Most of what you have said here is unintelligible to me, but in any case you're wrong here Willow, even just on the grounds that your argument is based on thinking causation is an empirical matter; it is not, it is a metaphysical postulate.

Well, that's the problem with your approach. Causation is a matter of the action empirical states. It is existing states which cause other ones, not some metaphysical force. The presence of causes and effects is a question of what states exists. If we pose a causal relationship, we are discussing existing states. Causation is not a metaphysical action.

You are making the same mistake most in philosophy have for centuries: trying to define questions of existing states by logic.

Correlations are observed between empirical states, causation is not. This is not controversial.

For sure. "Causation" is a logical expression of correlated empirical states. Doesn't change the fact that causal relationships are the presence of various states of existence following each other. It is the presence of a cause state and an effect state which constitutes a causal relationship.

Without those empirical states, there is no cause or effect. "Causation" might be an expression of logic, the abstracted meaning of a cause and effect, but that doesn't make causes and effects logic. Causation isn't a "force" which acts on states of existence to produce causal relationships. It is a logical expression immanent in existing states, the respective states of cause and effect.

In this respect, causation is most certainly an empirical matter; it is states of the world which do the causing and are the produced effects. Without them, an instance of causation is not expressed in existence.

No, that two correlated empirical events are related as cause and effect is purely inferential; there can be no empirically observable causal relation.

Missing the point, John. I wasn't saying the "causal relation" was observable. The point was that it is a logical expression of existing states. We might have to "infer" the presence of causation (just as we do any other logical meaning), but it is the existing states which constitute the presence of the causal relationship, the cause and effect.

But, I have not said that cause and effect is merely logical; if it is real, then it is also ontolgical, metaphysical, even physical. But that cannot be determined.

If deterministic relations (cause and effect) are rigid, then that means the future is closed (metaphysically, that is, but not for us, because we have no way of knowing whether it is so).

Freedom would then be an illusion. If deterministic relations are 'loose' ( if indeterministic events affect the system indeterministically), then freedom may be ontologically real. We have no way of knowing one way or the other.

Indeed, but you are ignoring that it is states of existence which are the causes and effects. You keep proposing (pre)determinism on the ground a past state can necessitate will happen in the future. That is treating the cause as logic. It is to say, logically, there is only one outcome which follows from this given state, as if it did not need the presence of the effect to define what was caused. To say that when one rolls a six-sided die, the only potential outcome is one because that's all a roll of a die could produce.


We know the future is closed though, for only the set of events which happen will occur. This is a basic logical point. Any casual relationship, similarly, is known to be closed. If there is X cause and it has Y effect, no other options are open to happening in that instance. Events turning out any differently would would involve talking about a different instance of cause and effect. By identity we know that cause and effect is rigid. (and it is most certainly "closed" to us, for we have no way of avoiding the actual events of the future).

If determinism is rigid, then it follows logically that there is only one possible future. If indeterminism, then there are alternative futures. Of course, as far as we can tell, only one future will eventuate, but from the fact that there can be only one actual future it does not logically follow that there is only one possible future.

The reason you give for saying the future is closed is really no reason at all for that conclusion. And we certainly do not know that cause and effect are rigid, by " identity" or any other means.

The "ridgid" future is the actual outcome. You are currently thinking of the ridgid future as if it mutually exclusive with possibility. It's not. As you point out, the fact there is one inevitable outcome of actual events has no impact on possibility. In the case of any actual event, other outcomes are possible. A ridgid future does not eliminate possibility at at all.

So, indeed, the presence of a ridgid future does not leave us with one possible outcome, just an inevitable event which is one possible outcome of a set of possible events. This means DETERMNISM, the ridgid future, does NOT invove only one possible outcome.

The proponents of (pre)determinism got determinism wrong. They thought a ridgid future meant one possible outcome when it does not.

This is the compatiblist's point: possibility is there with the ridgid future of determinism. Most of philosophy has been using this incorhent ideas of determinism and possibility.

I still don't understand why you (I think correctly) agree that we have no good reason to think that causation is rigidly determinative, and yet continue to claim that the future is "rigid".

Pierre, sorry about the delay responding. As it seems to me you have given an account, in your post 175, which differentiates between two different conceptions of "historical necessity" based on two different perspectives; the first and third person perspectives.

You have posited an ideal observer that can see every motivation of the agent and all the laws of physics and can thus predict precisely what will inevitably happen. And you have posited a less than ideal agent who cannot see her every motivation and presumably cannot see the laws of physics and so cannot predict what will inevitably happen. This is just like Spinoza's example of the stone rolling down the hill (or flying through the air?) which, if it could experience as we do would feel itself free in its rolling (or flying?). — John

That's not quite my argument. I am not relying on an essential limitation of the knowledge that an agent would face regarding her own cognitive state and causal antecedents, such that in light of this limitation, she would be enabled to picture herself as free (i.e. not predetermined) while an external perspective would reveal her to be thus predetermined by circumstances external to her.

Although there indeed is such an essential limitation of the knowledge that an agent can have of her own internal "cognitive states", for obvious logical reasons, that is not the source of her freedom, on my view. Rather, my main point is that those unknown "internal states" are irrelevant to the identification of the cause of the agent's actions. The external observer who may have a better (or even, let us assume, a perfect) knowledge of the internal states of the agent (and antecedent circumstances) may thereby better, or even perfectly, predict her actions, but will not necessarily understand *why* those actions occurred. In order to understand why they occurred, the external observer, just like the agent herself, must rather adopt the practical perspective of the agent in order to disclose her reasons for acting thus and so, when she does. This perspective will show that the action was only externally constrained by whatever was historically necessary relative to the practical circumstances of the agent, at the time when she deliberated. This is the relevant perspective that must be adopted by both the agent herself and the external observer if they are to assess the action and its causes. But that is not all.

Most importantly, those historical necessities (including some "historical necessities" that the agent might ignore -- such as the bus being poised to arrive late at the bus stop where she is now waiting) only partially constrain the agent's action, since they leave open a whole range of possible options. The choice that the agent makes between those options can't be explained through reference to historical necessities because many of the antecedent "determinative circumstances" of her bodily motions actually make up, or enable, the cognitive functioning of the agent and aren't thus "external circumstances" that constrain her. They rather constitute enabling "circumstances" that make her up, as it were, as a cognitive agent. And those internal "circumstances" can't be understood as what they are except in reference to the agents rational abilities. They are thus only disclosable by means of the interpretation of the agent's reasons for acting.

That the agent acted for some reasons or other, therefore, doesn't show that her action was predetermined or unfree (and this is one main insight of compatibilism). It only shows that the agent's action was determined jointly by the necessary restrictions imposed on her by genuinely external circumstances (what I called historical necessities -- i.e. circumstances that she has no power to change even when apprised of them) in conjunction with the actualization of her power of practical reasoning. It is thus her, and not "external circumstances", that explain, and is the cause, of the unique choice that she makes between all the options that are historically possible, that is, open to her from the point of view of her practical deliberation perspective. This perspective can be disclosed not only to her (as it must be when she deliberates) but also to the "perfect" external observer.

The external observer may be very good at predicting what the agent will do, but that's not because the agent was predetermined by circumstances external to her, but rather because the observer was in a position to anticipate what it is that the agent would have good reasons to do -- or that she would merely believe to have good reasons to do -- and that she would thereby do precisely for those reasons.

Or else, the observer may be able to only predict the bodily motions that the agent would exhibit without understanding what actions those bodily motions constitute in context. In that case also, the observer can't construe the actions of the agent to have been predetermined, since the observer doesn't have a clue what the predetermined bodily motions of the agent amount to, qua intentional actions. So, in order to establish that a specific action was predetermined, one would have to know what action concept the bodily motion realizing it falls under, but this can't be deduced from the antecedent circumstances and the deterministic laws governing them qua material occurrences. The relevant action concept must rather be disclosed consistently with an intelligible interpretation of the agent's rational perspective. And thus the question under which action concept some predetermined bodily motions fall isn't settled by antecedent material "circumstances" and by deterministic laws just because those uninterpreted "bodily motions" might be thus predetermined.

If I have understood you, you are saying that freedom consists in acting, or believing, for reasons. It is the very determinative character of reasons that constitutes freedom.

What is "historically necessary" for an agent is, then, determined by antecedent worldly events; like the bus might be predetermined to be late. So it will be historically determined that the agent will not catch the bus. But then, she might do any of a range of other things.

However it is a strong physicalist claim that whatever she does will ultimately be determined by neural activity. The questions then become: is she determined by the micro-physical brain activity or is she determined by her reasons? Are the reasons only a post hoc rationalization of her actions or is there a genuine 'top down' effect; a kind of 'formal causation' that is itself not reducible to micro-physical determination?
Can it make sense to say that she is determined by both, and if we want to say that, how do we understand the relationship between causal and rational determination?

It doesn't seem logically coherent to claim that any kind of genuinely efficacious formal rational determination of action or belief could be compatible with a rigid micro-physical determinism, and that is why I said that it could only be compatible with micro-physical indeterminism, because that would allow for genuine novelty and creativity.

If I have understood you, you are saying that freedom consists in acting, or believing, for reasons. It is the very determinative character of reasons that constitutes freedom. — John

Actually, I never thought about defining freedom in that way. I merely accept the idea that freedom requires the ability to have done otherwise in the circumstances in which one acted (i.e. I am accepting the weak version of the PAP). And I am questioning the strange and -- I would argue, incoherent -- construal that the determinist makes of the notion of an agent's "circumstances" such that anything that occurs within her own body constitutes for her such "circumstances". This confused notion gives rise to what I have termed the strong version of the PAP, which I reject. It depends on one conceiving the agent as something essentially disembodied. This strong version of the PAP often seems to be tacitly endorsed by both the compatibilists and the incompatibilists in a large portion of the literature on free will (with many notable exceptions).

What is "historically necessary" for an agent is, then, determined by antecedent worldly events; like the bus might be predetermined to be late. So it will be historically determined that the agent will not catch the bus. But then, she might do any of a range of other things.

Yes, what it is historically necessary that an agent will do is relative to the circumstances of her action. It consists in what it is, in those circumstances, that it is not up to her to prevent anymore (or ever). Hence, the range of what it is historically necessary that will occur increases over time (from my perspective, say) since the range of the possibilities for action that are open to me diminishes over time (in other words: I settle things over time); and this range isn't the same for me as it is for you, since different persons don't have the same powers and opportunities.

However it is a strong physicalist claim that whatever she does will ultimately be determined by neural activity.

Yes. It is a reductionist claim that goes beyond the claim that she is materially constituted and that her bodily motions (as they may be described in purely physical terms) are governed by the laws of physics. The reductionist claim goes further than this claim about material constitution since it also presupposes that actions, in a sense, supervene on bodily motions in such a way that whatever determines bodily motions also determines actions.

The questions then become: is she determined by the micro-physical brain activity or is she determined by her reasons?

At this stage in the argument, I think the compatibilist will rightly point out that the question sets up a false dichotomy. The microphysical brain activity settles what bodily motions will occur and the person deliberates and choses what she will do. The former may be part of a story about what it is about the person's neurophysiology that enables her powers to do the latter (i.e. deliberate and act).

Are the reasons only a post hoc rationalization of her actions or is there a genuine 'top down' effect; a kind of 'formal causation' that is itself not reducible to micro-physical determination?

I think downward causation is ubiquitous in nature, and it isn't mysterious. Pretty much all irreducible explanations of anything that occurs in nature, and that refer to the powers or dispositions of things, are of that kind. The availability of those explanations, as genuine explanations and not mere "rationalizations", is what is contested by reductionists and eliminative materialists. (To be fair, the reductionist may grant that there are such genuine explanations at the higher level, but question their independence from explanations of what occurs at the lower level).

For sure, explanations of the actions of human agents are, for the most part, rationalizing explanations. But they are not mere (i.e. illusory or false) rationalizations but rather genuine explanations as to why someone acted in one way rather than another way. For instance, I didn't go to the supermarket because I was informed that it was closed. This genuinely explains why I didn't go. It would have been irrational for me to go (because I need to buy some milk, say) while I knew that it was closed. A close examination of what went on in my brain could explain how I was able to reason that it was useless for me to go, but whatever this inquiry discloses doesn't compete with the rational explanation of my action. It merely changes the subject of the inquiry.

Can it make sense to say that she is determined by both, and if we want to say that, how do we understand the relationship between causal and rational determination?

Rational determination is a species of causation. It explains things that occur at a higher, more relevant, level of the activity of human beings. It is an inquiry that is concerned more about their intelligible actions rather than being concerned about the etiology of their "raw" bodily motions, or about the physiological enablements of their cognitive abilities. Those three different modes of inquiry are possible, and compatible, but they have three different topics.

It doesn't seem logically coherent to claim that any kind of genuinely efficacious formal rational determination of action or belief could be compatible with a rigid micro-physical determinism, and that is why I said that it could only be compatible with micro-physical indeterminism, because that would allow for genuine novelty and creativity.

This seems incoherent only if you endorse (maybe inchoately) a contentious metaphysical doctrine such as eliminative materialism and can't allow for there being consistent explanations of what happens at different levels of organization/description. Those may be explantations that have different topics altogether. Though, as is the case for the neurophysiological explanations of our cognitive powers (which need not be reductive explanations), some constraints on our abilities are thereby disclosed -- as are explanations of some of our irrational actions, or habitual cognitive biases -- but they are constraints that fall short from determining our actions, in most cases, or so am I prepared to argue.

I'm arguing causality is ridgidly determative. The future is ridgid because there is one outcome which occurs. My point is this ridgidness is concurrent with possibility.

Where the (pre)determinist goes wrong is not in suggesting causality is ridgidly determative, but rather in arguing such causality constitutes the absence of freedom.

You are still missing the point. Here the compatiblist's is attacking the idea a ridgid future entails the absence of freedom.The point is the common split between determinism and indetermism is build on a fundamental misunderstanding of freedom and causality. They never been opposed. Freedom is always present because no future state is defined prior to itself. All future states follow on from past ones in the ridgid set of actual states. Freedom and determinism are both necessary.

I'm arguing causality is ridgidly determative. The future is ridgid because there is one outcome which occurs. My point is this ridgidness is concurrent with possibility. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The determinist and the indeterminist both agree that only one outcome will be realized. The determinist claims, in addition to this, that there is only one possible outcome that can (and therefore will) be realized consistently with the present state of the universe and natural laws. So, what does it add to the account of the indeterminist to say that the future is "rigid"? She agrees with the determinist that only one future will be realized. So. in what sense is the future that will be realized "rigid" if one isn't a determinist? The actual future that will be realized is "rigid" in relation to what?