Does what you say imply there exists within the world objective states of a system rooting representations thereof within facts? If so, can we designate these objective states of a system as radiant facts transmitted to our understanding via representations? If so, does this radiant transmission of objectivity evidence information as an energetic, mass-to-mass alteration of form across spacetime?

I'm asking if causality is a physico_material phenomenon. This question is important because it spotlights whether spacetime is an active agent of consciousness as a physical phenomenon. Going forward with the presumption it is, we can conjecture that consciousness, the boundary administrator, parses reality via a set of formatting functions that includes causal changes that assemble the timeline. So, time, like space and consciousness, is a physico_material phenomenon.

Consciousness, as the boundary administrator formatting and thereby constructing the timeline of events making up the history of the cosmos, makes a close approach to mind as the fundamental thing in existence. — ucarr

I would like for you to try to explain yourself without using terms like, "internal/external", "material/immaterial" and "objective/subjective". Each time you type a sentence with those terms, try removing them and see if it takes away anything from what you intend to say. If it does, then what is it that is taken away?

What I am saying is that effects carry information about their causes, whether the cause starts in the world or in the mind (the mind is part of the world, so I don't see why it makes sense to talk about the mind being a different thing (immaterial vs material) than the world). Effects are also causes of subsequent effects. You make an observation, your observation is an effect of an object, reflected light and your eyes. You can then act on your observations, as such your behavior is an effect of your mind with your mind now being a cause. This is how your scribbles get on the screen for me to read, because your mind caused them and by understanding what the scribbles represent, I can get at the cause - the thoughts in your mind. So no, I am not saying that causality is a physico_material phenomenon. It is just a process, or a relationship, like everything else, and that using terms like physico and material confuses the issue.

R.E.M. sleep is the stage of sleep where most dreams happen. This fact makes me resistant to the claim dreaming of a red stop sign is unambiguously distinct from wakefully seeing a stop sign. — ucarr

Seeing involves light. No light entered your closed eyes. The fact that we see mirages and bent sticks in water makes me resistant to the claim that we see red stop signs. We see light and we use the effect of reflected light off objects to get at the nature of the object itself. What color is the stop sign when there is no light? When the lights are out or you close your eyes, and you experience a red stop sign, what are you actually doing - seeing or imagining?

I think your underlined claims support rather than refute the correctness of the conclusion of my quoted question. That you think the mind is just another information system additionally reenforces the correctness of my conclusion. — ucarr

Well yes, information is the relationship between causes and their effects. The mind is both a cause and an effect, just like everything else. Your problem lies in you trying to explain how material and immaterial things interact, and how an immaterial mind can represent material things. Your assertions imply that the mind is special or separate from the world when we understand that it isn't. The solution isn't in doubling down on dualism. The solution is monism.

If the deductive information is a logically correct derivative of the input information about the world, then barring emergence and supervenience, we know from the transitive property that it is also pertinent to the world, since its source is pertinent to the world. — ucarr

Sounds like my explanation of how information is the relationship between cause and effect.

To the extent the dreaming experience is recognizable as waking experience, and thus can be conflated with it, the dreaming experience is not different from the waking experience. — ucarr

It is when you wake up. Go back to what I said about using multiple observations and logic. Sure, if you only made one observation and didn't have multiple observations to apply logic to, then it is obvious that you would misinterpret the dreaming experience as a waking experience while within the dream. The moment you wake up you make another observation and then use logic to explain the distinction between the two. If you only made one observation of a mirage and didn't try to move around and make other observations and apply logic, you would still think that the mirage is a pool of water. Pools of water do not move when you move closer to them.

To the extent that an effect is not a simulation of its cause, it's not a representation of its cause. For an example: a chair is not a simulation of the process that made it. We can propound this argument by claiming the oakwood chair that derives from an oak tree is not the oak tree, nor is it a simulation of it.

Causal relationships are about transformation, not simulation. — ucarr

I never used the word, "simulation", so this appears to be a straw-man argument. An effect is a representation of its causes, not a simulation of its causes. The existence of an oak tree is not the only cause that preceded the existence of the chair. A carpenter has to shape the wood from the tree into a chair. As I said, the chair is a representation/effect of all the process that went into creating it. I would even say that there is no such thing as one cause leading to one effect. An effect is the result of multiple causes interacting - a process. You cannot say that the effect of you seeing a chair is only caused by the chair. Light has to reflect off the chair for you to see it. You have to have your eyes open for the light to enter your eyes. You visual experience is an effect of that process - off all the causes working together to produce the effect of you seeing a chair.

How did you come to the conclusion that I did not imply that a view from somewhere isn't a view from somewhere, as in where someone is standing? — Harry Hindu

I think you still haven't taken in the force of my point. Of course it's a view from somewhere, but that isn't what mainly characterizes it. Rather, it's the "someone" that is crucial. Can you imagine a "view" being from some particular place, but with no viewer?

This is why I asked what you mean by the words, "understanding", "trying" and "knowing". You can only say that the computer scientist and biologist is wrong in their usage when you have clearly defined the words themselves. — Harry Hindu

This is a separate point. I'm not saying they're wrong, I'm saying they're not experts. I was replying to your notion that a computer scientist is somehow expert in the use of those words because he or she is a computer scientist. Such a person may be as correct or incorrect as anyone else, and yes, we'd need to get clear on what that would mean, but the point is that there is no built-in expertise, either way, neither mine nor theirs. If you like, I can take a shot at putting some content to mentalistic terms, but I wanted to get the "computer scientist as expert on the mental" thing out of the way first.

Go back and read what I have said. I have clearly steered away from using dualistic terms — Harry Hindu

I don't think so, but we can let that one go. Possibly the only dualism you recognize is mind/body, or mental/physical, dualism; I was pointing to a much wider application.

I think you still haven't taken in the force of my point. Of course it's a view from somewhere, but that isn't what mainly characterizes it. Rather, it's the "someone" that is crucial. Can you imagine a "view" being from some particular place, but with no viewer? — J

No, and I never implied that you could with anything that I have said. This is why I made the distinction between a view from somewhere and a view from nowhere/everywhere. So I can say with certainty that we agree here on what "subjective" means, so we can move on.

This is a separate point. I'm not saying they're wrong, I'm saying they're not experts. I was replying to your notion that a computer scientist is somehow expert in the use of those words because he or she is a computer scientist. Such a person may be as correct or incorrect as anyone else, and yes, we'd need to get clear on what that would mean, but the point is that there is no built-in expertise, either way, neither mine nor theirs. If you like, I can take a shot at putting some content to mentalistic terms, but I wanted to get the "computer scientist as expert on the mental" thing out of the way first. — J

Again, you are putting words in my mouth that I did not say. I never said the computer scientists are experts in linguistics. They are experts in computer technology. As such, they will use words that define computer processes, and if those words work in giving you a better idea of how the computer works, then what is the issue? Based on what you have said, you could be wrong in your understanding of those terms and therefore have no ground to stand on when telling others how to use those words. You are pulling the rug out from under your own position. You have used the words, so you must know what they mean, right? If not, then what are you saying when you say those words? Where do we go if we want to know what words mean?

I don't think so, but we can let that one go. Possibly the only dualism you recognize is mind/body, or mental/physical, dualism; I was pointing to a much wider application. — J

Of course it is so. Go back and read my posts. I am a monist, so I don't see how you can say that I recognize aspects of dualism, when I have been saying that dualism is the cause of the HPoC?

The issue is that you think the brain exists how you see it - as a "solid", "physical" object, and then try to solve the problem of how a mind can be inside a brain as you experience it. The problem is solved by understanding that the brain as you experience it is just a representation of what is there, which is a mind. So the mind is not internal to the brain. It is the same thing as the brain but from a different perspective, just as the Earth appearing flat from your perspective while on its surface is the same round Earth you experience when out in space.

YOU are the one using the terms "internal/external". I'm asking you what YOU mean by those terms. If you are saying that the mind is caused by the brain, then that is not an internal/external relationship. It is a causal relationship. So what do YOU mean by saying that the mind is internal to the brain if you do not mean the same thing as the relationship between the dog and doghouse? — Harry Hindu

Maybe you, like I, can benefit by further examining what you mean by internal/external.

What do you mean by your use of the words, "internal/external"? Are you using them in the same sense that the dog is internal to the dog house? If so, then why can we look in the dog house and see the dog but not look in the brain and see the mind? What if the mind is what the whole brain does, and not what some internal part of the brain does? — Harry Hindu

In your quote directly above, I see that you're thinking through the meaning of internal/external in the same terms I've been using to think of them. You're meeting me halfway by using the doghouse/dog relationship in accordance with the context in which I've been referring to internal/external. Nevertheless, when you oppose my thinking with: "...why can we look in the dog house and see the dog but not look in the brain and see the mind?," you counter-example my claim with the same literal conception of internal/external I've been using. Since you base your counter-narrative upon a counter-example that uses internal/external in the same literal sense I've been using it, this evidences your belief the internal/external binary is real and probative, your preference for avoiding it notwithstanding.

I'm asking you what YOU mean by those terms. If you are saying that the mind is caused by the brain, then that is not an internal/external relationship. It is a causal relationship.

In your above quote you infer the possibility I'm positing "mind is caused by brain." That you infer this possibility suggests that you, like me, consider "mind emerges from brain" consistent with logical possibility and thus perhaps a real phenomenon.

Well, some causal relationships include effects emergent from their causes, as in the case of a viral infection and the symptom of heavy production of mucus by the immune system. So, your argument based upon the distinction between internal/external and cause/effect raises a question about the brain/mind relationship: Does it example mind emergent from brain, or not? If not, then that tells us some causal relations involve emergent properties, some don't. This limits the scope of causal relationships being also emergent relationships; it doesn't refute their possibility wholesale.

How does one get at the material nature of the world via a dimensionless, immaterial GUI? — Harry Hindu

By GUI I mean incandescent monitor displaying animated graphics and text streaming from a computer. Since you think GUI dimensionless and immaterial, you can help me better understand by elaborating further details about it.

What does it mean to say that there is a lack of dimensional extension of immaterial things? — Harry Hindu

...why can we look in the dog house and see the dog but not look in the brain and see the mind? — Harry Hindu

In the underlined part of the quote, are you not making the point that the mind, being dimensionless, cannot be seen by the eyes?

You cannot access all of your long-term memories at once but you can recall them from somewhere. From where are they recalled if there is no dimension to the mind? — Harry Hindu

Since you think the mind has dimensional extensions, as do material objects that can be measured in inches, why don't you specify, in inches, the dimensions of the mind?

One could argue that the dimensional aspect of material things is a product of your GUI, in the way the information is structured in your GIU, not of the world. — Harry Hindu

This is one of your important premises; I can't respond to it until you elaborate more details about what you mean by GUI.

This is only vision but I have four other senses that come together with vision in my mind. Where do they all come together in the information structure we call the mind, or the GUI? — Harry Hindu

When you write GUI, are writing a synonym for mind?

I can get at the thoughts in your head by correctly interpreting the causal relationship between the scribbles I see on the screen and the thoughts in your mind. — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure if communication in general always examples causality. Do you think my looking at an apple causes my mental image of the apple?

I would just say that self and environment are themselves relationships and processes. Try pointing to the boundaries of each and see if you can succeed. Everything is a relationship. — Harry Hindu

If you're in a jungle and a tiger starts racing towards you in attack mode, you don't think you could separate the tiger from the environment?

Where is the material stuff you keep talking about if all we can ever point to are relationships? — Harry Hindu

In the USA, 43K deaths per year are due to vehicle collisions.

...you have to bring in what I said about information being a relationship between causes and their effects, and the way you get at the causes is by making more than one observation and using logic. — Harry Hindu

If there's nothing but relationships between systems of information created mentally, with no material physics in existence, and, as you seem to think, causal relationships are instances of communication of information, then what's at stake in the lives of humans? Since there are only systems of information, and we know from experience information can be erased but not killed, what is there for humans to be fearful of; what is there for humans to care about? Only death gives reality and meaning to fear and love and hate. Only physics gives reality to death.

I would like for you to try to explain yourself without using terms like, "internal/external", "material/immaterial" and "objective/subjective". Each time you type a sentence with those terms, try removing them and see if it takes away anything from what you intend to say. If it does, then what is it that is taken away? — Harry Hindu

Let me refer to what I said at the end of the last part that I posted: the physics of a material world, beyond mentally constructed information supports something being at stake: the life of the aware subject experiencing the world. Materialism, with its discrete boundaries, makes real the life and possible death of the subject. It is the vulnerability and possible death of the subject that makes the discrete boundaries of the subject hold essential importance to its existence. These discrete boundaries include: objective/subjective; material/immaterial; before/after; here/there. If you've ever been attacked by an aggressor, or faced an impending collision in a car at high speed, you know the importance of here/there; left/right. In the real world of physics, an inch this way or that marks the difference between life and death. I'm not telling you anything you don't already know.

I am not saying that causality is a physico_material phenomenon. It is just a process, or a relationship, like everything else, and that using terms like physico and material confuses the issue. — Harry Hindu

We both know you're not confused about the difference between someone creating an animation showing you being shot and falling to the ground dead and a flesh and blood killer with a gun pointing at you and squeezing the trigger. If you want to claim both scenarios are just processes, or relationships like all other relationships, and "that using terms like physico and material confuses the issue." no one will try to stop you. Everyone will know you're keeping alive and well because, regardless of what you say in a debate, in your life you never confuse the two types of scenarios.

I know you have your language games configured so that when necessary, you can claim your denial the world is physical does not entail you regarding a memory of your supper last night and your real, physical supper before you today as one and the same. If the world were not physical, there'd be no important difference between the two. The boundaries of the world of physics have meaning beyond information and relationships.

When the lights are out or you close your eyes, and you experience a red stop sign, what are you actually doing - seeing or imagining? — Harry Hindu

In both situations: a) wakeful seeing; b) slumbering seeing the visual cortex processes visible light energy so that it's encoded for memory playback of visible light impressions. By the way, with the argument you're making here, depending as it does on a difference between seeing a stop sign with your eyes open versus dreaming a stop sign with your eyes closed, aren't you making use of your belief in open/closed, a "confusing" and unhelpful binary?

Your problem lies in you trying to explain how material and immaterial things interact, and how an immaterial mind can represent material things. Your assertions imply that the mind is special or separate from the world when we understand that it isn't. The solution isn't in doubling down on dualism. The solution is monism. — Harry Hindu

What evidence do you have proving my dualism?

Causal relationships are about transformation, not simulation. — ucarr

I never used the word, "simulation", so this appears to be a straw-man argument. An effect is a representation of its causes, not a simulation of its causes — Harry Hindu

"Represent" has meaning in more than one sense, depending on context. There's the sense of "represent" as "to speak for" in lieu of another. This sense often refers to an elected official who, as a member of congress, represents the voters who put him into office. It would be strange to claim the elected official is an effect of his constituents. There's also the sense of "represent" as "to depict" something. This sense often refers to a picture depicting, for example, a bucolic setting in the countryside. This is the sense that involves simulation.

We've been writing at length about the GUI. It can be a simulation.

With causal relationships, we're concerned with an initial state of a system and how it arrives at a different state of the system at a later time. A → B. If A is the cause and B is the effect, is B a representation of A, or a result of A?

You have used the words, so you must know what they mean, right? — Harry Hindu

Of course not, and neither does anyone else. We are building this particular boat on the ocean. We have, at best, some combination of historical information about how mentalistic terms have been used, intuitions about what they mean for us, and perhaps a sense of how to sharpen them for better use.

Where do we go if we want to know what words mean? — Harry Hindu

I can only say again:

I think a good response here would be to say, "Fine, let's not get hung up on language choices which may not satisfy everyone. I'm happy to consider using your terminology -- what would it be? How would you prefer to distinguish the 'location' of a mind so that we can talk meaningfully about its supervenience on my brain and not on, say, the tree in my front yard?" — J

I really don't mind what language we agree on. Tell me what you'd prefer, as long as it can do the job mentioned above.