Instead of thinking of the subject as being passively subjected to a world of activity, therefore producing an effect from that causation, it is much better to think of the agent as actively causing the world, as perceived. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not seeing how the latter is better. It sounds solipsistic to me.

I'd think it better to recognize that neither of those options is very realistic, or the only options.

Yep.

Seems to me that physical events cause mental events and mental events cause physical events. Not one or the other. Both.

An adequate theory of realism would have to treat the perceiver as a genuine agent, not an entirely passive recipient of a purely objective world in all its glory.

Hence, why I think critical realism and new realism are better positions since they're seeking a better understanding of what it even means for something to be real. A realist account of perception will have to consider what the agent themselves brings to the encounter in terms of subjectivity, context, history, affordance, cultural sediment etc. — Bodhy

Searle fills that bill nicely.

I still like the term naive realism. I think it is apt since it's not doing justice to any adequate theory of realism. An adequate theory of realism would have to treat the perceiver as a genuine agent, not an entirely passive recipient of a purely objective world in all its glory. — Bodhy

Have you read any of the above mentioned philosophers on perception? Try this.

Hence, why I think critical realism and new realism are better positions since they're seeking a better understanding of what it even means for something to be real. — Bodhy

They're better, because they're better at satisfying what you already assume? :roll:

What are you saying, that "direct realism" is better terminology? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, 'direct' is equally misunderstood by uncharitable opponents. I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance.

Considering the color fictionalism position, if the world is without color then I suppose a scene of greys is what it must look like. And the implications are crazy. We must have evolved into beings who paint the world with color, and somehow were able to stay within the lines this whole time. In fact we must have invented color at some point. Of course it’s all untenable.

if the world is without color then I suppose a scene of greys is what it must look like. — NOS4A2

You seem to be under the impression that there’s a way things look distinct from the way things look to us. That makes as much sense as saying that there’s a way things taste and smell and feel distinct from the way things taste and smell and feel to us.

Vision isn’t special.

It's sort of like what we see are the shadows on the wall cast from the fire behind us. We see a a distorted fragment of the world, but not the world itself.

I don't take credit for that analogy.

No, just that it is possible to see thing more accurately, for instance if the world is without color, maybe it would better to see it without color. Why would a species need color?

Why would a species need color? — NOS4A2

There are plenty of species that don't need vision at all. Why is there a question of a species needing color?

There are species that have color vision because for those species it was adaptive to have color vision, and via biological evolution such sensory capacities evolved.

I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance. — jkop

What does it refer to then?

There are plenty of species that don't need vision at all. Why is there a question of a species needing color?

There are species that have color vision because for those species it was adaptive to have color vision, and via biological evolution such sensory capacities evolved.

The is a question of a species needing color because, from the perspective of color fictionalism, color is a fiction. I’m just not sure why a species would adapt to a fictional view of its surroundings.

I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance.
— jkop

What does it refer to then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Versions of direct perceptual realism (e.g. McDowell's disjunctivism, or Searle's non-disjunctivism).

Compare it with indirect perceptual realism, which is sometimes called 'scientific' despite the fact that it does not refer to science per se but the philosophical assumption that perception is indirect since scientists can manipulate the conditions of observation and evoke non-veridical experiences or hallucinations. But from artificially evoked experiences or hallucinations it doesn't follow that all experiences are hallucinations, nor that we never directly experience objects and states of affairs.

In both of these cases the words 'naive' and 'scientific' are used metaphorically (or rethorically), not literally.

No, just that it is possible to see thing more accurately, for instance if the world is without color, maybe it would better to see it without color. Why would a species need color? — NOS4A2

Is it possible to smell and taste things more accurately? Does the world contain smell and taste even when we're not smelling and tasting things?

The is a question of a species needing color because, from the perspective of color fictionalism, color is a fiction. I’m just not sure why a species would adapt to a fictional view of its surroundings. — NOS4A2

I'd think it would make more sense to be dubious towards the color fictionalism theory one has in mind.

Light comes in a spectrum of wavelengths. Objects reflect some of those wavelengths more completely than other wavelengths. Our visual systems are able to capture some of the detail of how white light interacts with objects, and it provides an adaptive advantage that our visual systems do so. However, we might say that our visual systems do so crudely.

We might imagine a species with 'superior' color vision, in which each photoreceptive cell in the retina is a spectrophotometer, and can transmit to the brain lots of high accuracy data about the intensity of each spectral component of the light landing on each photoreceptor. There would be an information overload problem though. Such a species would need much thicker optic nerves than we have, in order to transmit such highly detailed visual information to the brain. Furthermore, the brain of this imagined species would need to be much bigger than ours, in order to make use of all the highly detailed data coming in via those thick optic nerves. Brain is metabolically expensive (and in the case of humans, already verging on too big to pass through a birth canal) so although we can imagine such a species it isn't a plausible outcome of biological evolution.

Instead we have visual systems that allow us to gather a useful amount of data about the optical environment while retaining the ability to run away from things that want to eat our brains.

In both of these cases the words 'naive' and 'scientific' are used metaphorically (or rethorically), not literally. — jkop

I guess I just don't see the metaphor here, and the use appears to me to be literal.

Is it possible to smell and taste things more accurately? Does the world contain smell and taste even when we're not smelling and tasting things?

Well, yes, dogs have better hearing and smell.

I was strictly speaking about colors, though. If color is a fiction, why are we adding fiction to whatever it is we’re adding the color to?

The eagle has 20/5 eyesight, more rods and cones, and see much better. According to color factionalism they invent color, too, and somehow paint the images with their brain, but why would animals with such great sight distort their sight with color?

The eagle has 20/5 eyesight, more rods and cones, and see much better. According to color factionalism they invent color, too, and somehow paint the images with their brain, but why would animals with such great sight distort their sight with color? — NOS4A2

It's clearly useful to visually distinguish objects which reflect 400nm light and objects which reflect 700nm light. Colour sensations is how we do that.

Take this for example:



It's not that either humans or dogs (or neither) is seeing the "correct" (mind-independent) colour when looking at an object that reflects 500nm light; it's just the case that 500nm light causes different colour sensations for humans and dogs.

It's clearly useful to visually distinguish objects which reflect 400nm light and objects which reflect 700nm light. Colour sensations is how we do that.

I don't see how it is useful to distort the picture with a fiction.

It's not that either humans or dogs (or neither) is seeing the "correct" (mind-independent) colour when looking at an object that reflects 500nm light; it's just the case that 500nm light causes different colour sensations for humans and dogs.

A fiction is something invented or untrue. Color is a fiction. So it follows that the less color the less fiction, and therefor more accurate. Given that the dog sees a less variety of color according to your spectrums, and color is a fiction, it follows that the dog sees less fiction. Isn't that so?

My opinion is the opposite: that the dog is less-equipped to see the world, not only because it has only a fraction of the cones we do, but because it sees less of the world as a result.

I don't think color is a sensation because sensations occur within the body, while colored objects occur outside the body in a space independent of the mind.

colored objects occur outside the body in a space independent of the mind. — NOS4A2

Objects outside the body just reflect different wavelengths of light. This light causes one type of colour sensation in humans and another type of colour sensation in dogs.

Color is a fiction. — NOS4A2

No it’s not, it just isn't what you claim it to be.

I don't see how it is useful to distort the picture with a fiction. — NOS4A2

Your reasoning is akin to arguing that because pain is not a mind-independent property of fire then it is not useful and a distortion and a fiction to feel pain when we put our hands in the fire.

It would be helpful if colour realists explain which of these they believe:

1. “the apple is red” means “the apple reflects ~700nm light”
2. The apple is red because it reflects ~700nm light
3. The apple reflects ~700nm light because it is red

My opinion is the opposite: that the dog is less-equipped to see the world, not only because it has only a fraction of the cones we do, but because it sees less of the world as a result. — NOS4A2

But dogs can see in the dark. They forfeit one advantage for the sake of another.

Objects outside the body just reflect different wavelengths of light. This light causes one type of colour sensation in humans and another type of colour sensation in dogs.

But their location suggests that the color is outside the body, not inside. What we do with paints, phosphors, pigments, suggest that the color is out there among the surfaces of the objects these adjectives are meant to describe. On the other hand, there is no indication color sensations exist.

No it’s not, it just isn't what you claim it to be.

It sure looks like it is. Yours neither looks like it is nor makes any sense.

Your reasoning is akin to arguing that because pain is not a mind-independent property of fire then it is not useful and a distortion and a fiction to feel pain when we put our hands in the fire.

But I'm speaking about vision. Pain is no doubt located in the body, but it isn't clear that color is. So it is a false analogy. We'll stick to color since that's what the thread is about.

What we do with paints, phosphors, pigments, suggest that the color is out there among the surfaces of the objects these adjectives are meant to describe. — NOS4A2

We just use those things to change the way an object’s surface reflects light. That does not suggest that colour is a mind-independent property of the object’s surface.

Perhaps you could explain which (if any) of these you believe:

1. “the apple is red” means “the apple reflects ~700nm light”
2. The apple is red because it reflects ~700nm light
3. The apple reflects ~700nm light because it is red

On the other hand, there is no indication color sensations exist. — NOS4A2

Yes there is. Dreams, hallucinations, variations in colour perception (e.g. the dress), and studies such as this. This is why James Clerk Maxwell in On Colour Vision (1871) said "it seems almost a truism to say that color is a sensation".

And as the SEP article on colour explains:

One of the major problems with color has to do with fitting what we seem to know about colors into what science (not only physics but the science of color vision) tells us about physical bodies and their qualities. It is this problem that historically has led the major physicists who have thought about color, to hold the view that physical objects do not actually have the colors we ordinarily and naturally take objects to possess.

We just use those things to change the way an object’s surface reflects light. That does not suggest that colour is a mind-independent property of the object’s surface.

Why would we need to change the properties of the object if color is not a property of the object?

Perhaps you could explain which (if any) of these you believe:

1. “the apple is red” means “the apple reflects ~700nm light”
2. The apple is red because it reflects ~700nm light
3. The apple reflects ~700nm light because it is red

I don't know the correct answer but all of them seem good enough for me.

Yes there is. Dreams, hallucinations, variations in colour perception (e.g. the dress), and studies such as this. This is why James Clerk Maxwell in On Colour Vision (1871) said "it seems almost a truism to say that color is a sensation".

Very few examples and most if not all of them are the result of a body in a state of sleep, deprivation, or hallucination. The body is no doubt fascinating but it’s just not enough for me to doubt common sense, personally.

Besides, sensations aren’t red any more than the word “red” is. Sensations or experiences do not have any properties to begin with. If we are to abandon common sense and the world for pseudo-objects and things without properties we're going to need much more than that.

Why would we need to change the properties of the object if color is not a property of the object? — NOS4A2

We need to change how the object reflects light because the wavelength of the light that stimulates the eyes is what determines the type of colour sensation elicited.

Pain is a sensation, it hurts to put my hand in very hot water, I add cold water to reduce the temperature, and so I no longer feel pain when I put my hand in.

Besides, sensations aren’t red any more than the word “red” is. Sensations or experiences do not have any properties to begin with. If we are to abandon common sense and the world for pseudo-objects and things without properties we're going to need much more than that. — NOS4A2

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Do you accept that pain is a sensation? Do you accept that a bitter taste is a sensation? I am simply pointing out that colour is another type of sensation, specifically a visual sensation. This may not be "common sense", but common sense does not determine the facts, and in this case common sense conflicts with the scientific evidence. I trust the scientific evidence.

If you want to reject the scientific evidence in favour of common sense then go ahead, but it's the less rational position to take.

We need to change how the object reflects light because the wavelength of the light that stimulates the eyes is what determines the type of colour sensation elicited.

Pain is a sensation, it hurts to put my hand in very hot water, I add cold water to reduce the temperature, and so I no longer feel pain when I put my hand in.

I’m trying to figure it out I just don’t understand how a sensation can have the property “color”. It isn’t clear what if anything we’re talking about with the phrase “color sensation”. We can’t point to it, examine it, or even think about whether it is the kind of object that is able to have such properties in the first place. So how can one verify whether such a thing even exists?

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Do you accept that pain is a sensation? Do you accept that a bitter taste is a sensation? I am simply pointing out that colour is another type of sensation, specifically a visual sensation. This may not be "common sense", but common sense does not determine the facts, and in this case common sense conflicts with the scientific evidence. I trust the scientific evidence.

If you want to reject the scientific evidence in favour of common sense then go ahead, but it's the less rational position to take.

I think of sensations as events in the body, but colored object appear outside of it. I’ve never seen or felt or tasted a colored sensation before.

I know common sense isn’t its own argument, but I don’t know how to deny that the colorful things outside my brain are not colored. And I am presented with evidence every moment of my waking life that objects, not sensations, have the property “color”. I don’t think believing what one is told or accepting an argument from authority is particularly rational, so I’ll go ahead and continue to believe what I do.

I think of sensations as events in the body, but colored object appear outside of it. — NOS4A2

And this is where you're making a mistake. Visual sensations are events in the body (specifically events in the visual cortex). Depth is a characteristic of visual sensations, and so it seems as if there are coloured objects outside the body. But this is as misleading as phantom limbs.

You appear to be under the impression that visual perception is fundamentally different to other modes of perception, such as pain, smell, and taste. It really isn't. Each perceptual system simply involves different organs responding to different stimuli eliciting different types of sensations.

I don’t think believing what one is told or accepting an argument from authority is particularly rational — NOS4A2

Believing what scientists say about what their scientific studies have determined about the world (including perception) is rational. It is rational to believe in the Big Bang, evolution, atoms, electromagnetism, superposition, and so on, even if any of it conflicts with "common sense", and even if one hasn't carried out the experiments oneself.

We just use those things to change the way an object’s surface reflects light. That does not suggest that colour is a mind-independent property of the object’s surface. — Michael

In quantum physics reflection is actually an interaction between light and electrons, explained as simultaneous absorption and emission of photons. Each photon of light interacts with all the electrons at the surface of the reflecting object, but there is a time difference depending on how far away the part of the surface is from the source of the photon. The frequency of photon emitted from the electron depends on the energy level of the electron. It's very complex, but something like that.

And this is where you're making a mistake. Visual sensations are events in the body (specifically events in the visual cortex). Depth is a characteristic of visual sensations, and so it seems as if there are coloured objects outside the body. But this is as misleading as phantom limbs.

Do you believe the colored objects themselves are events in your body? Or just the color?

You appear to be under the impression that visual perception is fundamentally different to other modes of perception, such as pain, smell, and taste. It really isn't. Each perceptual system simply involves different organs responding to different stimuli eliciting different types of sensations.

No, I think color and pain are fundamentally different. You seem to think they are fundamentally the same.

Plants can see without eyes and without central nervous systems.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8903786/