Basically it tells me that I have no moral blame if - say - I forget the gas on and there's a big explosion and many people die. — Agustino

Correct. I see nothing absurd about this. You are at fault, may have to pay damages, etc, but not morally at fault. If there was no malicious intent to kill people, then you've done nothing morally wrong.

I say to you, Agustino, that if you and I were building a house, and you accidentally slipped while holding an electric saw that then flew out of your hands and wounded me in some way, I would hold you responsible, but not morally responsible. I would demand nothing of you. I wouldn't say that you had committed evil. I wouldn't say that you yourself are evil. I would simply say, "It's okay, Agustino, I know you didn't intend to hurt me. I'm sorry you tripped, which caused me to be wounded. Think nothing of it."

To be held morally responsible for things one doesn't intend is an inversion of justice and precisely what postmodernist leftists peddle all the time. It is to be guilty before proven innocent. To say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to make everyone a moral monster. The only logical conclusion is to isolate oneself in a grass hut, far away from the material consumption and human interaction that cannot but implicate one in evil without one intending to. That is the only way to be moral on your account.

It doesn't follow that the action is not immoral, since that would be simply to presuppose that morality consists in not intending evil. — Agustino

But I think it does. Remember that I asked you why you chose the criteria you did, to which you merely repeated yourself. If you get to presuppose your position, then I get to presuppose mine.

For ourselves. Yes, we can. Because we are ethically free. Hence the value of that freedom. — Mariner

:s No, not just for myself, for everyone. I do share the idea of happiness/eudaimonia expressed in the video I linked you by Adler, namely that happiness/eudaimonia is the same for all human beings.

Now it's true that for action X to be moral it must be freely embraced, so in that regard freedom is important. So in other words, I cannot desire that other people are moral without desiring that they are free, but freedom alone is not sufficient for morality.

No, not just for myself, for everyone. — Agustino

You can think they are for everyone, but people may disagree with you. Because they are free. And you must cherish this ability that they have, of disagreeing with you even when you are right, because a world without that freedom would be horrible beyond imagination.

The idea that reason can guide us towards finding the right action is an idea I agree with. But my agreement does not make it right.

There is a subtle point here that I'm not sure you are grasping. There are distinctions between (a) X being the right action, (b) M thinking that X is the right action, and (c) M being justified in thinking that X is the right action. The locus of ethical freedom is (b). But you keep on pointing to (a) and (c).

because a world without that freedom would be horrible beyond imagination — Mariner

Out of curiosity, why?

I say to you, Agustino, that if you and I were building a house, and you accidentally slipped while holding an electric saw that then flew out of your hands and wounded me in some way, I would hold you responsible, but not morally responsible. I would demand nothing of you. I wouldn't say that you had committed evil. I wouldn't say that you yourself are evil. I would simply say, "It's okay, Agustino, I know you didn't intend to hurt me. I'm sorry you tripped, which caused me to be wounded. Think nothing of it." — Thorongil

Okay, first of all, I don't think this example is the same as the one I gave. It's one thing if an incident that ends up harming someone happens by accident, and another if it happens by negligence. If I leave my child on the side of the balcony while I go grab a beer from the fridge, and my child unknowingly pushes him/herself over the edge and dies, then I am morally blameworthy for that, even if I didn't intend it, because I was negligent with him or her and didn't perform my duty as a parent (by the way, this story that I told you is a true story, it happened to one of my friends' dad).

To be held morally responsible for things one doesn't intend is an inversion of justice and precisely what postmodernist leftists peddle all the time. It is to be guilty before proven innocent. To say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to make everyone a moral monster. The only logical conclusion is to isolate oneself in a grass hut, far away from the material consumption and human interaction that cannot but implicate one in evil without one intending to. That is the only way to be moral on your account. — Thorongil

To say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to understand that intention isn't the only factor at play. Yes it is a factor, a very important one, but not the only one. Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what?

In a nutshell, because the freedom to search for the right ethical values is the freedom to search for God. Without this freedom, man's happiness would not be anchored on God's love (as it is in our world). It [happiness] would be exterior, and dead.

If I leave my child on the side of the balcony while I go grab a beer from the fridge, and my child unknowingly pushes him/herself over the edge and dies, then I am morally blameworthy for that — Agustino

Blameworthy and negligent, yes, undoubtedly, but not morally so. I'm still missing the reason why it is the latter.

o say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to understand that intention isn't the only factor at play. Yes it is a factor, a very important one, but not the only one. Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what? — Agustino

The problem is that your position is arbitrary. How do we determine which factor is the one to use to confer moral blame in a given scenario?

Blameworthy — Thorongil

Can a stone be blameworthy? Can an animal be blameworthy? Or is it only moral agents that can be blameworthy?

How do we determine which factor is the one to use to confer moral blame in a given scenario? — Thorongil

All the four I've listed will be relevant, some more-so than others. But you still avoided to answer my question.

Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what? — Agustino

Can a stone be blameworthy? Can an animal be blameworthy? Or is it only moral agents that can be blameworthy? — Agustino

I distinguished between moral blame, which is to assign moral responsibility, and simply blame, which is to assign causal responsibility.

Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what? — Agustino

This question doesn't affect my position at all, so I ignored it. I'm here to defend what I take to be moral, not what qualifies as imprisonment-worthy.

I distinguished between moral blame, which is to assign moral responsibility, and simply blame, which is to assign causal responsibility. — Thorongil

So then O:) - a stone that falls from the rooftop on someone's head has "simple" blame? :D

This question doesn't affect my position at all, so I ignored it. I'm here to defend what I take to be moral, not what qualifies as imprisonment-worthy. — Thorongil

Do you hold that there are situations when we should imprison people based on factors that are NOT also immoral in nature?

So then O:) - a stone that falls from the rooftop on someone's head has "simple" blame? :D — Agustino

Yes, in the sense of being the cause of the event. The stone is responsible for it, but it isn't morally responsible, clearly.

Do you hold that there are situations when we should imprison people based on factors that are NOT also immoral in nature? — Agustino

I think there may be prudential and admonitory reasons for prison sentences in the absence of moral culpability. However, I also think such sentences can be gratuitous as forms of punishment. I would probably prefer sentences of community service or some form of charitable work instead.

Having answered your question, I still feel it's a red herring and would like us to stick to the topic at hand.

"Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what?"

I agree with Thorongil
Anyway, it is simple reason and fact to know that someone who is blameworthy because of having caused something bad without having done something immoral per se, often has a much greater tendency to learn something, benefit from and accept a sentence to prison or something similar(because he knows he has for example been neglient and thereby been the indirect cause of something horrible) than someone who has intentionally done something horrible. Why? Because of the difference of the attitude towards the one and the other from the judges.

I think there may be prudential and admonitory reasons for prison sentences in the absence of moral culpability. However, I also think such sentences can be gratuitous as forms of punishment. I would probably prefer sentences of community service or some form of charitable work instead. — Thorongil

This is a very important subject. You are aware that this is not the position of either the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox church with regards to morality right?

There are many problems with the view that good and evil are mere matters of simple intention. For example, what if someone authentically thinks that killing you will do you good because it would send you to heaven for example? If they try and kill you, then they intend to do good (even if they're wrong) no? According to you, they have done nothing wrong (morally) by killing you, since they intended to do good.

There is a saying out there - "the road to hell is paved with good intentions".

Morality cannot be a mere matter of intention. Intention is only a matter of the will, but the will doesn't act independently from the intellect. If the intellect thinks X is good, then the will will pursue X. But that judgement can be mistaken, so the will can pursue evil while intending to pursue good. Thus, mere intention is not sufficient to give an account for morality.

If the stone is as blameworthy as the individual who - by negligence - drops a hammer onto his co-worker's head, based on what considerations do we put one in prison, and we don't do anything to the other?

You are aware that this is not the position of either the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox church with regards to morality right? — Agustino

No. Show me.

There are many problems with the view that good and evil are mere matters of simple intention. For example, what if someone authentically thinks that killing you will do you good because it would send you to heaven for example? If they try and kill you, then they intend to do good (even if they're wrong) no? According to you, they have done nothing wrong (morally) by killing you, since they intended to do good. — Agustino

No, examples like these don't affect my position. One can be mistaken about what constitutes a good intention, such that even if one thinks that one's intentions are good, they may not be.

There is a saying out there - "the road to hell is paved with good intentions". — Agustino

An asinine saying. If good intentions lead one to hell, then do bad intentions lead one to heaven? If they were truly good, they couldn't lead one to hell.

If the intellect thinks X is good, then the will will pursue X. But that judgement can be mistaken, so the will can pursue evil while intending to pursue good. Thus, mere intention is not sufficient to give an account for morality. — Agustino

You've partially made my point here. To finish it, I would add that the fact that one can be mistaken about the good doesn't mean there isn't the objectively good for one to intend.

If the stone is as blameworthy as the individual who - by negligence - drops a hammer onto his co-worker's head, based on what considerations do we put one in prison, and we don't do anything to the other? — Agustino

I literally just answered a previous iteration of this question. In fact, your post quotes the answer I gave you.

Christ says quite clearly though that if you say you don't know, that is, it you dont know, you are without sin(without blame in this case), but if you say you KNOW, your sin remains.

"You are aware that this is not the position of either the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox church with regards to morality right?"

Is Dostoevsky 's view on morality Orthodox? If so, then this statement is either false or a lie. Unless Dostoevsky's view is ''heretical''

No. Show me. — Thorongil

https://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=1033639
https://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=325189
https://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=198249

If good intentions lead one to hell, then do bad intentions lead one to heaven? If they were truly good, they couldn't lead one to hell. — Thorongil

Well don't you think it's possible to have a good intention, and - for example - because of lack of knowledge produce a terrible result? In that case, would your good intention (say - your desire to save someone from death) morally excuse the results you have produced?

To finish it, I would add that the fact that one can be mistaken about the good doesn't mean there isn't the objectively good for one to intend. — Thorongil

Yeah, of course, I agree there is an objective good, HOWEVER, my point is that in striving to reach for that objective good you may fall into something that is immoral, due to various factors. That would still count as a sin.

I really encourage you to have a look at those links, and let me know what you think. You can share your thoughts in private if you don't want to derail the thread further down this route! (Y)

Is Dostoevsky 's view on morality Orthodox? — Beebert

Does Dostoevsky's view on morality represent the Orthodox Church? No. That, however, doesn't mean that it's heretical.

So then we are back to square one? Using your argument about the view of the churches doesnt prove anything?

Using your argument about the view of the churches doesnt prove anything? — Beebert

Well, I started out by saying that the view with regards to morality that Thorongil expounds here is quite similar to Kantian deontological ethics, and that's not the view adopted by the Church. The Church adopts virtue ethics instead. And in virtue ethics, having good intentions isn't sufficient to be moral.

Correct me if I am wrong, but as far as I know, your Church does NOT adopt virtue ethics. Perhaps it does in practice, but it simply hasnt defined it. What you seem to talk about is the catholic church.

Correct me if I am wrong, but as far as I know, your Church does NOT adopt virtue ethics. Perhaps it does in practice, but it simply hasnt defined it. What you seem to talk about is the catholic church. — Beebert

I think for the most part it does. Why would you say it doesn't?

Remember that the East seems to have had access to Aristotle's works earlier than the Catholics. However, it's less spoken of in Orthodoxy (where other things are emphasised) than in Catholicism since Orthodoxy isn't a Scholastic religion :P

Look at the greek fathers though. It was almost exclusively Platon that influenced them, not Aristotle. Aristotle came with Aquinas and others thanks to the arabs.

Look at the greek fathers though. It was almost exclusively Platon that influenced them, not Aristotle. Aristotle came with Aquinas and others thanks to the arabs — Beebert

And Plato's ethics isn't virtue ethics? :s

By the way, a solid argument can be made for Aquinas being much more of a Neo-platonist than a Aristotelian. The neo-platonists had, for the most part, absorbed Aristotle.

Those links don't exactly help in settling the claim you made. I would want an official church document of some kind.

Well don't you think it's possible to have a good intention, and - for example - because of lack of knowledge produce a terrible result? — Agustino

Of course.

In that case, would your good intention (say - your desire to save someone from death) morally excuse the results you have produced? — Agustino

They would morally excuse the individual performing the action.

Yeah, of course, I agree there is an objective good, HOWEVER, my point is that in striving to reach for that objective good you may fall into something that is immoral, due to various factors. That would still count as a sin. — Agustino

What makes something immoral? If you reply by saying, "that which is contrary to God," as one of the other forum's posts you linked says, then that assumes the truth of theism, which I have not done in this particular conversation.

The orthodox Church doesnt talk about virtue ethics, as far as I know, that is my Point. I would like you to show me if they do.

Also, I know what you mean about Aquinas, but his theology/philosophy, just like most other early theologians are also influenced too much by Athens, whether it is Plato or Aristotle, and thereby their theology is dependent upon their time in many ways it seems to me. Catholic thinkers and theologians of to day take their inspiration from different thinkers like Aquinas, Eckhart, Kant, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and even Nietzsche and Feuerbach. In the East, we see that the great russian religous renaissance was inspired by mainly Dostoevsky and Solovyev, but also Kant and Nietzsche(and Plato to some extent).

In the East, we see that the great russian religous renaissance was inspired by mainly Dostoevsky and Solovyev, but also Kant and Nietzsche(and Plato to some extent). — Beebert

I think Solovyev was the most important figure but he was very much influenced by Platonism (a system of thought which includes virtue ethics).

From Wikipedia:

In his The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists, Solovyov discredited the positivists' rejection of Aristotle's essentialism, or philosophical realism. In Against the Postivists, he took the position of intuitive noetic comprehension, or insight.

It's true that the Orthodox don't speak as much about ethics or philosophy as the Cathloics, but that's not to say it isn't there.

Those links don't exactly help in settling the claim you made. I would want an official church document of some kind. — Thorongil

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm - especially articles 3 & 10 (circumstance/context/consequences matter)
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2019.htm#article1 - especially articles 1 & 2 (intention matters)

You can't get more specific than this since the Catholic church doesn't have ONE philosophy only.

Those links don't exactly help in settling the claim you made. I would want an official church document of some kind. — Thorongil

Also, if you want the Catechism:

The morality of human acts depends on: — the object chosen; — the end in view or the intention; — the circumstances of the action. The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the ‘sources,’ or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

Of course. — Thorongil

Right, so in that case, intention alone wouldn't be sufficient to decide on good or evil, no?