when I go out). But without 'will', it is not that kind of word.

When you reverse the cogito

I am, therefore I think.

You are actually doing what you complain about. Making existence dependent on thinking.

It indicates a process of thought not a proces of causation or chronology. The detective's thought process, not the scientists proclamation of causation and order in time.

So, again, I think you misunderstand 'therefore' and are confusing word order with a diagram of events in time.