I think you've possibly misunderstood what's happening here.
— flannel jesus
Always possible. Can you make it clear in one or two clear sentences? — tim wood

That's much too opaque for me, sorry. I try to read between those lines, but I don't see anything. Can you spell out for me what you're trying to get at?

I replied to your request already: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/975134
If you're not just repeating the same request, I don't know what you're doing.

Why is it so common that people think that, pretty much -by definition-, libertarian free will means incompatibilist free will?

-edit- I even see Stanford Encyclopedia saying the same thing. — flannel jesus

In a nutshell: because people today - both academic and otherwise - have been habituated into believing that determinacy can only apply to a conflux of material causation / determinacy and efficient causation / determinacy - this to the necessary exclusion of teleological causation / determincay and formal causation / determinacy. But this is patently wrong.

To anyone who believes that it is not patently wrong to so exclude, please logically evidence how the latter two types of causes / determinacy must be logical impossibilities within metaphysics at large (or at least point to someone who so logically evidences).

I don't see why you think they're excluding goal-based determining factors. There's nothing, not one iota as far as I can see, of these definitions of determinism that makes it all about material causation or precludes all non-material causal factors.

Yes it's true that many individual determinists are also materialists/physicalists, but that doesn't mean the *definition* of determinism is so tight.

Don't now have time to look for more in depth references. There's this for starters.

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.[1]

Both formal causation and teleological causation directly contradict this proposition. Why? To express it briefly, and I acknowledge imperfectly: Because if these two forms of causation do occur, then some things are necessarily determined by determinants other than (efficient) causes per se. This such that some efficiently causal chains, or webs, can be (or at least in certain metaphysics can be viably upheld to be) altered via the two alternative forms of causation that are excluded. Which would then annul determinism (as it is specified in the quote). (Whereas material causes can be accordant to determinism as just specified.)

Most of today's compatibilitsts are so called soft-determinists. They uphold the determinism specified in the quote and further interpret "free will" in non-libertarian manners to conclude that there is compatibility between determinism and free will.

Therefore, most (at the very least I as one exception) will then conclude that libertarianism necessitates an incompatibility between libertarianism and determinacy - this on grounds of today's compatibilitsts being in fact determinists (who, again, reject the very possibility of both formal causation and teleological causation, basically to uphold the coherency of determinism thus understood as fully constituted of events made fully inevitable by efficient causes).

Both formal causation and teleological causation directly contradict this proposition. Why? To express it briefly, and I acknowledge imperfectly: Because if these two forms of causation do occur, then some things are necessarily determined by determinants other than (efficient) causes per se. — javra

I don't see why you think that quote excludes those types of causation. It certainly doesn't look like those types of causation are explicitly excluded. It doesn't specify any specific types of causation at all, in fact. Seems like it allows for any type of causation you can imagine.

Oh, shucks. I provided reasoning for what I upheld and yet uphold.

Go to the Wikipedia website linked to and click on the term "causally" and you will indeed see for yourself that it does strictly address efficient causes (wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect - this is not the case in either teleological causes or formal causes (in both of the latter, the determinant occurs, and can only occur, at the same time as that determined).

I think you're interpreting those words as narrowly as you can, so as to exclude the types of causes you're interested in. I don't interpret them so narrowly.

The last sentence of the first paragraph on the "causally" page is a nice entry point for non efficient causes, if I'm reading and understanding correctly.

The cause of something may also be described as the reason for the event or process.

Are teleological and formal causes the *reason* why some things happen? If so, they are not excluded from what I would consider to be a properly generalized concept of determinism.

Man, read the first two sentences of the second paragraph

In general, a process can have multiple causes,[1] which are also said to be causal factors for it, and all lie in its past. An effect can in turn be a cause of, or causal factor for, many other effects, which all lie in its future.

and then read the last sentence of the third paragraph:

Of Aristotle's four explanatory modes, the one nearest to the concerns of the present article is the "efficient" one.

And then reread what I previously said. (I feel like I'm spoon-feeding, and I don't like doing so.)

If you then still disagree, give some reasoning or references for so disagreeing. Please.

Are teleological and formal causes the *reason* why some things happen? — flannel jesus

They are merely "reasons" when one denies their ontological occurrence as determinants. And, once again, if they are ontologically occurring determinants, then determinism (as expressed in my linked to quote) fails.

an extremely unnecessarily narrow view of determinism fails, perhaps.

an extremely unnecessarily narrow view of determinism fails, perhaps. — flannel jesus

OK. I'll nevertheless repeat myself once again, if teleological causes and formal causes ontically occur, then one cannot logically maintain that everything is causally inevitable. Period.

So this broader view of determinism is not what is referred to by the term in today's philosophical literature. This broader view of determinism is instead logically contrary to it: thereby, in today's lingo, being in fact an in-(non)-deterministic metaphysics.

this conservation started with you saying

liberarianism is not necessarily a subcategory of incompatibalsim

and you used yourself and your beliefs regarding teleological causation as an example, going as far as to call yourself a "libertarian compatibilist"

but now we've come full circle and you're now saying that your particular brand of libertarian free will IS in fact incompatibilist.

but now we've come full circle and you're not saying that your particular brand of libertarian free will IS in fact incompatibilist. — flannel jesus

No. Please take the time to read what I post, as in this post here.

That initial post says it better, but to recap: libertarian free will can be an indeterminsim (as per the official meaning of the term "determinism" today in philosophical circles - with "indeterminism" then basically saying that at least some things are not causally inevitable) that is nevertheless compatible with determinacy (determinants and that which they determine). Ergo, libertarian compatibilism (for otherwise it would be soft-determinism compatibilism, which denies the possibility of libertarian free will).

After all, in a number of agentially libertarian forms of free will, the agent of itself is the efficient cause of the decision taken as effect - such that, despite potentially being influenced this way and that, it as cause to the decision as effect is at that juncture not predetermined in what it will decide by any other cause whatsoever. It's not determinism (everything is causally inevitable), but it is of itself a form of determiniacy - thereby fully compatible with a cosmos composed of determinants (again, of the four Aristotelian kinds).

Maybe you are confusing "indeterminism" with "incompatibilism" as terms?

I'll check in later. Spent enough time today at doing this.

Why do you think libertarianism isn't a subcategory of incompatibilism? — flannel jesus

I am going to take back what I said. While not everyone frames libertarianism as a species of incompatibilism, some do, and that includes some prominent proponents of libertarianism, such as Robert Kane:

Those who are convinced that there is a conflict between free will and determinism, for these and other reasons, are called incompatibilists about free will. They believe free will and determinism are incompatible. If incompatibilists also believe that an incompatibilist free will exists, so that determinism is false, they are called libertarians about free will. — Robert Kane

Others characterize libertarianism by what it means more generally, rather than by what it implies for determinism specifically. On that account, libertarianism and incompatibilism simply answer different questions.

If you're not just repeating the same request, I don't know what you're doing. — flannel jesus

Only in indeterminism can you start in the same state and end up doing something different. — flannel jesus

What is it about indeterminism that makes it that way? I'm trying to find out what all this means. From the article and the thread I cannot find the sense of it.

What is it about indeterminism that makes it that way? — tim wood

That's just the actual distinction between a deterministic system and an indeterministic one. In a deterministic system, the future states follow from past states, precisely and without variation. In an indeterministic system, they kinda semi loosey goosey follow from past states but with some wiggle room - a sprinkle of randomness.

From the article and the thread I cannot find the sense of it. — tim wood

Is this the first time you're reading about these terms? Determinism and indeterminism? If it is, I wouldn't recommend you try to learn everything you know about them just from one extremely short article and this thread.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/indeterminism

I find it useful to think of determinism from a programming point of view also. In programming, a function is deterministic if its output only depends on its input, and its output is the same every time you give it the same input. See here. Given a view like that, you could frame a deterministic system as a function of sorts, where the input is the current state and the output is the following state. An indeterministic function, thus, would be described by a function where, at least for some inputs, if you repeatedly call the function many times with that same input the output will sometimes be different.

Others characterize libertarianism by what it means more generally, — SophistiCat

What does it mean more generally?

For me, "free will" alone, without the term "libertarian" attached, is the general term. Attach "libertarian" and you're talking about the subclass of free will ideas which are not compatible with determinism. Apparently that's consistent with how the word was coined:

The first recorded use of the term libertarianism was in 1789 by William Belsham in a discussion of free will and in opposition to necessitarian or determinist views.

That's just the actual distinction between a deterministic.... — flannel jesus

Thank you again! After some thought, I'd put it this way: a deterministic system is one in which the exact nature of all future events has been always already completely determined by prior conditions. Your analogy of a function being apt. A non- or indeterministic system is simply a system that is not deterministic.

But beyond that simple fact, this tells us nothing about indeterministic systems and certainly nothing about will, free or not. It also, if you give it a moment's thought, tells us nothing about deterministic systems either. For example, one thing not accounted for in a deterministic system - never mind what it means to be such a system - is the significance of knowledge about the system.

In such a system, it may well be that event E1 will happen. But knowledge implies a possibility for an alternative E2. So, which is going to happen, E1, E2, or any Ek such as knowledge might suggest?

But beyond that simple fact, this tells us nothing about indeterministic systems and certainly nothing about will, free or not. — tim wood

What do you mean by "this"? What tells us nothing?

What do you mean by "this"? What tells us nothing? — flannel jesus

The "this" is the definition/understanding I offered. Given that a D system is distinguished by certain characteristics, namely that events past-present-and-future are all unbreakable and unalterable links in an unbreakable chain, and non-D systems are distinguished by being non-D, then we still don't know anything about them.

Suppose that in D, a rock will fall. Now suppose we know that. Given that knowledge, we may choose to prevent the rock from falling, or guide to fall differently from how it would have originally fallen. What then becomes of the determinism of D?

then we still don't know anything about them. — tim wood

Other than the definition of what they are, which I wouldn't call "nothing".

Now that you know what distinguishes determinism from indeterminism, do you care to reread the scenario in the linked article in op about Bob1 and Bob2?

For me, "free will" alone, without the term "libertarian" attached, is the general term. Attach "libertarian" and you're talking about the subclass of free will ideas which are not compatible with determinism. Apparently that's consistent with how the word was coined:
— flannel jesus

The first recorded use of the term libertarianism was in 1789 by William Belsham in a discussion of free will and in opposition to necessitarian or determinist views.

For what it’s worth, as pertains to the history of ideas, the concept of compatibilism was developed by David Hume (see for example this SEP article) within the following context of ideas: free will and the necessity of determinacy are not only not mutually exclusive but in fact require each other to in any way work and make sense of the world.

With that in mind, here’s a simplified explanation of a libertarian compatibilism.

Working definitions:

Libertarianism: it is metaphysically possible that one could have chosen otherwise than what one chooses at any juncture of choice making.

Compatibilism: it is metaphysically impossible that any event, including that of choice making, can occur in fully undetermined manners; i.e. all events, including that of choice making, must be in some way determined by necessary determinants.

Premises:

P1: There can be no free will, libertarian or otherwise, in the absence of intentions.
P2: There can be no intentioning in the absence of at least one intent (i.e,, goal) which one seeks to actualize.
P3: The intent of any conceivable intentioning will always determine the actions one takes so as to actualize the given intent.
P3.1: An intent one pursues is thereby always a determinant of one’s actions, including those mental actions taken during moments of choice making.
P3.2: An intent is thereby always a subspecies of final causes, aka of teleological determinants.

Conclusion:

C1: Were libertarian free will to occur, it would necessarily be at all times minimally, but thoroughly, determined by teleological determinants.
C2: Using the working definitions provided, libertarian free will shall thereby at all times be necessarily determined by determinants if it is to in any way occur, thereby mandating a libertarian compatibilism: such that libertarian free will cannot possibly occur in the absence of the necessity of being itself determined.

In other words: no such thing as undetermined libertarian free will can occur, which (given the working definitions provided) would then be classifiable as a species of thought as “an incompatibilist libertarianism” – again, specifying a libertarian free will that is in no way determined by any determinants.

Working definitions:

Libertarianism: it is metaphysically possible that one could have chosen otherwise than what one chooses at any juncture of choice making.

Compatibilism: it is metaphysically impossible that any event, including that of choice making, can occur in fully undetermined manners; i.e. all events, including that of choice making, must be in some way determined by necessary determinants. — javra

Are those your definitions?

Are those your definitions? — flannel jesus

What fault can you find with them?

I think you've given the definition of determinism and called it "compatibilism".

I think you've given the definition of determinism and called it "compatibilism". — flannel jesus

OK, it was laconically written and so incomplete: add to it "and free will does occur". (I thought this would be implicitly understood.)

But, again, today's meaning of determinism is that "everything is causally inevitable" - so the definition I provided is not equivalent to determinism as understood today.

did you know you don't have to be a determinist to be a compatibilist?

did you know you don't have to be a determinist to be a compatibilist? — flannel jesus

I don't get the question. The possibility of indeterminst compatibilism is what I've been arguing for, after all.

I thought you were arguing for libertarian compatibilism.

Yes. And liberarainism can only be indeterminist by today's semantics. Hence: an indeterminst compatibiliism.