You don't paint a painting perfectly from the get-go, unless you're extremely confident in your skills and in your understanding of the subject matter that you're painting.

Do you agree or disagree with me, up until that point?

That’s fine, but I think it is still worth noting that the problem being addressed in the OP is due to the ambiguity in what it describes…remove that ambiguity and there’s no issue anymore. This is not the case with standard philosophical disagreement: when two philosophers converse, they are conversing about who has it correct—providing two different theses if you will—which each is perfectly clear in their own right.

That’s not to say you are doing anything wrong by asking people’s opinions; but the OP ideally should be clearer IMHO (no offense).

on this topic is that some folks will tell you that we're appealing to the stone, and that's a fallac

Nothing I have said is a blunt assertion; so it is not an appeal to the stone fallacy.

If someone who takes solipsism seriously were to ask me "How do you know that you're not a disembodied brain in a vat that is hallucinating?", I would simply reply in the manner of Moore: here's a hand, mate.

That is appealing to the stone, so to speak, and is a bad argument. I think Moore was right to posit that there are purely intuitional primitive concepts; but the proposition “My hand exists” is not even a concept….

The reason solipsism holds no water is because it egregiously unparsimonious: my repetitive experience of my hand, as confirmed by everyone else, is evidence that my hand actually exists; and my experience of the world whereof I am in a transcendent reality is evidence that there is such a reality. All hard skepticism is deeply rooted in conflating the possibility of something with its probability.

So, I take it that you and I believe in good common sense, yes? I know I do. How about you?

Pure intuition, yes; “common sense”, absolutely not.

(AV1) If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.

I don’t see how this follows. A thing which has a sufficient reason for its existence and one which doesn’t isn’t analogous to concepts which refer to gradations (e.g., short vs. tall, shades of colors, etc.): it is analogous to non-gradations like ‘being a circle’ vs. ‘not being a circle’, and so it is not subjected to the problem of the heap.

(AV5) So, either everything has a sufficient reason, or nothing does.

Even if I grant AV1, it does not follow from the possibility of something that it is required; which is exactly what you implied in your argument. You seem to be trying to argue that if the PSR is like a sorites series, then it must either apply to everything or nothing; but your first premise only demonstrates the possibility of it being a sorites series. A person could just say “well, it is possible; but I don’t think it is a sorites series”. Viz,:

(AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of sufficient reason.
(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of sufficient reason.

This assumes that the PSR’s application is like a sorites series, which AV1 doesn’t even purport.

(AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of sufficient reason.

If it were a sorites series, then this would be true; but, like I said, either a fact is brute or non-brute: there’s no degrees to it.

(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of sufficient reason.

Again, these are both correct: the problem is that you provided no reasons for us to believe that the PSR’s application is a sorites series. AV1 doesn’t even claim that it is: it just admits of its possibility.

I would suggest writing your argument out into proper syllogisms just to ensure the logic is sound.

That’s not to say you are doing anything wrong by asking people’s opinions; but the OP ideally should be clearer IMHO (no offense). — Bob Ross

Mate, I say this with no ill intent: it genuinely doesn't make sense (to my mind) for you worry so much about etiquette, to the point of saying "no offense" when you give your honest opinion about something, especially considering the fact that you jumped into this Thread without even saying "hello". Like, relax mate, you're not offending me by stating your opinion on something.

I'll consider your feedback tomorrow, thanks for taking the time and energy to contribute it.

Happy New Year.

I disagree with this, honestly. I think that there are things that are not possible even at the level of theory. I'm a realist about modality: some things are metaphysically impossible. For example, it is metaphysically impossible that demons exist. The same goes for unicorns, basilisks, ghosts, etc. Scientism, to me, is not just a series of epistemic claims, it is also a series of metaphysical claims, and some of the latter use the language of modal logic (i.e., terms like "possible", "impossible", "contingent", "necessary"). — Arcane Sandwich

Sure you can disagree. But if you explain logically and understandably where the disagreement comes from, that is perfectly understandable.

It sounds like you seem to emphasize theoretically demons and ghosts can't exist metaphysically. I don't exactly understand what you mean by that. Why suddenly metaphysically? What does metaphysics have to do with the existence of demons and ghosts?

Why are they not possible to exist metaphysically? What is your definition of metaphysics, and what and which objects do you mean by demons and ghosts?

I would like to clarify this point of yours first before progressing further down the line.

I'm an atheist. I hold that it's metaphysically impossible for beings of a divine nature to exist. But if such beings, or such a being, existed, then we would be debating theology: does God have the moral obligation to intervene in reality, in every act? That's what the occasionalists believed, in matters of theology. — Arcane Sandwich

I find it a bit difficult to follow the flow of your argument and point here i.e you deny God's existence, but you suggest God has the moral obligation to intervene your time travel to the past world mentioning the claims of the occasionalists. What is this about?

I would like to clarify your points one by one instead of so many added up into one large sheet of message with loads of quotes, because it seems to make the points and flow of the arguments unclear and conflated at times. I hope it is OK with you. Thanks.

Of course it's a groundless and irrational belief. But to abandon it is to say that a dragon or a squid can suddenly pop up into existence, anywhere, at any time, for no reason whatsoever (since we've abandoned the strongest version of the PSR, which is the only version of the PSR that "makes sense", and yes, the appeal to good common sense is a fallacy, it's an "appeal to the stone"). — Arcane Sandwich

Somethings have causes and reasons, but some other things in the universe don't. Hence the PSR doesn't qualify as a principle. A principle means it must work for all the incidents, events and objects. When it is the case for some, and not the case for the others is not a principle.

Why not? Why do you say that it would not happen? The circumstances of the case, of every case, become irrelevant if you abandon the PSR in its strongest form. And that's the only way to sensibly deny it. — Arcane Sandwich

It is not total abandoning as you try to make out. It is a modification of the PSR. We could say the principle of possible reasoning instead of the principle of sufficient reasoning. So the new name of the PSR must be the PPR.

Some events and objects in the universe have reasons for its existence, but some don't. Yeah we managed to induce a new concept from the old nonworking wrong concept of the PSR.

The new more flexible and logical concept is called the PPR i.e. the Principle of Possible Reason. Hows that?

Pure intuition, yes; “common sense”, absolutely not. — Bob Ross

I believe in both. I don't know if I'd call it "pure", in any sense of the term. Just intuition. What is your reason for calling it "pure"? Are you somehow suggesting that as human beings we also have an "impure" intuition? Or am I way off here? I any case, can you explain why you said "pure intuition" and not just "intuition"? Thanks in advance.

(AV1) If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.


I don’t see how this follows. A thing which has a sufficient reason for its existence and one which doesn’t isn’t analogous to concepts which refer to gradations (e.g., short vs. tall, shades of colors, etc.): it is analogous to non-gradations like ‘being a circle’ vs. ‘not being a circle’, and so it is not subjected to the problem of the heap — Bob Ross

Think of AVI in the following way. Some philosophers (such as Plato) believe that existence comes in degrees: a shadow has less existence, and less being, than an ordinary object such as a table. And the idea of table, as a perfect concept, has more existence and more being than an ordinary object such as a table. So, in such scenarios (i.e., Platonism) it makes sense to say the sort of thing that AV1 is saying: In Platonism, the PSR has less "strength", if you want to call it that, in the case of paintings, it has more "strength" in the case of an ordinary object such as a stone, and it has even more "strength" in the case of an Idea, such as the Idea of The Stone. If you deny AV1, you have to explain why our ordinary life is not like Platonism.

I would suggest writing your argument out into proper syllogisms just to ensure the logic is sound. — Bob Ross

I agree, it's good advice. Believe it or not, I'm really lousy at syllogisms. I mean, I know how modus ponens and modus tollens work, instinctually, as a matter of habit at this point in my life, but I'm just not a good "artist" when I try to craft a rarer kind of syllogism. And there's a lot of them.
But to tell you the honest truth, I'm just not as passionate as you about proper syllogisms. As far as Logic goes, there's other areas of Aristotle's logical legacy that I'm interested in. That's on me, though, because what I just said there is technically an excuse. And it is. An excuse, that is. I mean, I just don't love Western culture enough to even care to be proficient at classical syllogisms in general. I like modus tollens, sure, and modus ponens not so much, and I'm proficient in both of those. But the rest? It's just too "Western-ish" in a stereotypical sense, if you will. And I don't consider myself a "Westerner". What does that even mean? That I was born in the western hemisphere? That doesn't mean anything to me, it carries no moral nor ethical value by itself. I'm a South American before being a "Westerner". Like, what are Australians, then? Easterners? And if they are, how much "stock" do you want to put on that fact? Like, it's meaningless. You're an Oceanian before being a "Westerner", is what I would say in that case.

It sounds like you seem to emphasize theoretically demons and ghosts can't exist metaphysically. I don't exactly understand what you mean by that. Why suddenly metaphysically? What does metaphysics have to do with the existence of demons and ghosts? — Corvus

For the reason that you just said: it has to do with the existence of such and such (i.e. stones, tables, trees, dogs, people, computers, the Internet, numbers, mathematical objects in general, fictional objects like Pegasus or Sherlock Holmes, demons, ghosts, poems, songs, music, sports, theater, history, Nature, philosophy itself, etc.). Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the topics of Being and existence. It also deals with other concepts, such as Nothing or Nothingness. So, demons and ghosts are "within the province", "within the domain", "within the realm", of what metaphysics studies. They are "elements of itself as a set", so to speak (poetically, not Platonically, of course).

And what I'm arguing is that ghost and demons do not exist. They do not have the property of existence, because in my personal philosophy, existence is a property. Ghosts and demons do not have that property, therefore they do not exist. I did not invent this idea myself, this is simply something that I took from Mario Bunge's philosophy.

And what I'm arguing is that ghost and demons do not exist. They do not have the property of existence, because in my personal philosophy, existence is a property. Ghosts and demons do not have that property, therefore they do not exist. I did not invent this idea myself, this is simply something that I took from Mario Bunge's philosophy. — Arcane Sandwich

OK, I see what you mean. But I was under the impression that Metaphysics allows us to discuss the objects we can imagine, contemplate, and conceptualize but has no material existence such as God, Souls, Demons and Ghosts etc.

When you said, even in Metaphysics, those concepts are impossible to exist, I was not sure if you were talking about a different Metaphysics from the traditional classic Metaphysics.

I think this is what Kant had been talking about in his CPR - if Metaphysics was possible as a Science, when it deals with the topics of non material existences such as God, Souls, Freedom etc.

When you are talking about God, Souls, Freedom, and even Demons or Ghosts, we are not saying they do exist in the external world. But rather what Metaphysical inquiries are asking is, how is it possible for us to think about those concepts when they are not existing in the external world, and what if they do exist. If they don't exist in the external world, then could it be possible that they might exist in our mind? And how do we form such immaterial concepts which are not in space and time?

These are perfectly reasonable questions to ask and discuss, and especially if you are a Modalist, I would have thought you would embrace the possibilities for the inquiries and discussions, rather than rejecting it.

I think this is what Kant had been talking about in his CPR - if Metaphysics was possible as a Science, when it deals with the topics of non material existences such as God, Souls, Freedom etc. — Corvus

That, is an extremely important question, and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been solved as a genuine scientific problem. Is it one? Is it a scientific question to begin with? Or is it a Meta-scientific question, if you will?

When you are talking about God, Souls, Freedom, and even Demons or Ghosts, we are not saying they do exist in the external world. But rather what Metaphysical inquiries are asking is, how is it possible for us to think about those concepts when they are not existing in the external world, and what if they do exist. — Corvus

This is a "Gnoseological" question in the Spanish sense of the term, in English it's called an "Epistemological" question. I don't what more I can answer on this point, sorry.

If they don't exist in the external world, then could it be possible that they might exist in our mind? — Corvus

This is an ontological question. And it's a good one. This is the type of problem that interests me as a philosopher.

These are perfectly reasonable questions to ask and discuss, and especially if you are a Modalist, — Corvus

Am I? Yes, I guess you could call me that. See, my philosophical hero, Mario Bunge, was not a modalist. So, this would be a difference between our philosophies (there are many other differences as well). And not only am I a modalist, I'm also a modal realist (I figure if Bunge had been a modalist, he would have identified with the other camp, the "modal fictionalists". Is that even a thing? Hmmm...)

I would have thought that you would embrace the possibilities for the inquiries and discussions, rather than rejecting it. — Corvus

What do you mean?

What do you mean? — Arcane Sandwich

Well you said that the demons and ghosts don't exist in the external world, so it is impossible to explain about them theoretically, and even metaphysically.

I was saying they are the perfect topics in Metaphysics, and why is it impossible to explain or discuss. That was what I mean.

I was saying they are the perfect topics in Metaphysics, and why is it impossible to explain or discuss. That was what I mean. — Corvus

Right, but here's my question, as a professional metaphysician (I think I've earned the right to call myself that, I have enough metaphysical publications in professional journals to qualify as such),

why is that?

I mean, since they are indeed the perfect topics in Metaphysics (I agree with you on that), I ask, as a metaphysician myself: why is it impossible to explain or discuss? What is the reason for that? Is it just ignorance? Is it superstition? Like, consider my own case: I'm a professional philosopher, I dabble a bit in Metaphysics (my forte, so to speak, is in Philosophy of Science, but that's beside the point).

The preceding being the case. Why can't I explain or discuss them? Why is it impossible for me, specifically, as an individual human being? Are there people out there, in the world, that are somehow under another impression? I'm extremely curious about that. I'm a bit of an amateur anthropologist, you could say. What do you think? What is your opinion on the Metaphysics of ghosts and demons?

Right, but here's my question, as a professional metaphysician (I think I've earned the right to call myself that, I have enough metaphysical publications in professional journals to qualify as such), — Arcane Sandwich

So you are a professional Metaphysician. Cool.

Are there people out there, in the world, that are somehow under another impression? I'm extremely curious about that. I'm a bit of an amateur anthropologist, you could say. What do you think? What is your opinion on the Metaphysics of ghosts and demons? — Arcane Sandwich

I think Metaphysics could discuss such topics e.g. Demons, Ghosts and God, Souls and Freedom etc. That is what Metaphysics is about. No one would suggest to discuss these topics under Physics or Chemistry. If you say, even Metaphysics cannot discuss them, then what is the point of Metaphysics?

I mean it is not the whole topic of Metaphysics of course. It has the other topics too. But I would have thought Metaphysics can discuss the entities which are in the out of the boundaries of normative reason.

If you still deny that freedom and authority of Metaphysics, then I would say you are limiting the scope of Metaphysics unreasonable and unnecessary way, and it would be stripped of much of its attraction.

I think Metaphysics could discuss such topics e.g. Demons, Ghosts and God, Souls and Freedom etc. — Corvus

I agree. I already said in another thread, that whoever proves that the existence of the Evil Demon is modally impossible, should win the Fields Medal. Why? Because, in order to prove that, you would would have to prove that logic itself cannot be doubted. And that is the reason why the recipient of the Fields Medal should receive such an outstanding award.

Sadly, that person won't be me.

That is what Metaphysics is about. No one would suggest to discuss these topics under Physics or Chemistry. If you say, even Metaphysics cannot discuss them, then what is the point of Metaphysics? — Corvus

That's an excellent argument in defense of Metaphysics as a profession, as a specialized area within professional, academic philosophy. The problem is, if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of demons, people laugh at you. But if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of Pegasus, people at least have the basic decency to tell you why your ideas are wrong.

Mate, I say this with no ill intent: it genuinely doesn't make sense (to my mind) for you worry so much about etiquette, to the point of saying "no offense" when you give your honest opinion about something, especially considering the fact that you jumped into this Thread without even saying "hello". Like, relax mate, you're not offending me by stating your opinion on something.

I just do it to be kind and considerate: for our discussion, it is duly noted that we do not need to do that. I will refrain (:

Happy New Year.

You too!

Just intuition. What is your reason for calling it "pure"?

Common sense is just whatever one has been sociologically conditioned to believe is obvious; whereas intuition—in the philosophical sense—is an intellectual seeming. What is intuitive—in this sense—may NOT BE obvious (e.g., “1 + 1 = 2” is not obvious to a tribal member); and what is obvious may not be intuitive (e.g., a society where all cats are considered to always green).

An intuition is a seeming based on purely intellectual grasping of the evidence; whereas common sense is based off of what society or an individual has been conditioned to believe. This is why intuitions—in the philosophical sense—are defined usually something like “An intuition is a seeming a reasonably rational person would have if they grasped the entirety of the evidence”. Therefore, “1 + 1 = 2” may not be obvious (and thusly not common sensically true) to the tribal man, but if one were to convey the concepts behind it to that man in a way that they understand; then they would intuit that it is true.

A pure intuition is any intuition which has no basis in any conveyable evidence; and an impure intuition is one which is based off of, at least some, conveyable evidence.

The grandaddy of examples for pure intuitions is ‘beingness’. There is nothing one can convey to another person that allows for an understanding of what it means ‘to be’ nor anything they can convey themselves to themselves; but yet any reasonably rational person who grasps readily their own experience knows what ‘to exist’ means. It is pure exactly because one just grasps it as a result of something deeply ingrained into their existence. “to be” is so undefinable exactly because it is a pure intuition.

An example of an impure intuition is ‘cars can’t fly’. Only by conveying what a car and flying is, and how it relates to the physics or common understanding involved, which can be done, can one intuit that “yeah, cars can’t fly”. It is based off of conveyable evidence because there concepts involved are complex (as opposed to absolutely simple).

Think of AVI in the following way.

I see what you are saying, but I disagree. Being does not come in degrees, just as much as the PSR doesn’t. I am a monist about being: there’s too many problems with it to me.

If the PSR has degrees to it, then I would need to know exactly how that works to re-assess your view. Give me example of two things which the PSR applies whereof one has the PSR more weakly associated with it.

Give me example of two things which the PSR applies whereof one has the PSR more weakly associated with it. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that I can do that. The whole point of the OP is that this is "uncharted territory", so to speak. Think of it like an actual geographical map. What we're talking about right now is like, I don't know, an island that has never been explored yet, but we can see it from afar. That's the metaphor here.

The best that I can do right now, is to compare AV1 to its equivalent in the literature on ordinary objects. Specifically, the argument that I presented above is structurally similar to Korman's version of the argument from vagueness against restricted composition:

(AV1) If some pluralities of objects compose something and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for composition.
(AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of composition.
(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition.
(AV5) So, either every plurality of objects composes something or none do. — Daniel Z. Korman

My argument is structurally similar to Korman's. The only difference is that he's talking about an Argument From Vagueness (an A.F.V., if you will) against restricted composition (i.e., the idea that some objects compose a further object and that some other objects do not). My argument is similar to his not only due to how the premises are stated, but also due to the fact that it's an A.F.V. against what you might call "restricted reason" (what that would be, is the idea that some objects have a sufficient reason for their being while some other objects have no sufficient reason for their being).

I'll now switch back to Korman:

If the argument is sound then either universalism or nihilism must be correct, though which of them is correct would have to be decided on independent grounds. A sorites series for composition is a series of cases running from a case in which composition doesn’t occur to a case in which composition does occur, where adjacent cases are extremely similar in all of the respects that one would ordinarily take to be relevant to whether composition occurs (e.g., the spatial and causal relations among the objects in question). Understood in this way, AV1 should be unobjectionable. If it’s true that the handle and head compose something only once the hammer is assembled, then a moment-by-moment series of cases running from the beginning to the end of the assembly of the hammer would be just such a series. — Daniel Z. Korman

So, here is where I would offer a new argument, in support of my version of AV1:

1) If the A.F.V. against restricted composition is logically valid (but not necessarily sound), then the A.F.V. against restricted reason is logically valid (but not necessarily sound).
2) If so, then (AV1) is True: If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.
So, (AV1) is True: If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.

The problem is, if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of demons, people laugh at you. But if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of Pegasus, people at least have the basic decency to tell you why your ideas are wrong. — Arcane Sandwich

Wouldn't it depend on what the definition of demon is? In the ordinary folk's mind perhaps demon means some evil with horrible looking face and body destroying and doing bad things to people. That's just a vulgar idea from the movies or comics.

Rise above from that, and you could define demon as a negative side of God, humans or anything really. There are always positive and negative sides of everything. The positive side of the world, life, mind, pleasure etc could be defined as the angelic property, and the negative side of these objects such death, war, pain, hatred ... etc could be branded as the demonic properties of the existence.

In that system, there is nothing to laugh about, but it could be a good topic to have discussions or thoughts on.

Anyhow my point is, you could make anything possible theoretically, because theoretically means you are presuming, supposing or assuming such and such might be the case. You are not claiming anything true or false here. In the modal situation, anything can be made possible or impossible.
But physically, many things would be impossible to implement and prove. There is a difference.

Wouldn't it depend on what the definition of demon is? In the ordinary folk's mind perhaps demon means some evil with horrible looking face and body destroying and doing bad things to people. That's just a vulgar idea from the movies or comics. — Corvus

I honestly don't think that it would depend on what the definition of what the word "demon" means, or even what a demon is in the sense of vulgar ideas from movies or comics. Metaphysics should be able to talk about both: the word "demon" and the vulgar idea of what a demon is, as portrayed in movies and comic books. Why? Because if it can't do that, then it's not Metaphysics, it's something else, like Psychology, or Phenomenology, or Linguistics, or Anthropology. It would not be Metaphysics. But I think that Metaphysics can speak coherently about any topic, up to a certain point, and that certainly includes demons. Think of it like this: from the POV of Metaphysics, it's easier to talk about ghosts and demons than to talk about Being, God, Cosmos or Chaos.

Rise above from that, and you could define demon as a negative side of God, humans or anything really. There are always positive and negative sides of everything. The positive side of the world, life, mind, pleasure etc could be defined as the angelic property, and the negative side of these objects such death, war, pain, hatred ... etc could be branded as the demonic properties of the existence. — Corvus

What you said there is an example of what I call "Ying-Yang Metaphysics". It is metaphysics, done in the style of the ying-yang. But it is not the same thing as having a philosophical discussion about the image and the concept of the Ying and the Yang. But my colleagues that are actively working and publishing in the academic discipline of Western Metaphysics usually don't believe me when I say these things.

In that system, there is nothing to laugh about, but it could be a good topic to have discussions or thoughts on. — Corvus

I feel the same way about that idea.

Anyhow my point is, you could make anything possible theoretically — Corvus

And that's where I humbly disagree. Some things are impossible theoretically. For example, the idea that there might be a living, fire-breathing dragon somewhere on planet Earth, right now, in the year 2024, is an idea that is theoretically impossible, in the literal sense: it is incompatible with the body of knowledge that modern science currently has. Technically speaking, they do not co-here, there would be no coherence within a theoretical system that accepts, at the same time and in the same sense, the idea of a living, fire-breathing dragon in the world and the body of knowledge of modern science.

That sort of theoretical impossibility has a modal "ring" to it, but I haven't fully figured out that part yet.

For example, the idea that there might be a living, fire-breathing dragon somewhere on planet Earth, right now, in the year 2024, is an idea that is theoretically impossible, in the literal sense: it is incompatible with the body of knowledge that modern science currently has. Technically speaking, they do not co-here, there would be no coherence within a theoretical system that accepts, at the same time and in the same sense, the idea of a living, fire-breathing dragon in the world and the body of knowledge of modern science. — Arcane Sandwich

:chin: :grin:

That example is easy to solve, from a Metaphysical POV: the dragon in that video is not alive. So, it's not fully representative of what I said. I said that the dragon had to meet two criteria:

1) It has to be alive.
2) It has to breathe fire.

Those two ideas, taken together, are incompatible with modern science.

In the example of the video that you showed, the "dragon" only meets one of the two criteria: it breaths fire, but it is not alive. And, technically speaking, it doesn't breathe fire either, because only living beings (only some of them, not all) can breathe.

I know that you posted the video because it is humorous, but there is truth in humor. Some truth, not all the truth.

In the example of the video that you showed, the "dragon" only meets one of the two criteria: it breaths fire, but it is not alive. And, technically speaking, it doesn't breathe fire either, because only living beings (only some of them, not all) can breathe. — Arcane Sandwich

But what makes something alive? What do you mean by "alive"?
Can machines be not alive?

But what makes something alive? What do you mean by "alive"? — Corvus

Life, as biologists understand the term, is a list of criteria that any entity has to have, in other for it to be alive. Among those criteria, the most important ones are the following ones:

1) It must have genetic material (i.e., DNA and/or RNA)
2) It must have cellular organization (i.e., it must be a single cell, like a bacteria, or multicellular, like an animal)

There are other criteria, like maintaining homeostasis, but if it does not have the first two, then it is not alive. So, for example, a stone is not alive. Why not? Firstly, because it does not have genetic material (stones do not have DNA and/or RNA), and secondly because they do not have cellular organization (stones are not composed of cells, they are not "made" of cells).

Can machines be not alive? — Corvus

No. They cannot be alive, because they are like stones in that sense. A machine is not alive (i.e., it does not have genetic material, it does not have DNA and/or RNA, and it is not composed of cells, it is not "made" of cells).

That's my answer to those questions.

No. They cannot be alive, because they are like stones in that sense. A machine is not alive (i.e., it does not have genetic material, it does not have DNA and/or RNA, and it is not composed of cells, it is not "made" of cells). — Arcane Sandwich

Does it mean that no one was alive before DNA RNA and body cells were discovered?

“Give me example of two things which the PSR applies whereof one has the PSR more weakly associated with it.” – Bob Ross

I'm not sure that I can do that. The whole point of the OP is that this is "uncharted territory", so to speak.

That’s a big problem, though; because you are arguing that the PSR applies in degrees. If you can’t give any example of it or the reasons why you believe it, then why do you believe that it does apply in degrees?

I have been clear with my position: something either has a sufficient reason for its existence or it does not. This is binary: it would make no sense to say that this thing right here has 8% of a sufficient reason for its existence and this other thing has 45%.

My argument is structurally similar to Korman's

I am not familiar with Korman to speak adequately on it; but it sound equally implausible to me. I have no clue how AV5 (of their argument) is implied from composition being incapable of being a sorites series. I agree it isn’t like a sorites series; and yet nothing about that implies that there can’t be one thing over here which is absolutely simple (in composition) and another thing over there which is composed of an infinite amount of smaller things.

Does it have to do with the cross-interaction between those types of things? I could see it getting weird thinking about an object composed of an infinite of things as it causally interacts with a thing that is absolutely simple; but I don’t see how that lends support to your claim.

A.F.V. against what you might call "restricted reason"

I have no problem admitting that the map is NOT the territory; and that reality cannot be reduced to thought. This does not mean that we cannot meaningfully talk about the composition of objects, nor the reasons for why a thing exists.

If reality is an infinite of collections (or something like that), then everything would be applicable to the PSR; but you haven’t demonstrated that this is the case. The fact that the application of the PSR is not like a sorites series, does not entail that it applies to everything.

For example, imagine a particle that pops in and out of existence in nanoseconds: it would be plausible that it might not have a reason for why it existed at all.

is logically valid (but not necessarily sound)

How can be unsound if it is logical?

1) If the A.F.V. against restricted composition is logically valid (but not necessarily sound), then the A.F.V. against restricted reason is logically valid (but not necessarily sound).
2) If so, then (AV1) is True: If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.
So, (AV1) is True: If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.

This doesn’t make any sense. I would envision that you could make an argument from composition though, like:

P1: If an object is divisible, then it must have a sufficient reason for its existence. [ Divisible<Object<x>> → SR<Object<x>> ]
P2: All objects are infinitely divisible. [ ∀x (Object<x> → Divisible<Object<x>>) ]
C1: Therefore, every object must have a sufficient reason for its existence. [ ∀x (Object<x> → SR<Object<x>>) ]

I’ll already tell you the problem with this though: it makes no mention of how the infinitely composed object relates to other infinitely composed objects. If there is no reason for why they relate to each other than that would be an area where the PSR still wouldn’t apply (even if this argument above holds).

That’s a big problem, though; because you are arguing that the PSR applies in degrees. — Bob Ross

Indeed. That is indeed what I seem to be arguing. And, here is my humble opinion on that: it's not a topic that's usually discussed in the literature, on anything. It's a fringe topic in the world of Academia. Like, if I use Google Scholar for this kind of investigation, I don't exactly get many results, and the ones that I do indeed get, are of dubious quality.

So, I'm just doing the type of research here that's usually called "exploratory investigation". It's a type of investigation in which, since not much has been said, you go in anyways without having even a working hypothesis. It's like, you're not even putting a presumably false hypothesis to the test, you don't even have a hypothesis to begin with. Karl Popper said that every scientific investigation starts with a question, and that question is to be answered by the hypothesis to be put to the test. In an exploratory investigation, one doesn't even have a working hypothesis to begin with, because what one has, initially, is not a scientific question. It is instead a proto-scientific question (not to be confused with a pseudo-scientific question):

Question
Why is my existence as a person (and as an "Aristotelian substance") characterized by the factual properties that I have, instead of other factual properties? The perplexing thing here is that factual properties are contingent (in a modal sense), even though I experience them as necessary (in a modal sense). — Arcane Sandwich

You seem to be suggesting that the very question is objectionable. What I'm saying, literally, as objectively as I possibly can: Yes, you are right in one sense, and wrong in another sense.

So, if I am saying that, then:

1) there is a sufficient reason to your words in one sense (otherwise, you could not be right)

and

2) there is no sufficient reason to your words in another sense (otherwise, you could not be wrong).

Your freedom, your very freedom (not in a political sense, but in an ontological sense) is only possible if it is possible for you to be right and wrong about something, thought in different senses. Sometimes you "get it right", sometimes you "get it wrong". What's important is the following:

1) If you get it right, try to make sure that you're right about something that is indeed a big deal.
2) If you're wrong about something, try to make sure that you're wrong about something trivial.

Man, I don't know where I'm going with this, I'm just "harping away", as in, I'm just "playing the Classical harp" at this point. It's Aesthetically unpleasing. And this is why you jumped into this thread in the first place:

you don't like it.

But who says that you have to like a certain style, or a certain way, of doing philosophy? Unless you think that my OP is non-philosophical.

Is it? Honest opinion, please.

(note: I edited this comment for the sake of clarity -Arcane Sandwich)

Does it mean that no one was alive before DNA RNA and body cells were discovered? — Corvus

No, it does not. DNA, RNA, and body cells already existed before they were discovered. And so did people, and those people were indeed alive, because they had DNA, RNA, and body cells, even though they did not know that specific fact about themselves and about the world in general. They were, I guess you could say, ignorant of that fact.

Karl Popper said that every scientific investigation starts with a question, and that question is to be answered by the hypothesis to be put to the test.

This isn’t science: there are no tests; there are no proofs in philosophy. What we do in philosophy, is determine the plausibility and probability of theses being true based off of weighing the evidence.

So, if I am saying that

I did not follow this part at all; and I am not sure how it related to anything we were talking about before. Can you re-word it?

I don't know where I'm going with this

Yeah, I think you derailed a bit here. I have no clue what you are trying to say here.

And this is why you jumped into this thread in the first place:

you don't like it.

I am not here because I don’t like what you are doing: I recognize that it needs help being thought out—in sharpening the concepts involved and the methodology—and so I do my best to try to help you.

But who says that you have to like a certain style, or a certain way, of doing philosophy? Unless you think that my OP is non-philosophical.

Is it? Honest opinion, please.

It is unphilosophical in the sense that the concepts and arguments are not well drawn out; but the topic (about the PSR) is an area of philosophy.

You did not provide a response to my response in your response; nor have you provided any reasons for why we should believe that reality is a web of infinitely inter-connected things which would require the a sufficient reason for why they are the way they are.

It is unphilosophical in the sense that the concepts and arguments are not well drawn out — Bob Ross

Hmmm... could be.

However, you also said this:

This isn’t science: there are no tests; there are no proofs in philosophy. What we do in philosophy, is determine the plausibility and probability of theses being true based off of weighing the evidence. — Bob Ross

So let me see if I'm following your lead, here. You're saying, that the OP is unphilosophical. You also say that philosophy is not science. Let me ask you this, then: is philosophy unscientific, in the sense that the OP is unphilosophical? Because there is a third sense here that could be the case: that the OP is unphilosophical and unscientific, the worst of both worlds.

If that's the verdict, then I'll accept my fate, as a poet should. Tell me then, what is the OP to you? If it is not philosophy, and if it is not science, what is it? Honest question.

reality is a web of infinitely inter-connected things — Bob Ross

Hmmm... do I agree with this? No, I think not. That is not what reality is. Reality is the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense of the term.

which would require the a sufficient reason for why they are the way they are. — Bob Ross

Would they require a sufficient reason for that? That's my point, dude. That there's three options here. And those options are, logically, the same ones that are available for answering van Inwagen's Special Composition Question, aka SCQ:

Option 1) Never. If you choose this option, you're a mereological nihilist.
Option 2) Sometimes. If you choose this option, you're a mereological particularist.
Option 3) Always. If you choose this option, you're a mereological universalist.

What I'm saying is that in the case of modality, you have the same structure, at least in principle:

Option 1) Never. If you choose this option, you're a modal nihilist.
Option 2) Sometimes. If you choose this option, you're a modal particularist.
Option 3) Always. If you choose this option, you're a modal universalist.

And this is what we're currently investigating, in page 4 of this Thread.

So I ask you, as if I was a "detective": do I have a "philosophical lead" here, so to speak? Or am I "way off"?

How can be unsound if it is logical? — Bob Ross

Hey Bob, I didn't want to leave you hanging on this one. Here's the answer to this specific question, since it's a good question.

An argument can be formally valid (what you call "logical") and still be unsound (in the sense that at least one of the premises is false).

Here's an example of a logically valid but unsound argument:

1) If ghosts exist, then Paris is the capital of France.
2) Ghosts exist.
3) Therefore, Paris is the capital of France.

This argument is logical, it is valid. Why? Because it has the logical structure of a syllogism, in this particular case, it is a modus ponens (which is technically classified as a mixed hypothetical syllogism). Take a look at its structure, using Propositional Logic:

1) p → q
2) p
3) q

It is a deduction. However, as valid as the argument may be (and it is), it's unsound. Why? Well, lets replace each propositional letter with the truth value of each statement that was made:

1) F → T
2) F
3) T

You see, the conclusion, which is True, has been logically deduced from a series of premises in which the second one, in this case, was False.

The moral of the story here is that it is logically possible to deduce True conclusions from False premises (and yes, there are examples that show how this can even be the case for all of the premises).

What cannot happen, of course, is a case in which you have a series of True, and only True premises, and yet somehow you want to logically deduce a false conclusion from them. That, my friends, is not valid reasoning.