What began as a simple contradiction, "It is true and not true that gold exists," ended as a more complex contradiction, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

I haven’t said either of those things.

There's no such thing as the truth; there's only the truth of a sentence, so this remark doesn't make much sense.

What you should say is that the non-existence of a sentence doesn't affect the existence of rain. — Michael

It does make sense given that I described what I mean to say something is true in the same sentence.

It also seems to follow from what I said that: to say a sentence is true is to say that what [that] sentence is about is the case (i.e. exists). To say something is true is to say that it is the case. Seems to me that what truth is actually about is the existence of things, where things are the case (Analogous to how the word "gold" is about gold). The fact we need sentences to assert that is incidental. If an observer sees something and asserts that it has the property of being the case, what is the case is a property of the observation / thing that is seen, not the assertion itself. How they say that it is the case or the very fact that they say it is incidental to the thing that has the property and was observed.

Edit: additional [that]

I haven’t said either of those things. — Michael

Sure you have.

You have substantially elevated the level of discourse in this thread, and I don't think the nature of truth is something that one can grasp in a day. For these reasons I will try not to complain. Curiously, fdrake's approach of setting out an argument beginning with two quasi-contradictory premises is thus far the best way of getting at the paradox:

1 ) Take the world without humans.
2 ) Imagine that nevertheless one human existed. — fdrake

His "modal context" workaround is apparently to say that it is not true that gold exists, but it would be true were there a mind. And there's no dinking around with the incoherent, "Gold exists but it's not true that gold exists." Such is a classical answer.

His "modal context" workaround is apparently to say that it is not true that gold exists, but it would be true were there a mind. And there's no dinking around with the incoherent, "Gold exists but it's not true that gold exists." Such is a classical answer. — Leontiskos

Yeah. Can there be truth without a truthbearer? Seems to me a different question to whether there can be rocks on earth without humans. People treating language as a required interface between mind and world, as if they were apart from each other.

You seem to continually misunderstand what I am saying.

"it is raining" is a correct description of the world (if it is raining).

The property of being a correct description of the world is a property that only sentences have. If there are no sentences then there are no correct descriptions of the world. But there's still rain.

Now just replace "is a correct description of the world" with "is true".

You seem to be reading something into my words that isn't there.

Yeah. Can there be truth without a truthbearer? Seems to me a different question to whether there can be rocks on earth without humans. — fdrake

Right.

Sure you have. — Leontiskos

1. Gold exists in universe B but nothing true or false is said in universe B
2. That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B

I said (1). You accused me of saying (2). (1) and (2) are not the same thing.

Try addressing my actual words and not the word you're putting in my mouth.

Can there be truth without a truthbearer? Seems to me a different question to whether there can be rocks on earth without humans. — fdrake

Which I thought I made very clear here, but I guess not.

- See:

What I say is true, and is being said in universe A. — Michael

And sure, you continue to refuse to talk about truth and instead want to merely talk about utterances, but my whole point is that you need to summon up the courage to move beyond that. "But now you should go on to ask yourself how it is..."

I'm not refusing to talk about truth. I am only talking about truth. Truth is a property of sentences. Sentences do not exist as mind-independent Platonic entities. If nothing is said then there are no sentences, and if there are no sentences then there are no true sentences.

And the existence of gold does not depend on us saying "gold exists".

Which I thought I made very clear here, but I guess not. — Michael

It's complicated by the fact that any theory of truth worth its salt should evaluate "There were rocks before the advent of humans" as true. Since there were. But the context of evaluation is somehow here and now - which allows some conditioning operation by a mind or language, and somehow back then - which means thinking about evaluation as inherently counterfactual.

24 pages on we've got people arguing over which flavour of language dependence dinosaurs had when they existed, I mean when "dinosaurs existed" was true, through the medium of the equivalence between the latter and the former which a successful theory of truth must provide.

I'm not refusing to talk about truth. I am only talking about truth. Truth is a property of sentences. Sentences do not exist as mind-independent Platonic entities. If nothing is said then there are no sentences, and if there are no sentences then there are no true sentences. — Michael

...and if there are no true sentences, then there is no truth. In which case my description of your illustration is perfectly accurate, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B."

In which case my description of your illustration is perfectly accurate, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

No it's not.

- Make sure to use earplugs with that sand.

It's complicated by the fact that any theory of truth worth its salt should evaluate "There were rocks before the advent of humans" as true — fdrake

I don't see why that's a complication? Let's just replace "is true" with "is a correct description of the world".

Can there be a correct description of the world without someone saying something? No.
Can rocks exist without someone correctly describing the world? Yes.
Is "rocks can exist without someone correctly describing the world" a correct description of the world? Yes.

Seems simple to me.

I don't see why that's a complication? — Michael

Because it quantifies into a context in which there are no truthbearers. In that condition no one could assert that there were dinosaurs, so "there are dinosaurs" isn't true at that point in time. Even though there were dinosaurs at that point in time... now.

It's complicated by the fact that any theory of truth worth its salt should evaluate "There were rocks before the advent of humans" as true. — fdrake

I still think the terminal question is about the relation of mind, truth, and world. Is mind accidental to the world or not? Then depending on how one conceives truth, the relation of truth and world will follow upon that.

This whole focus on sentences and utterances is a materialistic rider that is obscuring the question. To focus on truth-bearers in that sense would require one to say that unenunciated propositions have no truth value. For example, suppose there is a fish that we do not know about. Does it truly exist? There is no actual truth-bearer regarding it, so apparently it cannot be true that it exists (or does not exist).

Folks in this thread see mind as accidental to truth. They seem to think that the world is a database of Platonic truths, and when a mind comes on the scene it can begin to download those truths.

That's just a matter of tense.

"there were dinosaurs" is true.

This doesn't require someone to have truthfully said "there are dinosaurs".

Folks in this thread see mind as accidental to truth. They seem to think that the world is a database of Platonic truths, and when a mind comes on the scene it can begin to download those truths. — Leontiskos

I see what you mean. The world is seen as a database of propositional forms, if you'll pardon the pun. But criticising that is another thread.

That's just a matter of tense. — Michael

I'll make one more remark on the matter. Just to highlight the possibility of the debate, rather than to actually have it with you - I've no interest in that. If you assert "there are dinosaurs at t", where t is a time when there are dinosaurs... It's true. But "there are dinosaurs at t" cannot be true at t, since there were no truthbearers at t.

That's just a matter of tense.

"there were dinosaurs" is true.

This doesn't require someone to have truthfully said "there are dinosaurs". — Michael

This is Janus' future-truths transposed to be about the past instead of the future:

You want to say that a claim about the future involves no claim about what will be true in the future, and that's not coherent. — Leontiskos

"You want to say that a claim about the past involves no claim about what was true in the past, and that's not coherent."

If you assert "there are dinosaurs at t", where t is a time when there are dinosaurs... It's true. But "there are dinosaurs at t" cannot be true at t, since there were no truthbearers at t. — fdrake

I wouldn't say "there are dinosaurs at t", I'd say "there were dinosaurs at t", and in saying it (now) I am speaking the truth.

This perhaps ties into something I said earlier:

1. "Languages will die out" is true
2. "Languages are dead" will be true

(1) is true but (2) is necessarily false.

I see what you mean. The world is seen as a database of propositional forms, if you'll pardon the pun. But criticising that is another thread. — fdrake

Well the discussion began when I pointed out that Banno thinks there are truths even where there are no minds:

For me the strangeness of Banno's position is the claim that truth can exist where no minds do. Classically, truth pertains to minds/knowers, and if there are no knowers then there is no truth. There is some overlap with Pinter, here. To disagree with Pinter as strongly as Banno has is to run afoul also of this broader school which associates truth with mind. — Leontiskos

So that is the starting point, and this deviation into truth-bearers a tangent.

You want to say that a claim about the future involves no claim about what will be true in the future, and that's not coherent. — Leontiskos

A claim about the future is a claim about what will exist in the future and about what will happen in the future. We don't need true sentences to exist in the future for rocks to exist in the future.

A claim about the future is a claim about what will exist in the future and about what will happen in the future. We don't need to claim that true sentences exist in the future. — Michael

Truths and sentences are about things, not sentences.

Truths and sentences are about things, not sentences. — Leontiskos

Truth is a property of a sentence that correctly describes these other things. Truth is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

Falsehood is a property of a sentence that incorrectly describes these other things. Falsehood is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

Truth is a property of a sentence that correctly describes these other things. — Michael

This definition is what is leading to so many of your contradictions. Sentences have no existence or meaning apart from minds. You can't separate out sentences as if they float around in the ether.

Sentences have no existence or meaning apart from minds. — Leontiskos

I know.

You are misrepresenting what
I have said. Just as you misrepresented what Michale said.

But I think there’s a more interesting approach to this topic.

We start with the counterfactual sentences “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would have been assassinated” and “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would not have been assassinated.”

The counterfactual-realist would say that one of these sentences is true, but then that would seem to require the existence of a counterfactual truthmaker. Can we make sense of such a thing? Is there good reason to believe that there is such a thing?

With this consideration in mind, we can ask the same thing about sentences about the future. Such sentences being true would seem to require the existence of a future truthmaker. Does this require eternalism to be the case?

And the same questions can be asked about sentences about the past. Does them being true require presentism to not be the case?

Are past and future truthmakers not just past and future actualities? With your 'Hitler' example there can be no actuality, therefore no truth regarding whether or not he would have been assassinated. When it comes to the past and to the future if the required conditions are asserted, presumably there were and will be actualities which would make what we say now true or false.