This condition, "the condition that everyone conforms" is artificial though, it's made up as a way to make sense of the problems created by the category error. There really is no such condition at play here. What is the case, is that we conform because we want to conform, we apprehend conformation as beneficial to ourselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that's the whole point of conventions. I prefer to conform on the condition that everyone else conforms. There's no particular benefit to me driving on the right side of the road unless everyone else does, and everyone else feels the same.

There are many reasons why I drive on the right side of the road, the possibility of an accident or a fine, to begin with. And mostly, it's what I'm supposed to do. But I definitely do not do it on the condition that everyone else does it. That seems kind of childish to me, like "I'll only do what's right if you do what's right". The number of bad drivers that I see on the road demonstrates clearly to me, that the reason I try to be a safe driver is not because everyone else is a safe driver. Your "condition" that we only behave ourselves on the condition that everyone else does, seems very unrealistic.

It's not inherently right to drive on the right or the left side of the road. In the USA we drive on the right and expect everyone else to drive on the right and do so because we have these mutual expectations of each other. What makes it a convention is that we could just as well drive on the left like they do in the UK with suitably translated expectations and intentions.

I agree that it's not "inherently right". I would have a hard time believing that there is anything which is inherently right. Right and wrong are judgements which we make concerning actions. If I designate an action as the right action, I will proceed with that action, based on this judgement. When I make the decision to drive on the right side of the road, it is because I have been taught that this is the correct thing to do, and I have come to believe this.

In my training, it was expected of me, that I would come to this conclusion. So I make the decision to drive on the right hand side, based on what I believe others expect of me. The expectations are not mutual, because if I expect something back, for behaving in the correct way, it is some type of benefit, reward (my license, the privilege of driving, my safety). My expectation is not that others will behave in the same way as me. That claim is artificial, a falsity, created to support the vicious circle of circular reasoning.

So I make the decision to drive on the right hand side, based on what I believe others expect of me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah. What's more, you expect them to. If you expected everyone to drive on the left, driving on the right would be the wrong thing to do in whatever way you like.

My expectation is not that others will behave in the same way as me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? You don't think everyone drives on the right and expects you to?

We're not talking here about driving defensively. There is a general expectation that people in the USA drive on the right; that's not the same as an expectation of each driver that they always will.

Do you really think your choice of which side of the road to drive on has nothing at all to do with other drivers?

Yeah. What's more, you expect them to. — Srap Tasmaner

No, I have no such expectations, the thought never enters my mind until I see bad drivers driving on the wrong side of the road in inappropriate situations. But this just makes me realize that if I had them, such expectations would be unfounded.

There is a general expectation that people in the USA drive on the right ...[/quote

Of course such an expectation exists, but this expectation is produced by the descriptive law. That is what is observed, and we expect it to continue. What we are discussing here is the prescriptive rule which tells us that we ought to drive on the right side. This is taught to us in training, by the authorities, prior to them giving us a driver's license. We don't just decide to drive on the right because we expect that others will be doing this, we are trained to do it.
— Srap Tasmaner

Do you really think your choice of which side of the road to drive on has nothing at all to do with other drivers? — Srap Tasmaner

I think that other drivers make this choice in the same way that I do, they are trained to do this, just like me. We are all trained to drive on the right. We all see it as the correct thing to do, and expect to get the privilege of being allowed to drive if we do it correctly, and so we do. I don't think we learn to drive by observing others, and using the invalid deduction "if others are doing it this way, then I ought to do it this way too". That's the attitude which learns us bad habits, not the correct habits. The correct way is learned by training from the authorities, following the training precisely, and learning to resist the temptation to follow others in their bad habits.

I think that other drivers make this choice in the same way that I do, they are trained to do this, just like me. We are all trained to drive on the right. We all see it as the correct thing to do, and expect to get the privilege of being allowed to drive if we do it correctly, and so we do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. The point you're missing here is that you're also taught "WE all drive on the right side of the road," you're taught that other people will do this, and that's why you need to do it too.

Do you think it's a coincidence that all these people individually being taught what the right thing to do is are all taught to drive on the right side of the road?

I don't think we learn to drive by observing others, and using the invalid deduction "if others are doing it this way, then I ought to do it this way too". — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty sure I never said anything remotely like that, nor does my claim require it.

You're taught to drive on the right rather than the left just because that's how we drive around here. We all continue to drive on the right because we all continue to derive benefit from it, and pass it on to others, so we have no motivation for changing, but other conventions do change if a better alternative arises and is adopted.

Your argument here is that this must be either a prescriptive rule (your view) or a descriptive rule (what you wrongly take to be my view). I'm telling you it's both and has to be both. It only makes sense to tell people to do it if it's what everybody does. If you lived in the UK, you wouldn't teach your kid to drive on the right.

Now if you want to say, we teach people to drive on the correct side of the road, whatever that is, go ahead. Can you teach someone to drive on the correct side of the road without teaching them which side that is?

You're taught to drive on the right rather than the left just because that's how we drive around here. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually I think it's you who is missing the point. You misuse the word "because" here. The thinking which you demonstrate is a vicious circle. The cause of us driving on the ride side of the road is other people driving on the right side of the road. You express no understanding of how such a convention could come into existence. If you had such an understanding you would not say "we do X like this because that's the way we do it around here". This is the problem which Socrates demonstrated when he asked people if they knew what they were doing. They said of course we know what we are doing, because we are doing it, doesn't that demonstrate that we know what we are doing? But they could express no understanding of what they were doing, and Socrates was able to convince them that they really didn't know what they were doing. Saying that we do X like this "because" that's the way we do it around here, demonstrates that you do not know why we do X like this..

Your argument here is that this must be either a prescriptive rule (your view) or a descriptive rule (what you wrongly take to be my view). I'm telling you it's both and has to be both. It only makes sense to tell people to do it if it's what everybody does. If you lived in the UK, you wouldn't teach your kid to drive on the right. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that there is both a descriptive and prescriptive rule concerning this issue, that's not at question. The point is that to conflate these two is a category mistake. The prescriptive rule has causal impetus which the descriptive rule does not. To ask how a prescriptive rule has causal power is a very important philosophical question. To answer this question by referring to the descriptive rule, "we do what we ought to do because that's the way that we do it" is to give the wrong answer. It is the wrong answer because it is an answer designed to avoid the issue. It does not answer the question of why we drive on the right side of the road around here. Instead of following the inquiry into the reasons for the rule, the motivations behind doing what one ought to do, and the issue of how the prescriptive rule may cause the existence of such conventions, the entire question, which is a very important philosophical question, is dismissed with the assumption that we do what we ought to do because others are doing it that way.

You express no understanding of how such a convention could come into existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the in the nature of conventions that it barely matters how it got started. Members of a population face recurrent coordination problems. If there is only a single course of action that is clearly best for each party, the solution will not be a convention -- that's just doing what's best.

What makes their solution a convention is that there are multiple acceptable solutions available. Traffic flows smoothly on two-lane roads whether everyone drives on the left or on the right. There may be various particular reasons for doing one or the other at a given time and place, but they pale in comparison to the utility of settling on one or the other.

The prescriptive rule has causal impetus which the descriptive rule does not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd talk of reasons rather than causes here, but at any rate conventions generally are normative. My reasons for following the convention will always be connected to others following suit. If for some reason people start driving on the other side of the road, I had better do that too.

You can find all the gory details in Lewis's Convention, if you like, but I'm happy to continue as his spokesman since it makes perfect sense to me.

It is the in the nature of conventions that it barely matters how it got started. — Srap Tasmaner

I really don't think this is true. In each instance of there being a conventional way of doing things, there is a reason why that convention was adopted. As time passes things change, knowledge progresses and society evolves. The technology of the modern society may render the conventional way, as not the best way of doing things. So we ought to revisit the conventions periodically to determine why those particular ones are used, and whether a better way has come to light.

I'd talk of reasons rather than causes here, but at any rate conventions generally are normative. My reasons for following the convention will always be connected to others following suit. If for some reason people start driving on the other side of the road, I had better do that too. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know about this. "Normative" is a word often used in strange ways, so I wouldn't agree that conventions are necessarily normative without some explanation of what you mean by that term. A norm is a standard, a convention is an agreement. If there is a type of convention which is an informal agreement, then there cannot be a standard to be adhered to with this type of convention. Therefore, strictly speaking, this type of convention cannot be normative. Many philosophers will argue that the use of words, and perhaps even agreements like the social contract, are this type of "informal" convention. To those philosophers, I would argue that it is impossible that these so-called conventions are normative. To maintain the proposition "conventions are normative", we'd have to dismiss things like common word use as non-conventional, allowing that only word use in logical exercises is truly conventional.

No, descriptive rules are not prescriptive rules, to conflate the two is category error. That's the point I'm making. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but earlier you offered these two examples of "descriptive rules":

All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. — Metaphysician Undercover

But aren't these also examples of "prescriptive rules"? For example, doesn't this prescribe what ought to happen to objects when dropped?

I think before answering, I'd better ask what you imagine these standards to be.

Elsewhere, you have argued at length that truth is just certainty, that it is at best intersubjective. Are you going to suggest here that there are objective standards for us to conform to?

But aren't these also examples of "prescriptive rules"? For example, doesn't this prescribe what ought to happen to objects when dropped? — Luke

That's prediction, not prescription. We use descriptive rules to make predictions. Prescriptions are commands of what one ought to do, predictions are statements about what one believes will occur in the future.

I think before answering, I'd better ask what you imagine these standards to be. — Srap Tasmaner

Standards are principles or rules often used for comparing one thing to another. A straight forward example would be a rule of measurement. What type of existence standards have is an unresolved philosophical question, often debated. So there are a number of different views on that.

That's prediction, not prescription. We use descriptive rules to make predictions. Prescriptions are commands of what one ought to do, predictions are statements about what one believes will occur in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, prescriptive rules ("commands of what one ought to do") are limited only to human actions, whereas descriptive rules are not so limited? Seems somewhat ad hoc...

Can you provide an example of a prescriptive rule? Who prescribes these commands?

So, prescriptive rules ("commands of what one ought to do") are limited only to human actions, whereas descriptive rules are not so limited? Seems somewhat ad hoc... — Luke

If you think that describing the way things are, which is what philosophers are supposed to do, is "ad hoc", then I suppose the distinction between descriptive rules and prescriptive rules is ad hoc. It's just a description of how things are, the reality of the situation. There are existing rules, formed by inductive reasoning which describe the world, laws of physics etc.. I call them descriptive rules. There are also existing rules which tell human beings what they ought do and ought not do.

Can you provide an example of a prescriptive rule? Who prescribes these commands? — Luke

Take a look at a law book, common law, civil codes, that sort of thing. Or if you prefer, try a book of building codes. These are prescriptive rules. They are not produced as descriptions of how human beings behave, they are designed to conform human behaviour in certain ways. They have been drawn up, "commanded" by people in the position of governance.

If you prefer, consider the rules of a game. These prescriptive rules are very limited in scope, because they only apply to those who choose to play the game, and are only in effect for that particular game being played. Unlike the rules of a game, you are subject to the laws of the society where you live, regardless of whether you want to play that game. The rules of the game are drawn up by those who invent the game

So now we're right back where we started from.

To say that a rule is prescriptive is, in the first place, an incomplete description of why I follow it, if I do; I must also be, according either to myself or to others, obliged to follow the rule.

The model you give, where a prescriptive rule originates from someone recognized as an authority, seems clearly not to apply when it comes to, for instance, language use: here either there is no such authority, or we are all of us the authority. The latter seems preferable, but requires further analysis, which happily is quite interesting.

A thread on normativity would potentially be pretty interesting. Is it like truth: can't do without it, but can't discover any conceptual scaffolding under it?

Wish granted.

The model you give, where a prescriptive rule originates from someone recognized as an authority, seems clearly not to apply when it comes to, for instance, language use: here either there is no such authority, or we are all of us the authority. The latter seems preferable, but requires further analysis, which happily is quite interesting. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's right to the point. Language use, except in the case of formal logic including mathematics, is not controlled by prescriptive rules, in the same way that a game is regulated by prescriptive rules. We do have dictionary definitions of how language is used, but these are descriptive rules, not prescriptive. And there is no recognized principle which dictates that if a thing can be described by a rule, then it must be guided by a prescriptive rule, otherwise natural inanimate things would be considered to be following the guidance of prescriptive rules. So if we desire to understand how language use is guided by some sort of rules we cannot look at definitions of meaning, because this would be a category mistake.

I think that the question of whether there is no authority, or if we are all authorities, is to proceed in the right direction. Surely there is a demonstration of informal rules which are taught to us when we learn things. When someone shows us how to do something, we follow their rule. So in as much as we teach others, we are all authorities. But this requires another category of "prescriptive rule", principles which are not explicit, but implicit. So when you demonstrate to a student how to do something, it is implied by your act of demonstration, that the person ought to do it this way. By presenting yourself as an authority, the student apprehends you as an authority, and the implication is made, that the procedure ought be carried out in the way that you demonstrate. In this case, there is no prescriptive rule per se. There is authority, recognition of authority, the will to follow, and habituation. The result is essentially the same as the explicit prescriptive rule, with one big difference that I see. The explicit prescriptive rule may be published and directed to the masses, whereas the implicit demonstration reaches a limited number of people. The key point which is essential to both is the recognition of authority.

But you've left out other people again.

Teaching the use of a word is in many ways like teaching a skill: "Here's how you ..." But speaking a language is essentially cooperative, so the success of your performance is always connected to what other members of your speech community do.

I did leave out "other people", just for simplicity sake though. But I guess I thought it was rather obvious that we have more than one teacher, therefore there is more than one authority in the lives of each one of us. As you suggested, we are all authorities, and I agreed that as much as we are teachers, we are authorities.

I guess you could say that when someone misuses a word and you correct them, that puts you in the position of teacher, but whence derives your authority to be that person's teacher? When you're learning a skill, you grant authority to someone who possess the skil you want to learn; but this is a little different because the misuser must acknowledge that they do not possess the skill they thought they did.

And for all that, it is possible cooperatively to change the rules. Languages evolve.

Hey Srap, let's take it to the other thread.

This thread already keeps merging in my mind with the "Social Constructs" thread, where SX and I are about to talk about stipulative definitions, which is right next to what we're talking about here.