Ok. That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway, (a point that I suspect Leon has not appreciated). And I'm confident that Bunge's domain was not empty.

Seems to me the answer to the SEP article you pointed to was that

If Athena has different properties from Piece, then Athena ≠ Piece.

was wrong. The very same thing can have different properties. Kinda the point of modality.

That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway — Banno

Is it a necessary presumption?

And I'm confident that Bunge's domain was not empty. — Banno

Doesn't matter, for this is a point in which I'm willing to part ways with Bunge.

The very same thing can have different properties. — Banno

Not if the properties in question contradict each other. Athena can't survive flattening. Piece can. Therefore, by Leibniz Law, you're dealing with two different objects. And this is a problem for anyone like me, who wishes to find a working monist solution.

BTW this is the language that I personally call "Basic Alien". This is not Philosophy, this is Basic Alien.

For what could be more obvious then that we do refer to things with our words and mean things by them? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure we do. When you try to understand what it is that someone is referring to in using a name, how confident can you be that you have it right? Or, a better question, how confident do you need to be in order to get on with the conversation?

Doesn't the quote you provide imply that, if they started talking to each other, they may talk past each other entirely? — Leontiskos

That that it is possible to "talk past one another" relies on it not being the case that we always, or even mostly, talk past one another. It seems obviously possible to understand one another very well and yet disagree, nonetheless.

The very that that it is possible to "talk past one another" relies on it not being the case that we always, or even mostly, talk past one another. — Janus

If the quote <here> were true then we would talk past one another much more often than we do.

@Banno let me try another "sales pitch" for my proposal. Allow me to compare and contrast it to Quine's. I agree with Quine, not Bunge, in treating the case of Pegasus like so:

∃x(Px)

For Quine, that means "something Pegasizes". What people asked him in the 50's is if, by the same lights, President Truman exists because "something Trumanizes". Here's what I would say. Let's agree to use the following formula, if only for the sake of argument:

∃x(Tx)

Should that be read as if it were saying "something Trumanizes"? No. It should be read instead: "someone is Truman", or better yet, "it is the case that someone is President Truman", just as it is also the case that something is Pegasus. In saying "something is Pegasus", I make no commitments, because I deny that Pegasus exists (on the other hand, I obviously believe that someone in the past was President Truman).

That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway — Banno

A convention. This happens to be a conversation about challenging conventions.

Is it a necessary presumption? — Arcane Sandwich

Well, if not then A statement like ∀xP(x) would trivially be true, because there are no x to contradict it. And ¬∃x P(x) would be equivalent to ∀x ¬P(x). So you can do a sort of first order logic with empty sets, which is more or less what free logic is.

Doesn't matter, for this is a point in which I'm willing to part ways with Bunge. — Arcane Sandwich

Ok. It might be a path to madness, but on your head be it.

Athena can't survive flattening. — Arcane Sandwich

Then aren't you dealing with non-extensional contexts? For my money, the answer to "what was flattened?" is "Athena" as much as "Piece", since Athena = Piece. One can drop that, but at the cost of even more "alien language".

Ok. It might be a path to madness, but on your head be it. — Banno

I never made the promise that my proposed solution actually works. It might be nonsense. I'm aware of that possibility. But the problem of Material Constitution is so impossibly hard to tackle, that I'm willing to think outside the box here.

For my money, the answer to "what was flattened?" is "Athena" as much as "Piece", since Athena = Piece. — Banno

Yes, both of them were flattened, at the same time, but only one of them survived: Piece. On the other hand, Athena was destroyed when the process of flattening occurred: it has ceased to exist, and now only Piece remains.

EDIT: So, if Athena was destroyed but Piece wasn't, it follows that they were different objects to begin with.

I guess I'm not seeing the problem you want to solve, or perhaps i think it was solved by Kripke.

The reasons that Quine had for dropping individual constants and proper names were pretty much smashed by Possible World Semantics, along with the description theory of proper names.

but only one of them survived: Piece — Arcane Sandwich

But since Athena = Piece, Athena survived, too.

See how you have to drop extensionality? That is, you can't maintain that Athena = Piece and still say only one of them survived.

If you want to talk about empty domains, go ahead.

Athena survived, too. — Banno

I find that counter-intuitive. The flat piece of clay that I'm looking at is clearly not a human-shaped statue, so how could it still be Athena?

See how you have to drop extensionality? That is, you can't maintain that Athena = Piece and still say only one of them survived. — Banno

You can (I believe), if you symbolize "Athena" and "Piece" using the predicate letters (or predicate constants, in the case of second-order logic), "A" and "P", instead of the individual constants "a" and "p". That way, you can say that some "x" is both Athena and Piece in a predicative sense, and you're able to say that "x" is both Athena and Piece on Monday, while it is only Piece but not Athena on Tuesday, after flattening. That's more or less the "gist" of my proposed solution to the problem of Material Constitution.

I never made the promise that my proposed solution actually works. It might be nonsense. I'm aware of that possibility. — Arcane Sandwich

Sure. Hopefully you see my objections as they are intended, as helping you think through the consequences of your idea. I'm enjoying this.

Thanks for the help :up:

I find that counter-intuitive. The flat piece of clay that I'm looking at is clearly not a human-shaped statue, so how could it still be Athena? — Arcane Sandwich

Well, then ~(Athena = Piece).

I see your solution as rejecting this, since for you there is no individual Athena or Piece, but only descriptions of them - predicates. You seem to be going back to the solution suggested by Russell and Quine. How that would work with modality would remain to be seen.

Let's leave it for now.

Cheers. For my part I think I have a better understanding of extensionality as a result of this conversation, so thanks for your help, too.

If you want to talk about empty domains, go ahead. — Banno

Why did it come up? Because we were talking about ontological commitment and SEP utilizes the empty domain as a useful way to talk about ontological commitment. See my post <here> for the genesis.

If you want to talk about nothing, I'll not object. But I'll probably not join you, either.

- Then continue to go on contradicting SEP as you bristle, by all means. :up:

I see your solution as rejecting this, since for you there is no individual Athena or Piece, but only descriptions of them - predicates. You seem to be going back to the solution suggested by Russell and Quine. — Banno

Essentially, yes, as far as the syntax goes. I disagree with Russell's and Quine's parsing of the corresponding formulas, though.

How that would work with modality would remain to be seen. — Banno

Indeed, it remains to be seen. I make no promises in that sense. This could all be just one giant failed experiment in Philosophy of Logic.

Let's leave it for now. — Banno

Ok. Let me say this, though, in relation to Truman / Pegasus. Since people asked Quine if Truman exists because "something Trumanizes", by parity of reasoning the same sort of question can be asked in relation to the statement "someone is Truman": does President Truman exist because someone is Truman?

And my answer there would be yes, indeed: President Truman exists because someone is president Truman (i.e., in Quine-speak, "someone Trumanizes"). But how can that be? Isn't it the case that President Truman exists because he has two parents? Well, that's what Aristotle would say is Truman's efficient cause. Truman's formal cause, on the other hand, is not his two parents, it is instead his form. When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I am not referring to Truman's parents, I am referring to Truman's form.

Does that make sense?

Quine's thesis is not merely skeptical, that we "cannot be certain." It's that there is no reference going on. That's a big difference.

But in any case, we can be quite certain. Said in a room where there is but one rabbit, the English phrase "the rabbit in this room," refers to the one rabbit. If someone intends to refer to a rake instead, they have misspoken (hence, the distinction of intended reference/intentions is important). Reference can be ambiguous and indeterminate, and it can be more or less so.

BTW, one can make something like Quine's argument from inverted/jumbled qualia as well. "Every mind constructs reality differently, thus we don't refer to the same things." Or one could make it from cognitive relativism. But if you accept the limits of evidence in play and arguments from underdetermination, then you can just as well argue to solipsism or being the lone conscious human in an advanced alien zoo filled with androids.

Does that make sense? — Arcane Sandwich

Well, yes, but I don't think it the best way that this stuff could be said. When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I'm not refering to Truman's form, but to Truman. It's easier to work with individuals.

How does your idea fit with what in Australia is called the "pub test"? The common sense comparison you made elsewhere? Isn't "Truman exists" about Truman, rather than the-form-of-Truman?

When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I'm not refering to Truman's form, but to Truman. It's easier to work with individuals. — Banno

But then you run directly into the problem of Material Constitution, that's my point.

How does your idea fit with what in Australia is called the "pub test"? — Banno

I have no idea what that is, I don't live in Australia.

The common sense comparison you made elsewhere? Isn't "Truman exists" about Truman, rather than the-form-of-Truman? — Banno

Is it? When dealing with a problem as difficult as the one involving Athena and Piece, perhaps it's best to abandon common sense, but just in relation to that problem, just as physicists abandon common sense when dealing with complicated scientific phenomena that are not part of our everyday, ordinary lives.

EDIT: Think of it like this, Banno. Why is the idea that Truman can have an essence so repugnant to our analytic sensibilities?

Quine's thesis is not merely skeptical, that we "cannot be certain." It's that there is no reference going on. That's a big difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, I don't agree. Rather, for Quine, reference does work, but holistically, not in individual cases.

But in any case, we can be quite certain. Said in a room where there is but one rabbit, the English phrase "the rabbit in this room," refers to the one rabbit. If someone intends to refer to a rake instead, they have misspoken (hence, the distinction of intended reference/intentions is important). Reference can be ambiguous and indeterminate, and it can be more or less so. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I doubt Quine would disagree. The context is so limited that it is relatively easy to see the whole. Of course, "certain" here is about confidence, a psychological rather than a logical state.

I think qualia cause more problems than they solve.

Ok. I thought you had earlier expressed a preference for common sense. Happy to move on.

I'm all for common sense. That doesn't mean that common sense is infallible. There are cases in which it effectively fails. The problem of Material Constitution is one such case. There's just no common sense solution to it that can also accommodate the philosophical problem presented there. So perhaps it's best to solve it philosophically, and to leave common sense aside. That doesn't mean that we should throw common sense out the window, since there are good common sense solutions to other problems, such as the problem of finding an answer to the Special Composition Question, for example. See here for one such proposal, which also manages to solve the problem of the Ship of Theseus from a common sense point of view.

Truman's formal cause, on the other hand, is not his two parents, it is instead his form. When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I am not referring to Truman's parents, I am referring to Truman's form. — Arcane Sandwich

Perhaps what is happening here is that you want the referent for 'Truman' to be more than the bare particular of predicate logic, i.e. you want for Truman what is for species an essence. That is, you want to reference a primary substance rather than a bare particular.

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes."

Note that Banno's whole logical horizon is bound up with the bare particulars of predicate logic, so I'm not sure it is possible to easily convey an alternative semantics to someone who who has never been exposed to an alternative paradigm.

Very interesting, thank you. I'll take a look at those references.

If the quote <here> were true then we would talk past one another much more often than we do. — Leontiskos

Two men could be just alike in all their dispositions to verbal behavior under all possible sensory stimulations, and yet the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically, for the two men, in a wide range of classes

Do you think Quine intends this to be read as indicating a common occurrence or merely an outlying possibility?

Given charitability and good will I see little reason to think that divergences of intended meaning could not be discovered quickly enough and taken into account.

Sure thing. But it will work better for substances than for artifacts a la material constitution. Granted, a similar problem would occur if the real Athena were flattened (as least if she were mortal). You would have a clump of matter that was Athena a moment ago, but no longer is (i.e. you would have substantial change).