That's really awesome! Thanks!

↪wonderer1
That's really awesome! Thanks! — Patterner

Ditto.

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.

RIP Professor Dennett.

What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
— creativesoul
There's no easy way to answer that - especially if you are trying to find commonalities between thoughts that are articulated in language and thoughts that are not. The only place that they overlap is in their role as reasons in rational actions. — Ludwig V

That's not true. If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. That's not the only sense of the key terms.

They(all thought and belief) are all meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating them. They all consist of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Some creatures' correlations include language use. Others do not. Some creatures' include the rules of correct inference. Others do not. Some creatures' correlations include trains and humans. Others include community standards such as the time schedule...

The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. — Ludwig V

I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all.

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself. — creativesoul

I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book.

What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog. — creativesoul

I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other.

If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. — creativesoul

I was responding to a specific issue. It may be possible to generalize, but it's certainly very complicated.
If you include our sayings as well as our doings as actions, then beliefs do show up in actions. What sense could we make of a belief or thought (rational or irrational) that didn't (couldn't) affect what we say or do at all? But perhaps there is a different sense of belief in which we can make sense of such beliefs. What do you suggest?

I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all. — Patterner

It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.

The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachikō would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachikō died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)

That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands.

We could also debate how far the dog was rational. I would say that persisting for a while after Ueno died is rational. But continuing for that long... I'm not sure. Other dogs, I think, would have given up much, much, sooner. One factor in his persistence may have been that his new home (with Ueno's former gardener) did not distract him from his habit. Habits, I would say, can be rational, but can also be irrational, especially when they do not change when changed circumstances imply a change in habits.

But then, people saw his persistence as loyalty, which is not necessarily rational, but is something that we value, on the whole. So this question of how far we apply the "people" framework to animals extends beyond rationality or not. It incudes values.

But so far as the question "How do you know" goes, I don't see the difference between your simple case and your "other cases". — Ludwig V

Could you elaborate further on what you mean by that? My point was that being rational must be able to be verified, justified and approved to be so. You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal. That sounds like someone not understanding what being rational means, but just misusing the term.

I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. — Ludwig V

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)

My point was that being rational must be able to be verified, justified and approved to be so. — Corvus

You didn't quite say that.

Not always. I know it is autumn by looking at the falling leaves from the trees outside. My knowledge of autumn arrived to me purely from the visual perception. Why do I need to justify the knowledge? If someone asked me to justify it, I could then do it. But before that unlikely event, I just know it is autumn.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle. — Corvus

On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that.

You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal. — Corvus

I agree, a single case on its own doesn't cut much ice. One needs a framework of background knowledge, including a decision about whether rational explanation applies to at least some things that the subject does. However, given that you are a homo sapiens, if you walk down the street, stop at the shop door, open it and go in, I am justified in saying that you walked to the shop. I might be wrong, but that possibility applies to everything that I say. It would be unreasonable to deny that you walked to the shop in those circumstances. Ditto the dog and the hawk.

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had. — Mww

It's the result of the peculiar condition of the philosopher. But it is perfectly true that there are many experiences that we have that seem more or less completely arbitrary. But one can sometimes explain dizziness, for example, by the spinning dancing you've been indulging in, or by an ear infection. So perhaps one day...

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate. — Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. Their thoughts and feelings are on display to us in just the same way(s) that our thoughts and feelings are on display to them. I don't think speculation is particularly harmful in itself. It's when it gets mistaken for established truth that it can do damage.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.) — Mww

In fact, you know perfectly well how to play the game. The fact that we sometimes get it wrong is not important. We can spot mistakes and put them right.
Although in this case, I would propose that he did go out to welcome you home, but got distracted by the squirrel when he got out there. However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one.

The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day.
— Ludwig V
I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all. — Patterner

Nice input. I'm oblivious to the details of the actual events. My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. By my lights, it was the connection to the human that was meaningful to the dog. Thus, the significance that the train has to the dog had nothing to do with the time of arrival. Additionally, it was claimed that the dog hoped for the human to arrive. The question was asked, "Why else?" would the dog continue going.

That drew my attention to the differences between simple expectation and hope. Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. I've no issue with dogs having simple basic expectations regarding what's about to happen. I do not think that dogs are capable of having expectations that extend/exceed past the immediately perceptible. How far into the future one can consider is a measure/increment determined by its means of accounting for time/change. The details of the story are now better known by myself, and as a result, it seems that there could have been any number of reasons the dog continued going to the train station around the same time daily. I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train.
 

It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.

The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachikō would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachikō died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)

That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands. — Ludwig V

Being a part of routine is itself positive reinforcement, especially if that routine resulted in dopamine dumps and/or other sorts of good feelings within the dog. Those things happen autonomously and happen throughout the experience. So, when the human was alive, the good feelings began prior to the arrival. Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
— creativesoul
I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book. — Ludwig V

Well, in all fairness, I cringed far too much. Literally, viscerally. To use an intentional stance in a way that attributes agency where none is justifiable, was simply too much for me to accept. The book is chock full of anthropomorphism. Dennett just accepted that criticism and continued. He knew. What other method do we have??? That seems to have been his thoughts on the matter. Of course, he also regularly used a notion of "design" that most naturalists eschew.

I still, to this day, have a very hard time accepting much of what he argued for as a result. To be clear, Dennett was and remains an admirable public figure in American history.

Quining Qualia was brilliant!

What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
— creativesoul
I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other. — Ludwig V

They belong to the dog. They are meaningful to the dog. If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them.

What do those beliefs consist of?

…it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions…..
— Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. — Ludwig V

True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
————

However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one. — Ludwig V

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.

My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. — creativesoul

Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below.

If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them. — creativesoul

Clearly, beliefs are not propositional attitudes, except in the sense that a proposition is grammatically necessary to describe them. (There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)

I'm not sure that the question what they consist in is applicable, but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. So what the believer says is often given a specially authoritative status. But the believer's own description of their belief is not conclusive. We often overturn it when other evidence convinces us that they are lying or pretending or deceiving themselves.

When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.

If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images.

Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. — creativesoul

That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.

I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train. — creativesoul

The story doesn't tell. But surely, if the dog turned up at random times when the human is not coming, there would not have been anything like the same fuss.

Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way. — creativesoul

Yes, you do need to look more widely and/or have a decent background knowledge of the dog's habits. But if going to the station itself was a pleasurable experience for the dog, would they not turn up at random times as well as at 5 p.m.?

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations. — Mww

Surely, we would not even try to apply explanations of actions that work for humans unless we found that animal behaviour was sufficiently like human behaviour for that to make sense. It's not an arbitrary choice.

The article referenced in wiki says it was daily for a year while the man was alive, and the dog continued daily for eleven years until it died. Obviously, there is no way to answer most of the questions. I don't suspect the dog remembered man that it knew for a year a decade ago, and went there expecting that man to step off the train ten years after the last time it had happened.

The dog's behavior for all those years might change my mind, if we knew it. Did it go to the station every day a decade later, and sit starting at where the train was going to stop, largely ignoring anyone who spoke to or petted it? Eating an offered snack, but clearly focused on the tracks? When the train arrived each day, did it still get up, tail wagging, watching each person get off? When the man didn't walk off the train, for the 3,000th day in a row, did the dog turn around, head lowered in sadness, and walk home? Only to do it all again the 3,001st day?

My guess is it was conditioned to go there at that time of day by the reward of the man's arrival. When the man stopped showing up, it still went, because of the conditioning. Then other rewards showed up, and kept it going, so the conditioning never faded. It wasn't going there in 1934 for the same reason it went there in 1923.

However, The eye is the classic case of something that seemed to escape the possible range of evolutionary development. A major issue is that soft tissue is not often fossilized. But there is at least an outline of what happened. See:- New Scientist - Evolution of the Eye — Ludwig V

Just read it. Very cool. Thank you.

Good point. Myths are composed or propositions, but that's doesn't mean that they are propositions. Belief does seem to be better - so long as we bracket the context of evidence that applies to most run-of-the-mill beliefs. — Ludwig V

I am not clear what the distinction would be between being composed of propositions and being a proposition or set of propositions or being composed of beliefs and being a belief or set of beliefs. I wonder whether your point was that the use of either term should not confuse us into thinking that a myth is a belief or proposition that we have arrived at by ourselves and decided for ourselves. They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'.

A sense of self that via memory "unifies" experience.
— Janus
It seems to me that there are two related but different ideas of the self. To a great extent, we define ourselves or create who we are by what we (choose to) do. But that sense of self-identity is not always identical with our sense of the identity of others. A further complication is that often our identity is given by the roles that we occupy and these differ in different contexts. (Parent/child, teacher/student, manager/colleague) One can appeal to continuities of one kind or another - stream of consciousness, physical continuity, and so forth - but then there is the question of how important or relevant they are - especially when they conflict. So unity of experience is one factor amongst others. — Ludwig V

I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience.

My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog.
— creativesoul
Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below. — Ludwig V

I don't see the relevance. I don't think I've made my point clear enough. I'll try a question...

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.

(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.) — Ludwig V

That's not true.

All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.

but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. — Ludwig V

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.

how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, — Ludwig V

The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes.

When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.

If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images — Ludwig V

This troubles me. Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard.

However, I suspect there's little disagreement between us when it comes to what counts as an accurate report of another's belief if and when the other speaks our language. The question here is how to go about accurately reporting the belief of a language less creature.

That clauses are problematic here. The propositional attitude approach misses the mark altogether. Propositions are not meaningful to language less creatures. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating it.

Someone who thinks in images draws correlations between those images and other things.

Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations.
— creativesoul
That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. — Ludwig V

That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog.

But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.

Yeah. I see no reason to deny that a dog can expect to eat in many situations. Hope, on the other hand... not so much.

Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
— creativesoul
Yes, you do need to look more widely... — Ludwig V

Indeed. It's the approach that matters.

The correlations drawn by the dog between all the different sights, sounds, smells, etc., exhaust the dog's experience.

Let's say that there is a cat and that the cat has chased a mouse into hiding. The cat will wait and watch the entry point. Say it's a small opening under a cabinet. We could talk about the cat's thought and/or belief by saying the cat believes that the mouse is under the cabinet. I would have no issue with that. The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. However, the cabinet, the mouse, the smell, the taste, and the spatiotemporal relations are not meaningless at all in such circumstances. These elemental constituents of the cat's belief are the content. The content of a language less animal's belief are directly perceptible to them. The cat is biologically capable of perceiving and drawing correlations between those things. Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result.

My guess is it was conditioned — Patterner

Succinct.

Yup.

They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'. — Janus

Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill.

I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience. — Janus

When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities.

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer. — creativesoul

One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours.
It is very plausible that it is going too far to attribute to the dog a concept of belief; I cannot imagine dog behaviour that would lead me to do that. But saying that the dog believes that the train arrives at 5 p.m. is not for the dog's benefit, but for yours.
However, what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich.

That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief.

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect. — creativesoul

Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers).

The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes. — creativesoul

You are doing phenomenology, then - first person view. Not possible with a dog. But the phenomena that are relevant in this context are not the thinking processes.

They are the benchmark. They are the standard. — creativesoul

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.

That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog. — creativesoul

I'm sorry I wasn't clear. I was admitting that it seems right not to attribute hope to the dog, and then, with a "But..", introducing a case that makes that conclusion doubtful.

The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. .... Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result. — creativesoul

Yes, and the cat's grasp of that meaning is what justifies us in using "mouse" to describe what the cat is doing. To be sure, the cat's concept of a mouse is different from, and more limited than, our concept of a mouse. But cat and human are both thinking about the same furry animal, hiding away behind the wainscot.

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
— creativesoul
One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours. — Ludwig V

A child learns to utter "Bye, Bye" in certain situations. The balloon was leaving, and I say that for your benefit, not mine. The child knew it was time to utter "Bye, Bye." in situations where things were leaving. The "one" qualification is interesting. The child named the balloon. That is... he picked that balloon out of the world to the exclusion of all else. He isolated the balloon.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?

I watched "What the Bleep Do We Know" again last night and got a new understanding of what the movie intends to say. The movie blends quantum physics with spirituality. It questions what we think we know because each of us has a personal story as our life experiences are different. Two sisters will experience the same family but this shared reality is experienced differently for each one. From there the arguing can begin and it may never end. Each is sure the other is wrong.

A whole nation will have the same leader but the citizens can have opposing thoughts about the desirability of the leader. This opposition can be very emotional. When it comes to religion people can be strongly emotional about what they believe and what others believe. Everyone believing s/he is being rational even when they start killing each other.

If we were aliens looking at this reality would we believe humans can learn and that they are rational?
When social animals split and follow different leaders, they fight over territory and drive the other away.
Or if the social animals from one species cross each other's path, they will fight over the territory. There are factors that have led to humans living in large groups but how well is this working? What makes it possible for millions of people to live together?

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
19 minutes ago — creativesoul

Dogs may not be able to count to 10, but even the untrained ones have a rough sense of how many treats you put in their food bowl. That's the finding of a new study, which reveals that our canine pals innately understand quantities in much the same way we do. https://www.science.org/content/article/dog-brains-have-knack-numbers-much-ours#:~:text=Dogs%20may%20not%20be%20able,the%20same%20way%20we%20do.

do have a sense of time, but it differs from the way humans perceive it. A dog’s concept of time revolves around routine, daily patterns, and associative learning. Dogs can’t understand time in the abstract sense of hours and minutes, but they do have an internal awareness of time intervals.

What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things?

...what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich. — Ludwig V

Guilt is what one experiences when they know they have done something that they believe they should not have done. The dog does not believe that he ate the tuna out of the sandwich. He knows he did not.

So, attributing guilt to the dog is a mistake. The dog doesn't feel guilty even though it may be perfectly capable of it.

Feeling guilty requires belief about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior(moral belief). The dog, if it has lived long enough to attribute causality to its own behavior and what happens afterwards(praise/condemnation/punishment/etc.) then it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). We could call this rule following. It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows.

The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship.

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.

(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
— Ludwig V

That's not true.

All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief. — Ludwig V

Yes, and what you said has just been falsified.

The child named the balloon. — creativesoul

Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock? — creativesoul

Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?

Let's see...

The dog is on the platform at 4:55, looking down the track, just like he is there every week-day when Ueno goes off to work in the morning, and just like most of the humans who have gathered there in the last ten minutes. Agreed?
We will say of the humans that they are expecting a train. We know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that they are expecting the 5.00 train (whether they know that it is due at 5.00 or not - they might be unclear and only know that it is some time soon.).
Why will we not say of the dog that he is expecting a train? If we do, we know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that he is expecting the 5.00 train. "The 5.00 train" is our description, not his. So I'll give you this. The dog is not expecting a train at 5.00; he is not expecting anything at 5.00, because he doesn't have a concept of 5.00.

We know that when the train appears down the track, dog and humans will all come to attention - humans gathering their bits and pieces or moving towards the edge of the platform, dog standing with tail waving slowly back and to. When the train stops, the humans will climb into, and more humans will climb out of, the carriages. The humans still standing on the platform will meet and greet the people they have come to meet, the dog will meet and greet the human he has come to meet. Perhaps some humans will not meet anyone, but will pause till the train has gone and the platform cleared and then walk quietly away. Perhaps they will come back to meet another train. Eventually, the same will happen to the dog and the dog also will come back to meet another train.
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? Again, "Ueno" is our description (name), not his.

What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things? — Athena

I don't know. I would suggest that one thing that would change would be our ability to co-ordinate with each other.

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.
— creativesoul
Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers). — Ludwig V

There's a whole lot of presupposition packed up in very few words.

Evidently, I've misunderstood your position.

You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action.



Regarding my own, and the reification charge...

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?