Assuming that no one is forcing the mother to carry the child, and everyone believes it is wrong to intervene, should she or should she not kill her child? — NOS4A2

She can do what she wants. There's no "should" either way.

There is a “should” for the one committing the act of killing. Should I or should I not take this course of action? But I appreciate the honesty.

There is a “should” for the one committing the act the act of killing. Should I or should I not take this course of action? — NOS4A2

To the extent that one can ask "should I or should I not kill the weeds in my garden".

Plant ethics. Sure. But we’re talking about the killing of a human being.

Plant ethics. Sure. But we’re talking about the killing of a human being. — NOS4A2

As established by the trolley problem, the moral worth of a human-as-zygote is less than the moral worth of a human-as-baby (and in fact, the moral worth of five humans-as-zygotes is less than the moral worth of one human-as-baby).

The moral worth of a human-as-zygote is equivalent to the moral worth of a plant.

This doesn't seem very hard. If the question is: "let one person die (to make it easy, assume they are 100 years old) or every woman in the early stages of pregnancy in the world miscarries, it seems an easy choice to make.

Even excluding the (potential) children themselves, a great, great many women very much want to become pregnant. Some sort of scenario (however bizarre) where they have become pregnant and would otherwise give birth but will lose the children if there isn't some sort of sacrifice isn't without moral valence.

Plus, abortion is generally not about zygotes.

As established by the trolley problem, the moral worth of a human-as-zygote is less than the moral worth of a human-as-baby (and in fact, the moral worth of five humans-as-zygotes is less than the moral worth of one human-as-baby).

The moral worth of a human-as-zygote is equivalent to the moral worth of a plant.

I understand the position. A human-in-utero is morally insignificant. I just don’t understand how one can reach that conclusion. I suppose his worth might increase and decreases with his cell count, or, he is morally worthless until he is in my phone book, but who knows?

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion.

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

It's no less disgusting business than weighing the moral worth of non-human organisms. Is it wrong to kill plants? Flies? Cows? Dogs? E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial?

Tell that to the vast majority of parents who have children, that the child they have created and are carrying is morally insignificant and it doesn’t deserve to live.

Tell that to the vast majority of parents who have children, that the child they have created and are carrying is morally insignificant and it doesn’t deserve to live. — NOS4A2

That does not address my point. I'm not interested in sentiment (unless you want to argue that morality is sentiment).

You claim that all humans deserve to live, but then must also accept one of these:

1. No non-humans deserve to live
2. Some but not all non-humans deserve to live
3. All non-humans deserve to live

If you accept (1) or (2) then you accept that it is appropriate to weigh the moral worth of living organisms. I don't see why weighing the moral worth of individuals within a species is any less disgusting than weighing the moral worth of species within a genus (or higher up in the taxonomy).

And I'll add, you already accepted with the trolley problem that the lives of five zygotes are worth less than the life of one baby, so why the about-turn?

If the question is: "let one person die (to make it easy, assume they are 100 years old) or every woman in the early stages of pregnancy in the world miscarries, it seems an easy choice to make. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Women who have miscarriages can suffer extreme emotional stress. Some may kill themselves. Also, miscarriage itself can cause death. Your scenario muddies the water. It's easier to use a trolley-car situation like what Michael is doing.

The point that Michael has made, which seems irrefutable, is that a zygote's life is nothing compared to an actual person's life, and any number of zygotes can be killed/sacrificed/used to save a person.

Exactly. The morality of killing something depends on its level of sophistication.

The argument is pretty clear, and has been stated a few times. Whatever standing the cyst has is negligible in comparison to that had by Mrs Smith.

This is entirely too vague. Do you think the blastocyst has a right to life or not?!? You are purposefully avoiding the question, because you know if you grant it rights then you cannot make this kind of argument that Mrs. Smith has more of a right to bodily autonomy.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person).

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person). — Bob Ross

Well, zygotes don't have a rational will, therefore by your own logic they aren't persons.

I know many Republicans that believe that abortion should be allowed up to a certain point in the pregnancy for any reason. I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy.

I could see that (although I have many examples of Republicans that do not support that at all); because they lack a coherent position.

To me, the issue becomes moral only when the fetus develops a nervous system and is capable of feeling pain. Zygotes do not have nervous systems.

None of this matters; and can be demonstrated as useless considerations simply by observing that you probably eat other animals that can feel pain and have a nervous system much more complex than a fetus’ and your argument here would apply equally to all those animals. Viz., the principles which you are analyzing and committing yourself too, would entail, if granted, veganism.

If someone was raped or the birth control they were using failed,

Also irrelevant. Aborting a child from rape or a failing in contraception is no different than killing an infant born out of wedlock—two wrongs do not make a right.

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means).

Interesting, I guess we will have to see what happens then.

DID YOU READ MY MESSAGE?!? I am losing patience with you, my friend. Literally in the quote you made I addressed that!

I apologize: I was not intending to alter the example to my benefit. I am not following what difference it makes if the tactical bomber cannot retreat. What are you suggesting?

In that quote you explicitly say that things without a rational will are not persons.

In previous comments you said that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're human and wrong to kill humans because they're persons. Combining these together you were saying that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're persons.

So you're contradicting yourself.

At the very least you need to amend your original remarks and say that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they will be persons, and then I will deny this claim; it is only wrong to kill something if it currently is a person, and what it could be in the future (or was in the past) is irrelevant.

But you would pour zygotes on a burning building to put out the fire and save a child trapped inside, correct?

I understand your confusion, but I've clarified this many times now. A zygote is not a person (in that strict sense that you mean) but has a nature that marks it out as going to be a person (aka: "will be" a person, as you put it). It is not, under my view, the immanent personhood that grounds rights but, rather, the teleological nature.

When I said "because they are persons", I was speaking loosely in the sense of the teleological claim; which how persons were defined in the pre-modern sense. In the modern sense, you are right to point out that they are not persons.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip).

For your view, as you and I have noted, you have to ground rights in actual personhood; and this leads to absurd results (e.g., a knocked out human has no rights while knocked out).

One cannot just ground rights in the organism nor personhood: it must be grounded in the consideration of the nature of the organism.

In short, to make this painfully clear, in modern terminology a zygote is not a person (nor is a knocked out adult) and I would say they are teleologically marked out to become a person; and in pre-modern terminology (which I prefer) a zygote (and a knocked out adult) are persons because their nature marks them out as such. Either way you prefer, human beings have these rights because they are teleologically set out as (becoming) persons.

It is also worth mentioning that non-persons still have rights---they just aren't the same. E.g., a cow has the right to not be tortured for fun.

How many times are you going to ask the same question?

The answer is still no, I would not use the zygotes to put out the fire. I've elaborated in detail why that would be wrong: please ask questions if you are confused at all on it.



This is a really bad ethical principle. If I take it seriously, then we should kill and harvest the organs of physically disabled people to save the lives of normal, sick people. It is nonsense.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip). — Bob Ross

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will whereas a cow developing a rational will would require artificial intervention then it needs to be explained why this distinction is morally relevant, and why being highly likely to (naturally or otherwise) develop a rational will entails having a right to life.

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means). — Bob Ross

This a strange distinction.

Let's say there are two tracks. On one there is a box containing one living baby and on another there's a box containing five living zygotes. If you don't pull the lever then only the baby is run over and if you do then only the zygotes are run over.

This is achieved in one of three different ways:

1. Pulling the lever changes which track the trolley travels down
2. Pulling the lever switches the boxes
3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

These seem to be morally equivalent. If one ought pull the lever in the case of (1) then one ought pull the lever in the case of (2) and (3). (3) is equivalent to @RogueAI's example of using the zygotes to put out a fire.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

The answer is still no, I would not use the zygotes to put out the fire. I've elaborated in detail why that would be wrong: please ask questions if you are confused at all on it. — Bob Ross

OK, your position is absurd.

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process. — Michael

Correct.

That does not address my point. I'm not interested in sentiment (unless you want to argue that morality is sentiment).

You claim that all humans deserve to live, but then must also accept one of these:

1. No non-humans deserve to live
2. Some but not all non-humans deserve to live
3. All non-humans deserve to live

If you accept (1) or (2) then you accept that it is appropriate to weigh the moral worth of living organisms. I don't see why weighing the moral worth of individuals within a species is any less disgusting than weighing the moral worth of species within a genus (or higher up in the taxonomy).

And I'll add, you already accepted with the trolley problem that the lives of five zygotes are worth less than the life of one baby, so why the about-turn?

I don’t think all humans deserve to live.

It’s less a matter of sentiment and more a matter of justice. Two unjust conclusions have been made about these beings. One, that they are morally worthless, and two, that they deserve to die.

These are the conclusions of dehumanization. You judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics, and not because who they are and what they’ve done. In this case, separate human beings according to their stage of development. Segregate them in the mind, then theorize unrealistic scenarios wherein you are forced to choose between these beings and the ones you prefer morally who should live or die. Base all further conclusions on this unjust analysis. This is all it takes to justify their killing.

On the other hand, many people who want have children afford moral worth to the child they are carrying, believe he deserves to live, so much so that they will sacrifice their own security and resources for him to survive. No trolly problem or dehumanization will convince them otherwise. I suspect this is a more instinctual rather rational exercise, but so long as someone sees moral worth in them, the being is not morally worthless.

I don’t think all humans deserve to live. — NOS4A2

The "innocent" was implicit there.

One, that they are morally worthless, and two, that they deserve to die. — NOS4A2

I didn't say that they deserve to die. I have only said that we ought kill zygotes if it saves babies and that it is acceptable to abort a zygote.

You judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics, and not because who they are and what they’ve done. — NOS4A2

What is the distinction between who someone is and what something physically is, in particular with respect to zygotes? You're the one who often argues against anything like a soul or folk psychology and reduces everything to base biology.

But again, you haven't answered the question. Why is it wrong to judge the moral worth of a human but not the moral worth of a non-human? You're engaging in speciesism without even attempting to justify it.

so long as someone sees moral worth in them, the being is not morally worthless. — NOS4A2

Well now we might be getting somewhere. Are you suggesting that a living organism has moral worth if and only if someone sees moral worth in it?

That leads to problematic scenarios, such as what if I see moral worth in cows or the serial killer trying to kill you, or what if the pregnant woman doesn't see moral worth in the zygote growing inside her but some random kid half the world away does?