I'm sorry for implying that, it's just how I've personally always seen it. Philosophy is of course an activity, people might have different goals in doing it, I just can't understand what they are. — goremand

I see philosophy as a process of firstly getting clear as to just what my situation, epistemologically speaking, is. What can i reasonably be said to know? I've come to the conclusion that I know and can know very little.

It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?". If I know very little, can be certain of very little, then living happily with ignorance and uncertainty would seem to be the most important goal.

You'd have to show the truth to be a necessary consequence of a universally held set of assumptions. But well, I didn't literally mean "everyone", just everyone who participates in philosophical discourse. — goremand

The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. As the example of Socrates shows, it is probably only those who have thought critically and extensively that will come to this realization.

Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live, so while human ignorance and uncertainty might be in principle the one thing we could all agree upon, the ongoing choice of provisional hypotheses by which to live would likely come down to personal predilection.

What is desirable about "influence" per se? I mean that word runs the gamut from peer pressure to lobotomy. What is desirable to me is only the possibility of rational persuasion. — goremand

I agree with you that the only benign influence when it comes to what to believe would be one of rational persuasion, but I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason. It's the practical reason part where it becomes tricky, but I can't see how it can reasonably be ruled out.

So you're like - I don't know - a tourist? — Srap Tasmaner

Insinuating what? That I'm not really a player but a spectator?

Insinuating what? That I'm not really a player but a spectator? — Janus

Yeah.

You indicated to @goremand that you've already reached some conclusions. You indicated to me that there are a number of issues you think are a matter of personal preference. So yeah, it must all be just a matter of curiosity for you, and there aren't really any stakes.

I don't see why someone couldn't or shouldn't feel that way. Why not just find philosophy interesting?

I'd like to say that if you don't have skin in the game, you can't really understand it, but in your case, since you've already invested considerable time and effort into settling on particular views, it's more like you've retired and like to keep your hand in. Slightly different thing.

So yeah, it must all be just a matter of curiosity for you, and there aren't really any stakes. — Srap Tasmaner

I really do think there are stakes when it comes to ecological, economic and political issues. I'm not convinced there are stakes (other than the feelings and preferences of individuals) when it comes to metaphysical matters.

That said if a metaphysical standpoint morphs into evangelizing dogma then of course there will be consequences. Militant ideology, and perhaps even just plain old ideology, religious or otherwise, is and has always been a more or less significant problem for humanity.

I'm not sure how to convince, but I do think there are stakes in philosophy -- even in the esoteric topics. The ecological, economic and political issues fold into the metaphysics, from my perspective.

But, by the way I view things, that makes you a player in the metaphysic while you express it in terms of the ecology, economic, or political.

Or no?

I'm not sure what you mean here. If you mean that metaphysical attitudes can influence how folk think about ecological, economic and political issues then i agree.

What I don't believe is that there is any inherent or logically necessary relevance of for example questions like 'materialism versus idealism' for human life. Even religious views like belief in an afterlife or divine order can certainly influence how people think about earthly matters, but I think it can go either way.

The idea that God created the world for man, for example could lead to the idea that we can do whatever we want to nature with impunity or it could lead to the idea of us being charged with the role of guardians and protectors of the environment.

I'm not sure what you mean here. If you mean that metaphysical attitudes can influence how folk think about ecological, economic and political issues then i agree. — Janus

I suppose I'm speaking in favor of philosophy so I really do mean it the other way about: that philosophy doesn't influence but is the beginning of those thoughts, and so metaphysics and all the rest cannot be dismissed as a game else all the rest is a game.

I suppose I'm speaking in favor of philosophy so I really do mean it the other way about: that philosophy doesn't influence but is the beginning of those thoughts, and so metaphysics and all the rest cannot be dismissed as a game else all the rest is a game. — Moliere

The difference I see is that ecology, economics and politics all necessarily have real world consequences. As I've acknowledged I see that metaphysics can have such consequences, but I think it does not necessarily. I guess it could be said that the way the significance of ecology etc is seen is a metaphysical matter right from the start, but again I don't see what necessary difference to those seminal views the differences between idealism and physicalism or realism, for example, could have.

If people think this world doesn't matter then of course that is a problem. They could arrive at that view by thinking there is a spiritual realm and that's all that matters, or alternatively they could think that since it's all just mindless atoms in the void nothing matters. Any such views would be dogmatic ideologies though, and I've already acknowledged that they are deeply problematic.

Cool.

I see the difference flipped about. I'm tempted to say we're doing philosophy and thereby blah blah blah, but that seems kind of cheap too -- around the merry-go-round type comment.

:up:

It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?" — Janus

That is strange, because asking that question involves a lot of presuppositions, chiefly that there are better and worse ways of living. So it seems after you realized you barely know anything you proceed to ignore that realization and just believe whatever you like?

The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. — Janus

The important thing isn't to know, but to assume. Assumptions are fine as long as they are not questioned, that's why only universally held assumptions are acceptable within a discourse.

Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live — Janus

"As the example of Socrates shows", living isn't the goal of philosophy.

I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason — Janus

I have no idea what persuasion through "practical reason" looks like.

If you think Socrates' example shows that philosophy is not about how best to live then we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless.

we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless. — Janus

It doesn't surprise me to hear you say that! My entire problem with your view as on philosophy is that it makes discourse pointless. To make progress, you would have to be willing to question assumptions which your interlocutor does not agree with, but it seems that is just not an option for you. You are what I would call a dogmatist.

I ran across this in Gadamer's Truth and Method, just harking back to the OP if you're interested:

The question arises of the degree to which the dialectical superiority of reflective philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. . . . All these victorious arguments have something about them that suggests they are attempting to bowl one over. However cogent they seem, they miss the main point. In making use of them one is proved right, and yet they do not express any superior insight of any value. . . . Thus the formalism of this kind of reflective argument is of specious philosophical legitimacy. In fact it tells us nothing. We are familiar with this kind of thing from the Greek sophists, whose inner hollowness Plato demonstrated. It was also he who saw clearly that there is no argumentatively adequate criterion to distinguish truly between philosophical and sophistic discourse. — Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 308-9

Gadamer goes on to question a subset of reflexive argument, where the interlocutor points out logical or performative contradictions in, e.g., relativism or skepticism. But he is clearly talking about the reflexive nature of argumentation overall, and his doubts about it are similar to mine.

The final sentence I find especially intriguing. Leaving aside the question of whether he's right about Plato, I read Gadamer as saying to us: "No, you're wrong, philosophy is not characterized by a method or a discourse (or, perhaps, a formalism). What differentiates it from sophism is something else -- but there is a difference."

I want to return to this loose end. Am I right that we can avoid the conclusion in (8) by denying (4), the symmetry of relevance? — J

@fdrake's argument is both invalid and self-contradictory, among other things. Odd that no one understands it well enough to see this, even though it has been pointed out:

From (1) and (5) we get <X is relevant to X, and X is a philosophical claim, therefore something relevant to X is relevant to a philosophical claim>, and this contradicts (7). — Leontiskos

Wow, that is spot on.

The last couple days I kept finding myself thinking about the Phaedo, because there's a passage there about losing faith in arguments. The way I remembered it was something like Socrates saying, don't let my death cause you to lose faith in discussion and argument ― and I remembered it was something like this rather than "philosophy". But that's not what he says exactly, although it may be the subtext here. (Why bring this up now?)

Here's the whole passage:

there is a certain experience we must be careful to avoid.

What is that? I asked.

That we should not become misologues, as people become misanthropes. [d] There is no greater evil one can suffer than to hate reasonable discourse. Misology and misanthropy arise in the same way. Misanthropy comes when a man without knowledge or skill has placed great trust in someone and believes him to be altogether truthful, sound and trustworthy; then, a short time afterwards he finds him to be wicked and unreliable, and then this happens in another case; when one has frequently had that experience, especially with those whom one believed to be one’s closest [e] friends, then, in the end, after many such blows, one comes to hate all men and to believe that no one is sound in any way at all. Have you not seen this happen?

I surely have, I said.

This is a shameful state of affairs, he said, and obviously due to an attempt to have human relations without any skill in human affairs, for such skill would lead one to believe, what is in fact true, that the very [90] good and the very wicked are both quite rare, and that most men are between those extremes.

How do you mean? said I.

The same as with the very tall and the very short, he said. Do you think anything is rarer than to find an extremely tall man or an extremely short one? Or a dog or anything else whatever? Or again, one extremely swift or extremely slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Are you not aware that in all those cases the most extreme at either end are rare and few, but those in between are many and plentiful?

Certainly, I said.

[ b ] Therefore, he said, if a contest of wickedness were established, there too the winners, you think, would be very few?

That is likely, said I.

Likely indeed, he said, but arguments are not like men in this particular. I was merely following your lead just now. The similarity lies rather in this: it is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend their time [c] studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the Euripus and does not remain in the same place for any time at all.

What you say, I said, is certainly true.

It would be pitiable, Phaedo, he said, when there is a true and reliable argument and one that can be understood, if a man who has dealt with [d] such arguments as appear at one time true, at another time untrue, should not blame himself or his own lack of skill but, because of his distress, in the end gladly shift the blame away from himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and reviling reasonable discussion and so be deprived of truth and knowledge of reality.

Yes, by Zeus, I said, that would be pitiable indeed.

[e] This then is the first thing we should guard against, he said. We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to attain soundness, [91] you and the others for the sake of your whole life still to come, and I for the sake of death itself. I am in danger at this moment of not having a philosophical attitude about this, but like those who are quite uneducated, I am eager to get the better of you in argument, for the uneducated, when they engage in argument about anything, give no thought to the truth about the subject of discussion but are only eager that those present will accept the position they have set forth. I differ from them only to this extent: I shall not be eager to get the agreement of those present that what I say is true, except incidentally, but I shall be very eager that I should myself be thoroughly convinced that things are so. — Phaedo 89c-91a

I think it's only later that Greek philosophy settles on the tripartite scheme of physics, ethics, and logic as together making up philosophy. Socrates is talking about what would become logic, plainly, but maybe it's noteworthy that this passage occurs in the middle of a discussion of the nature of the soul, and the question of immortality (because Socrates is about to find out). Argument and discourse are only issues for those beings that have souls ― logic arises in the context of ethics.

I'm tempted now to say that the "trap" that science (or "physics") must avoid falling into is not philosophy but sophistry, and that it's better to see science also as a type of ongoing reasoned discussion (or "logic"). (Talking about the lab and the field, as I did, might be just an intuition pump, suggesting that scientists need only share the knowledge they acquired using their special techniques, rather than seeing science as a type of discussion.)

Which means science is only in the same position as philosophy.

- Yep. See also @Count Timothy von Icarus's thread, "The Unity of Dogmatism and Relativism."

Well, I considered sharing this quote from D.C. Schindler in the thread on Christians who don't believe in Christ (aside from as a good role model and source of "practical wisdom;" one is free to believe whatever one likes after all, it's just that no one should take it too seriously).

But it's as appropriate in this context:

Why might this neutralizing of truth claims be desirable? The point seems to be, above all, not to deny any particular truth claim outright, in the sense of taking a definitive position on the matter (“It is absolutely not the case that leaves are green, and anyone who says that they are is therefore wrong.”), but, just the opposite, to avoid taking an inflexible stand on one side of the question or the other. We want to allow a particular claim to be true, but only “as far as it goes,” and as long as this does not exclude the possibility of someone else taking a different view of the matter.13 Gianni Vattimo, the Italian philosopher-cum-politician, has advocated irony as the proper stance of citizens in the modern world: democracy works, he believes (ironically?), if we are sufficiently detached from our convictions to be capable of genuine tolerance of others,whose convictions may be different from our own.14 Such a stance is what Charles Péguy took a century ago to be the essence of modernity. According to him, to be modern means “not to believe what one believes.”15 Along these lines, we might think of the status of truth claims in terms of the so-called “right to privacy,” as analogous, that is, to private opinions. A thing is permitted to be true, as true as it wants to be, as long as that truth does not impose itself on others. Its truth is its own, as it were, and may not bear on anything beyond itself, may not transgress its particular boundaries. It is a self-contained truth,and, so contained, it is free to be perfectly “absolute.”


Let us call this a “bourgeois metaphysics." 6“Bourgeois” is an adjective meant to describe any form of existence, pattern of life, set of “values,” and so forth, that is founded on the principle of self-interest, which is posited as most basic. To speak of a “bourgeois metaphysics” is to observe that such an interest,such forms, patterns, and values, are themselves an expression of an underlying vision of the nature of reality, namely, a view that absolutizes individuals, that holds that things “mean only themselves”; it does not recognize things as belonging in some essential manner to something greater, as being members of some encompassing whole, and thus pointing beyond themselves in their being to what is other, but instead considers them first and foremost discrete realities.On the basis of such metaphysics, it is perfectly natural to make self-interest the basic reference point for meaning, the primary principle of social organization.17 In fact, given such a view of the nature of reality, nothing else would make any sense. This principle of social organization does not in the least exclude the possibility of what is called “altruism.”18 Quite to the contrary, we just articulated an expression of the “bourgeois metaphysics” precisely as a kind of concern for others: we are willing to affirm something as true only on the condition that we leave open the possibility for others to take a different position. We thus seek to give others a special respect. Toleration is, at least in our postmodern era, essential to this view of reality. In a certain respect, then, there is nothing preventing our judging that the “bourgeois metaphysics” is radically altruistic or other-centered.

Nevertheless, this judgment demands two qualifications. First, insofar as it is founded on a “bourgeois metaphysics,” it follows necessarily that any altruistic act will be equally explicable in purely self-centered terms. In this case, altruism will always be vulnerable to the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” such as we find,for example, in Friedrich Nietzsche: there can be no rational disputing the charge that what appears to be done for altruistic reasons is “really” motivated by the prospect of selfish gain.19 Second, the affirmation of the other inside of a"bourgeois metaphysics” is inevitably an affirmation of the other specifically as a self-interested individual. Altruism is not in the least an “overcoming” of egoism, but rather the multiplication of it. This is the essence of toleration: “live and let live” means, “let us agree to be self-centered individuals; we will give space to each other so that each may do and be what he likes, and will transgress our separateness only to confirm each other in our own individuality, that is, to reinforce each other’s selfishness.” One thinks here of Rilke’s famous definition of love, which may indeed have a deep meaning in itself, but not so much when it appears on a refrigerator magnet: “Love consists in the mutual guarding,bordering, and saluting of two solitudes.”20

Or we might consider here Nagel's ironic response to absurdity, one response to the post-modern era (and one can consider the hyper-irony of most far-right discourse too; nothing really matters or is really serious), and alongside this the more technocratic responses, which deflate every question in philosophy and life into a sort of bland "pragmatism." One can still call out social and economic elites for hypocrisy when these intellectual trends prevail, yet elites are hardly being inconsistent if they simply don't care about being hypocritical. Particularly, if nothing is really good or bad, then they are already saints of a sort simply for being even halfway decent while being under absolutely no obligation to be so. (And this is precisely the reasoning Bertrand Russell, who led a fairly odious personal life, used to elevate himself in moral standing over actual saints).

Anyhow, I do think it is fair to question if people who deny the reality of wisdom might rightly be said to deserve the mantle of "lovers of wisdom."

I'm tempted now to say that the "trap" that science (or "physics") must avoid falling into is not philosophy but sophistry, and that it's better to see science also as a type of ongoing reasoned discussion (or "logic"). (Talking about the lab and the field, as I did, might be just an intuition pump, suggesting that scientists need only share the knowledge they acquired using their special techniques, rather than seeing science as a type of discussion.)

Which means science is only in the same position as philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's reasonable to say that science and philosophy are in a similar position with respect to whatever a "highest" discourse is.

I think of them as different, but independent. The appeal to science is a move one can make in philosophy as much as one can make an appeal to coherency and beauty in science -- clearly philosophical words. But neither is "higher" than the other.

Though I'd also say the same about science as I did about philosophy -- there's a practical part that's important to consider (at a minimum, if philosophy is literature, then it seems we should read and discuss hte literature to say we are doing philosophy -- just as an example, I do believe there's more to it than this)

The last couple days I kept finding myself thinking about the Phaedo, because there's a passage there about losing faith in arguments. The way I remembered it was something like Socrates saying, don't let my death cause you to lose faith in discussion and argument — Srap Tasmaner

What is at issue is the fate of the soul. Socrates' attempts to "charm away" Simmias' and Cebes' fear of death.

The discussion has reached this point:

Phaedo:
“ Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust.” (88c)

Echecrates:
“'What argument shall we ever trust now?” (88d)

It is called misologic. More than losing faith in argument it is more strongly hatred of argument. (89d) Socrates addresses this in two related ways. By giving up the pretense that philosophical argument will give the former lover of argument the answers about death he desires and returning to mythology. The other is to move from sound arguments to the soundness of the soul and sound judgment, in a word phronesis, that is developed by the cultivation of certain beliefs about life and death. Or, as Gadamer might put it, a way of being.

We are familiar with this kind of thing from the Greek sophists, whose inner hollowness Plato demonstrated. It was also he who saw clearly that there is no argumentatively adequate criterion to distinguish truly between philosophical and sophistic discourse. — Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 308-9

What distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist, according to Gadamer, is a matter of intent. A difference in a way of being. (The Idea of the Good, 39.)

- Thanks. Wonderful passage. I tend to think this idea of "tolerance" is what underlies many of @J's meanderings. He worries about how he could ever be justified in claiming that something is true when he knows that others disagree.

It is also interesting to think about faux agreement, such as virtue signaling, as the other side of the coin of "bourgeois metaphysis." I see this a lot with philosophers who feel pressure to assent to a set of ideas based on appearing fashionable or "in." This informal chat with Dr. Michael Gorman about his introduction to philosophy and metaphysics gets at some of these ideas in a rather simple way, especially the student who worries that their question might be stupid.

Argument and discourse are only issues for those beings that have souls ― logic arises in the context of ethics. — Srap Tasmaner

Very good. I often tend to forget that, for Plato and Aristotle and probably for Kant too, there is an ethical motivation for arguing properly, one that has nothing to do with the more familiar "practical reason" or phronesis.

I especially like this passage: "I am in danger at this moment of not having a philosophical attitude about this, but like those who are quite uneducated, I am eager to get the better of you in argument." As Socrates goes on to say, convincing oneself is more important. This probably doesn't happen by a kind of arguing with oneself -- at least not in my case.

we might consider here Nagel's ironic response to absurdity — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this Thomas Nagel? Or Ernest? What passage do you have in mind?

What distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist, according to Gadamer, is a matter of intent. A difference in a way of being. (The Idea of the Good, 39.) — Fooloso4

Good find, I'd forgotten he said that (if I ever knew). It fits very well with the above speculations about the ethics of philosophical discourse. We may have uncovered a whole new way of approaching the question of phil. as "highest" -- though a lot more needs to be said about that "difference in being."

ethical motivation for arguing properly — J

There's that, but there's another meaning here too. If physics is the philosophy (or science) of the natural world, ethics the philosophy (or science) of human behavior, and logic the philosophy (or science) of discourse, then there's increasing specificity, in terms of subject matter.

But that arrangement doesn't preclude other relations among those three.

then there's increasing specificity, in terms of subject matter. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you say more about that? Not sure I see it.

It fits very well with the above speculations about the ethics of philosophical discourse — J

The "trinity" of Socratic philosophy, the just, the beautiful, and the good guides the inquiry of all of Socratic philosophy, which includes Plato and Aristotle.

I only meant that there's the natural world, and then a particular part of it, people like us, and then there's a particular thing we do, engage in discourse.

The other is to move from sound arguments to the soundness of the soul and sound judgment, in a word phronesis — Fooloso4

Yeah that really leaps out in the passage quoted. Socrates doesn't offer a distinction among types of arguments, but among people who hear them or make them.

Gadamer's word here, "hollowness", is really interesting.

It's reminiscent of that Wittgenstein quote about "working on yourself."

We spend so much time arguing about how strong particular arguments are -- are we missing something?

Gadamer's word here, "hollowness", is really interesting. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, and again the context is specifically about that particular kind of gotcha! recursion:

The question arises of the degree to which the dialectical superiority of reflective philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance — Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 308-9

We have the appearance of being able to corral any discourse back into philosophy -- but where does that leave the search for wisdom?

We spend so much time arguing about how strong particular arguments are -- are we missing something? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. We need to inquire about inquiry, ask ourselves what the value of a strong argument is.