I see my mistake. A creature IN-capable of thought (…) doesn’t have any, making his incapacity for comparing them with anything, moot.

I say empathy predates theory of mind by many millennia. — Vera Mont

The origins of both theory of mind and empathy go back about 5-6 million years ago.

"Homo sapiens" translates to "wise man"

The species Homo sapiens dates back about 200,000 years ago.

We're also very big on wishful thinking. — Vera Mont

That's true.

How do you know that non-human animals don't have a theory of mind? — Ludwig V

The scientific research into nonhuman animals’ theory of mind (ToM) goes back decades and there is no consensus. But do I think a dog can interpret and make inferences about human thought? No.

How do you know that other people have a theory of mind? — Ludwig V

I am human and I can make inferences into what is in another mind. The key word is inference.

We do not just perceive – we perceive and interpret. the mental states of others.

Besides empathy, things like collaboration, education, and figuring out our social standing, rely on our theory of mind.

Since the theory of mind is posited as an essential prerequisite of empathy, it seems to follow that if somone (human) can interact appropriately with other people, they have a theory of mind. — Ludwig V

Every time you form a conclusion about what is in the mind of another (whether it is correct or not) you are using your ToM capacity.

So, if some non-human animals can interact appropriately with various other animals, including human animals, does it not follow that they have a theory of mind? — Ludwig V

Not necessarily. Interacting is not the same as interpreting mental states.

In practice, these supposed different alternatives come down to the same process. There is no way to read a mind except by reading behaviour. — Ludwig V

But not all reading of behavior involves ToM.

When you read a book, is the end goal to see the symbols on the page, or to make meaning out of them?

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can.

The origins of both theory of mind and empathy go back about 5-6 million years ago. — Questioner

Theory of mind originated with gorillas? Without language? OK - I did not know that 'theory' could be applied to an inarticulate process like watching and interpreting the physical actions of another sentient being. Though I do suspect emotional empathy is older and less dependent on the socialization of young.

Interacting is not the same as interpreting mental states. — Questioner

I don't see how two individuals - other than predator and prey - can interact without interpreting states of mind - or at least states of emotion and health.

And yet, you have not elaborated the scientific method whereby it can be objectively measured and verified. — Vera Mont

Nor have I claimed that. — creativesoul

But you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough.

I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are. — creativesoul

Yes, I'm aware of that. I'm also aware of how much reliable factual information philosophy has contributed to human knowledge over the last two millennia.
The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational.

Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well. — creativesoul

How did sorts of thought become the central issue? A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. Adding layers of complexity, all the way up to wondering why the universe exists, doesn't change the fundamental nature of reason itself; it merely obfuscates the issue by shifting focus from the process to the subject matter.
A very small minority of humans set themselves the task of mulling over questions with no available answers (just how many angels can dance on a pin); a large minority grapple with the invention and application of technology or administrative affairs; the vast majority think about getting food, securing their physical well being, having sex, raising their young, pursuing pleasure when they get the chance - much like all the other animals. They go about these activities through both rational and irrational decisions - much like all the other animals.

The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational. — Vera Mont

How did sorts of thought become the central issue? — Vera Mont

Not all rational thought is the same. Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. Hence, any and all thought that is existentially dependent upon metacognition is of the sort that non human creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold.

There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.

you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough. — Vera Mont

That's not true.

A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. — Vera Mont

I'm guessing this refers to the earlier examples of tool use and learning how to open gates. I agree that those are cases of rational thinking in non human animals. None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.

On the contrary...

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

Can dogs compare their own behaviour with a set of rules governing that behaviour? Can they thik about the rules placed on their behaviour?

If not, then how can they know what you claim they can know?

Theory of mind originated with gorillas? — Vera Mont

More likely in the most recent common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, which lived about 6-8 million years ago.

I did not know that 'theory' could be applied to an inarticulate process like watching and interpreting the physical actions of another sentient being. — Vera Mont

Theory of mind does not refer to the process, but the end result – the inferences you make is the theory - formed in your mind – it’s a theory about what is in the mind of another mind.

I don't see how two individuals - other than predator and prey - can interact without interpreting states of mind - or at least states of emotion and health. — Vera Mont

We can make conclusions about emotion and health just by observing outward signs. This is not what forming a theory of mind is about. If you form a theory about what is in another mind, you form conclusions about the mental state of another with a view to making predictions.

A good book with a detailed explanation of theory of mind is Jesse Bering’s The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the Meaning of Life.

Here are two quotes from it -

From psychologist Nicholas Humphrey (pre-1978):

We humans … have evolved to be “natural psychologists.” The most promising but also the most dangerous elements in our environment are other members of our own species. Success for our human ancestors must have depended on being able to get inside the minds of those they lived with, to second-guess them, anticipate where they were going, help them if they needed it, challenge them, manipulate them. To do this they had to develop brains that would deliver a story about what it’s like to be another person from the inside.

From psychologists David Premark and Guy Woodruff (defining theory of mind in 1978):

A system of inferences of this kind may be properly viewed as a theory because such (mental) states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others.

Dogs want to please and they understand when you are displeased and are even able to anticipate that. I once had a Jack Russell terrier called Jimi and I decided to get some hens. He killed a hen and I scolded him. Some time after that my partner called me at work and told me Jimi had killed another and that the dead bird was on the floor near the front door. She asked me what she should do with the dead chook and I said she should leave it. When I opened the front door Jimi was sitting next to the dead bird shaking. He knew he had done the wrong thing. He never bothered another hen.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.

We can make conclusions about emotion and health just by observing outward signs. — Questioner

Of course. How else do we draw conclusions about anything? We don't get inward signs of other individuals.

Not all rational thought is the same — creativesoul

So what? A thought is rational or irrational. And action the result of thought or of emotion.

Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. — creativesoul

Yes, yes, several people have already established human specialness about two dozen times in this thread alone, and I have not disputed it once. I just don't see how it could invalidate the capability of other species for rational thought.

There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized. — creativesoul

Oh I appreciate the distinction you keep making. Sounds much like Descartes': They don't speak [in human words] and they don't philosophize. Granted on both counts. I just don't consider it relevant to the topic.

you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough. — Vera Mont
That's not true. — creativesoul

Than what was the purpose of

What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work. — creativesoul

That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, if you're not fussy about objectivity.

None of them require a creature capable of metacognition. — creativesoul

Neither does the Ford assembly line. The point is still to find areas of human specialness. You already have that. Why belabour it?

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take. — creativesoul

This is the direction this discussion needs to take. — creativesoul

It's been taken in that direction ten times over. By all means, pursue it again.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?

Of course. How else do we draw conclusions about anything? — Vera Mont

We imagine them.

what was the purpose of
What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
— creativesoul
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, — Vera Mont

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims. — creativesoul

That's why.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of? — creativesoul

I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking.
Reason is reason, whether it's applied to practical or fanciful subjects.

We imagine them. — Questioner

That's been known to produce variably reliable results.

That's why. — creativesoul

That's equally true of your theories.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards? — creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.

There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding. — creativesoul

That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me.
If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that.

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not. — creativesoul

I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language? I can only express it in language. Could a dog believe that there is beer in the fridge? Well, it can certainly believe that its dinner is in the fridge.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have? — creativesoul

Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.

On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".
The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since". — creativesoul

I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true.

A process.
Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature. — creativesoul

We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves.

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims. — creativesoul

To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. It is sensible to evaluate one's presuppositions in tne light of observations and to revise or refine them before making further observations. It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal.

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch. — creativesoul

I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. The idea that he is doing it for fun is not impossible, but is a bit of a stretch. If females did it too, it would be plausible. But, as I understand it, they don't. Suppose that female behaviour indicates that they are attracted by what the male does. Perhaps that Is just an coincidence, but that's a bit of a stretch too.

That's been known to produce variably reliable results. — Vera Mont

For sure. Assumptions, misperceptions, misconceptions, misunderstandings, delusions and fallacies all happen.

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
— Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take. — creativesoul

Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought?

Sorry about your Thanksgiving. Indeed, a lot of negative possibilities come along with our mental capacity. And the negative crap is, like Yoda said about the Dark Side, quicker, easier, more seductive. — Patterner

Thanks but the bad thing turned into a good thing. :grin: It seemed like an end-of-the-world event but now I see it as the beginning of wonderful new opportunities.

I was wondering how animals handle such events and decided their relationships change and their position in the troop can change, especially when they transition to adulthood.

Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.

You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve. — creativesoul

Thanks as I said above, what I thought was almost too terrible to bear has turned into a good thing. However, I am still pondering what you have said about the spirit of our times and what is happening in families. I might want to transfer this to a thread about the fall of civilizations.

Look at what I found because the posts in this thread pushed me to understand more...

https://chimpsnw.org/2023/02/conflict-and-reconciliation-2/

But perhaps most importantly, I want to show you how they make up afterwards. Chimp societies wouldn’t hold together very long if the individuals within them didn’t have the capacity to reconcile, and that is the saving grace for both the chimpanzees themselves and our own ability to care for them. Because no matter how bad things get, they usually find a way to move forward together.

Thank you, thank you everyone! Sometimes I worry that this thread is getting too far from topic but then I see a possible connection and I am blown away by the expansion of my mind. This is why I come here.

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.

That's why. — creativesoul

That's equally true of your theories. — Vera Mont

Sure. It's true of any ToM.

If the ToM being fleshed out by myself were incapable of drawing and maintaining those distinctions, then it too would inevitably result in conflating between non human thought and belief and human thought and belief. Hence, the importance of the endeavor.

I/we do not have all the answers, nor do I think it's possible to acquire them. We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?
— creativesoul
I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking. — Vera Mont

Which inevitably results in personification(anthropomorphism). That's unacceptable by my standards.

We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. — creativesoul

And this is important to you. Why?

They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'. — creativesoul

What does this mean? Malevolution? Man shooting the wrong species?

That [non-discrimination of thoughts by subject matter]'s unacceptable by my standards. — creativesoul

Yes, I can see that. I can also substitute 'prejudices' for 'standards'.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply. — Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.

There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some(arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.


It's the difference that you're neglecting and/or glossing over.

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

As set out above, I would say that they cannot even know they have done something they should not have done, let alone 'just like humans can'.

Do you have an argument/justification/reasons for claiming that, aside from Jimi's behaviour?

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). — creativesoul

Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point. Do you think it is any different with humans? Do you think that if children were never taught that they would know what is expected of them?

To be sure humans learn what is acceptable and what is not through both behavior and language whereas dogs do so primarily through behavior. That said they do learn what kinds of behavior of theirs relates respectively to and invokes "good dog" and "bad dog" and other simple utterances; so language is involved to some degree.

There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding.
— creativesoul
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.

The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.

It is our behaviour that clearly shows us - beyond all reasonable doubt - what thinking about one's own thought and belief(metacognition) requires: Naming and descriptive practices; picking one's own thought and belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else. That is the only means. That crucial bit of knowledge is part of the standard used to assess/judge any and all belief attribution by any and all authors/speakers to any and all creatures, human to human attribution notwithstanding. It's not the only one, but it's the one in consideration at the moment, and some others are irrelevant to the topic at hand. I digress...

So, it seems clear to me that what the dog does, and the subsequent attribution(s) of thought and/or belief to the dog because of what the dog does, all need to be considered in light of what metacognition requires(what metacognition is existentially dependent upon). The dog cannot consider its own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. Thus, any and all sorts of thinking that require a creature capable of doing so are sorts that dogs cannot form, have, and/or hold. It's that simple. Easy to say. Much more difficult to clearly set out, but I am getting a bit better at it, I think...

Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm unsure about the relevance of the opening statement above. I've certainly never made such a claim. Nor would I. Actually, I agree with that claim, as it is written. However, the second claim seems too vague to be of much use. I also cannot see how the rest counts as support for the idea that meaning governs behaviour. I would agree that meaning governs behaviour, but I suspect that our viewpoints, notions, and/or approaches towards meaning are very different. Hence, I suspect that our explanations of how meaning governs behaviour are quite different as a result.

To the example...

Sure, there are certain thoughts and beliefs one cannot possibly form, have, and/or hold if they have not learned, articulated, understood, and/or used the right sorts of language. Substituting that reason(ing) with "they have not learnt the relevant behaviours" is stretching behaviour beyond sensible use. I mean, sure learning maths and coding and programming are all behaviors. However, that completely misses what underwrites the topic at hand: thought and belief. Behaviour is not thought and belief. Behaviour alone is... ...there's a technical term/bit of jargon that applies here, but I cannot recall... ..."indeterminate" maybe?

There's quite a bit more that is of interest, but it'll have to wait. Until then, be well...

Glad things are going better. :smile: