What moral facts?

I think you're really talking about an act of war, and I don't think just war theory would permit initiating a war or a war-like act simply for the sake of preventing some country from engaging in immorality.

I am not just speaking about war, but also diplomacy.

Some immoralities may justify wars, but certainly not all.

I agree.

I think we have a Christian duty to help humans qua human, but not a natural duty
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For example, what is your rationale? What does it mean that we have a duty "for the sake of the entire moral project?"
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Presumably you would say we also have a duty to rational aliens on other planets, if they exist?
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Do you offer any reason for why we are responsible to people on the other side of the world?

I think we have a duty to help humans qua Justice. Our rational capacities mark us out, teleologically, as requiring of ourselves, among many other things, to be impartial, objective, and to bestow demerit and merit where it is deserved (objectively). Under my view, a human has a duty to be Just merely in virtue of being a person; and basic human rights are grounded in one’s nature as a person, and so, yes, a rational alien species would have those same basic rights.

By the entire moral project, I mean the human good which, as humans, we must embark on; or, more abstractly, the “person good”, as persons, which we must embark on. Human good includes Justice because we are persons.

I am not arguing that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations; but we do have a responsibility to stop immoralities when they are grave enough. Under your view, I am not following why one would be obligated to even do this; as it is not their community. Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation?

For wealth, but usually not for necessity. But a nation would generally be seen as a kind of para-community.

Well, that’s my point: the whole of humanity is a para-community no differently. So if a person must be concerned about the pollution in their nation, then they should be concerned about it every else on planet earth.

Kant is attempting to rationalize Christian morality, and I don't think he succeeds

I don’t think he did either; because all he really noted is that reason requires universalizability of its maxims, and this doesn’t entail any objective moral truths whatsoever.

I also find his categorical vs hypothetical imperatives kind of suspect.

Humans are pretty much always dependent, but if there were a non-social species then yes, it would not have communal obligations. One does not have communal obligations if one does not belong to a community.

But they would still have moral obligations—no? One such obligation would be to use their excess of resources to help other persons (and then other non-person animals). No?

Supposing I have duties to random strangers on the other side of the world, in virtue of what teleological reality do I have those duties?

Ultimately, your teleology as a human. You are a rational animal, which is a person. Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos.

He says, "a voluntary act is one which is originated by the doer with knowledge of the particular circumstances of the act" (Nicomachean Ethics, III.i).

Yes, but I don’t think the lion is ignorant just because it lacks the sufficient ability to will in accordance with reason. My dog, e.g., wills in accordance with its own knowledge and conative dispositions all the time.

A lion is bound by nature to care for its young, but not by reason.

So is a human bound by nature to care for its young, does that mean that a woman who takes care of her babies is not dutiful to her maternal duties?

Or, perhaps, do you mean by “bound by nature” that it wills it not in accordance with its own will, but some other biological underpinning?

But you are trying to say that chess duties are not moral duties. I would say that if one breaks their promise to play chess then they are acting immorally, which can be done by cheating. I don't recognize non-moral duties.

If the duty is not (indirectly or directly) related to our Telos as a mind; then it is an amoral duty. To your point, since we are analyzing everything relative to our Telos, everything truly morally relevant.

If I take your argument seriously, then it sounds like all forms of moral relativism must express merely hypothetical imperatives. — Bob Ross

Sure, that sounds right to me.

Let’s take the most famous example of moral relativism that is a form of moral realism: Aristotelian Ethics. Do you believe that there are no categorical imperatives in Aristotle’s view? Perhaps not, as Kant’s idea of a hypothetical vs. categorical imperative is a bit shaky and useless, but there certainly are objective moral truths in it.

E.g., I would consider “I should live a virtuous life” to be a categorical imperative that is derivable from Aristotelian Ethics even though it is true relative to the Telos of living creatures.

The moral facts. I don't know what you are looking for here. I certainly am not going to try to enumerate all the moral facts to you. The point was that "might entails right" is false because the moral facts dictate what is right.

Is there 'moral might' and does it win out over 'moral wrong'? If so how so? If not how not?

Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos. — Bob Ross

Do they?

In my view the most successful political ideologies have been those that have made what the Catholic church considered a sin to a virtue. Capitalism has made greed to be a virtue and socialism has made envy to be a virtue, something that is justified. We have moral relativity and we are finding even objective truth to be somehow problematic and start to use truth as a talking point, subjective

The fact is that these trends are part of the Western culture, as are other far positive aspects. Marxism-Leninism is part of the Western heritage. So is the woke ideology too is part of this Western culture. The Iranian revolution isn't doing so good, the young people of Iran don't embrace the ageing theocracy so well. The ideology that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State preach isn't Western, but we aren't following those. The idea that the Ummah has to be unified under a new Caliphate and the detrimental effects of the West should be erased isn't what the majority of the muslim people adhere to.

It is racist to think that values like democracy and human rights aren't universal today in the World. People only admit to authoritarian rule when that rule lavishly gives them prosperity and free services, which are usually rentier states. The Gulf States, Monaco or Brunei can be undemocratic monarchies as people are prosperous and in those small countries people can go to the monarch with their troubles. Saudi-Arabia shows the tensions that happen when the society is too large.

Yet otherwise people in generally want things that the West stands for. A good example is that the new rulers of Syria have shed away from radical Islamism (and hence ISIS has declared the HTS to be heretics) and seek to build stronger institutions and at least try to unite a country where the last tyrannical regime put the ethnic and religious groups against each other. It just shows how the radical ideology of Al Qaeda/IS has failed.

Do they?

Yes, as I noted in my post. I did not follow how anything you said was relevant to it.

What is 'moral might'? I don't recognize any such conception.

Obviously many people simply don't follow what you say they must follow.

I am not just speaking about war, but also diplomacy. — Bob Ross

Okay, but in your OP you talk about "forcible imposition" and "taking over North Korea," which look like warlike acts (i.e. imposing some value on a country by taking it over).

I think we have a duty to help humans qua Justice. Our rational capacities mark us out, teleologically, as requiring of ourselves, among many other things, to be impartial, objective, and to bestow demerit and merit where it is deserved (objectively). Under my view, a human has a duty to be Just merely in virtue of being a person; and basic human rights are grounded in one’s nature as a person, and so, yes, a rational alien species would have those same basic rights. — Bob Ross

So is your answer, "We must help the guy on the other side of the world because justice?" I don't see a concrete argument here. Why does justice require it?

Note how clear my argument was when I spoke of justice:

"Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good."

This was based on what Aquinas says, "it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community..."

I am not arguing that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations; but we do have a responsibility to stop immoralities when they are grave enough. — Bob Ross

Why wouldn't you be? Why don't you require that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations? And isn't that precisely what we are doing when we intervene to prevent them from engaging in immoralities?

Under your view, I am not following why one would be obligated to even do this; as it is not their community. — Bob Ross

We are not obligated in a natural sense.

Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation? — Bob Ross

You are mixing together the notions of obligatory and permissible. What by natural virtue is supererogatory is neither impermissible nor obligatory.

Well, that’s my point: the whole of humanity is a para-community no differently. So if a person must be concerned about the pollution in their nation, then they should be concerned about it every else on planet earth. — Bob Ross

Well the point is that a para-community does not possess obligations. The U.S. is so large, diverse, and diffuse, that what is at stake is more like an alliance than the natural obligations of a community.

But they would still have moral obligations—no? One such obligation would be to use their excess of resources to help other persons (and then other non-person animals). No? — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. Not on natural premises. Else, what is the argument for why a person with abundant resources is obligated to help others?

Ultimately, your teleology as a human. You are a rational animal, which is a person. Persons must pursue truth, knowledge, honesty, open-mindness, justice, impartiality, objectivity, etc. in order to fulfill their rational telos. — Bob Ross

The first problem is the idea that I have a duty to be virtuous. To whom is this duty owed? Strictly speaking, one does not owe oneself anything, because they are but one agent, not two.

The second problem is the idea that justice requires us to fulfill the things you want us to fulfill. How does it do that? I am not aware of any kind of justice that obliges me to help people on the other side of the world.

Yes, but I don’t think the lion is ignorant just because it lacks the sufficient ability to will in accordance with reason. My dog, e.g., wills in accordance with its own knowledge and conative dispositions all the time. — Bob Ross

For Aristotle your dog does not have knowledge, and it therefore does not have volition.

So is a human bound by nature to care for its young, does that mean that a woman who takes care of her babies is not dutiful to her maternal duties? — Bob Ross

A human is bound by reason to care for its young, unlike a lion.

Or, perhaps, do you mean by “bound by nature” that it wills it not in accordance with its own will, but some other biological underpinning? — Bob Ross

Yes, biological instinct dictates that lions care for their young. They do not engage in knowledge, volition, choices, etc.

Let’s take the most famous example of moral relativism that is a form of moral realism: Aristotelian Ethics. — Bob Ross

I don't take Aristotle to be a moral relativist.

E.g., I would consider “I should live a virtuous life” to be a categorical imperative that is derivable from Aristotelian Ethics even though it is true relative to the Telos of living creatures. — Bob Ross

Sure, so to speak.

Okay, but in your OP you talk about "forcible imposition" and "taking over North Korea," which look like warlike acts (i.e. imposing some value on a country by taking it over).

Correct; but war is the last resort. One of the central points of the OP was that it is a resort. I am merely elaborating that diplomacy and other tactics can be used; which would equally be banned if one is completely anti-imperialist.

I don't see a concrete argument here. Why does justice require it?

Justice’s essence is fairness; which is about judging merit and demerit impartially and objectively. To do so, requires that one judge merit and demerit based off of substances (viz., natures), relations (e.g., you are the father, you must take care of the baby), and decisions (e.g., you decided to spend all your money, now live with the consequences); for anything else, which would have to be the upshot of conative dispositions, is not impartial and objective. The just man, thusly, assigns merit and demerit, e.g., because this ‘thing’ is a person, a being that is alive, a being that has feelings, a being that is not alive, etc. and/or because this being decided to do this or that. The just man constructs a hierarchal structure of values based off of this sort of fairness, such that respecting persons is highest and non-living-things lowest (with everything in between).

One must help others, in general, ceteris paribus, because they are supposed to be just; and justice requires, as mentioned above, assigning merit and demerit impartially and objectively. Therefore, a just person should care, in general, about other people (and living things) in virtue that they are people (and are living things); because there nature sets them as worthy of protection.

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to think about the contrary: to believe that one shouldn’t help a person when they could at no or little cost to themselves, is to squarely value a non-person over persons; which misses, at best, the nature of a person vs. a non-person. E.g., the super rich man who spends a million dollars on a yacht, for no purpose other than to enjoy it, is valuing the satisfaction and enjoyment of a yacht over persons (which he could have helped with the money). Valuing a non-living-thing over a person is to improperly understand the nature of a person. The fact that they have a rational will marks them out as the most valuable; and the fact they are alive, can feel pain, etc. makes them more valuable than non-life (like a yacht).

"Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good."

Like I said before, this equally applies to all of life. Nature is one inter-connected body. We cannot survive and realize our good without the good of Nature herself. E.g., that’s why we hunt certain numbers of certain species to ensure the balance is stable. This equally applies to humanity as a whole, including itself in the whole of Nature. If I must care about mercury pollution in the water supply because my good is bound up with my community’s good (and vice-versa); then I should care about it because my good is bound up with Nature’s good (and vice-versa).

The reason I didn’t make this argument above is because it isn’t the ultimate reason why I think a rational agent is committed to the “moral project” of “the good of life”: like I stated above, it is the consequence of understanding properly how to analyze, impartially and objectively, the substances, relations, and decisions which exist in reality. I cannot be just and value a non-living-thing over a living-thing, all else being equal: that is to disrespect the nature of a living-thing in contrast to a non-living-thing. A living thing has a will (to some extent, albeit not necessarily proper), desires, emotions, can feel pain, etc.

Why don't you require that we have a responsibility to take care of other nations?

Because by this you are envisioning, I would say, a nation babysitting another nation; which is not what I am talking about. On the contrary, a nation does have a responsibility to take care of another nation if it does not pose a substantial risk to their duties to their own people; and that is why we do not go around advocating that nations, which have their own issues and are not in a position to help other nations, to take care of other nations. If a nation was super-abundant and rich and could give their excesses to helping an extremely poor nation—and at no risk of nuclear war or something like—in principle—I would say they have a duty to do so. But that duty does not supercede their more local duties.

This is no different than how, e.g., a father has a duty to take care of his kids and to care about water pollution for his community, but if the two conflict then he must uphold the former over the latter. Since father’s do not tend to have a super-abundance of resources and time, we do not generally advocate that fathers should spend an enormous amount of time solving water pollution: they don’t have the time or resources. They fit into society with certain more immediate roles that they must focus on.

There’s a hierarchy to duties.

Under your view, is it not a just war to invade Nazi Germany? Is it not an obligation other nations would have because they have no duty to victims of another nation? — Bob Ross

You are mixing together the notions of obligatory and permissible. What by natural virtue is supererogatory is neither impermissible nor obligatory.

That’s fair: I guess I would agree with that; as, by my own logic, a nation is not obligated to go to war with another nation to stop them from doing something egregious if it poses a significant risk to the integrity of their own prosperity. However, I can reword this to get at the main point: would you say that it is not obligatory for a nation who could stop Nazi Germany without any risk to their own prosperity, if that were possible, to do so? I think it would be, in principle.

Well the point is that a para-community does not possess obligations. The U.S. is so large, diverse, and diffuse, that what is at stake is more like an alliance than the natural obligations of a community.

So, to be clear, you are saying that I do not actually have a duty to care about water pollution in a state of the US which I do not live because the US is not a proper community?

This is a slippery slope. I can make the same argument for my local county vs. my state. They are just as much a “para-community”; and that was my original point.

The first problem is the idea that I have a duty to be virtuous. To whom is this duty owed? Strictly speaking, one does not owe oneself anything, because they are but one agent, not two.

Duties arise out of roles one has; and one has roles for themselves—no? E.g., one of my roles to myself is that I need to just with myself—no?

I don’t see why duty arises out of roles one has to others.

The second problem is the idea that justice requires us to fulfill the things you want us to fulfill. How does it do that?

What do you mean? Justice just requires us to be fair.

For Aristotle your dog does not have knowledge, and it therefore does not have volition.

I disagree with Aristotle on that point then. Evolution makes no leaps.

A human is bound by reason to care for its young, unlike a lion.

I am asking: what if a woman takes care of her young merely in virtue of an unbearable, primal, and motherly urge to do it? Arguably, a lot of mothers out there operate (at least sometimes) on primal motherly urges and are not committing themselves to their motherly duties because they rationally deliberated about it. In that case, then, your view seems to dictate that the woman would not be being dutiful because it is not being done through reason.

They do not engage in knowledge, volition, choices, etc.

I agree that they don’t engage in volition in accordance with reason; but there’s also volition in accordance with conative dispositions. I can will as an upshot of my passions, or my reasons for doing so. Animals have volition in the lesser sense; and knowledge in the sense that they also formulate beliefs about their environment (to some degree). Have you seen how smart some birds are? Belgian Malinois are way too smart to believe that they have no knowledge; unless by knowledge you mean something oddly specific.

I don't take Aristotle to be a moral relativist

I thought moral relativism meant something else: nevermind.

Correct; but war is the last resort. One of the central points of the OP was that it is a resort. I am merely elaborating that diplomacy and other tactics can be used; which would equally be banned if one is completely anti-imperialist. — Bob Ross

Not so. People who argue for institutions like the UN or ICC to have more power aren't imperialists. Imperialism starts with an empire, which starts with one state. You perfectly can have anti-imperialist demanding a New World Order of their liking.

Who is against any diplomatic measures against states like North Korea are isolationists, that see their isolationism as ideological basis.

by my own logic, a nation is not obligated to go to war with another nation to stop them from doing something egregious if it poses a significant risk to the integrity of their own prosperity. — Bob Ross

So better North Korea have those nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach Hawaii, if not the Western parts of the Continental United States.

ICBMs are the logical way, to keep the @Bob Ross away. :wink:

One must help others, in general, ceteris paribus, because they are supposed to be just; and justice requires, as mentioned above, assigning merit and demerit impartially and objectively. Therefore, a just person should care, in general, about other people (and living things) in virtue that they are people (and are living things); because there nature sets them as worthy of protection. — Bob Ross

I'm struggling to find an argument here. We must help others because they are worthy of protection? Is that the idea?

The fact that they have a rational will marks them out as the most valuable; and the fact they are alive, can feel pain, etc. makes them more valuable than non-life (like a yacht). — Bob Ross

Does this relate to your ideas about merit and demerit?

The difficulty is that yachts should not need to be brought in when we are speaking about justice. If I owe you $15,000, then I owe you $15,000 whether or not I buy a yacht. And if I don't owe you $15,000, then I don't owe you $15,000 whether or not I buy a yacht. Do I owe it to you to prefer you to a yacht? I take it that the preferential option for the poor is a Christian principle, not a principle of natural justice.
You seem to have a principle whereby wealthy people owe poor people money, simpliciter.

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to think about the contrary: to believe that one shouldn’t help a person when they could at no or little cost to themselves, is to squarely value a non-person over persons; which misses, at best, the nature of a person vs. a non-person. — Bob Ross

I would say that a greedy person lacks beneficence, but need not lack justice. It would be virtuous for the wealthy to give to the poor, but it is not owed in justice. The wealthy is not in the poor's debt (unless, say, their wealth was won at the unjust expense of the poor).

Like I said before, this equally applies to all of life. Nature is one inter-connected body. We cannot survive and realize our good without the good of Nature herself. E.g., that’s why we hunt certain numbers of certain species to ensure the balance is stable. This equally applies to humanity as a whole, including itself in the whole of Nature. If I must care about mercury pollution in the water supply because my good is bound up with my community’s good (and vice-versa); then I should care about it because my good is bound up with Nature’s good (and vice-versa). — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. If I am vacationing in China or on a deserted island and I find a source of water pollution, I have no duty to the community to rectify it. And it really won't matter. "Nature" is not something I need attend to in itself. For example, if we find a source of water pollution on Mars, we have no duty to rectify it.

I cannot be just and value a non-living-thing over a living-thing — Bob Ross

The extreme pacifist types who try to do such a thing come up against the fact that it is impossible to avoid killing organisms, however small they may be. But I think it is a misuse of words to say that, say, a vegetarian is more just than a meat eater. Someone might claim that the vegetarian is more just insofar as they accord animals their proper rights. But the whole question revolves around whether animals have these rights, or whether human beings have a right to always receive money from those who have more money. I am not convinced that they do have such rights, and if you're not talking about rights then I'm not sure you're talking about justice.

If a nation was super-abundant and rich and could give their excesses to helping an extremely poor nation—and at no risk of nuclear war or something like—in principle—I would say they have a duty to do so. — Bob Ross

So here again we have this strange relativization of dues. You think that a super-abundant nation has a duty to babysit other nations, and that the only reason no one has a duty to babysit is because no one is super-abundant, no?

But that duty does not supercede their more local duties.

This is no different than how, e.g., a father has a duty to take care of his kids and to care about water pollution for his community, but if the two conflict then he must uphold the former over the latter. Since father’s do not tend to have a super-abundance of resources and time, we do not generally advocate that fathers should spend an enormous amount of time solving water pollution: they don’t have the time or resources. They fit into society with certain more immediate roles that they must focus on.

There’s a hierarchy to duties. — Bob Ross

You seem to think that everything we ought to do is a duty. Thus a person ought to be merciful, beneficent, witty, healthy, and generally virtuous; therefore we have a duty to be these things. I think you are stretching the meaning of words like 'duty', 'justice', etc., much too far. Any common and reasonable notion of justice would say that there are bad acts which are not unjust, and there are good acts which are not just.

That’s fair: I guess I would agree with that; as, by my own logic, a nation is not obligated to go to war with another nation to stop them from doing something egregious if it poses a significant risk to the integrity of their own prosperity. However, I can reword this to get at the main point: would you say that it is not obligatory for a nation who could stop Nazi Germany without any risk to their own prosperity, if that were possible, to do so? I think it would be, in principle. — Bob Ross

No, and let me put it this way. There is heroism. There is going above and beyond (supererogation). Now if someone goes out of their way to stop a bully or malefactor when they have no duty to do so, we call them a hero. We call them virtuous. We call them beneficent. If someone does their duty we say, "He did his job. He did what he was expected to do." These are not the same thing.

I'm not convinced that there is any room for supererogation in your moral system.

So, to be clear, you are saying that I do not actually have a duty to care about water pollution in a state of the US which I do not live because the US is not a proper community? — Bob Ross

Yep.

This is a slippery slope. I can make the same argument for my local county vs. my state. — Bob Ross

Maybe, but you can't reasonably claim that your town is not a community. The slippery slope ends at some point.

Duties arise out of roles one has; and one has roles for themselves—no? E.g., one of my roles to myself is that I need to just with myself—no? — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. I can try to make a promise to myself, but breaking it is not injustice in any strict sense.

I am asking: what if a woman takes care of her young merely in virtue of an unbearable, primal, and motherly urge to do it? — Bob Ross

I don't think that happens. At the very least the woman is not impeding her natural instincts, and that not-impeding is praiseworthy. But in general I don't think human acts are separable into instinctual acts and rational acts. There is a kind of homogeneity, where rationality infuses and includes all of our acts (except for perhaps extreme cases of insanity and the like).

I agree that they don’t engage in volition in accordance with reason; but there’s also volition in accordance with conative dispositions. I can will as an upshot of my passions, or my reasons for doing so. Animals have volition in the lesser sense; and knowledge in the sense that they also formulate beliefs about their environment (to some degree). Have you seen how smart some birds are? Belgian Malinois are way too smart to believe that they have no knowledge; unless by knowledge you mean something oddly specific. — Bob Ross

It is not oddly specific to exclude knowledge from animals. The burden of proof is on you to find philosophers who think that animals have knowledge, beliefs, responsibilities, duties, etc. You are presenting an idiosyncratic view in this.

I thought moral relativism meant something else: nevermind. — Bob Ross

Okay.

Your response was good; and I need to think about it more and get back to you. There's two particularly challenging problems I haven't thought about much before. (1) The first being that justice can be viewed in two seemingly irreconcilable ways (and this reminded me of After Virue by MacIntyre, as he outlined in well in there): (A) in terms of some account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of what they have legitimately acquired and earned, or (B) in terms of some account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs and of the means to meet such needs. (2) The second being that moral naturalism doesn't seem to afford any notion of selfless justice whatsoever; instead, the only kind of naturalistic justice seems to be the need to socialize.

With respect to #1, it seems like your view of justice is squarely, although I don't want to put words in your mouth, A. Whereas, my attempted rebuttals invoke a sense of B; hence the disagreement. I am not so sure now if Justice is like A, B, or some sublated version I haven't thought of yet.

With respect to #2, if there is truly no way to naturally ground selfless justice, then I think you are right to point out that the only justice which one would participate in is the kind which is required by way of social goods; which would be essentially the relation between communal and individual goods. I am not so sure here either that naturalism can't afford an answer, but if it does I would reckon it would have to be grounded in the rational aspect of our nature (so Kant comes to mind here).

I am curious what @180 Proof has to say, although I am guessing it will be on consequentialistic lines of thought.

Let me outline a basic example so that we are all on the same page. Imagine you are completely self-sufficient living up in the mountains; viz., you are able to live off of the land, which is no one else's property, and need absolutely no social interactions between people to realize your own good (e.g., perhaps you are a bit anti-social). You come across an injured person in the woods, in need of desperate help. The question is twofold:

(C) Do you have any natural duty to help them?
(D) Would not helping them be an act of natural injustice?

As it stands now, I can think of no reason why one would have a natural duty to them at all; nor why it would be unjust. I feel like it is unjust, but I am starting to think that is the mere result of the Christian conscience in me from my forebearers.

(1) The first being that justice can be viewed in two seemingly irreconcilable ways (and this reminded me of After Virue by MacIntyre, as he outlined in well in there): (A) in terms of some account of what and how a given person is entitled to in virtue of what they have legitimately acquired and earned, or (B) in terms of some account of the equality of the claims of each person in respect of basic needs and of the means to meet such needs. (2) The second being that moral naturalism doesn't seem to afford any notion of selfless justice whatsoever; instead, the only kind of naturalistic justice seems to be the need to socialize. — Bob Ross

Here is Aristotle on justice in the narrower sense of a particular virtue:

But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for one man’s share to be unfair or fair as compared with another’s); and another kind is that which has to give redress in private transactions. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.2

Of course this is slightly different from your division.

I would say that for Aristotle the relevant sort of selflessness arises not by social contract, but by the fact that humans are social organisms. This interdependence creates a natural solicitude for members of the family or community. For example, rather than caring for one's spouse out of selfish motive, one's identity stretches to encompass one's spouse, or one's children, or the members of one's community. If my sense of self expands to include my family, and I act in favor of the common familial good, am I still acting selfishly? We can debate that, but it is not individualistic selfishness. At the same time, it does not extend to every family or community.

So I think an Aristotelian natural ethic is quite robust. It’s just that Christianity says things like this, “Why, one will hardly die for a righteous man—though perhaps for a good man one will dare even to die. But God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us” (Romans 5). This goes beyond sacrificing for one’s friends or family members or community, and I think the modern world would do well to discern when it is drawing on religious premises and when it is drawing on natural reason.

With respect to #1, it seems like your view of justice is squarely, although I don't want to put words in your mouth, A. Whereas, my attempted rebuttals invoke a sense of B; hence the disagreement. I am not so sure now if Justice is like A, B, or some sublated version I haven't thought of yet. — Bob Ross

There are different ways to go with this. Classically equality before a community is a matter of distribution, and in that sense the one in charge of distributing honors, or wealth, or rights, is the one who is required to be just. So there is a kind of equality vis-a-vis the community, via distributive justice. But on a naturalistic conception, who is in charge of distributing resources such that they are equally available to Africa, Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Australia? There is no one who is currently in charge (except for, say, God). Therefore it's not clear how the naturalist can make a claim like this, although I think there are certain limited claims that can be made about the equality of all those possessing a human nature, which you have begun to make.

Let me outline a basic example so that we are all on the same page. Imagine you are completely self-sufficient living up in the mountains; viz., you are able to live off of the land, which is no one else's property, and need absolutely no social interactions between people to realize your own good (e.g., perhaps you are a bit anti-social). You come across an injured person in the woods, in need of desperate help. The question is twofold:

(C) Do you have any natural duty to help them?
(D) Would not helping them be an act of natural injustice?

As it stands now, I can think of no reason why one would have a natural duty to them at all; nor why it would be unjust. I feel like it is unjust, but I am starting to think that is the mere result of the Christian conscience in me from my forebearers. — Bob Ross

Yes, I would say that failing to help them would be bad/unvirtuous, but not unjust (unless by "unjust" we only mean bad/unvirtuous). I think even the injured person would recognize this somewhat, in the sense that they would plead for beneficence rather than demand justice.

(There has been a good deal of discussion in the last five years on the topic of human dignity and infinite human dignity. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre's lecture on, "Human Dignity: A Puzzling and Possibly Dangerous Idea?")

Fyi – I've not read this thread but, fwiw ...

You & co seem to be conflating normative ethics (re: interpersonal harms) with applied ethics (re: structural/policy injustices), Bob. Consider this post reply to @Leontiskos from the thread The Breadth of the Moral Sphere
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/899132

I've not read this thread

No worries at all: I don't expect you to read the entire thread (:

I read that comment you linked, but I am, unfortunately, not following. How am I conflating normative with applied ethics? Are you saying my thought experiment was invalid (on grounds of some sort of conflation)?

:up:

I will think about it and get back to you.

My basic political orientation tells me to be against nationalism, western supremacy, and imperialism. Socialists are supposed to see all nations as one, all workers as brothers, etc. etc. On the other hand, nationalism seems like a reasonable vehicle for large-scale organization. I don't see the species as anywhere close to ready to abandon national identity.

As for imperialism, its methods are a proven method of advancement for the imperialistic power -- be it the Romans or the British, Mughal or Dutch, this dynasty or any of the other numerous empires that have arisen and fallen. People dither over colonialism and imperial conquest, but where would much of the world be today if no ambitious group had set out to capture as much territory as possible, and in doing so, gained glory, riches, and power to fuel its cultural development?

Every culture might be equal in the endeavor to meet basic human requirements, but that's a low bar. Some cultures are better than others--Not necessarily better at any given instant, but on average, superior cultures get better over time. Inferior civilizations get worse over time.

I've was lucky enough to be born in a culture which benefitted from a long history of colonialism, imperialism, and western supremacy. Had I been born in a culture which was the recipient of the hob-nailed boot, I'd look at things differently, I suppose.

If a people want to get ahead, nationalism, imperialism, supremacy, dominance, force -- that's how it's done.

Inferior civilizations get worse over time. — BC

Inferior civilizations simply change also peacefully: they copy the ways of other civilizations and adapt, with likely the last bastion being simply the language. Even that can wither away peacefully. Globalization has given us this already. In Antiquity people from different civilizations dressed quite differently, unlike today you couldn't in an airport define what "civilization" people come from by looking at their clothes. Hence there's a large unifying process happening through globalization, which is actually peaceful and voluntary.

Yet usually this is done by force and violence. A minority is simply not permitted to teach it's own language in school and the identity that makes a people a nation ir a religious group different is repressed. Especial empires do this because empires fight against the nationalism of the people they have subjugated. Empires only admit the nationalism they themselves are founded on. It's extremely rare that the empire would be so enlightened that it would accept the identities it has subjugated and would create a higher identity that all would belong to. The best successful example of this are the English with the creation of a British identity that is also accepted by the Welsh and the Scots and with some Northern Irish. Even if the British identity was made also for the Irish, the brutal history between the Irish and the English didn't make it possible.

The simple fact is that empires typically resort to violence, repression and all the negative actions that makes imperialism such a negative word and do not have much if any superior aspects in their culture other than the needed military might. What did the largest empire in the World, the Mongol Empire, really give us in hindsight? Not much.

Best example is the empire that we have still among us alive and kicking: Russia. Russian has an imperial identity, it isn't a nation state. If one understands this, then everything that Putin is doing makes sense. If one is totally ignorant about this, then one can make the mistake of thinking that Russia is a country just like any other European country. China would be similar too as it has had waves of being united and separated nations also.

Unfortunately the term empire is used in a variety of ways and hides the classic definition of a state that rules over a group of countries and people.

Thanks for your thoughtful insight, as always!

Are you saying my thought experiment was invalid (on grounds of some sort of conflation)? — Bob Ross

Yes, because, as any experienced attorney or judge will attest to: "justice" is not normative (re: micro bottom-up –> well-being (i.e. utilitarian)) as you seem to conceive of it, Bob; in a naturalistic moral framework¹, "justice" is applied (re: macro top-down –> nonzero sum conflict resolution (i.e. consequential)).

(2023) first 2 sentences ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857773 [1]