PS But yeah, antinatalism for sure. — SophistiCat

:up:

What Heidegger tried to do was to root thinking in practice, which is a rather modern idea. — Tobias

Oh yes, he "tried" this "modern idea" like a few others, iirc: Laozi-Zhuangzi, Heraclitus, Socrates, Pyrrho, Epicurus-Lucretius, Seneca-Epictetus, Sextus Empiricus ... Montaigne, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Peirce-Dewey, Wittgenstein et al.

- Yes and yes. :up:

God preserve us from interesting philosophers!

This thread belongs in the Lounge. What people find interesting or uninteresting in philosophy says more about them than about philosophy. — SophistiCat

Why? How unphilosophical to assert. That in itself is a hefty claim. Not sophisti-cated.

Oh yes, he "tried" this "modern idea" like a few others, iirc: Laozi-Zhuangzi, Heraclitus, Socrates, Pyrrho, Epicurus-Lucretius, Seneca-Epictetus, Sextus Empiricus ... Montaigne, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Peirce-Dewey, Wittgenstein et al — 180 Proof

Hmm, I think there is a difference. I do not know about Heraclitus, Epicurus, Seneca. The ancients are interesting, but this sweeping comparison I dare not make because it may well be anachrinistic. I do think he does something different from Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and something very similar to Merleau Ponty, Gadamer and even Foucault. I think Nietzsche is his closest predecessor. He does not ground his phenomenology in logic and thought. He decenters res cogitans in favour of res extensa. Akin to Spinoza, but Spinoza held on to a geometric method. I do think he tried to overcome dualism, while putting practice ahead of logos.

I am a historical person and, of course, he owes a lot to others. Moreover, I do not share his craving for authenticity. I think philosophy took a wrong turn in that respect. A wrong turn with which it still wrestles, considering how many words thought is spend on the notion of 'identity' and not in a logical sense. I do think his influence on modern thought is undeniable and for that alone he deserves study.

Indeed it is. What many don’t realize, though, is that he isn’t simply repeating Leibnitz’s question, he is deconstructing it. What he is really asking is , ‘why do we exclusively associate the copula ‘is’ with the notion of something, of presence, and not also the Nothing’? — Joshs

Thanks! I did start reading it once, (never finished) so I must have read this passage. Apparently it did not stick with me as it should have. :)

I had expected to find Rawls in there too.

He isn't "important" to me.