I'm trying to get at your reasoning here. — Harry Hindu

OK. My reasoning is based on what we would reason about the phenomenon of "life." As far as I know, the efforts at creating artificial life are all biologically based. I'm not aware that any scientists are working on the idea that a silicon-based digital entity might "come alive," begin reproducing, and/or provide evidence that it is having inner experiences such as animals have -- pain, for instance. (But by all means point me to any interesting new research along these lines.)

So, similarly, I'm guessing that consciousness will turn out to be a property of living organisms exclusively. Why? Because whatever it is that makes an entity alive is going to be turn out to be what makes it conscious. Or perhaps speaking of "subjectivity" is better here, as I don't know that a plant could be conscious but I find it plausible that it has experiences.

How likely is this to be true? I can only say "fairly likely" based on what we've seen so far: absolutely no evidence of either life or consciousness in digital entities. This gets muddled because proponents of mechanistic consciousness will define "consciousness" in such a way that a digital entity might have it (I think that's what you're doing, to a degree), so perhaps it's ultimately a philosophical rather than a scientific issue.

For you, who else? — Harry Hindu

But how can any such entity as "me" emerge from a working memory and sensory info processing? I think you're assuming that the digital toolkit will produce a "me" or a subject, but that's the very thing under discussion.

If my description does not resemble what it is like for you, then please explain what it is like for you. — Harry Hindu

Well, I am a subject, so in addition to all the ruckus going on, I experience my self. Transcendental ego, if you like. Moreover, as a subject I do a lot more than connect with the "outside" world. My imaginative consciousness is extremely vivid, and doesn't depend on stimuli from experience, unless we beg the question and say that it's the neuronal activity itself that is the stimulus. But I don't think brains cause consciousness, I think consciousness supervenes upon brains.

However, the general thrust of what you're saying is important and true -- WE DON'T KNOW. It is one of the great remaining scientific puzzles.

Only in distinguishing between the world and your experience do you become a realist and at the same time an indirect realist as the experience is not the same thing as the world. — Harry Hindu

The indirect realist never experiences the world, recall, only figments (e.g. sense-data) of his/her own experiences, by way of which s/he indirectly experiences the world. That's why it's called indirect.

Indirect realism and solipsism are identical in this respect, because also the solipsist experiences only figments of his/her own experiences.

The direct realist, however, experiences the world as it is, at least most times, under ordinary conditions of experience. Both the direct and the indirect realist acknowledge that there is a relation between experience and world. For the direct realist, the relation is direct.

For the solipsist, there is no genuine relation between experience and world, since the perceptual process and the world are figments of the experience. So, your claim that direct realism is solipsism is based on a misunderstanding of both.

Our difference centers on whether or not a potential current embodied within a charged battery is physical whereas a potential current embodied within the mind's memory is abstract. In both cases the potential is tied to something physical: a) the charged battery and its difference of potential; b) the mind's memory and the difference of potential it represents abstractly. — ucarr

For my philosophical purposes, I'm more interested in abstract Cosmic Potential than in concrete battery potential. A physical form of cosmic potential is Energy, in all its aspects*1 . But the universe has enormous abstract potential that is not-yet-actual. One example is the hypothetical Vacuum Energy. Potential energy is just knowledge of a possible future state.

All of those potentials are not real or actual until activated by some inter-connection. Even vacuum energy, presumably everywhere all around us, must be only Potential until actualized. Otherwise, the universe would burn itself up. The only non-physical forms of energy are the abstract concepts in a mind, such as Cosmic Potential Energy*2, or the knowledge that a AA battery will not shock you (i.e. only potential), unless you complete a circuit between poles, actualizing the Potential. :smile:


*1. Types of Energy :
"There are ten types of energy: chemical energy, mechanical energy, nuclear energy, gravitational energy, light energy, radiant energy, sound energy, motion energy, thermal energy, and electrical energy. In general, the first four on the list are potential energy and the last six are considered forms of kinetic energy."
https://study.com/academy/lesson/energy-definition-types.html
Note --- This list doesn't mention all the various physical Forces that are probably specific forms of general energy. The ultimate source of all those applications of causation is what I would call Cosmic Potential, or in my thesis : EnFormAction.

*2. Abstract Cosmic Potential :
Similar to Schopenhauer's World as Will. On the cosmic scale, it's Potential until actualized in specific instances of Causation. All generalizations are mental concepts, not material objects. Philosophy deals with generalizations. Science with specifics.
In Schopenhauer's philosophy, "will" is considered a fundamental, blind, and unconscious energy that permeates all of reality, acting as the driving force behind everything from the growth of a plant to human desires, essentially representing the core essence of existence beyond our perception of the world as a collection of objects; it is not a conscious choice but a primal, underlying force to strive and perpetuate life.
___Google AI overview

How does saying that potential is not-yet-real differ from saying it doesn't exist? . . . . there is no such thing except within our minds — Harry Hindu

Potential exists only in our minds. Potential is Ideal, not Real. Potential is knowledge in a mind, not a material substance or physical force. Not-yet-real is also an idea in a mind, consisting of knowledge of a possible future state given specified conditions*1.

Some posters may think that I am talking about some spooky spiritual force when I refer to "Potential". There seems to be a lot of confusion about what Aristotle was talking about, when he made a distinction between Potential and Actual. It's discussed in detail in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Today, we refer to not-yet-real statistical possibility as Potential*2. :smile:

*1. What are actuality and potentiality? :
As used in discussions of philosophy, potential and actual refer to “what might be” and “what is.”
https://www.gotquestions.org/actuality-potentiality.html

*2. Statistical potential
Statistical potentials or knowledge-based potentials are scoring functions derived from an analysis of known protein structures in the Protein Data Bank
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_potential

Likewise, when we experience seeing red, it's because that specific wavelength stands in contrast to other wavelengths of visible light. Therefore, within the neuronal circuits of the brain wherein we interpret the specific wavelength for red, there's nothing therein that's red because the relativistic effect that supports our experience of red exists within the context of the visual field of our eyes, not within the neuronal circuits of the visual cortex of our brain. — ucarr

But we can imagine and dream of red things. So it seems to me that the color red is the form visual information takes and stored as such for future use in making predictions about the world. For us to be able to apply what we predict to the world, our predictions need to be similar to what we attempting to realize in the world, or else how could we apply new ideas to the world? — Harry Hindu

You have exposed an error in my narrative quoted at top. I've underlined the part of my narrative where I've jumped the proper continuity by omitting something: after the brain assembles a visual image of the world seen optically, the color content is next coded so that red equals not-green and not-blue, and so this third element is relativistically red as specified by the corresponding EM wavelength, itself distinct from the green and blue wavelengths.

Next, a mnemonic loop for recording of the visual image in color is produced. An accessible memory loop of the experience of the visual image in color becomes available for imagination and dreams.

Through all the orders of feedback looping minus the one culminating in an accessible memory loop of the experience of the visual image in red, no colors are in the neuronal circuits of the brain. At the level of the memory loop of the experience of the visual image of red, the remembered color of red is present as coding via modulated circuits simulating the relativistic effect: red. The visual construction of the experience of seeing red is played back as a memory on a virtual GUI also encoded in the feedback loop.

Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what? — Harry Hindu

Viewed by the brain that constructs the simulation of the world within the visual field of the eyes.

Okay but you can only access the code via a GUI. I can only access your neurons via my GUI. Your neurons and the code appear in my GUI as visual representations of what is "out there". The neurons and the code do not exist as represented by the GUI. As you said, the GUI is a representation, and not the neurons and code as it actually is. So maybe terms like, "neurons" and "code" are representations of how they appear in the GUI and not how they are in the world, and how they are in the world is simply information or process and we are confusing the map (GUI) with the territory. — Harry Hindu

This applies within the scope of the simulation. A simulation has a referent outside of itself. If the simulation is successful, i.e., if it accurately describes its referent, then its coding also accurately describes its referent. So, no. The coding for a simulation is not hermetically sealed within the territory of the simulation.

As to what the neuronal circuits (modulated electric currents) are really like in context, in the world out there they are like themselves: building blocks; in the world of the simulation: they are like themselves: building blocks; in the world of themselves they are like themselves: building blocks.

We're supposed to confuse the map with the territory. How could the map be useful without this confusion of identities? If the map were completely distinct from the territory, it would effect no simulation of the world and thus be useless.

Simulation is specifically about the confusion, or overlapping of two identities. If your brain's simulation of the external world were not cause for suspension of disbelief of the sameness between what you perceive and what's out there, you'd never go outside of your house.

Are the building blocks and the construction of them bi-conditional? If you wish to navigate the world intelligently, and that especially means designing schemes to achieve your goals, you'd better hope they are. The brain's coding of its perception of the world is not a transformation of that world, but merely an internalization of it.

However, there's a feeling in what it's like to see the cat, which is comparable with a feeling of what it's like to see the cat-picture. There's also a feeling in what it's like to imagine a cat. You can compare your feelings (via memories), and judge resemblances between them. — jkop

If seeing a cat, seeing a picture of a cat, and imagining a cat, can all be reduced to feelings, and if these feelings can all be compared, then (the feeling of) the cat that one imagines can be compared to, and may resemble, (the feeling of) the cat that one sees.

Your visible/invisible distinction seems irrelevant, at least for the one imagining the cat. This distinction seems to be relevant only in terms of other people's ability to see your imagined cat. However, if you allow for such a thing as a privately imagined cat, then the one who imagines the cat can compare it to, and may judge it to resemble, a cat (or a picture of a cat) that they see in public.

It makes little difference whether you reduce all seeings and imaginings to "feelings", or whether you call it a comparison between a seen cat and an imagined cat. However, the latter seems more apt in relation to your description of: "doodling with a pencil on paper until the visible shapes of a drawn cat satisfy what you had in mind".

So, similarly, I'm guessing that consciousness will turn out to be a property of living organisms exclusively. Why? Because whatever it is that makes an entity alive is going to be turn out to be what makes it consciousness. — J

Correct. And that "whatever" is DNA. DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.

What is vitality important is that DNA is what I call active information. As opposed to static information. A book is an example of static information. A book is filled with information, but does nothing. A book about architecture does not construct buildings. It doesn't even draw blueprints. Further, I can read the book, and learn about architecture, yet I might never construct a building, or even draw blueprints. I need not act on information. The information can just sit in the book, and in my head, and nothing ever has to come of it.

DNA is active information because it must be acted upon. The laws of physics require certain things to happen under certain circumstances. When the stem of an apple hanging on a tree weakens below a certain point, the laws of physics are such that the apple falls. Likewise, the laws of physics are such that the enzyme helicase unzips DNA by breaking the hydrogen bonds that bind the base pairs. Then there's mRNA, tRNA, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase, on and on. No part of this is optional. The laws of physics require that the information in DNA be acted upon, and that that which DNA means comes into being in physical form.

DNA is in all life, and it's why there is life.

DNA is also why there is consciousness. Information. Does any theory of consciousness not consider information to be essential? DNA isn't only the information system that began life. In every cell of every living thing, information is constantly being processed, as protein is constantly being produced. And a lot of what those proteins are being used for is to build more information processing systems. Our senses are constantly changing input into information. Inside of us, homeostasis is accomplished thanks to the constant flow of information from every part of the body. Information about germs and viruses so they can be fought off. Information about injuries so they can be repaired. An incalculable amount of information constantly being processed inside us, all because of DNA.

you want to stipulate a meaning for "resemblance" that makes physical visibility more important as a criterion. I guess you can do that, but I think we need 1) an explanation for how the ordinary-language use became so common, and 2) a good argument for why this notion of "resemblance" is useful or clarificatory, in this context. What are you trying to ameliorate, with this usage? — J

1.The importance of visibility is relative to the success of vision as a means for acquiring knowledge of our environment. This knowledge-related feature of vision affects our linguistic habits so much that we are not only using the verb 'see' when we optically see visible objects, but also when we discover a solution to an abstract problem and say "I see how we can solve it". We "see" what someone is saying when we understand it, but also when we hear it without understanding it, because in another sense seeing is merely the attempt to make sense of what there is to see, or hear, or feel etc. We taste wine and "see" what the taste means (e.g. old wine). We see visible objects, but also voids, abstract, fictional, impossible, or nonsensical objects.

Thus we use the verb 'see' in several very different senses, and when we use it ambiguously between them, we produce fallacies of ambiguity. One example of such a fallacy is when we believe that we can see and acquire knowledge of mental images inside our heads. If that was true, then there would be no need to produce sketches, drawings or complex images, because then one could just think and investigate what one supposedly has in mind.

2. Anyone interested in understanding the term 'mental image' and the relation between what we have in mind and visible objects (e.g. images) might want to take a look at the possibility of a resemblance-relation. Obviously there can be no visible resemblance, since what we have in mind is not visible. But there can be resemblance between two states of affairs such as seeing things and thinking about things.

there can be resemblance between two states of affairs such as seeing things and thinking about things. — jkop

Good, this all makes sense. So why can't we claim that the "non-seeing" resemblance relation is just as central as the seeing one? You'd asked earlier, "How can anything invisible resemble something visible?" but I think you've answered your own question correctly. There just isn't any reason to make the visible/invisible comparison central to resemblance.

Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what?
— Harry Hindu

Viewed by the brain that constructs the simulation of the world within the visual field of the eyes. — ucarr

I think that "view" is the wrong way to look at this. The central executive in a computer does not view the data it is working with. The data simply exists in memory and is manipulated in real-time by the central executive. What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. From our perspective it takes the form of silicon circuits, computer code and logic gates. From others' perspective the data in your working memory takes the form of neurons and the chemical and electrical signals between them. But from our own minds, we do not experience neurons and their chemical and electrical signals. We experience colors, shapes, sounds, etc. of which others' working memory is composed of. From our own perspective, our own working memory takes the form of colors, shapes, etc. and it is only by observing others' working memories that we experience something different. So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes?

Is there a "what it is like" for the computer in its working memory? What about when the computer takes visual information, like your fingerprint, and compares this visual information to its database to allow you to log into the computer. One might say that the computer is just comparing ones and zeros and does not have a visual experience of your fingerprint and the ones stored in its database. But that is just how it looks like for someone that isn't the computer's working memory.

There just isn't any reason to make the visible/invisible comparison central to resemblance. — J

I didn't. What's central to resemblance is a set of comparable objects and states of affairs. The visible/invisible comparison is a means for clarifying what those comparable objects and states of affairs are, for example when we create visible objects of what we have in mind, and somehow seem to be able to compare them.

Your visible/invisible distinction seems irrelevant, at least for the one imagining the cat. — Luke

A cartoonist who imagines a fictional cat might find it relevant to also see visible cats.

It makes little difference whether you reduce all seeings and imaginings to "feelings", or whether you call it a comparison between a seen cat and an imagined cat. — Luke

Understanding their differences makes sense, I think.

The feeling in seeing a cat is causally fixed by the cat, while the feeling in imagining a cat is more loosely constrained by memories, beliefs, functions of interest, expectations, social pressure etc.. But no matter our expectations or social pressure etc, the cat remains a cat, and my visual experience is the cat. Salva veritate! :joke:

There just isn't any reason to make the visible/invisible comparison central to resemblance.
— J

I didn't. — jkop

Not to run it into the ground, but here's what you said:

A resemblance-relation requires at least two objects which can resemble each other. Granted that all objects resemble each other in the abstract sense of being objects, but how can anything invisible resemble something visible?

My point is that they can't, unless you somehow make both visible. — jkop

Surely that makes visibility "central to resemblance" -- indeed, it sounds like the criterion for it ("you can't, unless . . .").

How does saying that potential is not-yet-real differ from saying it doesn't exist? In your example, it seems that you are simply saying that potential is simply the current state of an electric battery before being connected to a system to supply it with energy. Some batteries are never connected to a system so it would be incorrect to say that they have the potential to do anything. It is our ignorance of what the future holds for the battery that makes us think of "potentials" and "possibilities" when, in a deterministic universe, there is no such thing except within our minds. — Harry Hindu

Our discussions about Consciousness have branched off into questions about "Potential" : what is it? In the quote*1 below, the postulated pre-existent "nothingness" consists of noumenal (ideal) Causal Laws*2 whose effects are what we call "real". Those pre-big-bang Laws & Energy may be what Aristotle postulated as Potential, and what Schopenhauer called WILL*3. :smile:

*1. SOMETHING FROM NOTHING?
"In the very beginning there was a void–– a curious form of vacuum –– a nothingness containing no space, no time, no matter, no light, no sound. Yet the laws of nature were in place, and this curious vacuum held potential."
—- Leon Lederman, The God Particle
"Leon Max Lederman was an American experimental physicist who received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1988" ___Wikipedia
Note --- I just came across this quote in my Enformationism thesis, that may shed some light . . . . . or may cast a shadow. Is it Science or spooky nonsense?

*2. A causal law is a law of nature that describes the relationship between two distinct events or features of a system, with one event or feature causing the other. Causal laws are a key part of scientific theories and are often used in philosophical analyses of science.
___Google AI overview
Note --- Regulating Laws + Working Energy = Causation

*3. "Schopenhauer's postulated noumenal world is quite different: reality in itself, independent of our sense perceptions, is a single undifferentiated entity that we can know about. He called this entity the Will. Schopenhauer's Will was something new, and very strange."
https://philosophynow.org/issues/114/Arthur_Schopenhauer_1788-1860
Note 1 --- Does that "strange" Cosmic Will sound like the Potential for change (including Natural Laws) that causes new things to emerge into Reality, and defines the forms they take? Is Will/Potential the source/cause of "reality itself"?
Note 2 --- In my thesis, Potential is the source of all Causation, the mother of Energy, and the origin of all Change. One of its noumenal babies is the power-to-know that we call Consciousness. Potential "exists" only as a philosophical concept, not as a physical thing or force. Only the effects (the offspring) of Potential exist in the real material world. Philosophers know of its logical necessity only via inference, not observation.

The central executive in a computer does not view the data it is working with. The data simply exists in memory and is manipulated in real-time by the central executive. — Harry Hindu

If by central executive you mean CPU (central processing unit), then I say it's not an unreasonable stretch to construe "processing" as "views." In each case -- the CPU in one and the brain in the other -- a processor processes data in the act of constructing a world view. Furthermore, the brain also manipulates data that simply exists in memory. When you imagine or dream of the experience of seeing red, that's an example of your brain manipulating data that simply exists in memory.

What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. — Harry Hindu

From our perspective it takes the form of silicon circuits, computer code and logic gates. From others' perspective the data in your working memory takes the form of neurons and the chemical and electrical signals between them. But from our own minds, we do not experience neurons and their chemical and electrical signals. We experience colors, shapes, sounds, etc. of which others' working memory is composed of. From our own perspective, our own working memory takes the form of colors, shapes, etc. and it is only by observing others' working memories that we experience something different. So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes? — Harry Hindu

Can you rewrite this passage?

I guess you want to go from:

What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. — Harry Hindu

to:

So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes? — Harry Hindu

I guess the passage is intended to be a narrative that elaborates two or more forms of "working memory."

Also, I guess you believe one form is real and the other not.

Surely that makes visibility "central to resemblance" -- indeed, it sounds like the criterion for it ("you can't, unless . . ."). — J

That's strange, because I also give examples of invisible things such as feelings that can resemble each other.

The invisible and visible can't resemble each other unless we make both visible. But we can also make both invisible, and compare what they feel like. These are not criteria for resemblance per se, but comparability. Resemblance requires at least two objects which can resemble each other (i.e. comparable).

The invisible and visible can't resemble each other unless we make both visible. — jkop

Why not? I must be missing something still. I thought such a resemblance was the point of your saying that "there can be resemblance between two states of affairs such as seeing things and thinking about things." One is visible, the other not. Oh well. Not a terribly important point, either way.

Your visible/invisible distinction seems irrelevant, at least for the one imagining the cat.
— Luke

A cartoonist who imagines a fictional cat might find it relevant to also see visible cats. — jkop

In what sense is the imagined cat invisible to the cartoonist? They picture it in their mind and attempt to express their imagined cat on paper. They might continue to refine the drawing until it more closely resembles what they imagine.

You are trying to restrict the application of the words "see" and "visible" only to those objects that are publicly available, but I don't think it's uncommon or atypical to talk about seeing, picturing or envisaging things in one's imagination. I don't consider it incorrect to say that the cartoonist sees or pictures the cat in their imagination (or in their mind's eye).

Well, you quote two of my sentences, but omit the two different senses in which I use them, which makes them contradict each other. But that's not how I use them.





In the sense that an imagination is invisible and a cat is visible, they can't be compared, and that's why we can't find any resemblance between them. They can, however, resemble each other in the sense of what it's like to imagine vs see the cat.

Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat. Nor is there a need to eliminate ordinary language use of the verb 'see' (or other perceptual verbs). See or experience or feel etc are used in many different senses.

However, when the same word is used in many different senses, it also gets used ambiguously between different senses. Many forms of dualism are fallacies of ambiguity. A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. Whenever our talk of what we have in mind gets muddled, or leads to intellectual disasters, it's probably because we use perceptual verbs ambiguously between different senses.

So perhaps the hard problem of consciousness is a fallacy of ambiguity?

In the sense that an imagination is invisible and a cat is visible, they can't be compared, — jkop

An imagination is invisible to the 3rd person perspective; it is not invisible to the 1st person perspective.
I can't see what you imagine; I can see what I imagine.

Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat. — jkop

Do you claim a cat seen via the virtual viewing of imagination is no less physico_material than a cat seen via the optics of the eyes?

Many forms of dualism are fallacies of ambiguity. — jkop

Language open to more than one interpretation falsely suggests two objective and parallel modes of being?

A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop

I see the redundancy; I don't see the ambiguity.

So perhaps the hard problem of consciousness is a fallacy of ambiguity? — jkop

You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature?

Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat.
— jkop

Do you claim a cat seen via the virtual viewing of imagination is no less physico_material than a cat seen via the optics of the eyes? — ucarr

Well, no. I claim that when you see the cat, then the relation between your experience and the cat is direct. Basically, the experience that you have is the cat that you see. What your experience is like is what the cat is like (e.g. cute, hairy etc).

When you imagine a cat, however, there is no relation between the experience and a cat (neither physical nor mental cat). What you are experiencing then is your own creative use of memories and beliefs with the intent to figure out (by what it feels like) what the cat is like.

The visible properties of the cat fix what it's like for you to experience the cat. Your use of memories and beliefs about cats fix what it's like for you imagine the cat.

Language open to more than one interpretation falsely suggests two objective and parallel modes of being? — ucarr

Language is and must remain open to more than one interpretation. We can use a word in different senses, but to use it ambiguously between different senses makes no sense. Fallacies of ambiguity are deceptively simple but pernicious when they remain unnoticed and get entrenched into our linguistic habits and assumptions (e.g. dualism).

A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity.
— jkop

I see the redundancy; I don't see the ambiguity. — ucarr

We invent 'mental images' by using the verb 'see' ambiguously between an intentionalistic sense of seeing (as in seeing a visible object), and a constitutive sense of seeing (as in having the visual experience). That's like inventing 'Casper the friendly ghost' by combining properties which are immaterial in some sense and material in another.

You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature? — ucarr

Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism.

As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. Separately or somehow coalesced. I find the dualism implausible and redundant. I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like.

When you imagine a cat, however, there is no relation between the experience and a cat (neither physical nor mental cat). What you are experiencing then is your own creative use of memories and beliefs with the intent to figure out (by what it feels like) what the cat is like. — jkop

As I understand you, you are saying when I imagine a cat, I'm having a completely internal experience between different parts of myself, i.e., I'm having an experience between the virtual seeing of a cat via my imagination and my intent to understand what a cat is like.

The visible properties of the cat fix what it's like for you to experience the cat. Your use of memories and beliefs about cats fix what it's like for you imagine the cat. — jkop

I agree with what you've written in the paragraph immediately above, but I also think the simulation of virtual seeing via memory-supported imagination of the physical cat retains its connection to the physical cat. I see evidence of this unbroken connection in your own words: "The visible properties of the cat fix what it's like for you to experience the cat."

A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop

What I see re: 'mental image' is "image" modified by "mental." Since "image" by definition means: a representation of the external form of a person or thing in art:, "mental" is redundant because "representation" includes the virtual seeing of something physical recorded in memory.

You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature? — ucarr

Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism. — jkop

You're saying Chalmers posits the "what it's like to be x" experience as a mental property emergent from the physical properties of the brain? Also, you're saying this bifurcation on Chalmers' part is an ambiguity of language with no referent ambiguity within the physics of the natural world?

Why do you think the mental property to which Chalmers refers is an erroneous use of the sense of "experience" (intentionalistic) and not simply the subjective memory of the person?

As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. Separately or somehow coalesced. I find the dualism implausible and redundant. I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like. — jkop

Why do you think a man can know he's seeing a cat but not also separate that knowledge from his knowledge of his knowledge? We're not simply aware. We're also self-aware.

My above question trains its focus upon a separation between seeing a cat and knowing that one is seeing a cat. In order to give an account of seeing the cat to a listener at a later date, doesn't that require that the storyteller hold in memory both the experience of seeing the cat and the experience of being aware of seeing the cat?

I think this is what Chalmers assumes. Therefore, as I understand him, the HPoC isn't about seeing things in the world, but rather it is about the subjective experience of knowing one is seeing things in the world, including knowing one is seeing oneself.

The HPoC, therefore, isn't based upon a false bifurcation of things seen in the world and then subsequently rendered into a physical property and a mental property; it's based upon the question about how self-awareness is apparently attached to a physical brain whose physico_material processes seem to give no account, in physico_material terms, of that attendant self-awareness.

Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism.

As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. — jkop

Photons bounce off of something > hit a photon detecting device > the device responds by sending a signal to an information processing and storage unit.

That is not an experience. That is just physical events that take place due to the properties of particles and laws of physics. We have robots that fit that description. We don't wonder what the robot experiences/what it's like to be the robot, any more than we wonder what a pool table experiences/what it's like to be a pool table.

Photons bounce off of something > hit my retina > my retina responds by sending a signal to my brain > I see red.

Seeing red is my experiences of the same thing that happens to and within the robot. The same physical events that happen to me happen to the robot, but the robot doesn't have an experience of the events.

I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like. — jkop

What is the cat like when it is not being seen?

the subjective experience of knowing one is seeing things in the world, including knowing one is seeing oneself. — ucarr

That's several different experiences and objects stacked on top of each other. What could that be like?

What is the cat like when it is not being seen? — Patterner

More or less like it is when it is seen (disregarding Schrödinger's cat). :smile:

...the subjective experience of knowing one is seeing things in the world, including knowing one is seeing oneself. — ucarr

That's several different experiences and objects stacked on top of each other. — jkop

Yes, it's the vertical stacking of higher-orders of memory feedback looping; this is what the current generation of robots lacks. That's why, as yet, robots lack subjectivity. Subjectivity requires awareness of being an aware subject of both objective and subjective experience.

What could that be like? — jkop

Were you not aware of being aware of me when you addressed your above question to me? Of course your were in possession of that second tier of awareness, or how else could you have addressed your question to me?

What is the cat like when it is not being seen? — Patterner

My conjectural answer is superposition; I draw this directly from what Schrödinger says about the cat in the box before the door is opened: the possible radioactive decay of the particle possibly triggering the killing of the cat, while unobserved, holds superposition of an undecided cat simultaneously alive/dead.

Note - At our Newtonian scale of experience, the vast network of sentients observing events makes macro-scale superposition extremely improbable. Even so, we do frequently experience something superposition-adjacent: in a courtroom with a defendant on trial for murder, in the instance of the murder presumably having occurred without a witness, that alleged murder holds something like superposition in that it's uncertain whether it did or did not occur. This uncertainty, for the judge, jury, prosecutor and defense is akin to the murder holding superposition: it simultaneously did/did not occur. Via circumstantial evidence, inference serves as the "observer" supplying the jury with an "observation" of the event. It then empowers them to resolve which possibility becomes a decided reality.

So, we see, as a generalization, that superposition is logical uncertainty rendered in physics.

For more on this, please click the hyperlink below:

What Does Consciousness Do?

If by central executive you mean CPU (central processing unit), then I say it's not an unreasonable stretch to construe "processing" as "views." In each case -- the CPU in one and the brain in the other -- a processor processes data in the act of constructing a world view. Furthermore, the brain also manipulates data that simply exists in memory. When you imagine or dream of the experience of seeing red, that's an example of your brain manipulating data that simply exists in memory. — ucarr

I would say the brain is more like the actual computer with a CPU, working memory and long-term memory, not just a CPU. Each part is necessary and cannot function without the other parts.

I would distinguish between "processing" and "views" as a view being a type of processing where the information being processed is about the world relative to the one processing the information. This is why the world appears and sounds to be located relative to your eyes and ears and that all of our sensory perceptions are about the world relative to our locating in space-time.

I guess you want to go from:

What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here.
— Harry Hindu

to:

So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes?
— Harry Hindu

I guess the passage is intended to be a narrative that elaborates two or more forms of "working memory."

Also, I guess you believe one form is real and the other not. — ucarr

I'm not asking which one is real. I'm simply asking what form does the contents in any type of working memory take. We seem to have a problem with how we experience other's working memory compared to how we experience our own working memory. If it is simply a matter of perspective - of BEING your working memory as opposed to representing the working memory of others because it would be impossible to BE others' working memory so your only option is to represent it, then that is ok.

I would say the brain is more like the actual computer with a CPU, working memory and long-term memory, not just a CPU. Each part is necessary and cannot function without the other parts. — Harry Hindu

I understand you to be referring to R.A.M./R.O.M. with: "working memory and long-term memory."

I would distinguish between "processing" and "views" as a view being a type of processing where the information being processed is about the world relative to the one processing the information. This is why the world appears and sounds to be located relative to your eyes and ears and that all of our sensory perceptions are about the world relative to our locating in space-time. — Harry Hindu

I understand you to be saying that the "views" type of processing is closely tied to the location of the referent and its viewer.

We seem to have a problem with how we experience other's working memory compared to how we experience our own working memory. — Harry Hindu

I think consciousness, performing in its virtual imaging mode, as based on memory, greatly complicates and perplexes the discreteness and certainty of the location of the referent in relation to the viewer. The portability of memory in time and in space complicates our understanding of the original link between referent and viewer regarding their respective locations.

Furthermore, I think this loosening of the link between the two is one of the main causes of the HPoC. I can access my own subjective memory directly. I can only attempt to access another person's subjective memory indirectly, as via listening to a narrative recounted from memory by another person.

I'm not asking which one is real. I'm simply asking what form does the contents in any type of working memory take... If it is simply a matter of perspective - of BEING your working memory as opposed to representing the working memory of others because it would be impossible to BE others' working memory so your only option is to represent it, then that is ok. — Harry Hindu

I think it's possible to understand that even in the case of one's own subjective memory of being oneself, a separation exists between oneself as thing-in-itself (a kind of pure objectivity of a thing, extant, I believe, more as concept than experience) and a mental representation within subjectivity.

I guess I'm saying we are not exactly our thoughts. Evidence for this might be the fact that sometimes the motives for our behaviors are unconscious.

As to the question of the general form of working memory, firstly, I think memory has a circular structure. Going forward from there, I speculate subjectivity is a higher-order of mnemonic feedback looping. Going forward from there, our ability to know what it's like to be someone else depends upon our virtual viewing (in our imagination) of the GUI of the contents (code) of the other person's working memory.

Dauntingly complicated, isn't it?

I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like.
— jkop

What is the cat like when it is not being seen?
— Patterner

More or less like it is when it is seen (disregarding Schrödinger's cat). :smile: — jkop

Let's use you as an example. If I see you, would you say my experience of you is like what you are like?

They could make a mannequin to look exactly like you, and so lifelike that it would fool me if I see it from even several feet away, but do not try to interact with it. I would agree that my experience of the mannequin is like what the mannequin is like.

They could make a drone to look exactly like you, which you would control, so it would behave exactly as you behave. I would agree that my experience of the drone is like what the drone is like.

But you? Surely, what it is like for me to experience you is not what you are like. I think I am missing every important quality/aspect of what you are like when I experience you.



Well done, re Schrödinger's cat. :grin:

If I see you, would you say my experience of you is like what you are like? — Patterner

The short answer is: yes, as long as I'm the object that you see.

One might add that the seeing is a presentation in your conscious awareness of some visible parts and properties of me as they appear in your visual field under conditions of satisfaction (e.g. under ordinary light conditions, with trichromatic eyes etc.)

I think I am missing every important quality/aspect of what you are like when I experience you. — Patterner

Granted that some parts are currently hidden from view (e.g, my lungs), but I wouldn't call them missing. A visual experience is about what's open to view. One can of course mistake things, such as in optical illusions, or even miss things when attention or interest makes one disregard some things while focussing on other things. But they're not missing in an absolute sense. You can always check again or look closer.

What about my hypothetical mannequin of you. Is my experience of seeing it like what you are like?